市民社会视域下的土耳其“居伦运动”述评
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摘要
"居伦运动"在很大程度上可视为市民社会组织的范畴,"服务"是其核心原则,金融捐助是其主要资金来源,其成员分为核心追随者、附属者和同情者三个圈层。"居伦运动"基于自愿原则开展教育、传媒、金融和经济活动,提供社会公共服务,是土耳其现代化进程的重要参与者。近年来,"居伦运动"参与政党政治尤其是同正义与发展党的权力博弈凸显了其政治色彩,背离了市民社会组织的非政治功能,表现出"越位"倾向。"居伦运动"的全球扩张引发了广泛质疑,很多国家怀疑该运动的本质是输出伊斯兰教,隐藏着重现奥斯曼帝国辉煌的野心,加之该运动与美国存在特殊关系,导致其在世界范围内遭遇严峻挑战。
The Gülen movement,as a civil society organization,relies on financial contribution.It emphasizes hizmet as a priority and comes into a huge community whose members can be subdivided into three circles: the core leaders,the affiliates and the sympathizers. The Gülen movement has scored great achievements in education,media,finance,economy and public services based on principles of autonomy and voluntary. The movement also participates in party politics in Turkey and launches power game with ruling party which suggests that it is beyond basic function of civil society organization. The expansion of the Gülen movement all over the world has aroused widespread doubt about its exporting Islam and recreating glory of the Ottoman Empire. There is also suspect that the Gülen movement has a special relationship with the United States. This led to challenges facing the movement in the world.
The Gülen movement,as a civil society organization,relies on financial contribution.It emphasizes hizmet as a priority and comes into a huge community whose members can be subdivided into three circles: the core leaders,the affiliates and the sympathizers. The Gülen movement has scored great achievements in education,media,finance,economy and public services based on principles of autonomy and voluntary. The movement also participates in party politics in Turkey and launches power game with ruling party which suggests that it is beyond basic function of civil society organization. The expansion of the Gülen movement all over the world has aroused widespread doubt about its exporting Islam and recreating glory of the Ottoman Empire. There is also suspect that the Gülen movement has a special relationship with the United States. This led to challenges facing the movement in the world.
引文
(1)费图拉·居伦是土耳其语名字的音译,目前国内译法并不统一,包括法图拉·葛兰、费图拉·居兰、费图拉·古莱恩、费图拉·居伦等,“居伦运动”也被译为葛兰运动、居兰运动、古莱恩运动等。本文除引用相关文献时保留原作者的译法外,均按照新华社译名室的译名标准,统一使用费图拉·居伦与“居伦运动”。
(2)Peter M andaville,“Transnational M uslim Solidarities and Everyday Life,”Nations and Nationalism,Vol.17,No.1,2011,pp.16-17.
(3)I爧tar B.G9zaydin,“The Fethullah Gülen M ovement and Politics in Turkey:A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?”Democratization,Vol.16,No.6,2009,p.1219.
(4)20世纪90年代以来,在中国学术界关于“市民社会”、“公民社会”、“非政府部门”或“第三部门”的讨论中,这些概念都直指国家与公民的中间环节。学界关于公民社会与市民社会的概念和内涵也多有争论,本文采用市民社会的称谓,但引文中为保持原文而使用公民社会的表述。
(1)Pim Valkenberg,Renewing Islam by Service,A Christian View of Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet Movement,Washington,D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press,2015,p.157.
(2)Brian Know elton,“Turk Who Leads a M ovement Has Advocates and Critics,”New York Times,June 11,2010.
(3)“努尔库运动”是伊斯兰思想家赛义德·努尔西追随者的统称。赛义德·努尔西是土耳其著名的伊斯兰思想家,其基本思想体现在鸿篇巨制《光的书信》中,影响了土耳其的伊斯兰复兴运动走向。在反对凯末尔世俗化改革过程中,努尔西的追随者日渐增多,形成声势浩大的“努尔库运动”。在土耳其现代化进程中,“努尔库运动”因成员思想分歧而陷入分裂。
(4)Doɡ(u Ergil and Gürkanelk,“The Socio-Political Dimension of the Gülen M ovement,”in Gürkanelk,Johan Leman and Karel Steenbrink,eds.,Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe:The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement.Bruxelles;New York:P.I.E.Peter Lang,2015,p.122.
