“条块治理”:军民融合发展中的地方政府
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摘要
地方政府是区域军民融合治理的主体。聚焦地方政府,从组织特征、组织环境和利益目标3个方面建立一个框架,分析地方政府如何影响区域军民融合发展,提出地方政府存在3个利益目标:提升区域经济,争取中央转移支付和承接军事需求在区域层面的落地实施。在"多头+层级"的军民融合治理体系下,各个参与主体在军民融合的"模糊共识"下集体行动,利益多元,并与地方政府的利益目标存在冲突,造成区域军民融合治理的一系列问题:地方政府治理负荷沉重、省级军民融合领导机构协调功能受限、"诸侯经济"下重复建设和"隐性"抵触并存,军事需求与区域军民融合发展对接不足。认为:一是要建设省级军民融合领导机构与中央军委以及军工央企的工作协商对接机制;二是建立决策权与事权相分离的政府内部政策过程机制;三是建立跨区域协调机制,在区域军民融合发展中有效嵌入军事需求;四是建立军民融合发展项目申报制度和临时跨部门工作小组。
Local government is the governor of local civil-military integration(CMI) development. Based on the organization characteristic, environment and interest goal, this paper constructed an analytical framework to study how the local government shapes the provincial CMI development, pointed out three goals of local government: local economic growth, central government transfer payment and implementation of military needs at the regional level. In the multi-agents and hierarchical governance system,the multi-agents take collective actions under an obscure CMI consensus with diverse goals, which collide with those of the local government, arousing a list of problems: heavy burden of local government, limited coordination function of provincial CMI leading group, repeated construction with regional protectionism, resistance from actors with impaired benefits, and insufficient connection between military needs and regional civil-military integration. Four policy suggestions are provided: firstly, building the coordination mechanism between the provincial CMI leading groups with headquarters of military and defense industry SOEs; secondly, separating the decision-making with policy enforcement inside the government; thirdly, enacting the cross-region coordination team, catering to military requirements in the development of regional civil-military integration; fourthly, establishing the operation mechanism of CMI development project declaration and temporary cross-sector workshops.
Local government is the governor of local civil-military integration(CMI) development. Based on the organization characteristic, environment and interest goal, this paper constructed an analytical framework to study how the local government shapes the provincial CMI development, pointed out three goals of local government: local economic growth, central government transfer payment and implementation of military needs at the regional level. In the multi-agents and hierarchical governance system,the multi-agents take collective actions under an obscure CMI consensus with diverse goals, which collide with those of the local government, arousing a list of problems: heavy burden of local government, limited coordination function of provincial CMI leading group, repeated construction with regional protectionism, resistance from actors with impaired benefits, and insufficient connection between military needs and regional civil-military integration. Four policy suggestions are provided: firstly, building the coordination mechanism between the provincial CMI leading groups with headquarters of military and defense industry SOEs; secondly, separating the decision-making with policy enforcement inside the government; thirdly, enacting the cross-region coordination team, catering to military requirements in the development of regional civil-military integration; fourthly, establishing the operation mechanism of CMI development project declaration and temporary cross-sector workshops.
引文
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[45]陈庆,李烨.军工行业管理体制改革与军民融合产业创新---动态博弈制度分析[J].科技进步与对策,2017,34(7):62-67.
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[3]卢周来,于连坤,姜鲁鸣.世界各主要国家军民融合建设评介[J].军事经济研究,2011(2):67-71.
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[5]黄朝峰,鞠晓生,纪建强,等.军民融合何以能富国强军?---军民融合、分工演进与报酬递增[J].经济研究,2017(8):189-203.
[6]贺琨,曾立.军民融合机理的范围经济解释[J].科技进步与对策,2015(9):110-115.
[7]姜鲁鸣.军民融合何以成为国家战略[J].湘潮,2017(5):9-12.
[8]沈志华.军民融合发展中政府与市场的关系[J].国防科技工业,2015(2):26-28.
[9]MONTINOLA G,QIAN Y,WEINGAST B R.Federalism,Chinese style:the political basis for economic success in China[J].World Politics,1995,48(1):50-81.
[10]QIAN Y,XU C.Why China’s economic reforms differ:the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector[J].Economics of Transition,1993,1(2):135-170.
[11]LANDRY P F.Decentralized authoritarianism in China:the communist party’s control of local elites in the post-Mao era[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008.
[12]郑永年.中国的“行为联邦制”:中央―地方关系的变革与动力[M].北京:东方出版社,2013.
[13]CAI H,DANIEL T.Did government decentralization cause China’s economic miracle?[J].World Politics,2006,58(4):505-535.
[14]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[15]周飞舟.锦标赛体制[J].社会学研究,2009(3):54-77.
[16]沈立人,戴园晨.我国“诸侯经济”的形成及其弊端和根源[J].经济研究,1990(3):12-19.
[17]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作---兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004(6):33-40.
[18]周雪光.中国国家治理的制度逻辑[M].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2017.
