信息披露的作用——来自拍拍贷的经验证据
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摘要
信息披露对于降低信息不对称、减少市场的非效率的作用已经得到广泛的认可。因为中国依然缺乏完善的征信体系,P2P市场上也存在着更严重的信息不对称,所以信息披露在P2P借贷市场中发挥着更为重要的作用,值得学界和业界更深入的研究。基于拍拍贷的数据,对信息披露在P2P市场上的作用进行研究。为了比较可验证的和不可验证的标准信息披露的不同作用,选择Logistic和Tobit等不同的回归模型以及不同的模型设置,实证检验其对于是否借款成功、是否违约、内部收益率的影响以及与借款利率之间的关系。研究结果表明,信息披露对借款成功有正向影响,可验证的标准信息披露影响更大;信息披露具有的可验证性对借款成功有正向影响。同时,信息披露多的借款者更愿意提高借款利率,表明他们可能具有更低的信用。信息披露并不总是降低违约风险,部分信息及其可验证性反而导致更高的违约率。为了得到更可靠的结果,进一步对信息披露和内部收益率进行研究,结果同样表明,部分信息披露及其可验证性会带来更低的内部收益率。在稳健性检验中,上述结论依然不变。研究结果丰富了信息披露、信息经济学、行为经济的研究内容,有利于平台设计更好的信息披露机制,即应控制披露信息条目,只披露能反映风险的信息,从而减少信息不对称,降低由投资人决策偏差导致的损失。同时,也为监管部门制定监管条例去纠正市场偏差和保护投资者权益提供了实证依据。
The role of information disclosures in reducing information asymmetry and attenuating inefficiencies in financial market has been widely accepted. Given that there are no well-established credit rating agencies in China,the role of information disclosure is of greater significance in the peer-to-peer lending market,more research is needed to examine the role of information disclosure.Using a comprehensive dataset of PPDai. com,we verified the role of information disclosure in the P2 P lending market. Furthermore,to demonstrate the distinct economically effects between the unverifiable and verifiable information disclosures,regression models such as Logistic and Tobit models and different model specifications are employed to investigate the influence of information disclosure on successful funding,the probability of default,the internal return rate,and the relationship with the interest rate of the loan listings as well.The results of the empirical study show that information disclosures have a positive effect on the successful funding,and verifiable information disclosures have a more significant impact. The verifiability of the information disclosure always has a positive influence. Meanwhile,the borrowers disclosing more information are more likely to raise the interest rate of the loan listings,which manifests that borrowers disclosing more information are more likely of worse credit. Consequently,the information disclosures do not effectively reduce the risk of default,and some information disclosures and their verifiability are even accompanied by higher rate of default. To concrete this result,Tobit regression model is employed to examine the relationship between information disclosures and the internal rate of return,and part of information disclosures and their verifiability also have a negative effect on the internal rate of return. Finally,alternative models were choosen to verify the robustness of the empirical results,and these conclusions still hold.This paper contributes to the literature of information disclosures,information economics and behavioral economics. Our results will benefit the design of a better information disclosure mechanism,and the platform should control the information disclosure items by only disclosuring the information which reflects the default risk of the borrowers to reduce the information asymmetry and alleviate the investment loss resulting from decision biases. And our study also provides empirical basis for regulators enacting regulations to correcting market biases and protecting the benefits of the investors.
The role of information disclosures in reducing information asymmetry and attenuating inefficiencies in financial market has been widely accepted. Given that there are no well-established credit rating agencies in China,the role of information disclosure is of greater significance in the peer-to-peer lending market,more research is needed to examine the role of information disclosure.Using a comprehensive dataset of PPDai. com,we verified the role of information disclosure in the P2 P lending market. Furthermore,to demonstrate the distinct economically effects between the unverifiable and verifiable information disclosures,regression models such as Logistic and Tobit models and different model specifications are employed to investigate the influence of information disclosure on successful funding,the probability of default,the internal return rate,and the relationship with the interest rate of the loan listings as well.The results of the empirical study show that information disclosures have a positive effect on the successful funding,and verifiable information disclosures have a more significant impact. The verifiability of the information disclosure always has a positive influence. Meanwhile,the borrowers disclosing more information are more likely to raise the interest rate of the loan listings,which manifests that borrowers disclosing more information are more likely of worse credit. Consequently,the information disclosures do not effectively reduce the risk of default,and some information disclosures and their verifiability are even accompanied by higher rate of default. To concrete this result,Tobit regression model is employed to examine the relationship between information disclosures and the internal rate of return,and part of information disclosures and their verifiability also have a negative effect on the internal rate of return. Finally,alternative models were choosen to verify the robustness of the empirical results,and these conclusions still hold.This paper contributes to the literature of information disclosures,information economics and behavioral economics. Our results will benefit the design of a better information disclosure mechanism,and the platform should control the information disclosure items by only disclosuring the information which reflects the default risk of the borrowers to reduce the information asymmetry and alleviate the investment loss resulting from decision biases. And our study also provides empirical basis for regulators enacting regulations to correcting market biases and protecting the benefits of the investors.