(1)Pim Valkenberg,Renewing Islam by Service,A Christian View of Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet Movement,p.161.
(2)Ahmet Yükleyen and G9k9eYurdaku,l“Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration:Turkish Organization in Germany,”Immigrant and Minorities,Vol.29,No.1,2011,p.75.
(3)Peter M andaville,“Transnational M uslim Solidarities and Everyday Life,”p.17.
(4)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,New York:Oxford University Press,2013,p.74.
(5)Ibid.,p.91.
(6)Jeremy F.Walton,“Horizons and Histories of Liberal Piety:Civil Islam and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey,”Ph.D.Dissertation,The University of Chicago,2009,p.41。转引自Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz,eds.,European Muslims,Civility and Public Life:Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement,New York:Continuum International,2012,p.208。
(1)市民社会组织是“在一定价值观的指导下活动的,不以营利为目的,致力于社会公益性事业”,“在谋求经济公平和社会正义、维护社会整体利益乃至全人类共同利益的旗帜下开展活动”的道义性社会组织力量。参见赵黎青:《非政府组织与可持续发展》,北京:经济科学出版社1998年版,第80页。
(1)“德尔沙尼”最初是“努尔库运动”成员集中学习和阅读努尔西著作的学习中心,部分大学生也在这里居住学习。“居伦运动”兴起后,居伦的追随者在这里阅读《古兰经》、“圣训”、努尔西和居伦的著作,并就阅读过程中遇到的疑问开展讨论。
(2)Tuɡ(ral Keskin,“M arket-Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,”in Berna Turam,ed.,Secular State and Religious Society:Two Forces in Play in Turkey,New York:Palgrave M acmillan,2012,p.135.
(3)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.78.
(4)Fabio Vicin,i“Gülen's Rethinking of Islamic Pattern and Its Socio-Political Effects,”in Ihsan Yilmaz et al.,eds.,Muslim World in Transition:Contributions of the Gülen Movement,London:Leeds M etropolitan University Press,2007,p.437.
(5)Rifat Atay,“Reviving the Suffa Tradition,”in Ihsan Yilmazet et al.,eds.,Muslim World in Transition:Contributions of the Gülen Movement,p.471.
(1)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen English vs.Turkish,Lanham:University Press of America,2012,p.4.
(2)M artin E.M arty,ed.,Hizmet Means Service:Perspectives on an Alternative Path within Islam,Oakland:University of California Press,2015,p.176.
(3)“希米特”意为给予无私捐助。
(4)“伊赫拉斯”意为获得真主的赞赏。
(5)Fabio Vicin,i“Gülen's Rethinking of Islamic Pattern and Its Socio-Political Effects,”p.437.
(6)天课是伊斯兰教的五功之一。伊斯兰教法规定,凡有合法收入的穆斯林家庭需每年捐出年度纯收入的2.5%用于赈济穷人或需要救助的人。
(7)Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz,eds.,European Muslims,Civility and Public Life:Perspective on and from the Gülen Movement,p.24.
(8)SalihYuce,l“Fethullah Gülen:Spiritual Leader in a Global Islamic Context,”Journal of Religion&Society,Vol.12,2010,pp.1-19.
(1)Helen Rose Ebaugh,The Gülen Movement:A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam,New York:Springer,2010,p.36.
(2)Ibid.,p.57.
(3)Ibid.,p.54.
(4)Ibid.,p.52.
(5)Ibid.
(1)参见Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,pp.87-88。
(1)Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koc,“The Turkish Coup Attempt:The Gülen M ovement vs.the State,”Middle East Policy,Vol.23,No.4,2016,p.138.
(2)Kim Shively,“Pragmatic Politics:The Gülen M ovement and the AKP,”inmit Cizre,ed.,The Turkish AK Party and Its Leader:Criticism,Opposition and Dissent,London and New York:Routledge,2017,p.195.
(3)范明林:《非政府组织与政府的互动关系---基于法团主义和市民社会视角的比较个案研究》,载《社会学研究》2010年第3期,第161页。
(4)BernaTuram,“The Politics of Engagement betw een Islam and the Secular State:Ambivalence of‘Civil Society',”The British Journal of Sociology,Vol.55,No.2,2004,p.261.
