就业保护法与劳动力市场绩效:理论基础、实证分析与政策实践
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摘要
就业保护法对雇主的雇佣及解雇权力进行法律限制,是政府规制劳动力市场的重要手段。因可能对劳动力市场产生不利影响,就业保护法受到西方学者的广泛关注。在理论研究领域,早期的法律经济学者们反对任何形式的对劳动力市场的法律规制;后期,学者们论证了就业保护法存在的正当性,但关于该法对就业水平等劳动力市场指标的影响只能作出模糊的判断。在实证研究领域,学者们通过量化各国就业保护法的严格程度,分析其对劳动力市场的影响,却得出积极影响、消极影响和无影响等不同结论。在政策实践中,一些国际机构早期依据就业保护法会对劳动力市场产生消极影响的研究结论,倡导各国为促进经济发展采取提高劳动力市场灵活性的劳动政策。但是,随着研究的深入,这些国际机构逐步认识到该劳动政策缺乏理论与实证研究的充分支撑,这使得提高劳动力市场灵活性的改革路径在国际上失去了曾有的影响力。
Employment Protection Legislation( EPL) imposes legal restrictions on an employer's hiring and firing powers and is an important institution by which a government regulates its country's labor market. EPL has received widespread attention from western scholars because of its possible adverse effects on the labor market. Early legal economists believed that a government's intervention in the labor market was inefficient and thus they opposed any form of labor regulation; more recent scholars have justified the legitimacy of EPL,but only present ambiguous predictions about how EPL will affect employment level and other labor market indicators. In the field of empirical studies,scholars have analyzed EPL's effect on labor market performance by measuring its stringency in different countries,but the research results have varied widely,showing positive,negative,and even no impact at all. In the past,based on findings that EPL had a negative impact,some international organizations vigorously advocated the labor market flexibility policy as a way to promote economic development. Today this approach has lost its former internationally influential position due to the lack of both theoretical and empirical support.
Employment Protection Legislation( EPL) imposes legal restrictions on an employer's hiring and firing powers and is an important institution by which a government regulates its country's labor market. EPL has received widespread attention from western scholars because of its possible adverse effects on the labor market. Early legal economists believed that a government's intervention in the labor market was inefficient and thus they opposed any form of labor regulation; more recent scholars have justified the legitimacy of EPL,but only present ambiguous predictions about how EPL will affect employment level and other labor market indicators. In the field of empirical studies,scholars have analyzed EPL's effect on labor market performance by measuring its stringency in different countries,but the research results have varied widely,showing positive,negative,and even no impact at all. In the past,based on findings that EPL had a negative impact,some international organizations vigorously advocated the labor market flexibility policy as a way to promote economic development. Today this approach has lost its former internationally influential position due to the lack of both theoretical and empirical support.
引文
(1)就业保护法这一概念在西方法学界以及经济学界被广泛使用,我国学者较少使用该概念,而是通常使用解雇保护制度的概念。虽然就业保护法的核心制度是解雇保护制度,但由于解雇保护制度并不能完全涵盖就业保护法的内容,而且本文的理论与实证分析主要基于西方文献,因此本文使用就业保护法而非解雇保护制度的概念。
(2)参见张五常:《张五常论新劳动法》,载苏力主编:《法律和社会科学》(第四卷2009年),法律出版社2009年版,第1-36页。
(3)关于劳动力市场灵活性的概念,参见谢增毅:《劳动力市场灵活性与劳动合同法的修改》,《法学研究》2017年第2期,第96-97页。
(4)2016年7月26日,中共中央政治局会议明确提出“降成本的重点是增加劳动力市场灵活性”。参见《中共中央政治局召开会议决定召开十八届六中全会分析研究当前经济形势部署下半年经济工作》,《人民日报》2016年7月27日,第1版。
(5)See Eliane Vogel-Polsky,“The Problem of Unemployment”,in B.Hepple(ed.),The Making of Labour Law in Europe,Mansell,1986,pp.188-189.
(6)参见注(5),第189页。
(7)See Simon Deakin,“The Law and Economics of Employment Protection Legislation”,in Michael L.Wachter and Cynthia L.Estlund(ed.),Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law,Edward Elgar Publishing,2012,p.330.
(8)See Christoph F.Büchtemann,Employment Security and Labor Market Behaviour:Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence,Cornell University Press,1993,p.8.
(9)See Hugh Collins,Justice in Dismissal:The Law of Termination of Employment,Clarendon Press,1992,p.28.
(10)参见注(7),第332页。
(11)参见注(7),第333页。
(12)参见国际劳工组织第158号公约(《雇主主动终止雇佣公约》),第2条。
(13)同注(12),第4条。
(14)参见注(12),第5、6条。
(15)参见注(12),第13条。
(16)参见注(12),第14条。
(17)参见注(12),第11条。
(18)参见注(12),第12条。
(19)参见注(12),第7条。
(20)参见注(12),第10条。
(21)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,The OECD Jobs Study:Facts,Analysis,Strategies,OECD Publications and Information Centre,1994,Introduction,p.1.
