高铁快运与快递企业合作的演化博弈分析
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摘要
高铁快运与快递企业合作能够有效地推动我国快递业的发展,为探讨促进双方合作的有效机制,运用演化博弈理论构建双方的演化博弈模型,研究影响双方合作的利润以及成本等因素,并使用MATLAB进行算例仿真。研究结果表明:系统演化博弈路径与系统初始状态、双方的支付矩阵、超额收益、合作成本、超额收益及合作成本分摊系数有密切关系;当超额收益大于合作成本时,双方有采取合作的可能性,且合作概率与超额收益呈正相关关系,与合作成本呈负相关关系;合理的超额收益分配系数与合作成本分摊系数有利于双方合作;在惩罚机制下,合理的惩罚契约能够有效地促进双方向着合作的方向演化。
The cooperation between high-speed rail express and private express delivery companies can effectively promote the development of Chinese express delivery. The paper applied evolutionary game theory to construct two evolutionary game models to study the factors that affect the cooperation between both parties,including profit and cost. In addition, the paper also used MATLAB for simulation. The result shows that the evolutionary game path of the system is closely related to the initial state of the system, the payment matrix of the two parties, the excess return, the cooperation cost, the excess return and the sharing cost allocation coefficient.Specifically, when the excess return is greater than the cooperation cost, the two parties may cooperate and the cooperation probability is positively correlated with the excess return and has a negative correlation with the cooperation cost; reasonable excess return distribution coefficient and cooperation cost allocation factor are favorable to cooperation between the two parties; under the penalty mechanism, a reasonable penalty contract can prompt both parties to cooperate.
The cooperation between high-speed rail express and private express delivery companies can effectively promote the development of Chinese express delivery. The paper applied evolutionary game theory to construct two evolutionary game models to study the factors that affect the cooperation between both parties,including profit and cost. In addition, the paper also used MATLAB for simulation. The result shows that the evolutionary game path of the system is closely related to the initial state of the system, the payment matrix of the two parties, the excess return, the cooperation cost, the excess return and the sharing cost allocation coefficient.Specifically, when the excess return is greater than the cooperation cost, the two parties may cooperate and the cooperation probability is positively correlated with the excess return and has a negative correlation with the cooperation cost; reasonable excess return distribution coefficient and cooperation cost allocation factor are favorable to cooperation between the two parties; under the penalty mechanism, a reasonable penalty contract can prompt both parties to cooperate.
引文
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[14]覃燕红,魏光兴.批发价格契约下基于公平偏好信息结构演进的行为博弈分析[J].工业工程与管理,2015,20(4):100-107,151.QIN Yanhong,WEI Guangxing.Behavior game analysis about the evolution based on information structure of fairness concern under wholesale price contract[J]Industrial Engineering and Management,2015,20(4):100-107,151.
[15]Friedman D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59(3):637-666.
[2]杨思聪.基于纳什均衡的高铁快递与传统快递合作可行性分析[J].交通科技与经济,2015,17(5):65-68.YANG Sicong.Analysis of cooperation feasibility between high-speed railway and traditional express delivery based on nash equilibrium[J].Technology&Economy in Areas of Communications,2015,17(5):65-68.
[3]吕璞,胡祥培,鲁渤.基于参与人关系网络的高铁快递合作博弈模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(6):1536-1547.LüPu,HU Xiangpei,LU Bo.Cooperative game model for hsr express based on relationship networks between participants[J].Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice,2017,37(6):1536-1547.
[4]吕璞,胡祥培,马永峰.高铁快递的契约与零售双市场定价决策模型[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(7):1759-1767.LüPu,HU Xiangpei,MA Yongfeng.Pricing decision models for high-speed rail express with allotments and spot market demand[J].Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems,2016,22(7):1759-1767.
[5]王宝义.电商与快递的博弈行为解构及优化策略--基于双重监督的两阶段三方模型的比较分析[J].中国流通经济,2014,28(9):66-73.WANG Baoyi.Study on the deconstruction of gaming behavior and the optimization strategies of e-business enterprise and the express enterprise[J].China Business and Market,2014,28(9):66-73.
[6]段华薇,严余松.主导权对高铁快递和传统快递合作定价策略的影响[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(5):1355-1362.DUAN Huawei,YAN Yusong.Impacts of power structure on price strategy for CRH express and traditional express[J].Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems,2016,22(5):1355-1362.
[7]YANG Feng,YANG Mingming,XIA Qiong,et al.Collaborative distribution between two logistics service providers[J].International Transactions in Operational Research,2016,23(6):1025-1050.
[8]Wei S L.A lemons market?An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2000,125(3):519-525.
[9]Subramanian N,Abdulrahman M D.Logistics and cloud computing service providers’cooperation:a resilience perspective[J].Production Planning&Control,2017,28(11-12):919-928.
[10]Nash J.Non-cooperative games[J].Annals of Mathematics,1951,54(2):286-295.
[11]Vincent T L,Brown J S.Evolutionary game theory,natural selection,and darwinian dynamics[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2005:157-159.
[12]Smith J M,Price G R.The logic of animal conflict[J].Nature,1973,246(11):15-18.
[13]欧江涛,马祖军.区域性物流园区竞合策略的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2016,25(2):98-103.OU Jiangtao,MA Zujun.Evolutionary game analysis of competition and cooperation strategy among regional logistics parks[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2016,25(2):98-103.
[14]覃燕红,魏光兴.批发价格契约下基于公平偏好信息结构演进的行为博弈分析[J].工业工程与管理,2015,20(4):100-107,151.QIN Yanhong,WEI Guangxing.Behavior game analysis about the evolution based on information structure of fairness concern under wholesale price contract[J]Industrial Engineering and Management,2015,20(4):100-107,151.
[15]Friedman D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59(3):637-666.