基于全同态加密的理性委托计算协议
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摘要
传统委托计算因需验证方验证其计算结果,从而导致协议效率低下.针对此问题,本文结合博弈委托代理理论和全同态加密技术,提出理性委托计算协议.该协议通过参与者之间的效用函数保证计算结果的正确性,无需验证方进行验证.首先,利用博弈委托代理理论,构造委托计算博弈模型;其次,结合全同态加密技术,构造理性委托计算协议;最后,对协议进行实验与分析,结果表明,该协议不但保证了安全性和正确性,并且全局可达帕累托最优.
The traditional delegation computation require the verification party to verify the results,which leads to low efficiency of computation protocol. To solve this problem, this paper combines the game principal-agent theory and the fully homomorphic encryption technology to propose a rational delegation computation protocol. This protocol guarantees the correctness of the results through the utility function between the participants,without the validation of the prover. Firstly,we use the game principal-agent theory to construct a game model. Secondly,we combine the fully homomorphic encryption technology to construct the rational delegation computation protocol. Finally,we test and analyze the protocol, the results show that this protocol not only guarantees the safety and validity, and can achieve global Pareto optimality.
The traditional delegation computation require the verification party to verify the results,which leads to low efficiency of computation protocol. To solve this problem, this paper combines the game principal-agent theory and the fully homomorphic encryption technology to propose a rational delegation computation protocol. This protocol guarantees the correctness of the results through the utility function between the participants,without the validation of the prover. Firstly,we use the game principal-agent theory to construct a game model. Secondly,we combine the fully homomorphic encryption technology to construct the rational delegation computation protocol. Finally,we test and analyze the protocol, the results show that this protocol not only guarantees the safety and validity, and can achieve global Pareto optimality.
引文
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[8]田有亮,马建峰,彭长根,等.秘密共享体制的博弈论分析[J].电子学报,2011,39(12):2790-2795.TIAN Y L,M A J F,PENG C G,et al. Game-theoretic anal-ysis for the secret sharing scheme[J]. Acta ElectronicaSinica,2011,39(12):2790-2795.
[9]田有亮,李秋贤.理性密码协议研究进展[J].贵州大学学报:自然科学版,2018,(3):14-23.TIAN Y L,LI Q X. Research progress on rational cryptog-raphy protocol[J]. Journal of Guizhou University:NaturalScience Edition,2018,(3):14-23.
[10]Xiao L,Chen Y,Lin W S,et al. Indirectreciprocity securi-ty game for large-scale w ireless netw orks[J]. IEEETransactions on Information Forensics&Security,2012,7(4):1368-1380.
[11]Xiao L,Chen T,Liu J,et al. Anti-jamming transmissionstackelberg game w ith observation errors[J]. IEEE Com-munications Letters,2015,19(6):949-952.
[12] Wang Y,Wu Q,Wong D S,et al. Securely OutsourcingExponentiations w ith Single Untrusted Program for CloudStorage[M]. Computer Security-ESORICS 2014. Spring-er International Publishing,2014. 326-343.
[13] Chen X,Li J,Susilo W. Efficient fair conditional pay-ments for outsourcing computations[J]. IEEE Transac-tions on Information Forensics&Security,2012,7(6):1687-1694.
[2] Goldwasser S,Micali S,Rackoff C. The knowledge com-plexity of interactive proof systems[J]. SIAM Journal onComputing,1989,18(1):186-208.
[3] Kalai Y T,Raz R. Probabilistically Checkable Arguments[M]. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2009. Berlin Hei-delberg:Springer,2009. 143-159.
[4] Gentry,Craig. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideallattices[J]. Stoc,2009,9(4):169-178.
[5] Gennaro R,Wichs D. Fully Homomorphic Message Au-thenticators[M]. Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT2013. Berlin Heidelberg:Springer,2013. 301-320.
[6] Gennaro R,Gentry C,Parno B. Non-interactive VerifiableComputing:Outsourcing Computation to Untrusted Work-ers[M]. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2010. BerlinHeidelberg:Springer,2010. 465-482.
[7]Chung K M,Kalai Y,Vadhan S. Improved Delegation ofComputation Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption[M].Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2010. Berlin Heidel-berg:Springer,2010. 483-501.
[8]田有亮,马建峰,彭长根,等.秘密共享体制的博弈论分析[J].电子学报,2011,39(12):2790-2795.TIAN Y L,M A J F,PENG C G,et al. Game-theoretic anal-ysis for the secret sharing scheme[J]. Acta ElectronicaSinica,2011,39(12):2790-2795.
[9]田有亮,李秋贤.理性密码协议研究进展[J].贵州大学学报:自然科学版,2018,(3):14-23.TIAN Y L,LI Q X. Research progress on rational cryptog-raphy protocol[J]. Journal of Guizhou University:NaturalScience Edition,2018,(3):14-23.
[10]Xiao L,Chen Y,Lin W S,et al. Indirectreciprocity securi-ty game for large-scale w ireless netw orks[J]. IEEETransactions on Information Forensics&Security,2012,7(4):1368-1380.
[11]Xiao L,Chen T,Liu J,et al. Anti-jamming transmissionstackelberg game w ith observation errors[J]. IEEE Com-munications Letters,2015,19(6):949-952.
[12] Wang Y,Wu Q,Wong D S,et al. Securely OutsourcingExponentiations w ith Single Untrusted Program for CloudStorage[M]. Computer Security-ESORICS 2014. Spring-er International Publishing,2014. 326-343.
[13] Chen X,Li J,Susilo W. Efficient fair conditional pay-ments for outsourcing computations[J]. IEEE Transac-tions on Information Forensics&Security,2012,7(6):1687-1694.