不对称信息条件下精准扶贫效果偏离的内在机理及实证分析
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摘要
通过引入不对称信息动态博弈模型中的经典信号博弈模型,研究在信息不对称的扶贫攻坚过程中,"普惠式"扶贫开发机制如何诱发贫困户机会主义行为。利用深度贫困的南疆四地州、六个县813户贫困家庭档案及调研数据进行实证分析,从理论和经验两个层面论证贫困户内生动力在扶贫开发中的关键作用。研究结果证明:①深度贫困地区扶贫开发主体和客体存在信息不对称,效用最大化的追逐诱发贫困户产生机会主义行为,使其更专注于贫困户身份的认定,不利于精准脱贫的可持续;②"短、平、快"的扶贫机制虽然能够快速帮助贫困户脱贫,但其保留效用较小,"益贫性"较低,导致贫困户对直接补贴产生持续依赖,进而失去主动摆脱贫困的内生动力,脱贫质量更低;③敏感性差异分析显示,长期受益于财政专项资金支持的国家级扶贫开发重点县"贫困陷阱"现象更为严峻,其扶贫开发对贫困户"扶志"的需求更为紧迫。以上发现是边疆少数民族深度贫困地区扶贫开发的难点,也是贫困治理"最后一公里"的关键点。新时代精准扶贫必须转变传统"输血式"扶贫模式,把兜底工作与直接财政支持区别开来,对具有一定劳动能力的家庭,坚持以"益贫式"发展为主,提高精准扶贫的保留效用。通过基础教育、国语教育、技能培训、外出就业指导服务等方式,分层次、多渠道、精准到村到户,充分激发贫困家庭劳动热情,持续提高其自我发展、主动脱贫的意识,彻底阻断贫困代际传递。
Introducing the traditional signaling game theory model with dynamic asymmetric information,this paper studies the poor households' opportunistic behavior induced by the universal poverty alleviation policy in China's poverty-stricken minority areas. It uses data covering 813 poor households selected from six counties in the four poverty-stricken areas of south Xinjiang to theoretically and empirically study the effect of endogenous motivation of the poor households on poverty reduction. Three important results are found from the empirical analysis. ① There is asymmetric information between the poor households and village leaders who implement government poverty alleviation policies. The opportunistic behavior of poor households is induced by the desire to maximize their utility with government subsidies,and village leaders tend to focus their effort on recognizing the poor rather than the sustainability of the poverty alleviation policy. ②The‘short,arbitrary and fast'poverty alleviation policy may quickly change the status of households from‘poor'to‘non-poor',but such a policy may have nurtured the dependency culture where poor households lose motivation to escape poverty through their own efforts,resulting in lower effectiveness of the anti-poverty campaign. ③Further sensitivity analysis suggests that poor households in the national designated poor counties may have been locked in the so-called‘poverty trap'. Due to long term universal state support,poor households in the national designated poor counties are less likely to escape poverty through their own efforts than their counterparts in the counties not designated as national poor. The above findings indicate that ‘the last mileage'of poverty eradication in China's poverty-stricken areas,particularly in the remote and minority regions,is the key issue of poverty reduction in the country. In the new era,China may need to change the ‘blood transfusion'poverty alleviation model,and separate those poor households that really require state support from those who have their own ability to fight poverty. The pro-poor development policy should be upheld to improve the residual utility that can benefit all households as a result of the poverty alleviation campaign,and emphasize the role of basic education,Mandarin language teaching,skill training and employment services. The government should encourage and motivate poor households to escape poverty and cut off intergeneration poverty transmission using differentiated policy instruments for different types of poor households with precision down to the village and households levels.
