股权激励计划对企业组织资本的影响——基于中国上市公司的经验数据
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摘要
现有关于股权激励的理论认为,一方面,股权激励有助于缓解高管与股东间的委托代理冲突,进而帮助企业实现更高的价值(激励假说);另一方面,股权激励被认为是对高管的一种补偿,是高管权力的象征,对于解决委托代理问题并无益处(福利假说)。基于我国上市公司2005—2017年样本,采用实证分析方法研究股权激励对企业组织资本的影响和作用机制,结果发现:实施股权激励计划的上市公司,其组织资本会得到显著提升(这一结果支持了激励假说);公司的内部治理机制及外部治理机制与股权激励的作用存在一定的替代作用,股权激励对企业组织资本的积极效应在企业独立董事比例越低、监事会规模越小、机构投资者持股比例越低的情况下越显著。因此,企业在制定股权激励策略时,除了考虑短期绩效改善之外,可以将股权激励与企业长期发展所需的组织资本积累相结合,综合考量企业自身内部与外部治理机制的完善程度,从而达到效用最大化。
Existing theories concerning stock option believe that:on the one hand,stock option will be helpful in relieving the principal-agent conflict between top managers and shareholders,which will in turn help the enterprises to realize higher value(the incentive hypothesis);on the other hand,stock option is identified as a kind of compensation for top managers,which will be not beneficial for us to solve the principal-agent problem(the welfare hypothesis). Based on the sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2017,the authors carry out the empirical research on the impact of stock option on company organization capital,and the mechanism of that. It is found that:stock option plays a significant positive role in enhancing firms' organization capital(supporting the incentive hypothesis);the role of stock option will be more significant with lower percentage of corporate independent directors,smaller scale of board of supervisors,and lower percentage of institutional stockholders. While formulating the stock option strategy,besides the short-term performance improvement,the enterprises should also combine the stock option with organization capital accumulation needed by the long-term corporate development and comprehensively consider the perfect level of corporate internal and external governance mechanism to achieve the result of utility maximization.
Existing theories concerning stock option believe that:on the one hand,stock option will be helpful in relieving the principal-agent conflict between top managers and shareholders,which will in turn help the enterprises to realize higher value(the incentive hypothesis);on the other hand,stock option is identified as a kind of compensation for top managers,which will be not beneficial for us to solve the principal-agent problem(the welfare hypothesis). Based on the sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2017,the authors carry out the empirical research on the impact of stock option on company organization capital,and the mechanism of that. It is found that:stock option plays a significant positive role in enhancing firms' organization capital(supporting the incentive hypothesis);the role of stock option will be more significant with lower percentage of corporate independent directors,smaller scale of board of supervisors,and lower percentage of institutional stockholders. While formulating the stock option strategy,besides the short-term performance improvement,the enterprises should also combine the stock option with organization capital accumulation needed by the long-term corporate development and comprehensively consider the perfect level of corporate internal and external governance mechanism to achieve the result of utility maximization.
引文
[1]LEV B,RADHAKRISHNAN S.The valuation of organization capital[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2005:73-110.
[2]BERLE A,MEANS G C.The modern corporation and private property[M].New Brunswick:Transaction publishers,1991:179-187.
[3]DEFUSCO R A,ZORN T S,JOHNSON R R.The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making[J].Financial management,1991,20(1):36-43.
[4]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of financial economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[5]李斌,孙月静.经营者股权激励、约束水平与公司业绩--基于民营上市公司的实证分析[J].中国软科学,2009(8):119-131.
[6]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].管理世界,2011(11):118-126.
[7]陈文强,贾生华.股权激励、代理成本与企业绩效--基于双重委托代理问题的分析框架[J].当代经济科学,2015(37):106-113.
[8]BENEISH M,VARGUS M.Insider trading,earnings quality,and accrual mispricing[J].Accounting review,2002,77(4):755-791.
[9]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010(11):88-100.
[10]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012(10):35-41.
[11]MARSHALL A.Principles of Economics[M].London:Edition,Macmillan,1961.
[12]王双龙.浅析组织资本对企业绩效的影响[J].财会月刊,2006(32):53-54.
[13]马宏乐.组织资本的价值创造机理[J].全国流通经济,2017(10):37-38.
[14]LI K,QIU B,SHEN R.Organization capital and mergers and acquisitions[J].Journal of financial and quantitative analysis,2018(53):1 871-1 909.
[15]EISFELDT A,PAPANIKOLAOU D.Organization capital and the cross-section of expected returns[J].Journal of finance,2013,68(4):1 365-1 406.
[16]邸强,郭俊华.组织资本与企业绩效:理论分析与实证检验[M].上海:上海交通大学出版社,2010.
[17]杨俊仙,周洁.组织资本、横截面收益和全要素生产率--来自中国上市公司的经验[J].中国管理科学,2016(S1):429-434.
[18]徐茗丽,孔东民,代昀昊.组织资本与企业创新[J].金融学季刊,2016(10):73-96.
[19]CHAU G,GRAY S J.Family ownership,board independence and voluntary disclosure:evidence from hong kong[J].Journal of international accounting,auditing and taxation,2010,19(2):93-109.