(5)Ihsan Yilmaz,“State,Law,Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey,”The Muslim World,Vol.95,Vol.3,2005,p.397.
(6)Berna Turam,Between Islam and the State:The Politics of Engagement,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2007,pp.31-32.
(1)Berna Turam,“Ordinary M uslims:Pow er and Space in Everyday Life,”International Journal of Middle East Studies,Vol.43,No.1,2011,p.145.
(2)Zeyno Baran,Torn Country:Turkey between Secularism and Islamism,Stanford:Hoover Institution Press Publication,2010,p.43.
(3)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.200.
(4)Abdullah Bozkurt,Turkey Interrupted:Derailing Democracy,New York:Blue Dome Press,2015,p.125.
(5)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.218.
(1)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.218.
(2)Kadir Ustun and Erol Cebec,i“AK Party-Gulen Split:Political Fallout from Corruption Probe,”SETAPerspective,January 2014,p.4,http://setadc.org/w p-content/uploads/2015/05/SETA_DC_Perspective_AK-Party-GUlen-Split_Political_Fallout.pdf,登录时间:2018年12月19日。
(3)李游、韩隽:《土耳其葛兰运动和正发党关系探析》,载《亚太安全与海洋研究》2017年第5期,第73页。
(4)同上,第71页。
(1)Suzy Hansen,“Whose Turkey Is It?,”The New York Time Magazine,February 9,2014。转引自Kim Shively,“Pragmatic Politics:The Gülen M ovement and the AKP,”inmit Cizre ed.,The Turkish AK Party and Its Leader:Criticism,Opposition and Dissent,London and New York:Routledge,p.202。
(2)Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz,eds.,European Muslims,Civility and Public Life:Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement,p.209.
(1)Bayram Balc,“Fethullah Gülen's M issinary School in Central Asia and the Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam”,Religion,State and Society,Vol.31,No.2,2003,p.164.
(2)Bayram Balc,“Central Asia:Fethullah Gulen's M issionary Schools,”Religioscope,April 11,2002,https://english.religion.info/2002/04/11/central-asia-fetullah-gulens-missionary-schools/,登录时间:2018年12月18日。
(3)Rachel Sharon-Krespin,“Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition:Turkey's Islamist Danger,”Middle East Quarterly,Vol.16,No.1,2009,http://w w w.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition,登录时间:2018年12月10日。
(4)M ichael Rubin,“Turkey's Turning Point Could There Be an Islamic Revolution in Turkey?”,April 14,2008,https://w w w.nationalreview.com/2008/04/turkeys-turning-point-michael-rubin/,登录时间:2018年12月20日。
(5)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.25.
(1)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.26.
(2)Ibid.,p.27.
(3)塔基亚原则(Taqiyya)是阿拉伯语的音译,意为掩饰。作为《古兰经》的一个原则,指的是穆斯林在遭受迫害时,可以隐瞒自己的信仰。
(4)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.23.
(1)Guy Rodgers,“Fethulla Gulen:Infiltrating the U.S.Through Our Charter Schools?,”ACT!for America,April 9,2009,https://w w w.meforum.org/campus-w atch/articles/2009/fethullah-gulen-infiltrating-the-u-s-throughour,登录时间:2018年12月22日。
(2)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.28.
(2)Peter M andaville,“Transnational M uslim Solidarities and Everyday Life,”Nations and Nationalism,Vol.17,No.1,2011,pp.16-17.
(3)I爧tar B.G9zaydin,“The Fethullah Gülen M ovement and Politics in Turkey:A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?”Democratization,Vol.16,No.6,2009,p.1219.
(4)20世纪90年代以来,在中国学术界关于“市民社会”、“公民社会”、“非政府部门”或“第三部门”的讨论中,这些概念都直指国家与公民的中间环节。学界关于公民社会与市民社会的概念和内涵也多有争论,本文采用市民社会的称谓,但引文中为保持原文而使用公民社会的表述。
(1)Pim Valkenberg,Renewing Islam by Service,A Christian View of Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet Movement,Washington,D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press,2015,p.157.
(2)Brian Know elton,“Turk Who Leads a M ovement Has Advocates and Critics,”New York Times,June 11,2010.