引文
[1] MICHELS J. Do unverifiable disclosures matter? Evidence from peer-to-peer lending. Accounting Review,2012,87(4):1385-1413.
[2] HERZENSTEIN M,SONENSHEIN S,DHOLAKIA U M. Tell me a good story and I may lend you money:the role of narratives in peer-to-peer lending decisions. Journal of Marketing Research,2011,48(S):S138-S149.
[3]谢平,邹传伟.互联网金融模式研究.金融研究,2012(12):11-22.XIE ping,ZOU Chuanwei. Internet based finance model.Journal of Financial Research,2012(12):11-22.(in Chinese)
[4] MORSE A. Peer-to-peer crowdfunding:information and the potential for disruption in consumer lending. Annual Review of Financial Economics,2015,7(1):463-482.
[5] POPE D G,SYDNOR J R. What's in a picture? Evidence of discrimination from Prosper. com. Journal of Human Resources,2011,46(1):53-92.
[6] GALAK J,SMALL D A,STEPHEN A T. Microfinance decision making:a field study of prosocial lending. Journal of Marketing Research,2011,48(S):S130-S137.
[7]廖理,吉霖,张伟强.借贷市场能准确识别学历的价值吗?来自P2P平台的经验证据.金融研究,2015(3):146-159.LIAO Li,JI Lin,ZHANG Weiqiang. Education and credit:evidence from P2P lending platform. Journal of Financial Research,2015(3):146-159.(in Chinese)
[8]廖理,李梦然,王正位.中国互联网金融的地域歧视研究.数量经济技术经济研究,2014,31(5):54-70.LIAO Li,LI Mengran,WANG Zhengwei. Regional discrimination in Chinese internet finance. Journal of Quantitative&Technical Economics,2014,31(5):54-70.(in Chinese)
[9] LIN M,VISWANATHAN S. Home bias in online investments:an empirical study of an online crowdfunding market.Management Science,2016,62(5):1393-1414.
[10]郭峰.网络昵称与P2P借贷的成功率和违约率.经济科学,2016(6):102-116.GUO Feng. Nickname and P2P loan success rate and default rate. Economic Science,2016(6):102-116.(in Chinese)
[11]王会娟,廖理.中国P2P网络借贷平台信用认证机制研究:来自“人人贷”的经验证据.中国工业经济,2014(4):136-147.WANG Huijuan,LIAO Li. Chinese P2P platform's credit authentication mechanism research:evidence from Renrendai.China Industrial Economics,2014(4):136-147.(in Chinese)
[12] FREEDMAN S,JIN G Z. The information value of online social networks:lessons from peer-to-peer lending. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2017,51:185-222.
[13] LIN M,PRABHALA N R,VISWANATHAN S. Judging borrowers by the company they keep:friendship networks and information asymmetry in online peer-to-peer lending. Management Science,2013,59(1):17-35.
[14] LIU D,BRASS J D,LU Y,et al. Friendships in online peerto-peer lending:pipes,prisms,and relational herding. MIS Quarterly,2015,39(3):729-742.
[15]李焰,高弋君,李珍妮,等.借款人描述性信息对投资人决策的影响:基于P2P网络借贷平台的分析.经济研究,2014,49(S1):143-155.LI Yan,GAO Yijun,LI Zhenni,et al. The influence of borrower's description on investors'decision-analysis based on P2P online lending. Economic Research Journal,2014,49(S1):143-155.(in Chinese)
[16] DUARTE J,SIEGEL S,YOUNG L. Trust and credit:the role of appearance in peer-to-peer lending. Review of Financial Studies,2012,25(8):2455-2484.
[17] RAVINA E. Love&loans:the effect of beauty and personal characteristics in credit markets. Manhattan,NY:Columbia University,2012:1-79.
