水利工程施工环境成本内部化三方博弈探析
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摘要
为促进水利工程施工过程中减少环境污染、实现可持续发展,分析了政府、建设单位、施工单位三方博弈模型的均衡解,以寻求激励施工单位环境成本内部化的措施。首先,分析水利工程项目环境治理现状,对建立模型的前提条件进行假设;其次,建立政府、建设单位、施工单位三方博弈模型,分析随着各影响因素的变化,模型均衡解是否会向着环境成本内部化的方向发展;最后,根据对模型均衡解的分析,提出政府完善监督激励政策等激励施工单位环境成本内部化、主动不偷排的措施。结果表明:有效的监督、合理的环保合同条款以及适当的奖惩机制有利于施工单位环境成本内部化,从而减少环境污染,实现可持续发展,将绿色理念贯穿水利工程建设始终。
In order to promote the reduction of environmental pollution in the process of water conservancy project construction and achieve sustainable development,this paper formulated a three-side dynamic game model including government,owner and contractor,to explore measures to incentive environmental cost internalization. First,it analyzed the present situation of environmental governance in water conservancy project and assumed the premise conditions of the model. Then,it formulated the three-side dynamic game model to obtain the equilibrium and its variation as the change of various influencing factors. Finally,it put forward the incentive measures such as improving government policies to incentive environmental cost internalization. The results show that the effective government incentive policies,the reasonable environmental terms of the contract and the appropriate social supervision are beneficial to the environmental cost internalization,thus reducing environmental pollution and realizing sustainable development.
In order to promote the reduction of environmental pollution in the process of water conservancy project construction and achieve sustainable development,this paper formulated a three-side dynamic game model including government,owner and contractor,to explore measures to incentive environmental cost internalization. First,it analyzed the present situation of environmental governance in water conservancy project and assumed the premise conditions of the model. Then,it formulated the three-side dynamic game model to obtain the equilibrium and its variation as the change of various influencing factors. Finally,it put forward the incentive measures such as improving government policies to incentive environmental cost internalization. The results show that the effective government incentive policies,the reasonable environmental terms of the contract and the appropriate social supervision are beneficial to the environmental cost internalization,thus reducing environmental pollution and realizing sustainable development.
引文
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[2]李创.环境成本内部化及其在工业企业间的差异分析[J].价格理论与实践,2015(12):86-88.
[3]金友良,李晶晶.基于生命周期的企业环境成本内部化探讨[J].西安财经学院学报,2015,28(3):49-52.
[4]安志蓉,丁慧平.环境绩效、环境成本内部化与环境保护:一个研究综述[J].中国科技论坛,2013(1):126-131.
[5]刘佳佳,曾月明.环境成本最优化决策模型构建:基于环境成本内部化视角[J].财会月刊,2015(9):37-40.
[6]汪龙生.港口工业污水处理监督的演化博弈分析[J].大连海事大学学报,2012(4):26-29.
[7]章辉美,邓子纲.基于政府、企业、社会三方动态博弈的企业社会责任分析[J].系统工程,2011(6):123-126.
[8]王丽,王志祥.建筑工程绿色施工质量与环境成本分析[J].施工技术,2016,45(12):103-106,137.
[9]张智慧,邓超宏.建设项目施工阶段环境影响评价研究[J].土木工程学报,2003,36(9):12-18.
[10]周建亮,佟瑞鹏,陈大伟,等.我国建筑安全生产管理责任制度的政策评估与完善[J].中国安全科学学报,2010,20(6):146-151.
[11]刘长玉,于涛.绿色产品质量监管的三方博弈关系研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(10):170-177.