财务困境下基于努力与激励的外包供应链契约协调

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英文篇名：Coordination Contracts for Outsourcing Supply Chain with Financial Constraint Based on Effort and Incentive 作者：于丽萍 ; 扶潇 英文作者：YU Li-ping;FU Xiao;School of Business Administration,Northeastern University; 关键词：外包供应链 ; 财务困境 ; 激励契约 ; 努力 ; 契约协调 英文关键词：outsourcing supply chain;;financial constraint;;incentive contracts;;effort;;coordination contracts 中文刊名：GYGC 英文刊名：Industrial Engineering and Management 机构：东北大学工商管理学院; 出版日期：2018-10-31 11:03 出版单位：工业工程与管理 年：2019 期：v.24;No.135 基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772035,71571041,71372186) 语种：中文; 页：GYGC201902014 页数：8 CN：02 ISSN：31-1738/T 分类号：106-112+119

摘要

在一个用户公司和一个面临财务困境的客服中心构成的外包供应链中,考虑用户公司与客服中心各自的努力对客户数量影响,构建了用户公司提供激励且用户公司与客服中心双方努力及客户中心一方努力的情况下外包供应链双方的利润函数,分析了外包供应链集中决策与分散决策的协调机制。在此基础上,将激励契约与成本共担契约相结合,最终实现财务困境下集中决策外包供应链的协调,并确定出实现协调的契约参数与条件。最后通过数值算例对研究结论进行说明、验证和相应的敏感性分析。
        The outsourcing supply chain consists of a user company and a customer service center with financial constraint.Considering the influence of the respective efforts of the user company and the customer service center on the number of customers,the profit functions of both sides of the outsourcing supply chain were constructed in two situations.Firstly,the user company provided the incentive contract and both the user company and the customer service center provided efforts.Secondly,the user company provided the incentive contract and customer center provided efforts to the outsourcing supply chain.Then the coordination mechanism of centralized decision and decentralized decision in outsourcing supply chain was analyzed.On this basis,the incentive contract was combined with the cost-sharing contract to ultimately achieve the coordination of the outsourcing supply chain under centralized decision-making.After that,the parameters and conditions for achieving the coordination contract were determined.Finally,a numerical example illustrated and verified the conclusions of the study,and then the impact of sensitivity factors were analyzed at the same time.

引文

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