高管薪酬与经营风险的内在联系及实证检验——基于上市银行的研究

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英文篇名：The Internal Relationship between Executive Compensation and Operational Risks and the Empirical Test——A Research Based on Listed Banks 作者：方蔚豪 ; 杨文慧 英文作者：FANG Wei-hao;YANG Wen-hui; 关键词：银行高管 ; 高管薪酬 ; 长期薪酬激励 ; 经营风险 ; 上市银行 英文关键词：bank executive;;executive compensation;;long-term compensation incentive;;operational risk;;listed bank 中文刊名：CSJR 英文刊名：Finance Forum 机构：西安交通大学经济与金融学院; 出版日期：2019-05-05 出版单位：金融论坛 年：2019 期：v.24;No.281 基金：国家社会科学基金项目“银行高管人员薪酬激励、风险承担与监管改革研究”(15BJY024) 语种：中文; 页：CSJR201905007 页数：8 CN：05 ISSN：11-4613/F 分类号：62-69

摘要

本文基于委托代理理论和上市银行的数据,研究银行高管薪酬与经营风险的内在联系。研究结论显示,高管长期薪酬及总薪酬与银行风险水平呈现负相关性,即高管长期薪酬和总薪酬水平较高时,银行经营风险相对较低。因此,应发挥银行董事会在高管薪酬制定中的作用,制定科学合理的薪酬水平和薪酬结构,运用股权激励、延期支付等长期薪酬激励方式激励银行高管,促进银行控制风险,创新经营和可持续发展。
        Based on the principal-agent theory and the data of listed banks, the authors of this paper research the internal relationship between bank executive compensation and operational risks. The results of the paper show that the executive long-term compensation and total compensation are negatively correlated with the risk level of banks, which is means that the operational risks of banks are relatively low if the levels of executive long-term compensation and total compensation are high. Therefore, the board of directors of the banks should play the role in the formulation of executive compensation, determine a scientific and reasonable compensation level and compensation structure, use equity incentive, deferred payment and other long-term compensation incentives to encourage bank executives, promote the risk control, innovative management and sustainable development of banks.

引文

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    (1)本文将工商银行、农业银行、中国银行、建设银行、交通银行称作国有控股银行,其余银行称作非国有控股银行。