官员搭配、制度环境与地方实际税率——基于中国工业企业数据的研究
|
摘要
地方官员之间的互动关系对经济政策形成具有重要影响。结合中国工业企业微观数据和地方官员数据,实证分析地方主要党政领导之间的同质性对本地企业实际税率的影响。研究发现:(1)当市委书记与市长具有相同的年龄时,本地企业的实际税率会显著下降0.32%～0.48%。(2)当市委书记与市长具有相同的受教育水平或者党龄时,本地企业实际税率也会显著降低,但相同的性别则未表现出这一现象。(3)官员同质性的影响对于非国有企业和政府规模较大地区更为显著。因此,在当前中国大力推动减轻企业税收负担和优化企业营商环境的背景下,应该更加重视通过优化地方政府内部官员配置,以降低企业税收负担。这对于降低民营企业的税负水平和改善制度环境较差地区的营商环境尤为重要。
The interactive relationship between local government officials has a significant impact on the formation of local economic policies. Based on the micro data of China's industrial enterprise and the data of local official, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of the similarity between local party and government leaders on the local effective tax rate. The findings show that:(1) the effective tax rate of the local enterprises will drop significantly by 0.32% to 0.48% in the cities where the Party sectaries have the same age as the mayors;(2) the effective tax rate of the local enterprises will also drop significantly in the cities where the Party sectaries have the same level of education or Party standing as the mayors, but the same gender shows no such phenomenon;(3)the impact of official homogeneity is more significant on non-state-owned enterprises and the areas with larger governmental scales. Therefore, under the background of China's vigorous efforts to reduce the tax burden of enterprises and to improve the business environment, more attention should be paid to optimize the official collocation within the local governments and reducing the tax burden of local enterprises. This is especially important for the reduction of the tax burden of private-owned firms and the improvement of the business environment in the regions with poorer institutional environment.
The interactive relationship between local government officials has a significant impact on the formation of local economic policies. Based on the micro data of China's industrial enterprise and the data of local official, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of the similarity between local party and government leaders on the local effective tax rate. The findings show that:(1) the effective tax rate of the local enterprises will drop significantly by 0.32% to 0.48% in the cities where the Party sectaries have the same age as the mayors;(2) the effective tax rate of the local enterprises will also drop significantly in the cities where the Party sectaries have the same level of education or Party standing as the mayors, but the same gender shows no such phenomenon;(3)the impact of official homogeneity is more significant on non-state-owned enterprises and the areas with larger governmental scales. Therefore, under the background of China's vigorous efforts to reduce the tax burden of enterprises and to improve the business environment, more attention should be paid to optimize the official collocation within the local governments and reducing the tax burden of local enterprises. This is especially important for the reduction of the tax burden of private-owned firms and the improvement of the business environment in the regions with poorer institutional environment.
引文
[1]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(6):33-40.
[2]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[3]Li H.,Zhou L..Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[4]陶然,苏福兵,陆曦,朱昱铭.经济增长能够带来晋升吗?——对晋升锦标竞赛理论的逻辑挑战与省级实证重估[J].管理世界,2010,(12):13-26.
[5]刘慧龙,吴联生.制度环境、所有权性质与企业实际税率[J].管理世界,2014,(4):42-52.
[6]谢贞发,范子英.中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竞争[J].经济研究,2015,(4):92-106.
[7]陈晓光.财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等[J].中国社会科学,2016,(4):53-70.
[8]Besley T.,Persson T..Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2014,28(4):99-120.
[9]Chen S. X..The Effect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement:Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2017,147(3):62-76.
[10]周雪光.基层政府间的“共谋现象”——一个政府行为的制度逻辑[J].社会学研究,2008,(6):1-21.
[11]范子英,田彬彬.政企合谋与企业逃税:来自国税局长异地交流的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1303-1328.
[12]袁凯华,李后建.政企合谋下的策略减排困境——来自工业废气层面的度量考察[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,(1):134-141.
[13]聂辉华,蒋敏杰.政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据[J].经济研究,2011,(6):146-156.
[14]张莉,徐现祥,王贤彬.地方官员合谋与土地违法[J].世界经济,2011,(3):72-88.
[15]洪群,戴亦一.官员到访减轻了企业税收负担吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2018,(1):111-121.
[16]Besley T.,Persson T.,Sturm D. M..Political Competition,Policy and Growth:Theory and Evidence from the US[J].The Review of Economic Studies,2010,77(4):1329-1352.
