私募股权投资对创业板上市公司现金股利政策研究
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摘要
本文研究在私募市场快速发展、大量热钱涌入背景下,从私募股权投资促进还是抑制现金股利分配视角,检验私募股权投资是否还是"积极投资者"。研究发现,私募股权投资抑制了创业板上市公司现金股利分配,说明私募股权投资不再是"积极投资者"。从已有文献普遍关注的投资者保护和股权集中度来看,在投资者保护较弱、股权集中度高度分散的上市公司中私募股权投资更能抑制现金股利分配,进一步支持了研究结论。另外本研究还发现,私募股权投资还可能将留下来的现金流用于过度投资和增加代理成本,以谋取其自身私利。本文的结论对于完善现金股利政策、深入认识当前私募股权投资作用具有积极的启示意义。
Under the background of the rapid development of private equity market and the large influx of hot money, this paper examines whether private equity investment is still a "positive investor" with the perspective of private equity investment has promoted or suppressed influence to cash dividend distribution. The empirical results indicate that private equity investment inhibits the cash dividend distribution of the GEM listed companies, showing that private equity investment is no longer a "positive investor". From the perspective of investor protection and ownership concentration, which has been widely cited in the literature, private equity investment can effectively inhibit cash dividend distribution of listed companies which have relatively weak investor protection and highly centralized ownership, which further supports the research conclusion. Moreover,further tests also find that private equity investment may also use the remained cash flow for overinvestment and to increase agency costs in order to obtain its own private benefits. The conclusions of this paper have profound enlightenment to improve cash dividend policy and understand the current role of private equity investment.
Under the background of the rapid development of private equity market and the large influx of hot money, this paper examines whether private equity investment is still a "positive investor" with the perspective of private equity investment has promoted or suppressed influence to cash dividend distribution. The empirical results indicate that private equity investment inhibits the cash dividend distribution of the GEM listed companies, showing that private equity investment is no longer a "positive investor". From the perspective of investor protection and ownership concentration, which has been widely cited in the literature, private equity investment can effectively inhibit cash dividend distribution of listed companies which have relatively weak investor protection and highly centralized ownership, which further supports the research conclusion. Moreover,further tests also find that private equity investment may also use the remained cash flow for overinvestment and to increase agency costs in order to obtain its own private benefits. The conclusions of this paper have profound enlightenment to improve cash dividend policy and understand the current role of private equity investment.
引文
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[19]魏志华,李常青,吴育辉,等.半强制分红政策、再融资动机与经典股利理论——基于股利代理理论与信号理论视角的实证研究[J].会计研究,2017(7):55-61.
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[22]刘孟晖,高友才.现金股利的异常派现、代理成本与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):152-160.
[23]罗进辉,黄泽悦,朱军.独立董事地理距离对公司代理成本的影响[J].中国工业经济,2017(8):100-119.
[24]王会娟,张然.私募股权投资与被投资企业高管薪酬契约——基于公司治理视角的研究[J].管理世界,2012(9):156-167.
[2]Bloom N,Sadun R,Van Reenen J.Do private equity owned firms have better management practices?[J].American Economic Review,2015,105(5):442-46.
[3]邓超,许志勇.我国非金融企业的盈利模式与金融化策略[J].甘肃社会科学,2017(5):228-232
[4]陈洪天,沈维涛.风险投资是新三板市场“积极的投资者”吗[J].财贸经济,2018(6):73-87.
[5]温军,冯根福.风险投资与企业创新:“增值” 与 “攫取” 的权衡视角[J].经济研究,2018,2:185-199.
[6]李曜,张子炜.私募股权、天使资本对创业板市场IPO抑价的不同影响[J].财经研究,2011(8):113-124.
[7]张永明,潘攀,邓超.私募股权投资进入对上市公司IPO当年业绩的影响研究[J].管理科学,2018(1):149-160.
[8]张天舒,陈信元,黄俊.政治关联、风险资本投资与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(5):18-27.
[9]李九斤,王福胜,徐畅.私募股权投资特征对被投资企业价值的影响——基于2008-2012年IPO企业经验数据的研究[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(5):151-160.
[10]Kaplan S N,Str?mberg P.Venture capitalists as principals:Contracting,screening [J].Working Paper Series,2001(2):8201-8210.
[11]Marco D R,and María F P.The effect of venture capital on innovation strategies [R].National Bureau of Economic Research,2007.
[12]Huang R,Ritter J R,Zhang D.Private equity firms’ reputational concerns and the costs of debt financing [J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2016,51(1):29-54.
[13]Kilincarslan E,Ozdemir O.Institutional investment horizon and dividend policy:An empirical study of UK firms [J].Finance Research Letters,2018,24:291-300.
[14]Goyal A,Muckley C.Cash dividends and investor protection in Asia [J].International Review of Financial Analysis,2013,29:31-43.
[15]Lin T J,Chen Y P,Tsai H F.The relationship among information asymmetry,dividend policy and ownership structure [J].Finance Research Letters,2017,20:1-12.
[16]Gonzalez M,Molina C A,Pablo E,et al.The effect of ownership concentration and composition on dividends:Evidence from Latin America [J].Emerging Markets Review,2017,30:1-18.
[17]周县华,范庆泉,吕长江,等.外资股东与股利分配:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].世界经济,2012(11):112-140.
[18]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,等.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012(1):105-119.
[19]魏志华,李常青,吴育辉,等.半强制分红政策、再融资动机与经典股利理论——基于股利代理理论与信号理论视角的实证研究[J].会计研究,2017(7):55-61.
[20]Richardson S.Over-investment of free cash flow [J].Review of accounting studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189
[21]干胜道,胡明霞.管理层权力、内部控制与过度投资——基于国有上市公司的证据[J].审计与经济研究,2014,29(5):40-47.
[22]刘孟晖,高友才.现金股利的异常派现、代理成本与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):152-160.
[23]罗进辉,黄泽悦,朱军.独立董事地理距离对公司代理成本的影响[J].中国工业经济,2017(8):100-119.
[24]王会娟,张然.私募股权投资与被投资企业高管薪酬契约——基于公司治理视角的研究[J].管理世界,2012(9):156-167.