代理人公平偏好下的长短期业绩目标与薪酬激励契约研究
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摘要
以薪酬激励合约为中介,通过植入代理人公平偏好的异质性,构建代理人长短期业绩目标的多任务委托代理模型.基于该模型探究了代理人最优:在公平偏好下,代理人风险厌恶程度越强,委托人给予代理人最优长短期激励薪酬越少,固定薪酬与总体薪酬越多;代理人能力、公平偏好对最优长短期薪酬激励契约的影响与代理人风险偏好类型相关;代理人公平偏好程度及最优长短期薪酬激励强度对固定薪酬及总体薪酬的影响取决于各任务间的相关系数.
Based on the compensation incentive contract, this paper constructs the long-term and shortterm task principal-agent model under condition of the heterogeneity of fairness preference. The optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract was studied, and the effect of the optimal longterm and short-term incentive compensation contract on the agent's fairness preference and risk preference was investigated. The result shows that under the fairness preference, the stronger the degree of the agent's risk aversion is, the weaker the intensity of the agent's compensation incentive from the principal is, and the more the fixed compensation and the total compensation is; the degree of the influence of the agent's ability and fairness preference on the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract depends on the type of the agent's risk appetite; the intensity of the effect of the fixed compensation and total compensation on the agent's fairness preference and the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation is related to the correlation between the multi-tasks.
Based on the compensation incentive contract, this paper constructs the long-term and shortterm task principal-agent model under condition of the heterogeneity of fairness preference. The optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract was studied, and the effect of the optimal longterm and short-term incentive compensation contract on the agent's fairness preference and risk preference was investigated. The result shows that under the fairness preference, the stronger the degree of the agent's risk aversion is, the weaker the intensity of the agent's compensation incentive from the principal is, and the more the fixed compensation and the total compensation is; the degree of the influence of the agent's ability and fairness preference on the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation contract depends on the type of the agent's risk appetite; the intensity of the effect of the fixed compensation and total compensation on the agent's fairness preference and the optimal long-term and short-term incentive compensation is related to the correlation between the multi-tasks.
引文
[1]黄继承,阚铄,朱冰,等.经理薪酬激励与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2016(11):156-171.Huang J C, Kan S, Zhu B, et al. Manager's salary incentive and dynamic adjustment of capital structure[J].Management World, 2016(11):156-171.
[2]王新,毛慧贞,李彦霖.经理人权力、薪酬结构与企业业绩[J].南开管理评论,2015, 18(1):130-140.Wang X, Mao H Z, Li Y L. Executive power, compensation structure and enterprise performance[J]. Nankai Business Review, 2015, 18(1):130-140.
[3] Yamagishi T, Li Y, Takagishi H, et al. In search of homo economics[J]. Psychological Science, 2014, 25(9):1699-1711.
[4] Cohn A, Fehr E, Goette L. Fair wages and effort provision:Combining evidence from a choice experiment and a field experiment[J]. Management Science, 2014, 61(8):1777-1794.
[5] Nishimura T, Okada A, Shirata Y. Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games[J]. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2017, 420:53-67.
[6] Debove S, Baumard N, Andre J B. Models of the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game:A review and classification[J]. Evolution&Human Behavior,2016, 37(3):245-254.
[7] Kim T Y, Edwards J R, Shapiro D L. Social comparison and distributive justice:East Asia differences[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2015, 132(2):401-414.
[8] Lazear E P, Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,89(5):841-864.
[9] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987, 55(2):303-328.
[10] Alchian A A, Demsetz H. Production, information costs, and economic organization[J]. American Economic Review, 1972, 62(5):777-795.
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[14]袁茂,雷勇,蒲勇健.基于公平偏好理论的激励机制与代理成本分析[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):82-86.Yuan M, Lei Y, Pu Y J. Incentive mechanisms and analysis of agency cost based on fairness theory[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2011, 25(2):82-86.
[15]秦华,张好雨,柳瑞禹.基于纵向公平偏好视角的委托代理模型及薪酬激励机制研究[J].技术经济,2015, 34(5):124-129.Qin H,Zhang H Y, Liu R Y. Research on principal-agent model and salary incentive mechanism based on perspective of vertical fairness preference[J]. Technology Economics, 2015, 34(5):124-129.
