药品供应链质量投入与政府分层监管策略研究
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摘要
结合近年来曝光的假药、假疫苗事件以及药品监管缺失等问题,基于博弈理论,构建了药品供应链多层级混合策略博弈模型,求解了药品供应链上各参与方策略选择的Nash均衡解,揭示了药品供应链的全过程影响机理,并进行了仿真分析。研究表明:政府应从药品流通全过程对供应链上各方依次增加监管严格度;提高举报奖励金、降低举报成本、增加罚款额有利于各方积极采取质量投入策略;药品供应链上游参与者的收益信息对政府及下游参与者的策略选择有重要影响;合理制定各方的罚款额有助于提高监管有效性。提出了政府分层监管策略的改进措施。
Combined with recent exposures of counterfeit drugs,fake vaccines,and lack of drug supervision,based on game theory,this paper constructs a model of multi-level mixed game in the whole drug supply chain,draws Nash equilibrium solutions for each participant's strategy choice,reveals the interaction of participants in the whole process of drug supply chain,and has carried on the simulation analysis.Results show that:The strictness of quality supervision for participants joined from the upstream to the downstream of drug supply chain should be increased more and more by the government;Raising reporting bonuses,reducing the cost of reporting,and increasing the fines will help all participants invest in the drug quality actively;Knowing the information of upstream participant's profit information has a great impact on government and downstream participant's strategy choice;Setting a reasonable fines for each participants can help improve regulatory effectiveness.Finally,the paper puts forward the improvement measures of the government supervision strategy under the quality input of the drug supply chain.
Combined with recent exposures of counterfeit drugs,fake vaccines,and lack of drug supervision,based on game theory,this paper constructs a model of multi-level mixed game in the whole drug supply chain,draws Nash equilibrium solutions for each participant's strategy choice,reveals the interaction of participants in the whole process of drug supply chain,and has carried on the simulation analysis.Results show that:The strictness of quality supervision for participants joined from the upstream to the downstream of drug supply chain should be increased more and more by the government;Raising reporting bonuses,reducing the cost of reporting,and increasing the fines will help all participants invest in the drug quality actively;Knowing the information of upstream participant's profit information has a great impact on government and downstream participant's strategy choice;Setting a reasonable fines for each participants can help improve regulatory effectiveness.Finally,the paper puts forward the improvement measures of the government supervision strategy under the quality input of the drug supply chain.
引文
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[13]慕静,马丽丽.基于SD的食品供应链信息共享演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2015,35(3):182-185.
[14]Giri B C,Roy B,Maiti T.Multi-manufacturer Pricing and Quality Management Strategies in The Presence of Brand Differentiation and Return Policy[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2017,105:146-157.
[15]Hsieh C,Liu Y T.Quality Investment and Inspection Policy in A Supplier-manufacturer Supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,202(3):717-729.
[16]Hlioui R,Gharbi A,Hajji A.Replenishment,Production and Quality Control Strategies in Three-stage Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,166:90-102.
[17]申强,杨为民,刘笑冰,等.基于两种策略的四级供应链质量控制优化研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):52-59.
[18]赵荧梅,郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):111-120.
[2]陶红茹,孙韶云.地方政府与企业对食品安全问题的博弈模型[J].统计与决策,2014(23):44-47.
[3]张雪,张维维,谢明.基于博弈论分析中药饮片质量监管策略[J].中国药房,2017,28(7):872-877.
[4]宋燕,甄天民.药品安全监管的演化博弈与对策分析[J].中国药房,2016,27(19):2593-2595.
[5]于涛,刘长玉.政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):90-96.
[6]Wengle S.When Experimentalist Governance Meets Science‐Based Regulations;The Case of Food Safety Regulations[J].Regulation&Governance,2016,10(3):262-283.
[7]Simpson B P.The Effect of Environmental Regulations and other Government Controls on Oil and Gasoline Production[J].Energy&Environment,2011,22(3):151-166.
[8]沈凯,李从东.供应链视角下的中国药品安全问题研究[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2008(3):82-85.
[9]梁旭,汤宁,魏亚男.供应链视角下我国药品质量问题研究[J].卫生经济研究,2016(5):44-46.
[10]胡颖廉,慕玲.超越监管看安全:国家药品安全治理体系构建[J].中国行政管理,2017(6):115-120.
[11]向靖宇,万建平,杨小军,等.从“铬超标药用胶囊事件”分析我国药品安全监管[J].中国药房,2013,24(25):2308-2310.
[12]肖静华,谢康,于洪彦.基于食品药品供应链质量协同的社会共治实现机制[J].产业经济评论,2014(5):5-15.
[13]慕静,马丽丽.基于SD的食品供应链信息共享演化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2015,35(3):182-185.
[14]Giri B C,Roy B,Maiti T.Multi-manufacturer Pricing and Quality Management Strategies in The Presence of Brand Differentiation and Return Policy[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2017,105:146-157.
[15]Hsieh C,Liu Y T.Quality Investment and Inspection Policy in A Supplier-manufacturer Supply chain[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,202(3):717-729.
[16]Hlioui R,Gharbi A,Hajji A.Replenishment,Production and Quality Control Strategies in Three-stage Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,166:90-102.
[17]申强,杨为民,刘笑冰,等.基于两种策略的四级供应链质量控制优化研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):52-59.
[18]赵荧梅,郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):111-120.