“最严格的监管”和“最严厉的处罚”指示的食品安全治理研究——基于委托代理理论的分析
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摘要
食品安全问题一直是社会各界关注的焦点,运用委托代理模型,剖析政府监管部门与食品企业之间的委托代理关系,分析"四个最严"中"最严格的监管"与"最严厉的处罚"两条指示的经济学机理和作用效果。研究结果表明,提升监管强度和处罚力度可以有效激励食品企业提升努力水平,从而增强食品的安全性。同时,食品企业的努力水平还受市场规模及食品价格等因素影响,并且不同类型的食品受影响的方式也不同。
Food safety issues have always been the focus of attention from all walks of life. This paper mainly uses the principal-agent model to analyze the principal-agent relationship between the government supervision department and the food enterprise,and analyzes the economy mechanism and effect of the " strictest supervision" and " strictest punishment". The research results show that improving the intensity of supervision and punishment can effectively encourage food enterprises to improve their efforts,thus enhancing the safety of food. At the same time,the level of efforts of food enterprises is also affected by factors such as market size and price,and different types of foods are affected in different ways.
Food safety issues have always been the focus of attention from all walks of life. This paper mainly uses the principal-agent model to analyze the principal-agent relationship between the government supervision department and the food enterprise,and analyzes the economy mechanism and effect of the " strictest supervision" and " strictest punishment". The research results show that improving the intensity of supervision and punishment can effectively encourage food enterprises to improve their efforts,thus enhancing the safety of food. At the same time,the level of efforts of food enterprises is also affected by factors such as market size and price,and different types of foods are affected in different ways.
引文
[1]毕井泉.落实“四个最严”保障“舌尖上的安全”[J].紫光阁,2015(10):44-45.
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[6]LAPAN H,MOSCHINI G C.Grading,minimum quality standards,and the labeling of genetically modified products[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2007,89(3):769-783.
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[8]张汉江,肖伟,葛伟娜,等.有害物质在食品供应链中传播机制的混合策略静态博弈模型[J].系统工程,2008(1):62-67.
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[11]马英娟.走出多部门监管的困境论中国食品安全监管部门间的协调合作[J].清华法学,2015,9(3):35-55.
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[13]任勇,李晓光.委托代理理论:模型、对策及评析[J].经济问题,2007(7):13-15.
[14]DUBOIS P,VUKINA T.Grower risk aversion and the cost of moral hazard in livestock production contracts[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2004,86(3):835-841.
[15]HERWEG F,MüLLER D,WEINSCHENK P.Binary payment schemes:Moral hazard and loss aversion[J].American Economic Review,2010,100(5):2451-2477.
[16]LOEB M,MAGAT W A.A decentralized method for utility regulation[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):399-404.
[17]全世文,曾寅初,朱勇.我国食品安全监管者激励失灵的原因——基于委托代理理论的解释[J].经济管理,2015,37(4):159-167.
[18]王常伟,顾海英.基于委托代理理论的食品安全激励机制分析[J].软科学,2013,27(8):65-68.
[19]郑风田.从多头监管到一个部门说话:我国食品安全监管体制急待重塑[J].中国行政管理,2005(12):51-54.
[20]TAM W,YANG D.Food safety and the development of regulatory institutions in China[J].Asian Perspective,2005(1):5-36.
[21]DUKES A,GEYLANI T,LIU Y.Dominant retailers′ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels[J].Marketing Letters,2014,25(1):93-107.
[2]习近平.决胜全面建成小康社会夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告[M].北京:人民出版社,2017.
[3]王冀宁.食品安全的利益演化、群体信任与管理规制研究[J].现代管理科学,2011(2):32-33.
[4]HONG I H,DANG J F,TSAI Y H,et al.An RFID application in the food supply chain:A case study of convenience stores in Taiwan[J].Journal of Food Engineering,2011,106(2):119-126.
[5]WANG J,CHEN T,WANG J.Research on cooperation strategy of enterprises′ quality and safety in food supply chain[J].Discrete Dynamics in Nature & Society,2015(3):1-15.
[6]LAPAN H,MOSCHINI G C.Grading,minimum quality standards,and the labeling of genetically modified products[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2007,89(3):769-783.
[7]MARUCHECK A,GREIS N,MENA C,et al.Product safety and security in the global supply chain:Issues,challenges and research opportunities[J].Journal of Operations Management,2011,29(7/8):707-720.
[8]张汉江,肖伟,葛伟娜,等.有害物质在食品供应链中传播机制的混合策略静态博弈模型[J].系统工程,2008(1):62-67.
[9]HUSSAIN S.Co-regulation and voluntarism in the provision of food safety:Lessons from institutional economics[R].Working Paper,2006.
[10]刘小峰,陈国华,盛昭瀚.不同供需关系下的食品安全与政府监管策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(2):143-150.
[11]马英娟.走出多部门监管的困境论中国食品安全监管部门间的协调合作[J].清华法学,2015,9(3):35-55.
[12]ZHANG S.The scientific basis of food safety supervision and typical case analysis [J].Journal of Chinese Institute of Food Science and Technology,2013,13(2):1-5.
[13]任勇,李晓光.委托代理理论:模型、对策及评析[J].经济问题,2007(7):13-15.
[14]DUBOIS P,VUKINA T.Grower risk aversion and the cost of moral hazard in livestock production contracts[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2004,86(3):835-841.
[15]HERWEG F,MüLLER D,WEINSCHENK P.Binary payment schemes:Moral hazard and loss aversion[J].American Economic Review,2010,100(5):2451-2477.
[16]LOEB M,MAGAT W A.A decentralized method for utility regulation[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):399-404.
[17]全世文,曾寅初,朱勇.我国食品安全监管者激励失灵的原因——基于委托代理理论的解释[J].经济管理,2015,37(4):159-167.
[18]王常伟,顾海英.基于委托代理理论的食品安全激励机制分析[J].软科学,2013,27(8):65-68.
[19]郑风田.从多头监管到一个部门说话:我国食品安全监管体制急待重塑[J].中国行政管理,2005(12):51-54.
[20]TAM W,YANG D.Food safety and the development of regulatory institutions in China[J].Asian Perspective,2005(1):5-36.
[21]DUKES A,GEYLANI T,LIU Y.Dominant retailers′ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels[J].Marketing Letters,2014,25(1):93-107.
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