(22)See Bruno Veneziani,“The Employment Relationship”,in Bob Hepple and Bruno Veneziani(eds.),The Transformation of Labour Law in Europe:A Comparative Study of 15 Countries 1945-2004,Hart Publishing,2009,pp.114-121.
(23)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Employment Outlook 2013,OECD Publishing,2013,p.67.
(24)参见葛文博:《刺激经济,法国推动劳动法改革》,《人民日报》2017年9月14日,第18版。
(25)关于是否应采纳不正当解雇制度的讨论,See J.H.Verkerke,“An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:Resolving the Just Cause Debate”,Wisconsin Law Review,Vol.1995,No.4(1995),pp.837-918;Richard A.Epstein,“In Defense of the Contract at Will”,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.51,No.4(1984),pp.947-982;Stewart J.Schwab,“Life-Cycle Justice:Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will”,Michigan Law Review,Vol.92,No.1(1993),pp.8-62.Kenneth G.Dau-Schmidt,“Employment Security:A Comparative Institutional Debate”,Texas Law Review,Vol.74,No.7(1996),pp.1645-1654.
(26)参见注(25),Epstein文。
(27)参见注(7),第333-334页;Per Skedinger,Employment Protection Legislation:Evolution,Effects,Winners and Losers,Edward Elgar Publishing,2010,p.67.
(28)参见注(27),Skedinger文,第67-68页。
(29)参见注(2),第10-11页。
(30)See Alan Manning,Monopsony in Motion:Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets,Princeton University Press,2003,p.58.
(31)参见[美]J.H.韦尔克尔克:《就业保护法的经济学分析》,丁雯雯译,《比较》2016年第1期,第127页。
(32)See Pauline T.Kim,“Bargaining with Imperfect Information:A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-will World”,Cornell Law Review,Vol.83,No.1(1997),pp.133-147.
(33)See Cass R.Sunstein,“Human Behavior and the Law of Work”,Virginia Law Review,Vol.87,No.2(2001),p.225.
(34)参见注(31)。
(35)See David I.Levine,“Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection”,Journal of Labor Economics,Vol.9,No.3(1991),pp.294-305.
(36)参见注(25),Schwab文。
(37)See Alvaro Santos,“Labor Flexibility,Legal Reform,and Economic Development”,Virginia Journal of International Law,Vol.50,No.1(2009),p.43.
(38)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第58页。
(39)See Giuseppe Bertola,“Microeconomic Perspectives on Aggregate Labor Markets”,in Orley Ashenfelter,David Card(eds.),Handbook of Labor Economics,Vol.3C,North Holland,1999,pp.2985-3028.不过,早期也有少数学者得出不同结论。See Richard Jackman and Stephen Nickell,“Combating Unemployment is Flexibility Enough?”,in Richard Layard(ed.),Tackling Unemployment,Palgrave Macmillan,1999,pp.257-288.该研究认为就业保护法对失业无影响,这是因为其对雇佣的影响被其对解雇的影响抵消了。
(40)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第58页。
(41)See Daniel S.Hamermesh,“Employment Protection:Theoretical Implications and Some US Evidence”,in Christoph F.Buechtmann(ed.),Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior-Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence,ILR Press,1993,pp.126-147.
(42)See Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers,“The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment:The Aggregate Evidence”,The Economic Journal,Vol.110,No.462(2000),pp.1-33.
(43)See Michèle Belot,Jan Boone and Jan Van Ours,“Welfare-Improving Employment Protection”,Economica,Vol.74,No.295(2007),pp.381-396.
(44)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第62页。
(45)参见注(44)。
(46)See Winfried Koeniger,“Dismissal Costs and Innovation”,Economics Letters,Vol.88,No.1(2005),pp.79-84.
(47)See Edward Lazear,“Job Security Provisions and Employment”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.105,No.3(1990),pp.699-726.
(48)See Assar Lindbeck,Dennis J.Snower,“Insiders Versus Outsiders”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.15,No.1(2001),pp.165-188.劳工流失成本一般包括雇佣成本、解雇成本以及员工的技能培训成本等。
(49)参见注(47)。
(50)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第58页。
(51)最早,有学者将劳动力模拟为一种准固定投入来量化雇佣与解雇的成本。See Walter Y.Oi,“Labor as a QuasiFixed Factor”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.70,No.6(1962),pp.538-555.
(52)See Benoit Pierre Freyens and J.H.Verkerke,“Mapping Employment Dismissal Law:A Leximetric Investigation of EPL Stringency and Regulatory Style”,Conditions of Work and Employment Series No.88(2017),pp.5-6.
(53)参见注(47)。
(54)参见注(47)。
(55)参见注(47)。
(56)See Stefano Scarpetta,“Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings on Unemployment:ACross-Country Study”,OECD Economic Studies,Vol.26,No.1(1996),pp.43-98.
(57)See Jrgen Elmeskov,John Martin and Stefano Scarpetta,“Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms:Evidence from OECD Countries'Experience”,Swedish Economic Policy Review,Vol.5,No.2(1998),pp.205-252.
(58)See Stephen Nickell,“Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities:Europe Versus North America”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.11,No.3(1997)pp.55-74.
