基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈的农地流转价格研究
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摘要
针对农地流转市场存在双边信息不对称议价的现实,基于Rubinstein讨价还价博弈刻画了农地流转双方的议价过程,根据子博弈精炼纳什均衡得到了均衡流转价格,最后利用有关数据进行了算例分析.研究发现:均衡流转价格与流入方议价能力负相关、与流出方议价能力正相关;在流出方先出价的不完全信息讨价还价博弈中,当流出方对流入方的策略空间了解的越准确,或者流入方对流出方的策略空间了解的越少时,均衡交易价格越高;另外,流转双方的心理预期价格越高,均衡交易价格也越高.将流转双方的讨价还价过程、信息结构、破裂点纳入到农地流转价格的研究,既兼顾了流出方和流入方的利益,为双方谈判和议价提供了理论上的指导,也为农地流转价格的研究提供了新的视角.
Based on the Rubinstein bargaining game,the bargaining process with asymmetry information and the formation of equilibrium transfer price are analyzed.The results show that the equilibrium turnover price is negatively correlated with the bargaining power of the inflow party,and is positively correlated with the bargaining power of the outflow party.The more accurate the outflow party's strategy space for the inflow party,the less the inflow party understands the policy space of the outflow party,the more the equilibrium transaction price.The higher of the psychological expectation price of both sides,the higher the equilibrium transaction price.On the basis of theoretical analysis,the analysis of examples under various parameters is carried out,and the correctness and validity of the relevant conclusions are further verified.
Based on the Rubinstein bargaining game,the bargaining process with asymmetry information and the formation of equilibrium transfer price are analyzed.The results show that the equilibrium turnover price is negatively correlated with the bargaining power of the inflow party,and is positively correlated with the bargaining power of the outflow party.The more accurate the outflow party's strategy space for the inflow party,the less the inflow party understands the policy space of the outflow party,the more the equilibrium transaction price.The higher of the psychological expectation price of both sides,the higher the equilibrium transaction price.On the basis of theoretical analysis,the analysis of examples under various parameters is carried out,and the correctness and validity of the relevant conclusions are further verified.
引文
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[10]周敏,雷国平,匡兵.信息不对称下的农地流转“柠檬”市场困境-以黑龙江省西城村例证[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017(04):118-123+150.
[11]李华,李恩极,孙秋柏等.基于讨价还价博弈的经理人激励契约研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(09):2280-2287.
[12]浦徐进,金德龙,杜晓东等.超市和直销区并存条件下的合作社最优销售策略[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(02):393-399.
[13]Shaked A,Sutton J.Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,1984,52(6):1351-1364.
[14]Muthoo A.Bargaining theory with applications:the Rubinstein model[J].Economic Journal,1999,112(483):F596-F597.
[2]朱述斌,申云,石成玉.农地流转市场中介平台与定价机制研究-基于双边市场理论的视角[J].农业经济与管理,2011(03):39-46.
[3]Perry G M,Robison L J.Evaluating the Influence of Personal Relationships on Land Sale Prices:A Case Study in Oregon[J].Land Economics,2001,77(3):385-398.
[4]邓大才.农地流转的交易成本与价格研究-农地流转价格的决定因素分析[J].财经问题研究,2007(09):89-95.
[5]申云,朱述斌,邓莹等.农地使用权流转价格的影响因素分析-来自于农户和区域水平的经验[J].中国农村观察,2012(03):2-17+25+95.
[6]尚旭东,常倩,王士权.政府主导农地流转的价格机制及政策效应研究[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2016,26(08):116-124.
[7]王倩,任倩,余劲.粮食主产区农地流转农户议价能力实证分析[J].中国农村观察,2018(02):47-59.
[8]Hanson E.D,Sherrick B J,Kuethe T H.The changing roles of urban influence and agricultural productivity in farmland price determination[J].Land Economics,2018,94(2):199-205.
[9]于传岗,张军伟.是否流转分权?农地有序流转最优机制设计[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2017,17(04):40-50.
[10]周敏,雷国平,匡兵.信息不对称下的农地流转“柠檬”市场困境-以黑龙江省西城村例证[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017(04):118-123+150.
[11]李华,李恩极,孙秋柏等.基于讨价还价博弈的经理人激励契约研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(09):2280-2287.
[12]浦徐进,金德龙,杜晓东等.超市和直销区并存条件下的合作社最优销售策略[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(02):393-399.
[13]Shaked A,Sutton J.Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,1984,52(6):1351-1364.
[14]Muthoo A.Bargaining theory with applications:the Rubinstein model[J].Economic Journal,1999,112(483):F596-F597.