[16]傅强,朱浩·基于公共偏好理论的激励机制研究——兼顾横向公平偏好和纵向公平偏好[J].管理工程学报,2014, 28(3):190-195.Pu Q, Zhu H. Incentive mechanisms based on fairness preference theory—Give consideration to both vertical and horizontal fairness concerns[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2014, 28(3):190-195.
[17]柳瑞禹,秦华.基于公平偏好和长期绩效的委托代理问题研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015, 35(10):2708-2720.Liu R Y, Qin H. Research of multi-task principal-agent problems based on fairness preference and long-term performance[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2015, 35(10):2708-2720.
[18]陈克贵,黄敏.非对称公平关切系数下虚拟企业激励机制研究[J].系统工程学报,2014, 29(3):315-323.Chen K G, Huang M. Incentive machanism in virtual enterprise with asymmetry fairness concern factor[J].Journal of Systems Engineering, 2014, 29(3):315-323.
[19]丁翔,陈永泰,盛昭瀚,等.基于FS模型的设计施工总承包联合体领导-成员风险分配策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(7):43-53.Ding X, Chen Y T, Sheng Z H, et al. Optimal leader-follower risk allocation strategies for design-build coalitions based on fair process and social preferences(FS)model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(7):43-53.
[20]孙世敏,张林玉,赵希男,等.长短期业绩相结合的过度自信代理人激励机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2013, 27(4):150-155.Sun S M, Zhang L Y, Zhao X N, et al. Overconfident agent's incentive mechanisms based on the combined long-term and short-term performance[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013,27(4):150-155.
[21] Zhao L L, Wang X Q, Chen C. Risk-sharing and incentive contract design of the supervisor based on fairness preference[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science&Technology of China 2016, 18(2):73-79.
[22] Karagozoglu E, Urhan U B. The effect of stake size in experimental bargaining and distribution games:A survey[J]. Group Decisions&Negotiation 2017, 26(2):285-325.
[23] Perversi E, Regazzini E. Inequality and risk aversion in economies open to altruistic attitudes[J]. Mathematical Models&Methods in Applied Sciences, 2016, 26(9):1735-1760.
[24] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Multitask principal-agent analyses:Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design[J], Journal of Law, Economics,&Organization, 1991, 7(Special Issue):24-52.
[25] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica,1987, 55(2):303-328.
1.在其他条件不变时,代理人在短期任务方面投入多少努力,很快就会产生多少业绩,容易被委托人观测到;而代理人在长期任务方面所做的努力,其产生的业绩不能在短期内显现出来,因而长期努力不易被委托人观测到,虽然代理人在长短期任务上的努力信息可能存在相关性,但在不影响结论的前提下,为分析方便,假定长短期任务的观测信息独立.
2.运用“分布函数的参数化方法”,可以推导出代理人风险规避度p=-u"/u',这里u表示代理人期望效用函数,设代理人的收入为φ,那么存在(dlnu')/(dφ)=-p、lnu'=-pφ+B,则u'=e~(B_e-pφ)、u=-e~B/pe~(-pφ)+C,其中,B和C为常数.为方便公式运算,在不影响运算结果情况下,假设e~B/p=1, C=0(B=lnp),则效用函数u=-e~(-pφ).
3.借鉴BO模型以群体平均收入为参照对象的思想,提出了以公平工资为参照标准的假定.
[2]王新,毛慧贞,李彦霖.经理人权力、薪酬结构与企业业绩[J].南开管理评论,2015, 18(1):130-140.Wang X, Mao H Z, Li Y L. Executive power, compensation structure and enterprise performance[J]. Nankai Business Review, 2015, 18(1):130-140.
[3] Yamagishi T, Li Y, Takagishi H, et al. In search of homo economics[J]. Psychological Science, 2014, 25(9):1699-1711.
[4] Cohn A, Fehr E, Goette L. Fair wages and effort provision:Combining evidence from a choice experiment and a field experiment[J]. Management Science, 2014, 61(8):1777-1794.
[5] Nishimura T, Okada A, Shirata Y. Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games[J]. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2017, 420:53-67.
[6] Debove S, Baumard N, Andre J B. Models of the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game:A review and classification[J]. Evolution&Human Behavior,2016, 37(3):245-254.
[7] Kim T Y, Edwards J R, Shapiro D L. Social comparison and distributive justice:East Asia differences[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2015, 132(2):401-414.
[8] Lazear E P, Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,89(5):841-864.
[9] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1987, 55(2):303-328.