(59)See Stephen Nickell and Richard Layard,“Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance”,in Orley Ashenfelter,David Card(eds.),Handbook of Labor Economics,Vol.3C,North Holland,1999,pp.3029-3084.
(60)See Juan C.Botero,Simeon Djankov,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer,“The Regulation of Labor”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.119,No.4(2004),pp.1339-1382.
(61)See John Addison,Paulino Teixeira and Jean-Luc Grosso,“The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment:More on a Vexed Theme”,Southern Economic Journal,Vol.67,No.1(2000),pp.105-122;John Addison and Paulino Teixeira,“The Economics of Employment Protection”,Journal of Labor Research,Vol.24,No.1(2003),pp.85-128.这些研究考察了更多的年份,增加了更多的解释变量,对就业保护法进行了更为综合的衡量,并且进行了多种稳健性测试。
(62)See David R.Howell,Dean Baker,Andrew Glyn and John Schmitt,“Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment?A Critical Review of the Evidence”,Capitalism and Society,Vol.2,No.1(2007),pp.1-73;Tito Boeri,“Institutional Reforms and Dualism in European Labor Markets”,Handbook of Labor Economics,Vol.4B,(2011),pp.1173-1236;Dean Baker,Andrew Glyn,David R.Howell and John Schmitt,“Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment:Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence”,in David R.Howell(ed.),Fighting Unemployment:The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy,Oxford University Press,2005,pp.72-113.
(63)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Employment Outlook 1999,OECD Publishing,1999.
(64)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Employment Outlook 2006:Boosting Jobs and Incomes,OECD Publishing,2006;参见注释(23)。
(65)See Andrea Bassanini and Romain Duval,“Employment Patterns in OECD Countries:Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions”,OECD Economics Department Working Papers,No.486(2006).不过,他们同时认为,就业保护法与经济冲击的相互影响会导致失业率上升。
(66)See Lucio Baccaro and Diego Rei,“Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD Countries:A Time Series Cross-Section Analysis”,International Institute for Labour Studies Discussion Paper,(2005).
(67)See Bruno Amable,Lilas Demmou,and Donatella Gatti,“Employment Performance and Institutions:New Answers to an Old Question”,IZA Discussion Papers,No.2731(2007).
(68)See Michele Belot and Jan C.Van Ours,“Does the Recent Success of Some OECD Countries in Lowering Their Unemployment Rates Lie in the Clever Design of Their Labor Market Reforms?”,Oxford Economic Papers,Vol.56,No.4(2004),pp.621-642.
(69)关于美国的雇佣自由例外原则,参见胡立峰:《美国劳动法上雇佣自由原则的公共政策例外:形成、实践与反思》,《西南政法大学学报》2009年第11期,第65-77页;胡立峰:《美国劳动法对雇主不当解雇行为的规制:源流、发展与反思》,《环球法律评论》2009年第1期,第130-141页。
(70)See David Autor,John Donohue and Stewart Schwab,“The Employment Consequences of Wrongful Dismissal Laws:Large,Small or None at All?”,American Economic Review,Vol.94,No.2(2004),pp.440-446.
(71)See Aditya Bhattacharjea,“Labour Market Regulation and Industrial Performance in India:A Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence”,Indian Journal of Labour Economics,Vol.49,No.2(2006),pp.211-232;Aditya Bhattacharjea,“The Effects of Employment Protection Legislation on Indian Manufacturing”,Economic and Political Weekly,Vol.44,No.22(2009),pp.55-62;Praveen Jha and Sakti Golder,“Labour Market Regulation and Economic Performance:ACritical Review of Arguments and Some Plausible Lessons for India”,International Labour Organisation Economic and Labour Market Paper 1(2008);Errol D'Souza,“The Employment Effects of Labour Legislation in India:A Critical Essay”,Industrial Relations Journal,Vol.41,No.2(2010),pp.122-135.
(72)See Adriana D.Kugler,“The Effect of Job Security Regulations on Labor Market Flexibility:Evidence from the Colombian Labor Market Reform”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.183-228;Jaime Saavedra and Mhmo Torero,“Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact over Formal Labor Demand and Job Market Turnover:The Case of Peru”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.131-182;Mondino,Guillermo and Silvia Montoya,“The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms:Empirical Evidence for Argentina”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.351-400.
(73)See De Barros,Ricardo Paes,and Carlos Henrique Corseuil,“The Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.273-350;Andrew Downes,Nlandu Mamingi and Rose-Marie Belle Antoine,“Labor Market Regulation and Employment in the Caribbean”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.517-552.