[18]李悦雷,郭阳,张维.中国P2P小额贷款市场借贷成功率影响因素分析.金融研究,2013(7):126-138LI Yuelei,GUO Yang,ZHANG Wei. Analysis on the factors affecting the success rate of China's P2P micro-loan market.Journal of Financial Research,2013(7):126-138.(in Chinese)
[19]陈冬宇,朱浩,郑海超.风险、信任和出借意愿:基于拍拍贷注册用户的实证研究.管理评论,2014,26(1):150-158.CHEN Dongyu,ZHU Hao,ZHENG Haichao. Perceived risk,trust,and willingness to lend:an empirical study based on the users of PPDai. com. Management Review,2014,26(1):150-158.(in Chinese)
[20]廖理,李梦然,王正位.聪明的投资者:非完全市场化利率与风险识别:来自P2P网络借贷的证据.经济研究,2014,49(7):125-137.LIAO Li,LI Mengran,WANG Zhengwei. The intelligent investor:not-fully-marketized interest rate and risk identifications:evidence from P2P lending. Economic Research Journal,2014,49(7):125-137.(in Chinese)
[21] IYER R,KHWAJA A I,LUTTMER E F P,et al. Screening peers softly:inferring the quality of small borrowers. Management Science,2016,62(6):1554-1577.
[22] ZHANG J,LIU P. Rational herding in microloan markets.Management Science,2012,58(5):892-912.
[23] WEI Z,LIN M. Market mechanisms in online peer-to-peer lending. Management Science,2016,63(12):4236-4257.
[24] HILDEBRAND T,PURI M,ROCHOLL J. Adverse incentives in crowdfunding. Management Science,2016,63(3):587-608.
[25]张海洋.信息披露监管与P2P借贷运营模式.经济学(季刊),2017,16(1):371-392.ZHANG Haiyang. Regulation of information disclosure and the patterns of P2P lending in China. China Economic Quarterly,2017,16(1):371-392.(in Chinese)
[26] AKERLOF G A. The market for lemons:quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500.
[27] GROSSMAN S J,HART O D. Disclosure laws and takeover bids. Journal of Finance,1980,35(2):323-334.
[28] GROSSMAN S J. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. The Journal of Law&Economics,1981,24(3):461-483.
[29] MILGROM P R. Good news and bad news:representation theorems and applications. Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(2):380-391.
[30] MATHIOS A D. The impact of mandatory disclosure laws on product choices:an analysis of the salad dressing market.The Journal of Law&Economics,2000,43(2):651-678.
[31] JIN G Z,LESLIE P. The effect of information on product quality:evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(2):409-451.
[32] LEWIS G. Asymmetric information,adverse selection and online disclosure:the case of e Bay motors. The American Economic Review,2011,101(4):1535-1546.
[33]王冲,谢雅璐.会计稳健性、信息不透明与股价暴跌风险.管理科学,2013,26(1):68-79.WANG Chong,XIE Yalu. Accounting conservatism,information opacity and stock price crash risk. Journal of Management Science,2013,26(1):68-79.(in Chinese)
[34]薛有志,吴超,周杰.代理成本、信息不对称与IPO前媒体报道.管理科学,2014,27(5):80-90.XUE Youzhi,WU Chao,ZHOU Jie. Agency costs,information asymmetry and media coverage before IPO. Journal of Management Science,2014,27(5):80-90.(in Chinese)
[35] FARRELL J,RABIN M. Cheap talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1996,10(3):103-118.
[36] TVERSKY A,KAHNEMAN D. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science,1981,211(4481):453-458.
[37] RABIN M,WEIZSACHER G. Narrow bracketing and dominated choices. The American Economic Review,2009,99(4):1508-1543.
[38] SIMON H A. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,69(1):99-118.
[39] BORDALO P,GENNAIOLI N,SHLEIFER A. Salience theory of choice under risk. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2012,127(3):1243-1285.
[40] GILBERT D T. How mental systems believe. American Psychologist,1991,46(2):107-119.
[41] GILBERT D T,TAFARODI R W,MALONE P S. You can't not believe everything you read. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1993,65(2):221-233.
[42]NISBETT R E,ZUKIER H,LEMLEY R E. The dilution effect:nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information. Cognitive Psychology,1981,13(2):248-277.
[43]王丹萍,庄贵军,周茵.信息框架对广告态度的影响:论据强度的中介作用.管理科学,2014,27(1):75-85.WANG Danping,ZHUANG Guijun,ZHOU Yin. Influence of message framing on attitude toward advertisement:the mediating effects of argument strength. Journal of Management Science,2014,27(1):75-85.(in Chinese)
[44] BERTRAND M,KARLAN D,MULLAINATHAN S,et al.What's advertising content worth? Evidence from a consumer credit marketing field experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2010,125(1):263-306.
