基于收益共享契约的竞争性产品渠道设计与优化
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摘要
设计了两个竞争性供应商与两个网络平台商组成的三类渠道结构,分析了供应商与平台商分别作为决策者,基于产品与渠道联合替代率的渠道选择策略.进一步研究了在建立从网络平台商到供应商的收益共享契约后,联合替代率与收益共享比率对多渠道供应链结构优化的影响.研究发现,在基本的渠道结构中,平台商的占优策略为与供应商组建独家交易,而供应商则会选择多渠道策略,此时,无均衡解;在建立收益共享契约后,所有参与者组建独家交易为一均衡战略.该研究结果对多渠道供应链环境下,不同决策主体的渠道结构选择与优化具有一定的指导意义.
Three types of channel structure composed of two competitive suppliers and two network platforms are designed. The channel selection strategy is analyzed based on the joint substitution rate of products and channels when the supplier and the network platform act as decision makers,respectively. After establishing the revenue sharing contract from the network platform to the supplier,the influence of the joint substitution ratio and revenue sharing ratio on the optimization of the multi-channel supply chain structure is further studied. It is found that the dominant strategy of the platform is to set up an exclusive deal with the supplier and the supplier will choose the multi-channel strategy. Therefore,in the basic channel structure there is no equilibrium solution. That all participants form an exclusive deal is a balanced strategy after the revenue sharing contract is established. The results of the study are of guiding significance to different decision-makers for channel structure selection and optimization in the multi-channel supply chain environment.
Three types of channel structure composed of two competitive suppliers and two network platforms are designed. The channel selection strategy is analyzed based on the joint substitution rate of products and channels when the supplier and the network platform act as decision makers,respectively. After establishing the revenue sharing contract from the network platform to the supplier,the influence of the joint substitution ratio and revenue sharing ratio on the optimization of the multi-channel supply chain structure is further studied. It is found that the dominant strategy of the platform is to set up an exclusive deal with the supplier and the supplier will choose the multi-channel strategy. Therefore,in the basic channel structure there is no equilibrium solution. That all participants form an exclusive deal is a balanced strategy after the revenue sharing contract is established. The results of the study are of guiding significance to different decision-makers for channel structure selection and optimization in the multi-channel supply chain environment.
引文
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[13]Ingene C A,Parry M E.Bilateral monopoly,identical distributors,and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels[J].Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,2007,35(4):586-602.
[2]Cai G.Channel selection and coordination in dual-channel supply chains[J].Journal of Retailing,2010,86(1):22-36.
[3]David A,Adida E.Competition and coordination in a twochannel supply chain[J].Production and Operations Management,2015,24(8):1358-1370.
[4]Khouja M,Park S,Cai G.Channel selection and pricing in the presence of retail-captive consumers[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2010,125(1):84-95.
[5]Wu C,Mallik S.Cross sales in supply shains:an equilibrium analysis[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2011,126(2):158-167.
[6]Cao W,Jiang B,Zhou D.The effects of demand uncertainty on channel structure[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,207(3):1471-1488.
[7]Matsui K.Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2016,248(2):646-657.
[8]Cachon G P,Lariviere M A.Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:strengths and limitations[J].Management Science,2005,51(1):30-44.
[9]Foros,Hagen K P,Kind H J.Price-dependent profit sharing as a channel coordination device[J].Management Science,2009,55(8):1280-1291.
[10]Bai Q G,Chen M Y,Xu L.Revenue and promotional costsharing contract versus two-part tariff contract in coordinating sustainable supply chain systems with deteriorating items[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,187(5):85-101.
[11]黄松,杨超,张嗛.考虑战略顾客行为时的供应链性能分析与协调[J].管理科学学报,2012,15(2):47-58.(Huang Song,Yang Chao,Zhang Xi.Supply chain performance analysis and coordination with consideration of strategic customer behavior[J].Journal of Management Science,2012,15(2):47-58.)
[12]anako4lu E,Bilgi9 T.Analysis of a two-stage telecommunication supply chain with technology dependent demand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,177(1):995-1012.
[13]Ingene C A,Parry M E.Bilateral monopoly,identical distributors,and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels[J].Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,2007,35(4):586-602.