(74)相关研究参见注释(56)。该研究认为,年轻人以及长期未就业的劳动者是最容易受到负面影响的群体。这是因为,由于解雇要求的提高,雇主会谨慎雇佣新的员工,年轻人缺乏工作经验,而长期失业者会被雇主认为失去了工作技能或者工作效率低下。See also Adriana Kugler,Juan Jimeno and Virginia Hernanz,“Employment Consequences of Restrictive Permanent Contracts:Evidence from Spanish Labour Market Reforms”,CEPR Discussion Paper,No.3724(2003).该研究分析了1997年西班牙关于解雇保护的改革,这一改革仅适用于某些特定人群。研究者发现,降低解雇成本会增加年轻人与年长的男性的就业水平。See also Luc Behaghel,Bruno Crépon and Béatrice Sédillot,“The Perverse Effects of Partial Employment Protection Reform:The Case of French Older Workers”,Journal of Public Economics,Vol.92,No.3-4(2008),pp.696-721.该研究针对法国1992年的劳动法改革展开。这一改革降低了对超过50岁的劳动者的就业保护水平。该研究发现,受改革的影响,超过50岁的失业者重新就业的比例远远超过低于50岁的年轻人。不过,也有少数不同观点。例如,有的研究认为,就业保护法对年轻人就业并无影响,see Sandrine Cazes and Alena Ne2porová,Flexicurity:A Relevant Approach in Central and Eastern Europe,International Labour Office,2007;有的研究则认为,就业保护法会促进年轻人的就业水平,参见注(66)。
(75)参见注(65),第45-48页。
(76)See James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages-Serra,“The Cost of Job Security Regulation:Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets”,Economía,Vol.1,No.1(2000),pp.109-144.
(77)参见注(2),第4页。
(78)参见注(59)。
(79)See Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar,“Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour Law Systems:A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New Time Series Data”,Industrial Relations Journal,Vol.39,No.6(2008),pp.453-487.
(80)See Andrea Bassanini,Luca Nunziata and Danielle Venn,“Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth in OECDCountries”,Economic Policy,Vol.24,No.58(2009),pp.349-402.这一结论仅针对非临时劳动合同而言。就临时劳动合同而言,该研究并未发现就业保护法对劳动生产率有影响。
(81)See Stefano Scarpetta,Philip Hemmings,Thierry Tressel,and Jaejoon Woo,“The Role of Policy and Institutions for Productivity and Firm Dynamics:Evidence from Micro and Industry Data”,OECD Economics Department Working Paper,No.329(2002).
(82)参见注(43),第381-396页。
(83)See Gayle Allard and Peter H.Lindert,“Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs Since the 1960s:Which Institutions Really Mattered?”,in T.J.Hatton,Kevin H.O'Rourke and Alan M.Taylor(eds.),The New Comparative Economic History:Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G.Williamson,The MIT Press,2007,pp.365-394.
(84)See Beata Smarzynska Javorcik and Mariana Spatareanu,“Disentangling FDI Spillover Effects:What Do Firm Perceptions Tell Us?”,in Theodore H.Moran,Edward Montgomery Graham,Magnus Blomstrom and Magnus Blomstr9m(eds.),Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?,Peterson Institute,2005,pp.45-72.
(85)See Markus Leibrecht and Johann Scharler,“How Important is Employment Protection Legislation for Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Central and Eastern European Countries?”,Economics of Transition,Vol.17,No.2(2009),pp.275-295.
(86)See Simon Deakin,Priya Lele,and Mathias Siems,“The Evolution of Labour Law:Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes”,International Labour Review,Vol.146,No.3-4(2007),pp.133-162.
(87)参见注(52),第7-9页。
(88)参见注(52),第31-38页。
(89)参见注(37),第43页。
(90)参见注(39)。
(91)参见注(52),第5-15页。See also Simon Deakin,“The Use of Quantitative Methods in Labour Law Research:An Assessment and Reformulation”,Social&Legal Studies,Vol.27,No.4(2018),pp.461,465-467.
(92)参见注(52),第5-15页。
(93)参见注(52),第46页。
(94)参见注(23),第74-77页。
(95)See Zoe Adams and Simon Deakin,“Quantitative Labour Law”,in Amy Ludlow and Alysia Blackham(eds.),New Frontiers in Empirical Labour Law Research,Hart Publishing,2015,p.35.
(96)See Lee Sangheon,Deirdre McCann and Nina Torm,“The World Bank's‘Employing Workers’Index:Findings and Critiques-A Review of Recent Evidence”,International Labour Review,Vol.147,No.4(2008),pp.420-423.
(97)参见注(37),第49-50页。
(98)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,The OECD Jobs Study:Evidence and Explanations,OECD Publications and Information Centre,1994,p.69.
(99)参见注(99)。
(100)参见注(47)。
(101)参见注(21),Introduction。
(102)参见注(21),Part 3b,第4页。
(103)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Implementing the OECD Job Strategy:Lessons from Member Countries,OECD Publishing,1997,pp.7-8.
(104)See World Bank,“Doing Business in 2004:Understanding Regulation”,http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingB usiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB04-FullReport.pdf,pp.29-39,2018年5月17日访问。
(105)See World Bank,“Bolivia:Country Economic Memorandum Policies to Improve Growth and Employment”,Report No.32233-BO,2005,p.32;World Bank,“Ecuador-Investment Climate Assessment”,Report No.31900,2005,pp.190,187.
(106)See Peter Bakvis,“How the World Bank&IMF Use the Doing Business Report to Promote Labour Market Deregulation in Developing Countries”,http://archivio.rassegna.it/2006/europamondo/articoli/doingbusinessicftuanalysis0606.pdf,pp.2,5,7-12,2018年5月17日访问。
(107)See International Monetary Fund,“Nepal:Article IV Consultation Staff Report”,IMF Country Report No.06/44,2006;International Monetary Fund,“South Africa:Article IV Consultation Staff Report”,IMF Country Report No.05/346,2005.