[45] STIGLITZ J E,WEISS A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American Economic Review,1981,71(3):393-410.
[46] AKERLOF G A,SHILLER R J. Phishing for phools:the economics of manipulation and deception. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015.
[2] HERZENSTEIN M,SONENSHEIN S,DHOLAKIA U M. Tell me a good story and I may lend you money:the role of narratives in peer-to-peer lending decisions. Journal of Marketing Research,2011,48(S):S138-S149.
[3]谢平,邹传伟.互联网金融模式研究.金融研究,2012(12):11-22.XIE ping,ZOU Chuanwei. Internet based finance model.Journal of Financial Research,2012(12):11-22.(in Chinese)
[4] MORSE A. Peer-to-peer crowdfunding:information and the potential for disruption in consumer lending. Annual Review of Financial Economics,2015,7(1):463-482.
[5] POPE D G,SYDNOR J R. What's in a picture? Evidence of discrimination from Prosper. com. Journal of Human Resources,2011,46(1):53-92.
[6] GALAK J,SMALL D A,STEPHEN A T. Microfinance decision making:a field study of prosocial lending. Journal of Marketing Research,2011,48(S):S130-S137.
[7]廖理,吉霖,张伟强.借贷市场能准确识别学历的价值吗?来自P2P平台的经验证据.金融研究,2015(3):146-159.LIAO Li,JI Lin,ZHANG Weiqiang. Education and credit:evidence from P2P lending platform. Journal of Financial Research,2015(3):146-159.(in Chinese)
[8]廖理,李梦然,王正位.中国互联网金融的地域歧视研究.数量经济技术经济研究,2014,31(5):54-70.LIAO Li,LI Mengran,WANG Zhengwei. Regional discrimination in Chinese internet finance. Journal of Quantitative&Technical Economics,2014,31(5):54-70.(in Chinese)
[9] LIN M,VISWANATHAN S. Home bias in online investments:an empirical study of an online crowdfunding market.Management Science,2016,62(5):1393-1414.
[10]郭峰.网络昵称与P2P借贷的成功率和违约率.经济科学,2016(6):102-116.GUO Feng. Nickname and P2P loan success rate and default rate. Economic Science,2016(6):102-116.(in Chinese)
[11]王会娟,廖理.中国P2P网络借贷平台信用认证机制研究:来自“人人贷”的经验证据.中国工业经济,2014(4):136-147.WANG Huijuan,LIAO Li. Chinese P2P platform's credit authentication mechanism research:evidence from Renrendai.China Industrial Economics,2014(4):136-147.(in Chinese)
[12] FREEDMAN S,JIN G Z. The information value of online social networks:lessons from peer-to-peer lending. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2017,51:185-222.
[13] LIN M,PRABHALA N R,VISWANATHAN S. Judging borrowers by the company they keep:friendship networks and information asymmetry in online peer-to-peer lending. Management Science,2013,59(1):17-35.
[14] LIU D,BRASS J D,LU Y,et al. Friendships in online peerto-peer lending:pipes,prisms,and relational herding. MIS Quarterly,2015,39(3):729-742.
[15]李焰,高弋君,李珍妮,等.借款人描述性信息对投资人决策的影响:基于P2P网络借贷平台的分析.经济研究,2014,49(S1):143-155.LI Yan,GAO Yijun,LI Zhenni,et al. The influence of borrower's description on investors'decision-analysis based on P2P online lending. Economic Research Journal,2014,49(S1):143-155.(in Chinese)
[16] DUARTE J,SIEGEL S,YOUNG L. Trust and credit:the role of appearance in peer-to-peer lending. Review of Financial Studies,2012,25(8):2455-2484.
[17] RAVINA E. Love&loans:the effect of beauty and personal characteristics in credit markets. Manhattan,NY:Columbia University,2012:1-79.