(3)“努尔库运动”是伊斯兰思想家赛义德·努尔西追随者的统称。赛义德·努尔西是土耳其著名的伊斯兰思想家,其基本思想体现在鸿篇巨制《光的书信》中,影响了土耳其的伊斯兰复兴运动走向。在反对凯末尔世俗化改革过程中,努尔西的追随者日渐增多,形成声势浩大的“努尔库运动”。在土耳其现代化进程中,“努尔库运动”因成员思想分歧而陷入分裂。
(4)Doɡ(u Ergil and Gürkanelk,“The Socio-Political Dimension of the Gülen M ovement,”in Gürkanelk,Johan Leman and Karel Steenbrink,eds.,Gülen-Inspired Hizmet in Europe:The Western Journey of a Turkish Muslim Movement.Bruxelles;New York:P.I.E.Peter Lang,2015,p.122.
(1)Pim Valkenberg,Renewing Islam by Service,A Christian View of Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet Movement,p.161.
(2)Ahmet Yükleyen and G9k9eYurdaku,l“Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration:Turkish Organization in Germany,”Immigrant and Minorities,Vol.29,No.1,2011,p.75.
(3)Peter M andaville,“Transnational M uslim Solidarities and Everyday Life,”p.17.
(4)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,New York:Oxford University Press,2013,p.74.
(5)Ibid.,p.91.
(6)Jeremy F.Walton,“Horizons and Histories of Liberal Piety:Civil Islam and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey,”Ph.D.Dissertation,The University of Chicago,2009,p.41。转引自Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz,eds.,European Muslims,Civility and Public Life:Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement,New York:Continuum International,2012,p.208。
(1)市民社会组织是“在一定价值观的指导下活动的,不以营利为目的,致力于社会公益性事业”,“在谋求经济公平和社会正义、维护社会整体利益乃至全人类共同利益的旗帜下开展活动”的道义性社会组织力量。参见赵黎青:《非政府组织与可持续发展》,北京:经济科学出版社1998年版,第80页。
(1)“德尔沙尼”最初是“努尔库运动”成员集中学习和阅读努尔西著作的学习中心,部分大学生也在这里居住学习。“居伦运动”兴起后,居伦的追随者在这里阅读《古兰经》、“圣训”、努尔西和居伦的著作,并就阅读过程中遇到的疑问开展讨论。
(2)Tuɡ(ral Keskin,“M arket-Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,”in Berna Turam,ed.,Secular State and Religious Society:Two Forces in Play in Turkey,New York:Palgrave M acmillan,2012,p.135.
(3)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.78.
(4)Fabio Vicin,i“Gülen's Rethinking of Islamic Pattern and Its Socio-Political Effects,”in Ihsan Yilmaz et al.,eds.,Muslim World in Transition:Contributions of the Gülen Movement,London:Leeds M etropolitan University Press,2007,p.437.
(5)Rifat Atay,“Reviving the Suffa Tradition,”in Ihsan Yilmazet et al.,eds.,Muslim World in Transition:Contributions of the Gülen Movement,p.471.
(1)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen English vs.Turkish,Lanham:University Press of America,2012,p.4.
(2)M artin E.M arty,ed.,Hizmet Means Service:Perspectives on an Alternative Path within Islam,Oakland:University of California Press,2015,p.176.
(3)“希米特”意为给予无私捐助。
(4)“伊赫拉斯”意为获得真主的赞赏。
(5)Fabio Vicin,i“Gülen's Rethinking of Islamic Pattern and Its Socio-Political Effects,”p.437.
(6)天课是伊斯兰教的五功之一。伊斯兰教法规定,凡有合法收入的穆斯林家庭需每年捐出年度纯收入的2.5%用于赈济穷人或需要救助的人。
(7)Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz,eds.,European Muslims,Civility and Public Life:Perspective on and from the Gülen Movement,p.24.
(8)SalihYuce,l“Fethullah Gülen:Spiritual Leader in a Global Islamic Context,”Journal of Religion&Society,Vol.12,2010,pp.1-19.
(1)Helen Rose Ebaugh,The Gülen Movement:A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam,New York:Springer,2010,p.36.
(2)Ibid.,p.57.
(3)Ibid.,p.54.
(4)Ibid.,p.52.
(5)Ibid.