(108)See Zoe Adams,Louise Bishop,Simon Deakin,Colin Fenwick,Sara Martinsson Garzelli and Giudy Rusconi,“The E-conomic Significance of Laws Relating to Employment Protection and Different Forms of Employment:Analysis of a Panel of 117 Countries,1990-2013”,International Labour Review(forthcoming).
(109)学者们对劳动力市场制度的其他方面,例如失业保险制度、最低工资标准以及集体谈判制度等,也开展了诸多的理论与实证分析。
(110)See Richard B.Freeman,“Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders:The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance”,International Economic Journal,Vol.19,No.2(2005),pp.129-145.
(111)See Trevor Manuel,Carlos Arruda,Jihad Azour,Chong-En Bai,Timothy Besley,Dong-Sung Cho,Sergei Guriev,Huguette Labelle,Jean Pierre Landau,Arun Maira and Hendrik Wolff,“Independent Panel Review of the Doing Business Report”,http://www.dbrpanel.org/sites/dbrpanel/files/doingbusiness-review-panel-report.pdf,2018年5月20日访问。
(112)See World Bank,“Doing Business 2018:Reforming to Create Jobs”,http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingB usiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf,pp.206-207,2018年5月20日访问。
(2)参见张五常:《张五常论新劳动法》,载苏力主编:《法律和社会科学》(第四卷2009年),法律出版社2009年版,第1-36页。
(3)关于劳动力市场灵活性的概念,参见谢增毅:《劳动力市场灵活性与劳动合同法的修改》,《法学研究》2017年第2期,第96-97页。
(4)2016年7月26日,中共中央政治局会议明确提出“降成本的重点是增加劳动力市场灵活性”。参见《中共中央政治局召开会议决定召开十八届六中全会分析研究当前经济形势部署下半年经济工作》,《人民日报》2016年7月27日,第1版。
(5)See Eliane Vogel-Polsky,“The Problem of Unemployment”,in B.Hepple(ed.),The Making of Labour Law in Europe,Mansell,1986,pp.188-189.
(6)参见注(5),第189页。
(7)See Simon Deakin,“The Law and Economics of Employment Protection Legislation”,in Michael L.Wachter and Cynthia L.Estlund(ed.),Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law,Edward Elgar Publishing,2012,p.330.
(8)See Christoph F.Büchtemann,Employment Security and Labor Market Behaviour:Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence,Cornell University Press,1993,p.8.
(9)See Hugh Collins,Justice in Dismissal:The Law of Termination of Employment,Clarendon Press,1992,p.28.
(10)参见注(7),第332页。
(11)参见注(7),第333页。
(12)参见国际劳工组织第158号公约(《雇主主动终止雇佣公约》),第2条。
(13)同注(12),第4条。
(14)参见注(12),第5、6条。
(15)参见注(12),第13条。
(16)参见注(12),第14条。
(17)参见注(12),第11条。
(18)参见注(12),第12条。
(19)参见注(12),第7条。
(20)参见注(12),第10条。
(21)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,The OECD Jobs Study:Facts,Analysis,Strategies,OECD Publications and Information Centre,1994,Introduction,p.1.
(22)See Bruno Veneziani,“The Employment Relationship”,in Bob Hepple and Bruno Veneziani(eds.),The Transformation of Labour Law in Europe:A Comparative Study of 15 Countries 1945-2004,Hart Publishing,2009,pp.114-121.
(23)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Employment Outlook 2013,OECD Publishing,2013,p.67.
(24)参见葛文博:《刺激经济,法国推动劳动法改革》,《人民日报》2017年9月14日,第18版。
(25)关于是否应采纳不正当解雇制度的讨论,See J.H.Verkerke,“An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:Resolving the Just Cause Debate”,Wisconsin Law Review,Vol.1995,No.4(1995),pp.837-918;Richard A.Epstein,“In Defense of the Contract at Will”,The University of Chicago Law Review,Vol.51,No.4(1984),pp.947-982;Stewart J.Schwab,“Life-Cycle Justice:Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will”,Michigan Law Review,Vol.92,No.1(1993),pp.8-62.Kenneth G.Dau-Schmidt,“Employment Security:A Comparative Institutional Debate”,Texas Law Review,Vol.74,No.7(1996),pp.1645-1654.
(26)参见注(25),Epstein文。
(27)参见注(7),第333-334页;Per Skedinger,Employment Protection Legislation:Evolution,Effects,Winners and Losers,Edward Elgar Publishing,2010,p.67.
(28)参见注(27),Skedinger文,第67-68页。
(29)参见注(2),第10-11页。
(30)See Alan Manning,Monopsony in Motion:Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets,Princeton University Press,2003,p.58.
(31)参见[美]J.H.韦尔克尔克:《就业保护法的经济学分析》,丁雯雯译,《比较》2016年第1期,第127页。
(32)See Pauline T.Kim,“Bargaining with Imperfect Information:A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-will World”,Cornell Law Review,Vol.83,No.1(1997),pp.133-147.
