商业信用:替代性融资,还是流动性危机的信号?
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摘要
受经济增速下滑和结构性去杠杆政策的影响,银行信贷顺周期收缩导致企业对商业信用融资的依赖度上升。本文利用2006-2017年非金融上市公司数据,考察商业信用与银行信贷对于不同融资约束企业在不同经济周期下的关系演变,并以商业信用对企业破产风险的影响来检验商业信用增加的实际功效。实证结果发现:在经济下行周期,商业信用融资约束会随着银行信贷的收紧而收紧,商业信用对银行信贷的替代效应顺周期下降,市场整体流动性风险上升。非融资约束型企业会在经济下行周期减少商业信用的使用量,而融资约束型企业的商业信用的替代效应则不受经济环境的影响。但是,对于融资约束型企业来说,这一替代效应更多的是"虚假替代",即企业并未获得有效的商业信用补充,而是企业财务状况恶化导致的商业信用被动增长,是信用风险上升的信号。
Influenced by the decline of economic growth and structural de-leveraging policy,the pro-cyclical contraction of bank credit leads to the increase of enterprises' dependence on commercial credit financing. Based on the data of non-financial listed companies from 2006 to 2017,this paper examines the evolution of the relationship between commercial credit and bank credit in different financial constraints under different economic cycles,and examines the actual effect of the increase of commercial credit on the bankruptcy risk of enterprises. The empirical results show that in the downturn period,the constraints of commercial credit financing will be tightened with the tightening of bank credit,the substitution effect of commercial credit on bank credit will decrease in a pro-cyclical manner,and the overall liquidity risk of the market will increase. Non-financing-constrained enterprises will reduce the use of commercial credit in the downturn cycle,while the substitution effect of commercial credit of financing-constrained enterprises is not affected by the economic environment. However,for financing-constrained enterprises,this substitution effect is more"false substitution",that is,enterprises have not been effectively supplemented by commercial credit,but the passive growth of commercial credit caused by the deterioration of the financial situation of enterprises,which is a signal of rising credit risk.
Influenced by the decline of economic growth and structural de-leveraging policy,the pro-cyclical contraction of bank credit leads to the increase of enterprises' dependence on commercial credit financing. Based on the data of non-financial listed companies from 2006 to 2017,this paper examines the evolution of the relationship between commercial credit and bank credit in different financial constraints under different economic cycles,and examines the actual effect of the increase of commercial credit on the bankruptcy risk of enterprises. The empirical results show that in the downturn period,the constraints of commercial credit financing will be tightened with the tightening of bank credit,the substitution effect of commercial credit on bank credit will decrease in a pro-cyclical manner,and the overall liquidity risk of the market will increase. Non-financing-constrained enterprises will reduce the use of commercial credit in the downturn cycle,while the substitution effect of commercial credit of financing-constrained enterprises is not affected by the economic environment. However,for financing-constrained enterprises,this substitution effect is more"false substitution",that is,enterprises have not been effectively supplemented by commercial credit,but the passive growth of commercial credit caused by the deterioration of the financial situation of enterprises,which is a signal of rising credit risk.
引文
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[16]张小茜,孙璐佳.抵押品清单扩大、过度杠杆化与企业破产风险---动产抵押法律改革的“双刃剑”效应[J].中国工业经济,2017(7):175-192.
[2]Burkart M,Ellingsen T.In-Kind Finance:A Theory of Trade Credit[J].American Economic Review,2004,94(3):569-590.
[3]Boissay F,Gropp R.Trade Credit Defaults and Liquidity Provision by Firms[J].Working Paper,2007,28(6):581-611.
[4]Huang H,Shi X,Zhang S.Counter-cyclical substitution between trade credit and bank credit[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2011,35(8):0-1878.
[5]陆正飞,杨德明.商业信用:替代性融资,还是买方市场?[J].管理世界,2011(4):6-14,45.
[6]Nilsen,J.Trade credit and the bank lending channel[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2002,34:227-253.
[7]Baum C F,Caglayan M O,Ozkan N,et al.The Impact of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Cash Holdings for NonFinancial Firms[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2004,15(4):289-304.
[8]王化成,刘欢,高升好.经济政策不确定性、产权性质与商业信用[J].经济理论与经济管理,2016(5):34-45.
[9]于博,Gary Gang Tian.产能治理与企业债务结构再平衡---基于商业信用与银行信贷关系视角[J].财经研究,2018,44(2):29-43.
[10]Love I,Preve L A,Sarria-Allende V.Trade credit and bank credit:Evidence from recent financial crises.[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,83(2):453-469.
[11]Banerjee A V,Besley T,Guinnane T W.Thy Neighbor's Keeper:The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test[J].New Haven Connecticut Yale University Economic Growth Center Sep,1993,109(2):491-515.
[12]Cu1at V.Trade Credit:Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers[J].Review of Financial Studies,2007,20(2):491-527.
[13]Weiss L.Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity:An Overview:Comment[J].Proceedings,1988,20(3):594-596.
[14]Gilchrist,Simon.Investment:Fundamentals and Finance[J].NBER Macroeconomics Annual,1998,13(1):223-262.
[15]Altman,E.I.Predicting Financial Distress of Companies:Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA Models[R].Stern School of Business,New York University,2000.
[16]张小茜,孙璐佳.抵押品清单扩大、过度杠杆化与企业破产风险---动产抵押法律改革的“双刃剑”效应[J].中国工业经济,2017(7):175-192.
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