[19]荣敬本.从压力型体制向民主合作体制的转变:县乡两级政治体制改革[M].北京:中央编译出版社,1998.
[20]杨雪冬.压力型体制:一个概念的简明史[J].社会科学,2012(11):4-12.
[21]周黎安.行政发包制[J].社会,2014,34(6):1-38.
[22]周雪光.基层政府间的“共谋现象”---一个政府行为的制度逻辑[J].社会学研究,2008(6):1-21.
[23]孙立,郭于华.“软硬兼施”:正式权力非正式运行的过程分析---华北B镇收粮的个案研究.清华社会学评论(特辑1)[M].厦门:鹭江出版社,2000.
[24]BARNETT A D.Cadres bureaucracy and political power in communist China[C].New York:Columbia University Press,1967,62(3):563-965.
[25]ANDREW J N.A Factionalism model for CCP politics?[J/OL].[2018-01-10].https://www.jstor.org/stable/652506?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
[26]TANG T,ANDREW J N.Prolegomenon to the study of informal groups in CCP politics[J/OL].[2018-01-10].https://www.onacademic.com/detail/journal_1000037441678610_40b6.html.
[27]KUSNITZ L A,PYE L.The dynamics of Chinese politics[M].Cambridge:Chlager,Gunn&Hain,1981.
[28]OKSENBERG M.Policy making in China:[M].New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1988.
[29]LIEBERTHAL K,LAMPTON D M.Bureaucracy,politics,and decision making in post-Mao China/[M].Los Angeles:University of California Press,1992.
[30]SUSAN L S.The political logic of economic reform in China[M].Los Angeles:University of California Press,1993.
[31]MERTHA A.“Fragmented authoritarianism 2.0”:political pluralization in the Chinese policy process[J].China Quarterly,2009,200:995-1012.
[32]徐湘林.从政治发展理论到政策过程理论---中国政治改革研究的中层理论建构探讨[J].中国社会科学,2004(3):108-120.
[33]王绍光,樊鹏.中国式共识型决策:“开门”与“磨合”[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2013.
[34]王浦劬.中国协商治理的基本特点[J].求是,2013(10):28-29.
[35]邢华.我国区域合作治理困境与纵向嵌入式治理机制选择[J].政治学研究,2014(5):37-50.
[36]赵静,陈玲,薛澜.地方政府的角色原型、利益选择和行为差异---一项基于政策过程研究的地方政府理论[J].管理世界,2013(2):90-106.
[37]KORNAI J.Economics of shortage.v.A-B[M]//Economics of shortage.Netherlands:North-Holland Pub.Co.1980.
[38]OI J C.Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China[J].World Politics,1992,45(1):99-126.
[39]OI J C.The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy[J].China Quarterly,1995,144(144):1132-1149.
[40]YASHENG H.Capitalism with Chinese characteristics[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008.
[41]中国社会科学院“国际金融危机与经济学理论反思”课题组,胡乐明,刘志明,等.国家资本主义与“中国模式”[J].经济研究,2009(11):31-37.
[42]聂辉华,蒋敏杰.政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据[J].经济研究,2011(6):146-156.
[43]刘明兴,张冬,钱滔,等.地方政府的非正式权力结构及其经济影响[J].社会学研究,2013(5):26-52.
[44]李飞跃,张冬,刘明兴.实际政治权力结构与地方经济增长:中国革命战争的长期影响[J].经济研究,2014(12):45-59.
[45]陈庆,李烨.军工行业管理体制改革与军民融合产业创新---动态博弈制度分析[J].科技进步与对策,2017,34(7):62-67.
[46]曾立,胡宇萱.“委托-代理”视角下建立军民融合管理机构的思考[J].湖南大学学报(社会科学版),2017,31(1):82-85.
[47]胡宇萱,曾立,邓建斌.委托代理视角下军民融合体制机制研究[J].科技进步与对策,2017,34(6):117-121.
[48]威廉姆·A·尼斯坎南.官僚制与公共经济学[M].王浦劬,译.北京:中国青年出版社,2004.
[49]周雪光,练宏.政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型---以环境政策实施为例[J].中国社会科学,2011(5):80-96.
[50]周雪光.权威体制与有效治理:当代中国国家治理的制度逻辑[J].开放时代,2011(10):67-85.
[51]高民政.军政现象与军政关系探微---兼论军事政治学的研究对象与核心问题[J].军事历史研究,2009(1):152-157.
[52]PERLMUTTER A,LEOGRANDE W M.The party in uniform:toward a theory of civil-military relations in communist political systems[J].American Political Science Review,1982,76(4):778-789.
[53]FRAVEL M T.Shifts in warfare and party unity:explaining China's changes in military strategy[J].International Security,2017,42(3):37-83.
[54]LIEBERTHAL K,LAMPTON D M.Bureaucracy,politics,and decision making in post-Mao China[M].Los Angeles:University of California Press,1992.
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