(33)See Cass R.Sunstein,“Human Behavior and the Law of Work”,Virginia Law Review,Vol.87,No.2(2001),p.225.
(34)参见注(31)。
(35)See David I.Levine,“Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection”,Journal of Labor Economics,Vol.9,No.3(1991),pp.294-305.
(36)参见注(25),Schwab文。
(37)See Alvaro Santos,“Labor Flexibility,Legal Reform,and Economic Development”,Virginia Journal of International Law,Vol.50,No.1(2009),p.43.
(38)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第58页。
(39)See Giuseppe Bertola,“Microeconomic Perspectives on Aggregate Labor Markets”,in Orley Ashenfelter,David Card(eds.),Handbook of Labor Economics,Vol.3C,North Holland,1999,pp.2985-3028.不过,早期也有少数学者得出不同结论。See Richard Jackman and Stephen Nickell,“Combating Unemployment is Flexibility Enough?”,in Richard Layard(ed.),Tackling Unemployment,Palgrave Macmillan,1999,pp.257-288.该研究认为就业保护法对失业无影响,这是因为其对雇佣的影响被其对解雇的影响抵消了。
(40)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第58页。
(41)See Daniel S.Hamermesh,“Employment Protection:Theoretical Implications and Some US Evidence”,in Christoph F.Buechtmann(ed.),Employment Security and Labor Market Behavior-Interdisciplinary Approaches and International Evidence,ILR Press,1993,pp.126-147.
(42)See Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers,“The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment:The Aggregate Evidence”,The Economic Journal,Vol.110,No.462(2000),pp.1-33.
(43)See Michèle Belot,Jan Boone and Jan Van Ours,“Welfare-Improving Employment Protection”,Economica,Vol.74,No.295(2007),pp.381-396.
(44)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第62页。
(45)参见注(44)。
(46)See Winfried Koeniger,“Dismissal Costs and Innovation”,Economics Letters,Vol.88,No.1(2005),pp.79-84.
(47)See Edward Lazear,“Job Security Provisions and Employment”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.105,No.3(1990),pp.699-726.
(48)See Assar Lindbeck,Dennis J.Snower,“Insiders Versus Outsiders”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.15,No.1(2001),pp.165-188.劳工流失成本一般包括雇佣成本、解雇成本以及员工的技能培训成本等。
(49)参见注(47)。
(50)参见注(27),Skdinger文,第58页。
(51)最早,有学者将劳动力模拟为一种准固定投入来量化雇佣与解雇的成本。See Walter Y.Oi,“Labor as a QuasiFixed Factor”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.70,No.6(1962),pp.538-555.
(52)See Benoit Pierre Freyens and J.H.Verkerke,“Mapping Employment Dismissal Law:A Leximetric Investigation of EPL Stringency and Regulatory Style”,Conditions of Work and Employment Series No.88(2017),pp.5-6.
(53)参见注(47)。
(54)参见注(47)。
(55)参见注(47)。
(56)See Stefano Scarpetta,“Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings on Unemployment:ACross-Country Study”,OECD Economic Studies,Vol.26,No.1(1996),pp.43-98.
(57)See Jrgen Elmeskov,John Martin and Stefano Scarpetta,“Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms:Evidence from OECD Countries'Experience”,Swedish Economic Policy Review,Vol.5,No.2(1998),pp.205-252.
(58)See Stephen Nickell,“Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities:Europe Versus North America”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.11,No.3(1997)pp.55-74.
(59)See Stephen Nickell and Richard Layard,“Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance”,in Orley Ashenfelter,David Card(eds.),Handbook of Labor Economics,Vol.3C,North Holland,1999,pp.3029-3084.
(60)See Juan C.Botero,Simeon Djankov,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer,“The Regulation of Labor”,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.119,No.4(2004),pp.1339-1382.
(61)See John Addison,Paulino Teixeira and Jean-Luc Grosso,“The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment:More on a Vexed Theme”,Southern Economic Journal,Vol.67,No.1(2000),pp.105-122;John Addison and Paulino Teixeira,“The Economics of Employment Protection”,Journal of Labor Research,Vol.24,No.1(2003),pp.85-128.这些研究考察了更多的年份,增加了更多的解释变量,对就业保护法进行了更为综合的衡量,并且进行了多种稳健性测试。
(62)See David R.Howell,Dean Baker,Andrew Glyn and John Schmitt,“Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment?A Critical Review of the Evidence”,Capitalism and Society,Vol.2,No.1(2007),pp.1-73;Tito Boeri,“Institutional Reforms and Dualism in European Labor Markets”,Handbook of Labor Economics,Vol.4B,(2011),pp.1173-1236;Dean Baker,Andrew Glyn,David R.Howell and John Schmitt,“Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment:Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence”,in David R.Howell(ed.),Fighting Unemployment:The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy,Oxford University Press,2005,pp.72-113.
(63)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Employment Outlook 1999,OECD Publishing,1999.