Introducing the traditional signaling game theory model with dynamic asymmetric information,this paper studies the poor households' opportunistic behavior induced by the universal poverty alleviation policy in China's poverty-stricken minority areas. It uses data covering 813 poor households selected from six counties in the four poverty-stricken areas of south Xinjiang to theoretically and empirically study the effect of endogenous motivation of the poor households on poverty reduction. Three important results are found from the empirical analysis. ① There is asymmetric information between the poor households and village leaders who implement government poverty alleviation policies. The opportunistic behavior of poor households is induced by the desire to maximize their utility with government subsidies,and village leaders tend to focus their effort on recognizing the poor rather than the sustainability of the poverty alleviation policy. ②The‘short,arbitrary and fast'poverty alleviation policy may quickly change the status of households from‘poor'to‘non-poor',but such a policy may have nurtured the dependency culture where poor households lose motivation to escape poverty through their own efforts,resulting in lower effectiveness of the anti-poverty campaign. ③Further sensitivity analysis suggests that poor households in the national designated poor counties may have been locked in the so-called‘poverty trap'. Due to long term universal state support,poor households in the national designated poor counties are less likely to escape poverty through their own efforts than their counterparts in the counties not designated as national poor. The above findings indicate that ‘the last mileage'of poverty eradication in China's poverty-stricken areas,particularly in the remote and minority regions,is the key issue of poverty reduction in the country. In the new era,China may need to change the ‘blood transfusion'poverty alleviation model,and separate those poor households that really require state support from those who have their own ability to fight poverty. The pro-poor development policy should be upheld to improve the residual utility that can benefit all households as a result of the poverty alleviation campaign,and emphasize the role of basic education,Mandarin language teaching,skill training and employment services. The government should encourage and motivate poor households to escape poverty and cut off intergeneration poverty transmission using differentiated policy instruments for different types of poor households with precision down to the village and households levels.
引文
[1]国家统计局.“扶贫开发成就举世瞩目脱贫攻坚取得决定性进展---改革开放40年经济社会发展成就系列报告之五”[EB/OL].2018-09-03.http://www.stats.gov.cn/ztjc/ztfx/ggkf40n/201809/t20180903_1620407.html.
[2]BIRLDSALL N,LONDONO J L.Asset inequality matters:an assessment of the World Bank’s approach to poverty reduction[J].American economic review,1997,87(2):32-37.
[3]樊丽明,解垩.公共转移支付减少了贫困脆弱性吗?[J].经济研究,2014(8):67-78.
[4]FUJII T.Dynamic poverty decomposition analysis:an application to the Philippines[J].World development,2017,100:69-84.
[5]贾俊雪,秦聪,刘勇政.“自上而下”与“自下而上”融合的政策设计---基于农村发展扶贫项目的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2017(9):68-89.
[6]杨娟,赖德胜,邱牧远.如何通过教育缓解收入不平等?[J].经济研究,2015(9):86-99.
[7]RAVALLION M,HIMELEIN K,BEEGLE K.Can subjective questions on economic welfare be trusted?evidence for three developing countries[J].Policy research working paper,2013,64(4):2-38.
[8]GUAGNANO G,SANTARELLI E,SANTINI I.Can social capital affect subjective poverty in Europe?an empirical analysis based on a generalized ordered logit model[J].Social indicators research,2016,128(2):881-907.
[9]左停,杨雨鑫.重塑贫困认知:主观贫困研究框架及其对当前中国反贫困的启示[J].贵州社会科学,2013(9):43-49.
[10]舒尔茨,著.梁小民,译.改造传统农业[M].上海:商务印书馆,1987.
[11]ROBERT S.Measuring transaction costs:an incomplete survey[J].The Ronald Coase Institute working paper series,1947(2):1-16.
[12]林毅夫.小农与经济理性[J].中国农村观察,1988(3):31-33.
[13]张新伟.反贫困进程中的博弈现象与贫困陷阱分析[J].中国农村经济,1998(9):22-27.
[14]傅晨,狄瑞珍.贫困农户行为研究[J].中国农村观察,2000(2):39-42.
[15]TAROZZI A,DEATON A.Using census and survey data to estimate poverty and inequality for small areas[J].The review of economics statistics,2009,91(4):773-792.
[16]CHO I K,KREPS D M.Signaling game and stable equilibria[J].Quarterly journal of economics,1997,102(2):179-221.
[17]张维迎,著.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004.
[18]方丽,田传浩.筑好巢才能引好凤:农村住房投资与婚姻缔结[J].经济学:季刊,2016(2):571-596.
[19]YAO S J,ZHANG Z Y.On regional inequality and diverging clubs:a case study of contemporary China[J].Journal of comparative economics,2001,29(3):466-484.
[20]科林·卡梅隆,普拉温·特里维迪,著.微观计量经济学方法与应用(英文版)[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2008.
