右转机动车与非机动车冲突博弈行为分析

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英文篇名：Analysis on conflict behavior between right-turn motor vehicles and non-motor vehicles based on game theory 作者：张翠平 ; 于瑞康 ; 赵晖 英文作者：ZHANG Cuiping;YU Ruikang;ZHAO Hui;Computer School,Beijing Information Science & Technology University;Department of Safety Management,Shandong High Speed Logistics Group Co.,Ltd;School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University; 关键词：冲突 ; 延误 ; 风险 ; 决策 ; 非机动车 英文关键词：conflict;;delay;;risk;;decision-making;;non-motor vehicle 中文刊名：BJGY 英文刊名：Journal of Beijing Information Science & Technology University 机构：北京信息科技大学计算机学院;山东高速物流集团有限公司安全管理部;北京交通大学交通运输学院; 出版日期：2019-02-15 出版单位：北京信息科技大学学报(自然科学版) 年：2019 期：v.34;No.127 基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371028);; 北京信息科技大学学校科研基金资助项目(1825028) 语种：中文; 页：BJGY201901002 页数：5 CN：01 ISSN：11-5866/N 分类号：10-14

摘要

基于博弈论方法,研究了信号交叉口右转机动车与非机动车的冲突行为。右转机动车与非机动车冲突的严重性取决于冲突双方的决策行为,因此可以采用博弈论模型对机动车与非机动车冲突决策场景与过程进行建模分析。通过构建基于延误与风险参数的收益函数,分析了机动车与非机动车的冲突决策行为,计算了机动车和非机动车在采取不同策略先后条件下的收益。结果表明,非机动车选择等待策略,机动车选择抢行策略可获得最大收益。针对此现象,提出了相应的安全措施。可见,所提出的模型对于信号交叉口安全管理具有潜在的应用价值。
        Based on game theory, the conflict behavior between right-turn motor vehicles and non-motor vehicles at signalized intersection is investigated. The conflict severity depends on their decision making behaviors, so game theory could be introduced to model and analyze the decision making of them. A pay-off function based on delay and risk parameters is constructed. A non-cooperative dynamic model is established based on game theory for analyzing the decision making behavior of them. The results indicate that the right-turn motor vehicles and non-motor vehicles have different strategies for calculating the pay-off. No matter which side makes the decision first, maximum benefit can be achieved when the right-turn motorized vehicles choose to rush out and the non-motorized vehicles choose to wait. The proposed model has some potential application for signalized intersection safety management.

引文

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