(64)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Employment Outlook 2006:Boosting Jobs and Incomes,OECD Publishing,2006;参见注释(23)。
(65)See Andrea Bassanini and Romain Duval,“Employment Patterns in OECD Countries:Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions”,OECD Economics Department Working Papers,No.486(2006).不过,他们同时认为,就业保护法与经济冲击的相互影响会导致失业率上升。
(66)See Lucio Baccaro and Diego Rei,“Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD Countries:A Time Series Cross-Section Analysis”,International Institute for Labour Studies Discussion Paper,(2005).
(67)See Bruno Amable,Lilas Demmou,and Donatella Gatti,“Employment Performance and Institutions:New Answers to an Old Question”,IZA Discussion Papers,No.2731(2007).
(68)See Michele Belot and Jan C.Van Ours,“Does the Recent Success of Some OECD Countries in Lowering Their Unemployment Rates Lie in the Clever Design of Their Labor Market Reforms?”,Oxford Economic Papers,Vol.56,No.4(2004),pp.621-642.
(69)关于美国的雇佣自由例外原则,参见胡立峰:《美国劳动法上雇佣自由原则的公共政策例外:形成、实践与反思》,《西南政法大学学报》2009年第11期,第65-77页;胡立峰:《美国劳动法对雇主不当解雇行为的规制:源流、发展与反思》,《环球法律评论》2009年第1期,第130-141页。
(70)See David Autor,John Donohue and Stewart Schwab,“The Employment Consequences of Wrongful Dismissal Laws:Large,Small or None at All?”,American Economic Review,Vol.94,No.2(2004),pp.440-446.
(71)See Aditya Bhattacharjea,“Labour Market Regulation and Industrial Performance in India:A Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence”,Indian Journal of Labour Economics,Vol.49,No.2(2006),pp.211-232;Aditya Bhattacharjea,“The Effects of Employment Protection Legislation on Indian Manufacturing”,Economic and Political Weekly,Vol.44,No.22(2009),pp.55-62;Praveen Jha and Sakti Golder,“Labour Market Regulation and Economic Performance:ACritical Review of Arguments and Some Plausible Lessons for India”,International Labour Organisation Economic and Labour Market Paper 1(2008);Errol D'Souza,“The Employment Effects of Labour Legislation in India:A Critical Essay”,Industrial Relations Journal,Vol.41,No.2(2010),pp.122-135.
(72)See Adriana D.Kugler,“The Effect of Job Security Regulations on Labor Market Flexibility:Evidence from the Colombian Labor Market Reform”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.183-228;Jaime Saavedra and Mhmo Torero,“Labor Market Reforms and Their Impact over Formal Labor Demand and Job Market Turnover:The Case of Peru”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.131-182;Mondino,Guillermo and Silvia Montoya,“The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms:Empirical Evidence for Argentina”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.351-400.
(73)See De Barros,Ricardo Paes,and Carlos Henrique Corseuil,“The Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.273-350;Andrew Downes,Nlandu Mamingi and Rose-Marie Belle Antoine,“Labor Market Regulation and Employment in the Caribbean”,in James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages(eds.),Law and Employment:Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean,University of Chicago Press,2004,pp.517-552.
(74)相关研究参见注释(56)。该研究认为,年轻人以及长期未就业的劳动者是最容易受到负面影响的群体。这是因为,由于解雇要求的提高,雇主会谨慎雇佣新的员工,年轻人缺乏工作经验,而长期失业者会被雇主认为失去了工作技能或者工作效率低下。See also Adriana Kugler,Juan Jimeno and Virginia Hernanz,“Employment Consequences of Restrictive Permanent Contracts:Evidence from Spanish Labour Market Reforms”,CEPR Discussion Paper,No.3724(2003).该研究分析了1997年西班牙关于解雇保护的改革,这一改革仅适用于某些特定人群。研究者发现,降低解雇成本会增加年轻人与年长的男性的就业水平。See also Luc Behaghel,Bruno Crépon and Béatrice Sédillot,“The Perverse Effects of Partial Employment Protection Reform:The Case of French Older Workers”,Journal of Public Economics,Vol.92,No.3-4(2008),pp.696-721.该研究针对法国1992年的劳动法改革展开。这一改革降低了对超过50岁的劳动者的就业保护水平。该研究发现,受改革的影响,超过50岁的失业者重新就业的比例远远超过低于50岁的年轻人。不过,也有少数不同观点。例如,有的研究认为,就业保护法对年轻人就业并无影响,see Sandrine Cazes and Alena Ne2porová,Flexicurity:A Relevant Approach in Central and Eastern Europe,International Labour Office,2007;有的研究则认为,就业保护法会促进年轻人的就业水平,参见注(66)。
(75)参见注(65),第45-48页。
(76)See James J.Heckman and Carmen Pages-Serra,“The Cost of Job Security Regulation:Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets”,Economía,Vol.1,No.1(2000),pp.109-144.
(77)参见注(2),第4页。
(78)参见注(59)。
(79)See Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar,“Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour Law Systems:A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New Time Series Data”,Industrial Relations Journal,Vol.39,No.6(2008),pp.453-487.