[10] Alchian A A, Demsetz H. Production, information costs, and economic organization[J]. American Economic Review, 1972, 62(5):777-795.
[11] Fehr E, Schmidt K M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation(J). Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999, 114(3):817-868.
[12] Bolton G E, Ockenfels A. ERC:A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition[J]. American Economic Review,2000, 90(1):166-193.
[13] Englmaier F, Wambach A. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 69(2):312-328.
[14]袁茂,雷勇,蒲勇健.基于公平偏好理论的激励机制与代理成本分析[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):82-86.Yuan M, Lei Y, Pu Y J. Incentive mechanisms and analysis of agency cost based on fairness theory[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2011, 25(2):82-86.
[15]秦华,张好雨,柳瑞禹.基于纵向公平偏好视角的委托代理模型及薪酬激励机制研究[J].技术经济,2015, 34(5):124-129.Qin H,Zhang H Y, Liu R Y. Research on principal-agent model and salary incentive mechanism based on perspective of vertical fairness preference[J]. Technology Economics, 2015, 34(5):124-129.
[16]傅强,朱浩·基于公共偏好理论的激励机制研究——兼顾横向公平偏好和纵向公平偏好[J].管理工程学报,2014, 28(3):190-195.Pu Q, Zhu H. Incentive mechanisms based on fairness preference theory—Give consideration to both vertical and horizontal fairness concerns[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2014, 28(3):190-195.
[17]柳瑞禹,秦华.基于公平偏好和长期绩效的委托代理问题研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015, 35(10):2708-2720.Liu R Y, Qin H. Research of multi-task principal-agent problems based on fairness preference and long-term performance[J]. Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice, 2015, 35(10):2708-2720.
[18]陈克贵,黄敏.非对称公平关切系数下虚拟企业激励机制研究[J].系统工程学报,2014, 29(3):315-323.Chen K G, Huang M. Incentive machanism in virtual enterprise with asymmetry fairness concern factor[J].Journal of Systems Engineering, 2014, 29(3):315-323.
[19]丁翔,陈永泰,盛昭瀚,等.基于FS模型的设计施工总承包联合体领导-成员风险分配策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(7):43-53.Ding X, Chen Y T, Sheng Z H, et al. Optimal leader-follower risk allocation strategies for design-build coalitions based on fair process and social preferences(FS)model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(7):43-53.
[20]孙世敏,张林玉,赵希男,等.长短期业绩相结合的过度自信代理人激励机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2013, 27(4):150-155.Sun S M, Zhang L Y, Zhao X N, et al. Overconfident agent's incentive mechanisms based on the combined long-term and short-term performance[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013,27(4):150-155.
[21] Zhao L L, Wang X Q, Chen C. Risk-sharing and incentive contract design of the supervisor based on fairness preference[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science&Technology of China 2016, 18(2):73-79.
[22] Karagozoglu E, Urhan U B. The effect of stake size in experimental bargaining and distribution games:A survey[J]. Group Decisions&Negotiation 2017, 26(2):285-325.
[23] Perversi E, Regazzini E. Inequality and risk aversion in economies open to altruistic attitudes[J]. Mathematical Models&Methods in Applied Sciences, 2016, 26(9):1735-1760.
[24] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Multitask principal-agent analyses:Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design[J], Journal of Law, Economics,&Organization, 1991, 7(Special Issue):24-52.
[25] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica,1987, 55(2):303-328.
1.在其他条件不变时,代理人在短期任务方面投入多少努力,很快就会产生多少业绩,容易被委托人观测到;而代理人在长期任务方面所做的努力,其产生的业绩不能在短期内显现出来,因而长期努力不易被委托人观测到,虽然代理人在长短期任务上的努力信息可能存在相关性,但在不影响结论的前提下,为分析方便,假定长短期任务的观测信息独立.
2.运用“分布函数的参数化方法”,可以推导出代理人风险规避度p=-u"/u',这里u表示代理人期望效用函数,设代理人的收入为φ,那么存在(dlnu')/(dφ)=-p、lnu'=-pφ+B,则u'=e~(B_e-pφ)、u=-e~B/pe~(-pφ)+C,其中,B和C为常数.为方便公式运算,在不影响运算结果情况下,假设e~B/p=1, C=0(B=lnp),则效用函数u=-e~(-pφ).
3.借鉴BO模型以群体平均收入为参照对象的思想,提出了以公平工资为参照标准的假定.