(1)参见Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,pp.87-88。
(1)Hakan Yavuz and Rasim Koc,“The Turkish Coup Attempt:The Gülen M ovement vs.the State,”Middle East Policy,Vol.23,No.4,2016,p.138.
(2)Kim Shively,“Pragmatic Politics:The Gülen M ovement and the AKP,”inmit Cizre,ed.,The Turkish AK Party and Its Leader:Criticism,Opposition and Dissent,London and New York:Routledge,2017,p.195.
(3)范明林:《非政府组织与政府的互动关系---基于法团主义和市民社会视角的比较个案研究》,载《社会学研究》2010年第3期,第161页。
(4)BernaTuram,“The Politics of Engagement betw een Islam and the Secular State:Ambivalence of‘Civil Society',”The British Journal of Sociology,Vol.55,No.2,2004,p.261.
(5)Ihsan Yilmaz,“State,Law,Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey,”The Muslim World,Vol.95,Vol.3,2005,p.397.
(6)Berna Turam,Between Islam and the State:The Politics of Engagement,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2007,pp.31-32.
(1)Berna Turam,“Ordinary M uslims:Pow er and Space in Everyday Life,”International Journal of Middle East Studies,Vol.43,No.1,2011,p.145.
(2)Zeyno Baran,Torn Country:Turkey between Secularism and Islamism,Stanford:Hoover Institution Press Publication,2010,p.43.
(3)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.200.
(4)Abdullah Bozkurt,Turkey Interrupted:Derailing Democracy,New York:Blue Dome Press,2015,p.125.
(5)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.218.
(1)Hakan Yavuz,Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:The Gülen Movement,p.218.
(2)Kadir Ustun and Erol Cebec,i“AK Party-Gulen Split:Political Fallout from Corruption Probe,”SETAPerspective,January 2014,p.4,http://setadc.org/w p-content/uploads/2015/05/SETA_DC_Perspective_AK-Party-GUlen-Split_Political_Fallout.pdf,登录时间:2018年12月19日。
(3)李游、韩隽:《土耳其葛兰运动和正发党关系探析》,载《亚太安全与海洋研究》2017年第5期,第73页。
(4)同上,第71页。
(1)Suzy Hansen,“Whose Turkey Is It?,”The New York Time Magazine,February 9,2014。转引自Kim Shively,“Pragmatic Politics:The Gülen M ovement and the AKP,”inmit Cizre ed.,The Turkish AK Party and Its Leader:Criticism,Opposition and Dissent,London and New York:Routledge,p.202。
(2)Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz,eds.,European Muslims,Civility and Public Life:Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement,p.209.
(1)Bayram Balc,“Fethullah Gülen's M issinary School in Central Asia and the Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam”,Religion,State and Society,Vol.31,No.2,2003,p.164.
(2)Bayram Balc,“Central Asia:Fethullah Gulen's M issionary Schools,”Religioscope,April 11,2002,https://english.religion.info/2002/04/11/central-asia-fetullah-gulens-missionary-schools/,登录时间:2018年12月18日。
(3)Rachel Sharon-Krespin,“Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition:Turkey's Islamist Danger,”Middle East Quarterly,Vol.16,No.1,2009,http://w w w.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition,登录时间:2018年12月10日。
(4)M ichael Rubin,“Turkey's Turning Point Could There Be an Islamic Revolution in Turkey?”,April 14,2008,https://w w w.nationalreview.com/2008/04/turkeys-turning-point-michael-rubin/,登录时间:2018年12月20日。
(5)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.25.
(1)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.26.
(2)Ibid.,p.27.
(3)塔基亚原则(Taqiyya)是阿拉伯语的音译,意为掩饰。作为《古兰经》的一个原则,指的是穆斯林在遭受迫害时,可以隐瞒自己的信仰。
(4)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.23.
(1)Guy Rodgers,“Fethulla Gulen:Infiltrating the U.S.Through Our Charter Schools?,”ACT!for America,April 9,2009,https://w w w.meforum.org/campus-w atch/articles/2009/fethullah-gulen-infiltrating-the-u-s-throughour,登录时间:2018年12月22日。
(2)Doɡ(an Ko9,Strategic Defamation of Fethullah Gülen:English vs.Turkish,p.28.