(80)See Andrea Bassanini,Luca Nunziata and Danielle Venn,“Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth in OECDCountries”,Economic Policy,Vol.24,No.58(2009),pp.349-402.这一结论仅针对非临时劳动合同而言。就临时劳动合同而言,该研究并未发现就业保护法对劳动生产率有影响。
(81)See Stefano Scarpetta,Philip Hemmings,Thierry Tressel,and Jaejoon Woo,“The Role of Policy and Institutions for Productivity and Firm Dynamics:Evidence from Micro and Industry Data”,OECD Economics Department Working Paper,No.329(2002).
(82)参见注(43),第381-396页。
(83)See Gayle Allard and Peter H.Lindert,“Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs Since the 1960s:Which Institutions Really Mattered?”,in T.J.Hatton,Kevin H.O'Rourke and Alan M.Taylor(eds.),The New Comparative Economic History:Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G.Williamson,The MIT Press,2007,pp.365-394.
(84)See Beata Smarzynska Javorcik and Mariana Spatareanu,“Disentangling FDI Spillover Effects:What Do Firm Perceptions Tell Us?”,in Theodore H.Moran,Edward Montgomery Graham,Magnus Blomstrom and Magnus Blomstr9m(eds.),Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?,Peterson Institute,2005,pp.45-72.
(85)See Markus Leibrecht and Johann Scharler,“How Important is Employment Protection Legislation for Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Central and Eastern European Countries?”,Economics of Transition,Vol.17,No.2(2009),pp.275-295.
(86)See Simon Deakin,Priya Lele,and Mathias Siems,“The Evolution of Labour Law:Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes”,International Labour Review,Vol.146,No.3-4(2007),pp.133-162.
(87)参见注(52),第7-9页。
(88)参见注(52),第31-38页。
(89)参见注(37),第43页。
(90)参见注(39)。
(91)参见注(52),第5-15页。See also Simon Deakin,“The Use of Quantitative Methods in Labour Law Research:An Assessment and Reformulation”,Social&Legal Studies,Vol.27,No.4(2018),pp.461,465-467.
(92)参见注(52),第5-15页。
(93)参见注(52),第46页。
(94)参见注(23),第74-77页。
(95)See Zoe Adams and Simon Deakin,“Quantitative Labour Law”,in Amy Ludlow and Alysia Blackham(eds.),New Frontiers in Empirical Labour Law Research,Hart Publishing,2015,p.35.
(96)See Lee Sangheon,Deirdre McCann and Nina Torm,“The World Bank's‘Employing Workers’Index:Findings and Critiques-A Review of Recent Evidence”,International Labour Review,Vol.147,No.4(2008),pp.420-423.
(97)参见注(37),第49-50页。
(98)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,The OECD Jobs Study:Evidence and Explanations,OECD Publications and Information Centre,1994,p.69.
(99)参见注(99)。
(100)参见注(47)。
(101)参见注(21),Introduction。
(102)参见注(21),Part 3b,第4页。
(103)See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Implementing the OECD Job Strategy:Lessons from Member Countries,OECD Publishing,1997,pp.7-8.
(104)See World Bank,“Doing Business in 2004:Understanding Regulation”,http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingB usiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB04-FullReport.pdf,pp.29-39,2018年5月17日访问。
(105)See World Bank,“Bolivia:Country Economic Memorandum Policies to Improve Growth and Employment”,Report No.32233-BO,2005,p.32;World Bank,“Ecuador-Investment Climate Assessment”,Report No.31900,2005,pp.190,187.
(106)See Peter Bakvis,“How the World Bank&IMF Use the Doing Business Report to Promote Labour Market Deregulation in Developing Countries”,http://archivio.rassegna.it/2006/europamondo/articoli/doingbusinessicftuanalysis0606.pdf,pp.2,5,7-12,2018年5月17日访问。
(107)See International Monetary Fund,“Nepal:Article IV Consultation Staff Report”,IMF Country Report No.06/44,2006;International Monetary Fund,“South Africa:Article IV Consultation Staff Report”,IMF Country Report No.05/346,2005.
(108)See Zoe Adams,Louise Bishop,Simon Deakin,Colin Fenwick,Sara Martinsson Garzelli and Giudy Rusconi,“The E-conomic Significance of Laws Relating to Employment Protection and Different Forms of Employment:Analysis of a Panel of 117 Countries,1990-2013”,International Labour Review(forthcoming).
(109)学者们对劳动力市场制度的其他方面,例如失业保险制度、最低工资标准以及集体谈判制度等,也开展了诸多的理论与实证分析。
(110)See Richard B.Freeman,“Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders:The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance”,International Economic Journal,Vol.19,No.2(2005),pp.129-145.
(111)See Trevor Manuel,Carlos Arruda,Jihad Azour,Chong-En Bai,Timothy Besley,Dong-Sung Cho,Sergei Guriev,Huguette Labelle,Jean Pierre Landau,Arun Maira and Hendrik Wolff,“Independent Panel Review of the Doing Business Report”,http://www.dbrpanel.org/sites/dbrpanel/files/doingbusiness-review-panel-report.pdf,2018年5月20日访问。
(112)See World Bank,“Doing Business 2018:Reforming to Create Jobs”,http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingB usiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf,pp.206-207,2018年5月20日访问。
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