[21]朱梦冰,李实.精准扶贫重在精准识别贫困人口---农村低保政策的瞄准效果分析[J].中国社会科学,2017(9):90-112.
[22]MADDALA G S.A perspective on the use of limited-dependent and qualitative variables models in accounting research[J].The accounting review,1991,66(4):788-806.
[23]TAROZZI A,DEATON A.Using census and survey data to estimate poverty and inequality for small areas[J].The review of economics statistics,2009,91(4):773-792.
[24]陈强,著.高级计量经济学及Stata应用(第二版)[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2013.
[25]崔红志.农村老年人主观幸福感影响因素分析---基于全国8省(区)农户问卷调查数据[J].中国农村经济,2015(4):72-80.
[26]林毅夫.新结构经济学:反思经济发展与政策的理论框架[M].苏剑,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2012.
[2]BIRLDSALL N,LONDONO J L.Asset inequality matters:an assessment of the World Bank’s approach to poverty reduction[J].American economic review,1997,87(2):32-37.
[3]樊丽明,解垩.公共转移支付减少了贫困脆弱性吗?[J].经济研究,2014(8):67-78.
[4]FUJII T.Dynamic poverty decomposition analysis:an application to the Philippines[J].World development,2017,100:69-84.
[5]贾俊雪,秦聪,刘勇政.“自上而下”与“自下而上”融合的政策设计---基于农村发展扶贫项目的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2017(9):68-89.
[6]杨娟,赖德胜,邱牧远.如何通过教育缓解收入不平等?[J].经济研究,2015(9):86-99.
[7]RAVALLION M,HIMELEIN K,BEEGLE K.Can subjective questions on economic welfare be trusted?evidence for three developing countries[J].Policy research working paper,2013,64(4):2-38.
[8]GUAGNANO G,SANTARELLI E,SANTINI I.Can social capital affect subjective poverty in Europe?an empirical analysis based on a generalized ordered logit model[J].Social indicators research,2016,128(2):881-907.
[9]左停,杨雨鑫.重塑贫困认知:主观贫困研究框架及其对当前中国反贫困的启示[J].贵州社会科学,2013(9):43-49.
[10]舒尔茨,著.梁小民,译.改造传统农业[M].上海:商务印书馆,1987.
[11]ROBERT S.Measuring transaction costs:an incomplete survey[J].The Ronald Coase Institute working paper series,1947(2):1-16.
[12]林毅夫.小农与经济理性[J].中国农村观察,1988(3):31-33.
[13]张新伟.反贫困进程中的博弈现象与贫困陷阱分析[J].中国农村经济,1998(9):22-27.
[14]傅晨,狄瑞珍.贫困农户行为研究[J].中国农村观察,2000(2):39-42.
[15]TAROZZI A,DEATON A.Using census and survey data to estimate poverty and inequality for small areas[J].The review of economics statistics,2009,91(4):773-792.
[16]CHO I K,KREPS D M.Signaling game and stable equilibria[J].Quarterly journal of economics,1997,102(2):179-221.
[17]张维迎,著.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004.
[18]方丽,田传浩.筑好巢才能引好凤:农村住房投资与婚姻缔结[J].经济学:季刊,2016(2):571-596.
[19]YAO S J,ZHANG Z Y.On regional inequality and diverging clubs:a case study of contemporary China[J].Journal of comparative economics,2001,29(3):466-484.
[20]科林·卡梅隆,普拉温·特里维迪,著.微观计量经济学方法与应用(英文版)[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2008.
[21]朱梦冰,李实.精准扶贫重在精准识别贫困人口---农村低保政策的瞄准效果分析[J].中国社会科学,2017(9):90-112.
[22]MADDALA G S.A perspective on the use of limited-dependent and qualitative variables models in accounting research[J].The accounting review,1991,66(4):788-806.
[23]TAROZZI A,DEATON A.Using census and survey data to estimate poverty and inequality for small areas[J].The review of economics statistics,2009,91(4):773-792.
[24]陈强,著.高级计量经济学及Stata应用(第二版)[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2013.
[25]崔红志.农村老年人主观幸福感影响因素分析---基于全国8省(区)农户问卷调查数据[J].中国农村经济,2015(4):72-80.
[26]林毅夫.新结构经济学:反思经济发展与政策的理论框架[M].苏剑,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2012.