[20]BEASLEY M S.An empirical analysis of the relation between the boards of director composition and financial statement fraud[J].The accounting review,1996,71(4):43-665.
[21]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?[J].经济研究,2006(5):62-73.
[22]薛祖云,黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量--来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2004(25):84-89.
[23]李维安,王世权.中国上市公司监事会治理绩效评价与实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005(1):4-9.
[24]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革[J].经济研究,2005(4):72-86.
[25]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[26]CHUNG R,FIRTH M,KIM J B,Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management[J].Journal of corporate finance,2002,8(1):29-48.
[27]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲,许静静.为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?[J].会计研究,2011(1):68-75.
[28]LEV B,RADHAKRISHNAN S,ZHANG W.Organization capital[J].Abacus,2009,45(3):275-298.
[29]IMROHOROGLU A,TUZEL S.Firm-level productivity,risk and return[J].Management science,2014,60(8):2073-2 090.
[30]DEMERJIAN P R,LEV B,MCVAY S E.Quantifying managerial ability:a new measure and validity tests[J].Management science,2012,58(7):1 229-1 248.
(1)我们发现,交乘项Option×INDEP×SUPVIS与Option_percent×INDEP×SUPVIS的系数显著为正,表明当独立董事制度、监事会制度和股权激励配合作用时,效果则非常明显。这表明,公司中股权激励的执行效果与公司自身的内部治理机制之间的配合是尤为重要的。
[2]BERLE A,MEANS G C.The modern corporation and private property[M].New Brunswick:Transaction publishers,1991:179-187.
[3]DEFUSCO R A,ZORN T S,JOHNSON R R.The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making[J].Financial management,1991,20(1):36-43.
[4]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of financial economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[5]李斌,孙月静.经营者股权激励、约束水平与公司业绩--基于民营上市公司的实证分析[J].中国软科学,2009(8):119-131.
[6]吕长江,张海平.股权激励计划对公司投资行为的影响[J].管理世界,2011(11):118-126.
[7]陈文强,贾生华.股权激励、代理成本与企业绩效--基于双重委托代理问题的分析框架[J].当代经济科学,2015(37):106-113.
[8]BENEISH M,VARGUS M.Insider trading,earnings quality,and accrual mispricing[J].Accounting review,2002,77(4):755-791.
[9]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010(11):88-100.
[10]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012(10):35-41.
[11]MARSHALL A.Principles of Economics[M].London:Edition,Macmillan,1961.
[12]王双龙.浅析组织资本对企业绩效的影响[J].财会月刊,2006(32):53-54.
[13]马宏乐.组织资本的价值创造机理[J].全国流通经济,2017(10):37-38.
[14]LI K,QIU B,SHEN R.Organization capital and mergers and acquisitions[J].Journal of financial and quantitative analysis,2018(53):1 871-1 909.
[15]EISFELDT A,PAPANIKOLAOU D.Organization capital and the cross-section of expected returns[J].Journal of finance,2013,68(4):1 365-1 406.
[16]邸强,郭俊华.组织资本与企业绩效:理论分析与实证检验[M].上海:上海交通大学出版社,2010.
[17]杨俊仙,周洁.组织资本、横截面收益和全要素生产率--来自中国上市公司的经验[J].中国管理科学,2016(S1):429-434.
[18]徐茗丽,孔东民,代昀昊.组织资本与企业创新[J].金融学季刊,2016(10):73-96.
[19]CHAU G,GRAY S J.Family ownership,board independence and voluntary disclosure:evidence from hong kong[J].Journal of international accounting,auditing and taxation,2010,19(2):93-109.
[20]BEASLEY M S.An empirical analysis of the relation between the boards of director composition and financial statement fraud[J].The accounting review,1996,71(4):43-665.
[21]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?[J].经济研究,2006(5):62-73.
[22]薛祖云,黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量--来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2004(25):84-89.
[23]李维安,王世权.中国上市公司监事会治理绩效评价与实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005(1):4-9.
[24]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革[J].经济研究,2005(4):72-86.
[25]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[26]CHUNG R,FIRTH M,KIM J B,Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management[J].Journal of corporate finance,2002,8(1):29-48.
[27]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲,许静静.为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?[J].会计研究,2011(1):68-75.
[28]LEV B,RADHAKRISHNAN S,ZHANG W.Organization capital[J].Abacus,2009,45(3):275-298.
[29]IMROHOROGLU A,TUZEL S.Firm-level productivity,risk and return[J].Management science,2014,60(8):2073-2 090.
[30]DEMERJIAN P R,LEV B,MCVAY S E.Quantifying managerial ability:a new measure and validity tests[J].Management science,2012,58(7):1 229-1 248.
(1)我们发现,交乘项Option×INDEP×SUPVIS与Option_percent×INDEP×SUPVIS的系数显著为正,表明当独立董事制度、监事会制度和股权激励配合作用时,效果则非常明显。这表明,公司中股权激励的执行效果与公司自身的内部治理机制之间的配合是尤为重要的。