[18]李悦雷,郭阳,张维.中国P2P小额贷款市场借贷成功率影响因素分析.金融研究,2013(7):126-138LI Yuelei,GUO Yang,ZHANG Wei. Analysis on the factors affecting the success rate of China's P2P micro-loan market.Journal of Financial Research,2013(7):126-138.(in Chinese)
[19]陈冬宇,朱浩,郑海超.风险、信任和出借意愿:基于拍拍贷注册用户的实证研究.管理评论,2014,26(1):150-158.CHEN Dongyu,ZHU Hao,ZHENG Haichao. Perceived risk,trust,and willingness to lend:an empirical study based on the users of PPDai. com. Management Review,2014,26(1):150-158.(in Chinese)
[20]廖理,李梦然,王正位.聪明的投资者:非完全市场化利率与风险识别:来自P2P网络借贷的证据.经济研究,2014,49(7):125-137.LIAO Li,LI Mengran,WANG Zhengwei. The intelligent investor:not-fully-marketized interest rate and risk identifications:evidence from P2P lending. Economic Research Journal,2014,49(7):125-137.(in Chinese)
[21] IYER R,KHWAJA A I,LUTTMER E F P,et al. Screening peers softly:inferring the quality of small borrowers. Management Science,2016,62(6):1554-1577.
[22] ZHANG J,LIU P. Rational herding in microloan markets.Management Science,2012,58(5):892-912.
[23] WEI Z,LIN M. Market mechanisms in online peer-to-peer lending. Management Science,2016,63(12):4236-4257.
[24] HILDEBRAND T,PURI M,ROCHOLL J. Adverse incentives in crowdfunding. Management Science,2016,63(3):587-608.
[25]张海洋.信息披露监管与P2P借贷运营模式.经济学(季刊),2017,16(1):371-392.ZHANG Haiyang. Regulation of information disclosure and the patterns of P2P lending in China. China Economic Quarterly,2017,16(1):371-392.(in Chinese)
[26] AKERLOF G A. The market for lemons:quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500.
[27] GROSSMAN S J,HART O D. Disclosure laws and takeover bids. Journal of Finance,1980,35(2):323-334.
[28] GROSSMAN S J. The informational role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. The Journal of Law&Economics,1981,24(3):461-483.
[29] MILGROM P R. Good news and bad news:representation theorems and applications. Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(2):380-391.
[30] MATHIOS A D. The impact of mandatory disclosure laws on product choices:an analysis of the salad dressing market.The Journal of Law&Economics,2000,43(2):651-678.
[31] JIN G Z,LESLIE P. The effect of information on product quality:evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(2):409-451.
[32] LEWIS G. Asymmetric information,adverse selection and online disclosure:the case of e Bay motors. The American Economic Review,2011,101(4):1535-1546.
[33]王冲,谢雅璐.会计稳健性、信息不透明与股价暴跌风险.管理科学,2013,26(1):68-79.WANG Chong,XIE Yalu. Accounting conservatism,information opacity and stock price crash risk. Journal of Management Science,2013,26(1):68-79.(in Chinese)
[34]薛有志,吴超,周杰.代理成本、信息不对称与IPO前媒体报道.管理科学,2014,27(5):80-90.XUE Youzhi,WU Chao,ZHOU Jie. Agency costs,information asymmetry and media coverage before IPO. Journal of Management Science,2014,27(5):80-90.(in Chinese)
[35] FARRELL J,RABIN M. Cheap talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1996,10(3):103-118.
[36] TVERSKY A,KAHNEMAN D. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science,1981,211(4481):453-458.
[37] RABIN M,WEIZSACHER G. Narrow bracketing and dominated choices. The American Economic Review,2009,99(4):1508-1543.
[38] SIMON H A. A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,69(1):99-118.
[39] BORDALO P,GENNAIOLI N,SHLEIFER A. Salience theory of choice under risk. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2012,127(3):1243-1285.
[40] GILBERT D T. How mental systems believe. American Psychologist,1991,46(2):107-119.
[41] GILBERT D T,TAFARODI R W,MALONE P S. You can't not believe everything you read. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1993,65(2):221-233.
[42]NISBETT R E,ZUKIER H,LEMLEY R E. The dilution effect:nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information. Cognitive Psychology,1981,13(2):248-277.
[43]王丹萍,庄贵军,周茵.信息框架对广告态度的影响:论据强度的中介作用.管理科学,2014,27(1):75-85.WANG Danping,ZHUANG Guijun,ZHOU Yin. Influence of message framing on attitude toward advertisement:the mediating effects of argument strength. Journal of Management Science,2014,27(1):75-85.(in Chinese)
[44] BERTRAND M,KARLAN D,MULLAINATHAN S,et al.What's advertising content worth? Evidence from a consumer credit marketing field experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2010,125(1):263-306.
[45] STIGLITZ J E,WEISS A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American Economic Review,1981,71(3):393-410.
[46] AKERLOF G A,SHILLER R J. Phishing for phools:the economics of manipulation and deception. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015.