三级低碳供应链联合减排及宣传促销微分博弈研究
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摘要
低碳环境下,研究供应商、制造商与零售商组成的三级供应链联合减排及宣传促销微分博弈问题.首先,通过两次成本加成,考虑产品需求受产品减排量、零售商宣传促销努力及产品零售价格的综合影响,得到供应链分散决策与集中决策情形下的动态均衡策略及减排量的最优轨迹.然后,通过数值算例及灵敏度分析比较两种情形下的结果,研究发现:无论分散决策还是集中决策,减排量,产品批发价,供应商、制造商、零售商的努力水平都随时间逐渐增加至某一稳定值,但集中决策的稳定值大于分散决策相应的稳定值;随着供应商、制造商各自的减排努力对产品减排率的影响系数及零售商的宣传促销努力对产品需求的影响系数的增大,减排量、产品批发价、供应链成员努力水平、供应链成员利润、供应链总利润都会增加;集中决策的供应链总利润总是大于分散决策的供应链总利润.最后,对集中决策总利润用多人联盟博弈的多目标决策合作博弈方法进行分配,实现了供应链系统整体绩效的提升.
This paper studies differential game models for the joint carbon emission reduction and promotion in a threeechelon supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer under the low carbon environment. Based on twice cost accumulation, considering product demand affected by the amount of carbon emission reduction,retailer promotion efforts and product retail prices, the dynamic equilibrium strategy and optimal emission reduction track are abtained under conditions of decentralized manners and centralized manners. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis show that, the amount of carbon emission reduction, the wholesale price of the product and the effort level of supply chain members will gradually increase to a stable value with time, whether it is under the decentralized manners or the centralized manners, but the stable value under centralized manners is larger than that under the decentralized manners. If the impact coefficients of the supplier's and manufacturer's emission reduction efforts to the rate of emission reduction and the impact coefficient of the retailer's promotion efforts to product demand are increased, the amount of carbon emission reduction, the wholesale price of the product, efforts level of supply chain members, profits of supply chain members and the whole system will increase accordingly. The total profits under centralized decision are larger than that under decentralized manners. Finally, the multi-objective cooperative decision method is used to distribute the total profits in this multi-player alliance game model, which improves the overall performance of the whole supply chain system.
This paper studies differential game models for the joint carbon emission reduction and promotion in a threeechelon supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer under the low carbon environment. Based on twice cost accumulation, considering product demand affected by the amount of carbon emission reduction,retailer promotion efforts and product retail prices, the dynamic equilibrium strategy and optimal emission reduction track are abtained under conditions of decentralized manners and centralized manners. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis show that, the amount of carbon emission reduction, the wholesale price of the product and the effort level of supply chain members will gradually increase to a stable value with time, whether it is under the decentralized manners or the centralized manners, but the stable value under centralized manners is larger than that under the decentralized manners. If the impact coefficients of the supplier's and manufacturer's emission reduction efforts to the rate of emission reduction and the impact coefficient of the retailer's promotion efforts to product demand are increased, the amount of carbon emission reduction, the wholesale price of the product, efforts level of supply chain members, profits of supply chain members and the whole system will increase accordingly. The total profits under centralized decision are larger than that under decentralized manners. Finally, the multi-objective cooperative decision method is used to distribute the total profits in this multi-player alliance game model, which improves the overall performance of the whole supply chain system.
引文
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[16]Xu J T,Chen Y Y,Bai Q G.A two-echelon sustainable supply chain coordination under cap-and-trade regulation[J].J of Cleaner Production,2016,135:42-56.
[17]Liu K N,Song H M.Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation[J].Supply Chain Management,2017,22(3):270-283.
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[21]石松,颜波,石平.考虑公平关切的自主减排低碳供应链决策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3079-3091.(Shi S,Yan B,Shi P.Pricing and coordination decisions in autonomous reduction low-carbon supply chain with fairness concerns[J].Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,2016,36(12):3079-3091.)
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[23]黄书真,徐福缘,何建佳,等.双渠道低碳供应链合作减排与促销决策模型[J].科技管理研究,2017(17):246-256.(Huang S Z,Xu F Y,He J J,et al.Cooperative reduction and promotion decision model in dual channel supply chain[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2017(17):246-256.)
[24]徐春明,赵道致,杜其光.需求依赖减排水平和价格的供应链决策与协调机制[J].控制与决策,2016,31(3):486-492.(Xu C M,Zhao D Z,Du Q G.Decision and coordination models for supply chain with carbon emissions reduction level and price dependent demand[J].Control and Decision,2016,31(3):486-492.)
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[26]樊世清,汪晴,陈莉.政府补贴下的三级低碳供应链减排博弈研究[J].工业技术经济,2017(11):12-20.(Fan S Q,Wang Q,Chen L.A study on emission reduction game of three level low carbon supply chain under government subsidies[J].J of Industrial Technologyical Economics,2017(11):12-20.)
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[29]Zhao H J,Li Z.Dynamic game analysis of R&Dinvestment in low carbon supply chain[C].The 28th Chinese Control and Decision Conf.Yinchuan:IEEE,2016:4570-4573.
[30]Zu Y F,Chen L H,Fan Y.Research on low-carbon strategies in supply chain with environmental regulations based on differential game[J].J of Cleaner Production,2018,177:527-546.
[31]赵道致,徐春秋,王芹鹏.考虑零售商竞争的联合减排与低碳宣传微分对策[J].控制与决策,2014,29(10):1809-1815.(Zhao D Z,Xu C Q,Wang Q P.Differential strategies of joint emission reductions and low-carbon promotion considering competing retailers[J].Control and Decision,2014,29(10):1809-1815.)
[32]赵道致,原白云,徐春秋.低碳环境下供应链纵向减排合作的动态协调策略[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(1):147-154.(Zhao D Z,Yuan B Y,Xu C Q.Dynamic coordination strategy of vertical cooperative on carbon emission reduction in supply chain under low-carbon era[J].Jof Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2016,30(1):147-154.)
[33]游达明,朱桂菊,岳柳青.加成定价下低碳供应链生态研发与促销的微分博弈分析[J].软科学,2016,30(2):102-106.(You D M,Zhu G J,Yue L Q.Differential game analysis of ecological R&D and promotion in the low-carbon supply chain with mark-up pricing[J].Soft Science,2016,30(2):102-106.)
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