[17]Zodrow G. R.,Mieszkowski P..Pigou,Tiebout,Property Taxation,and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods[J].Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19(3):356-370.
[18]王玮.税收优惠的公共治理:制度框架与我国的选择[J].当代财经,2017,(10):26-33.
[19]Dimaggio P..Culture and Cognition[J].Review of Sociology,1997,23(1):263-287.
[20]余泳泽,杨晓章.官员任期、官员特征与经济增长目标制定——来自230个地级市的经验证据[J].经济学动态,2017,(2):51-65.
[21]Wu L.,Wang Y.,Lin B.,Li C.,Chen S..Local Tax Rebates,Corporate Tax Burdens,and Firm Migration:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2007,26(5):555-583.
[22]王延明.上市公司所得税率变化的敏感性分析[J].经济研究,2002,(9):74-80.
[23]聂辉华,江艇,杨汝岱.中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题[J].世界经济,2012,(5):142-158.
[24]Cai H., Liu Q..Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms[J].The Economic Journal,2009,119(537):764-795.
(1)参见周雪光(2008)的概念。[10]本文对合作或合谋行为的界定是:代理人与监督人(如政企、地方政府上下级、地方政府官员等)之间相互配合,采取策略以应对中央政府(委托人)的政策法令与监督检查。
(1)因篇幅所限,本文未详细汇报分样本稳健性检验的回归结果。若有需要,可向作者索取。
[2]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[3]Li H.,Zhou L..Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1743-1762.
[4]陶然,苏福兵,陆曦,朱昱铭.经济增长能够带来晋升吗?——对晋升锦标竞赛理论的逻辑挑战与省级实证重估[J].管理世界,2010,(12):13-26.
[5]刘慧龙,吴联生.制度环境、所有权性质与企业实际税率[J].管理世界,2014,(4):42-52.
[6]谢贞发,范子英.中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竞争[J].经济研究,2015,(4):92-106.
[7]陈晓光.财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等[J].中国社会科学,2016,(4):53-70.
[8]Besley T.,Persson T..Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2014,28(4):99-120.
[9]Chen S. X..The Effect of a Fiscal Squeeze on Tax Enforcement:Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China[J].Journal of Public Economics,2017,147(3):62-76.
[10]周雪光.基层政府间的“共谋现象”——一个政府行为的制度逻辑[J].社会学研究,2008,(6):1-21.
[11]范子英,田彬彬.政企合谋与企业逃税:来自国税局长异地交流的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1303-1328.
[12]袁凯华,李后建.政企合谋下的策略减排困境——来自工业废气层面的度量考察[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,(1):134-141.
[13]聂辉华,蒋敏杰.政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据[J].经济研究,2011,(6):146-156.
[14]张莉,徐现祥,王贤彬.地方官员合谋与土地违法[J].世界经济,2011,(3):72-88.
[15]洪群,戴亦一.官员到访减轻了企业税收负担吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2018,(1):111-121.
[16]Besley T.,Persson T.,Sturm D. M..Political Competition,Policy and Growth:Theory and Evidence from the US[J].The Review of Economic Studies,2010,77(4):1329-1352.
[17]Zodrow G. R.,Mieszkowski P..Pigou,Tiebout,Property Taxation,and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods[J].Journal of Urban Economics,1986,19(3):356-370.
[18]王玮.税收优惠的公共治理:制度框架与我国的选择[J].当代财经,2017,(10):26-33.
[19]Dimaggio P..Culture and Cognition[J].Review of Sociology,1997,23(1):263-287.
[20]余泳泽,杨晓章.官员任期、官员特征与经济增长目标制定——来自230个地级市的经验证据[J].经济学动态,2017,(2):51-65.
[21]Wu L.,Wang Y.,Lin B.,Li C.,Chen S..Local Tax Rebates,Corporate Tax Burdens,and Firm Migration:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2007,26(5):555-583.
[22]王延明.上市公司所得税率变化的敏感性分析[J].经济研究,2002,(9):74-80.
[23]聂辉华,江艇,杨汝岱.中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题[J].世界经济,2012,(5):142-158.
[24]Cai H., Liu Q..Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms[J].The Economic Journal,2009,119(537):764-795.
(1)参见周雪光(2008)的概念。[10]本文对合作或合谋行为的界定是:代理人与监督人(如政企、地方政府上下级、地方政府官员等)之间相互配合,采取策略以应对中央政府(委托人)的政策法令与监督检查。
(1)因篇幅所限,本文未详细汇报分样本稳健性检验的回归结果。若有需要,可向作者索取。
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |