差异化风险及买方市场环境下的审计师行为选择研究——基于上市公司操纵“会税差”的视角
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摘要
为降低盈余操纵行为被市场或监管机构发现的概率,公司可能会选择承担盈余操纵所产生的税负成本。相应地,在客户主导的审计市场上,审计师可能会因自身承担较低风险而配合客户的纳税型盈余操纵。以2012—2016年A股上市公司为样本,检验了异常审计收费及审计意见是否在纳税和非纳税这两种类型的盈余操纵中存在差异。研究发现,客户为操纵盈余纳税和不纳税都降低了公司的盈余持续性,且纳税型盈余操纵可能造成公司未来更大的经营风险,更有可能损害投资者利益,但审计师会通过提高审计收费和发表非无保留审计意见应对客户的非纳税型操纵盈余行为,而不太重视更为隐蔽的纳税型操纵盈余,以规避客户的流失,这种现象在透明度低的公司中更可能出现。研究揭示了竞争压力下审计师权衡风险后对客户纳税型盈余操纵的"纵容"行为,有助于监管部门提升对公司中较隐蔽的纳税型盈余操纵及相应审计师行为的关注和规范。
The companies may pay the tax for their earnings manipulation to avoid being suspected by capital market or regulators. Accordingly,in buyer's market where customers orient the trade,we would like to know whether auditors would cooperate with their clients due to auditors' relatively low risk when companies involve in tax-paying earnings manipulation. With the sample of A-share listed companies during the years from 2012 to 2016,we examine whether there is any difference in the abnormal auditing fees and auditing opinions between tax-paying and non-tax-paying earnings manipulation. The research finds that the earnings persistence has been reduced no matter whether companies pay the tax for their earnings manipulation or not. The taxpaying earnings manipulation is likely to result in more business risks in the companies and more likely to damage the interests of investors. However,auditors may react on the non-tax-paying behaviors by increasing the audit fees and issuing the non-standard audit opinions,but they pay less attention to the tax-paying earnings manipulation which is harder to detect,for the purpose of keeping clients. This phenomenon is more common in the companies with low transparency. This paper reveals the auditors' act of connivance under the pressure of competition after auditors weigh the risks of indulging their clients' tax-paying earnings manipulation,in the hope that the findings can help regulatory departments increase their concern and regulation on the hidden taxpaying earnings manipulation and related auditors' selective behaviors.
The companies may pay the tax for their earnings manipulation to avoid being suspected by capital market or regulators. Accordingly,in buyer's market where customers orient the trade,we would like to know whether auditors would cooperate with their clients due to auditors' relatively low risk when companies involve in tax-paying earnings manipulation. With the sample of A-share listed companies during the years from 2012 to 2016,we examine whether there is any difference in the abnormal auditing fees and auditing opinions between tax-paying and non-tax-paying earnings manipulation. The research finds that the earnings persistence has been reduced no matter whether companies pay the tax for their earnings manipulation or not. The taxpaying earnings manipulation is likely to result in more business risks in the companies and more likely to damage the interests of investors. However,auditors may react on the non-tax-paying behaviors by increasing the audit fees and issuing the non-standard audit opinions,but they pay less attention to the tax-paying earnings manipulation which is harder to detect,for the purpose of keeping clients. This phenomenon is more common in the companies with low transparency. This paper reveals the auditors' act of connivance under the pressure of competition after auditors weigh the risks of indulging their clients' tax-paying earnings manipulation,in the hope that the findings can help regulatory departments increase their concern and regulation on the hidden taxpaying earnings manipulation and related auditors' selective behaviors.
引文
[1]叶康涛.盈余管理与所得税支付:基于会计利润与应税所得之间差异的研究[J].中国会计评论,2006(2):205-224.
[2]孙峥嵘.会计---税收差异、盈余管理及市场反应[D].成都:西南财经大学,2008.
[3]CHAN K H,LIN K Z,MO P L L.Will a departure from tax-based accounting encourage tax noncompliance?Archival evidence from a transition economy[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):58-73.
[4]BADERTSCHER B A,PHILLIPS J D,PINCUSM,et al.Earnings management strategies and the trade-off between tax benefits and detection risk:to conform or not to conform?[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(1):63-97.
[5]WONG R M K,LO A W Y,FIRTH M.Managing discretionary accruals and book-tax differences in anticipation of tax rate increases:evidence from China[J].Journal of International Financial Management&Accounting,2015,26(2):188-222.
[6]DESAI M A.The degradation of reported corporate profits[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2005,19(4):171-192.
[7]HELTZER W.Conservatism and book-tax differences[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2009,24(3):469-504.
[8]芦笛.税收---会计差异与企业盈余管理行为的研究[J].科研管理,2017(5):98-106.
[9]FRANK M M,LYNCH L J,REGO S O.Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(2):467-496.
[10]曹琼,卜华,杨玉凤,等.盈余管理,审计费用与审计意见[J].审计研究,2013(6):76-83.
[11]程昔武,张泽云,纪纲.产权性质、会计---税收差异与审计收费---来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2016(5):22-29.
[12]HANLON M,KRISHNAN G V,MILLS L F.Audit fees and book-tax differences[J].Journal of the American Taxation Association,2012,34(1):55-86.
[13]RIGUEN K,JARBOUI A.Direct and mediated associations among earnings quality,book-tax differences and the audit quality[J].Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting,2017,15(3):293-316.
[14]HANLON M.The persistence and pricing of earnings,accruals,and cash flows when firms have large book-tax differences[J].The Accounting Review,2005,80(1):137-166.
[15]FRANCIS J R,MICHAS P N,SEAVEY S E.Does audit market concentration harm the quality of audited earnings?Evidence from audit markets in 42 countries[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):325-355.
[16]肖虹,李少轩,张瑞丽.其他综合收益列报与审计师行为---基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(10):108-124.
[17]ERICKSON M,HANLON M,MAYDEW E L.How much will firms pay for earnings that do not exist?Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):387-408.
[18]林翔,陈汉文.增长、盈余管理和应计持续性[J].中国会计评论,2005(1):117-142.
[19]BLAYLOCK B,SHEVLIN T,WILSON R J.Tax avoidance,large positive temporary book-tax differences,and earnings persistence[J].The Accounting Review,2011,87(1):91-120.
[20]洪金明.上市公司信息披露质量的经济后果研究[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2011.
[21]田高良,李留闯,齐保垒.内部控制鉴证报告的信号失灵和甄别---一个本土化的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2011(5):109-117.
[22]王亮亮.税制改革与利润跨期转移---基于“账税差异”的检验[J].管理世界,2014(11):105-118.
[23]SIMUNIC D A.The pricing of audit services:theory and evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,78(4):161-190.
[24]LARCKER D F,RICHARDSON S A.Fees paid to audit firms,accrual choices,and corporate governance[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(3):625-658.
[25]DECHOW P M,DICHEV I D.The quality of accruals and earnings:the role of accrual estimation errors[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77(1):35-59.
(1)会税差=会计利润-应税利润。由非纳税型盈余操纵行为导致的会税差通过增加会计利润而产生了大额会税差;而由避税行为导致的大额会税差是通过降低应税利润导致的。
(2)由于2008年税法改革规定原享受15%所得税率的企业要从2008年起逐步过渡到25%,2008—2012年分别适用18%、20%、22%、24%、25%的企业所得税率。为防止税率变动对企业盈余操纵动机和会税差估计值的影响,本文选取2012年税率稳定后的数据为样本进行研究。
(3)虽然这种用财务报表推算会税差的方式存在一定误差。但由于纳税申报表的保密性,外部资本市场也无法详细观测到公司真实的会税差,因此资本市场往往也用估计会税差作为公司盈余质量的观测窗口,见参考文献14。
(4)由于当期审计收费可能会提前确定,纳税型盈余操纵程度对审计收费的影响可能会反映在下一期的审计收费中。为此,进行了稳健性检验,将被解释变量中的当期审计收费替换为下一期的审计收费,重新运算模型(4),见回归结果(1),公司纳税型盈余操纵程度(DA_CON)与下一期的审计收费(ABFEEt+1)间的回归系数仍然显著为负(-0. 014),与原模型中的结果保持了一致,说明原结果稳健。
[2]孙峥嵘.会计---税收差异、盈余管理及市场反应[D].成都:西南财经大学,2008.
[3]CHAN K H,LIN K Z,MO P L L.Will a departure from tax-based accounting encourage tax noncompliance?Archival evidence from a transition economy[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):58-73.
[4]BADERTSCHER B A,PHILLIPS J D,PINCUSM,et al.Earnings management strategies and the trade-off between tax benefits and detection risk:to conform or not to conform?[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(1):63-97.
[5]WONG R M K,LO A W Y,FIRTH M.Managing discretionary accruals and book-tax differences in anticipation of tax rate increases:evidence from China[J].Journal of International Financial Management&Accounting,2015,26(2):188-222.
[6]DESAI M A.The degradation of reported corporate profits[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2005,19(4):171-192.
[7]HELTZER W.Conservatism and book-tax differences[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2009,24(3):469-504.
[8]芦笛.税收---会计差异与企业盈余管理行为的研究[J].科研管理,2017(5):98-106.
[9]FRANK M M,LYNCH L J,REGO S O.Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(2):467-496.
[10]曹琼,卜华,杨玉凤,等.盈余管理,审计费用与审计意见[J].审计研究,2013(6):76-83.
[11]程昔武,张泽云,纪纲.产权性质、会计---税收差异与审计收费---来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2016(5):22-29.
[12]HANLON M,KRISHNAN G V,MILLS L F.Audit fees and book-tax differences[J].Journal of the American Taxation Association,2012,34(1):55-86.
[13]RIGUEN K,JARBOUI A.Direct and mediated associations among earnings quality,book-tax differences and the audit quality[J].Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting,2017,15(3):293-316.
[14]HANLON M.The persistence and pricing of earnings,accruals,and cash flows when firms have large book-tax differences[J].The Accounting Review,2005,80(1):137-166.
[15]FRANCIS J R,MICHAS P N,SEAVEY S E.Does audit market concentration harm the quality of audited earnings?Evidence from audit markets in 42 countries[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2013,30(1):325-355.
[16]肖虹,李少轩,张瑞丽.其他综合收益列报与审计师行为---基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(10):108-124.
[17]ERICKSON M,HANLON M,MAYDEW E L.How much will firms pay for earnings that do not exist?Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):387-408.
[18]林翔,陈汉文.增长、盈余管理和应计持续性[J].中国会计评论,2005(1):117-142.
[19]BLAYLOCK B,SHEVLIN T,WILSON R J.Tax avoidance,large positive temporary book-tax differences,and earnings persistence[J].The Accounting Review,2011,87(1):91-120.
[20]洪金明.上市公司信息披露质量的经济后果研究[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2011.
[21]田高良,李留闯,齐保垒.内部控制鉴证报告的信号失灵和甄别---一个本土化的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2011(5):109-117.
[22]王亮亮.税制改革与利润跨期转移---基于“账税差异”的检验[J].管理世界,2014(11):105-118.
[23]SIMUNIC D A.The pricing of audit services:theory and evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,78(4):161-190.
[24]LARCKER D F,RICHARDSON S A.Fees paid to audit firms,accrual choices,and corporate governance[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42(3):625-658.
[25]DECHOW P M,DICHEV I D.The quality of accruals and earnings:the role of accrual estimation errors[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77(1):35-59.
(1)会税差=会计利润-应税利润。由非纳税型盈余操纵行为导致的会税差通过增加会计利润而产生了大额会税差;而由避税行为导致的大额会税差是通过降低应税利润导致的。
(2)由于2008年税法改革规定原享受15%所得税率的企业要从2008年起逐步过渡到25%,2008—2012年分别适用18%、20%、22%、24%、25%的企业所得税率。为防止税率变动对企业盈余操纵动机和会税差估计值的影响,本文选取2012年税率稳定后的数据为样本进行研究。
(3)虽然这种用财务报表推算会税差的方式存在一定误差。但由于纳税申报表的保密性,外部资本市场也无法详细观测到公司真实的会税差,因此资本市场往往也用估计会税差作为公司盈余质量的观测窗口,见参考文献14。
(4)由于当期审计收费可能会提前确定,纳税型盈余操纵程度对审计收费的影响可能会反映在下一期的审计收费中。为此,进行了稳健性检验,将被解释变量中的当期审计收费替换为下一期的审计收费,重新运算模型(4),见回归结果(1),公司纳税型盈余操纵程度(DA_CON)与下一期的审计收费(ABFEEt+1)间的回归系数仍然显著为负(-0. 014),与原模型中的结果保持了一致,说明原结果稳健。