不同农药残留标准下家庭农场种植行为选择
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摘要
文章建立了政府与家庭农场农户之间的博弈模型,探讨在不同农药残留标准下政府如何对生态种植行为进行激励.研究表明,在宽松的农药残留标准下,政府可通过征收农药税等方式提高农药成本来激励农户选择生态种植,生态补贴及超标罚款的效果不明显;在严格的农药残留标准下,当农产品抽查难度较大时,政府可选择降低检查概率,同时大幅度提高农药价格来增加农户使用生态种植的动机;当政府对农药成本控制力较低或农药价格增量的边际效益较小时,政府应提高其检查概率,同时提高对于农药残留超标的罚款及生态种植的补贴来激励农户使用生态种植.
Guaranteeing the quality and safety of agricultural products is a significant part of the realization of source control of food safety.This paper establishes game models between the government and farmers in family farm separately under the loose standard of pesticide residue and under the rigorous one,and then it explores how the government stimulates the behavior of ecological planting under different standards of pesticide residue.The results show that,under the loose standard of pesticide residue,the government to encourage farmers in ecological planting can increase the pesticide costs by imposing the pesticide tax or stipulating the pesticide quota,while the effects of both ecological subsidy and fines for excessive pesticide residue are insignificant.The results also demonstrate that,under the rigorous standard of pesticide residue and with the aim to enhance farmers' motivation in ecological planting,the government can reduce the check probability and raise the pesticide prices if the agricultural products are difficult in random check,while the government should increase the check probability(at least being),fines for excessive pesticide residue,as well as ecological subsidy if it has less control over pesticide costs or if the marginal benefit of raising pesticide prices is minimal.
Guaranteeing the quality and safety of agricultural products is a significant part of the realization of source control of food safety.This paper establishes game models between the government and farmers in family farm separately under the loose standard of pesticide residue and under the rigorous one,and then it explores how the government stimulates the behavior of ecological planting under different standards of pesticide residue.The results show that,under the loose standard of pesticide residue,the government to encourage farmers in ecological planting can increase the pesticide costs by imposing the pesticide tax or stipulating the pesticide quota,while the effects of both ecological subsidy and fines for excessive pesticide residue are insignificant.The results also demonstrate that,under the rigorous standard of pesticide residue and with the aim to enhance farmers' motivation in ecological planting,the government can reduce the check probability and raise the pesticide prices if the agricultural products are difficult in random check,while the government should increase the check probability(at least being),fines for excessive pesticide residue,as well as ecological subsidy if it has less control over pesticide costs or if the marginal benefit of raising pesticide prices is minimal.
引文
[1]王晓博,安洪武.我国食品安全治理工具多元化的探索[J].预测,2012(3):13-18.Wang X B,An H W.The exploration on diversification of governmental administration tools based on China domestic food safety administration[J].Forecasting,2012(3):13-18.
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[3]Cooper J,Dobson H.The benefits of pesticides to mankind and the environment[J].Crop Protection,2007,26(9):1337-1348.
[4]Fisher M C,Henk D A,Briggs C J,et al.Emerging fungal threats to animal,plant and ecosystem health[J].Nature,2012,484(7393):186-194.
[5]Verger P J P,Boobis A R.Reevaluate pesticides for food security and safety[J].Science,2013,341(6147):717-718.
[6]杨波.适应WTO规则的食品安全体系建设研究[J].农业经济问题,2011(9):31-34.Yang B.A study of the construction of food safety system adjusted to the rules of WTO[J].Issues in Agricultural Economy,2011(9):31-34.
[7]朱文玉.我国生态农产品认证制度的缺陷及其完善[J].学术交流,2010(3):57-59.Zhu W Y.Disadvantages and improvements of certification system of Chinese ecological agricultural products[J].Academic Exchange,2010(3):57-59.
[8]Theodoros S,Stefanou S E,Oude L A.Can economic incentives encourage actual reductions in pesticide use and environmental spillovers[J].Agricultural Economics,2012,43(3):267-276.
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[10]田一辉,朱庆华.政府价格补贴下绿色供应链管理扩散博弈模型[J]·系统工程学报,2016,31(4):526-535.Tian Y H,Zhu Q H.Game model for different of green supply chain management based on price subsides of the government[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2016,31(4):526-535.
[11]Florence J,Jean P B,Laurence G.An economic analysis of the possibility of reducing pesticides in French field crops[J].Ecological Economics,2011,70(9):1638-1648.
[12]曹裕,俞传艳,万光羽.政府参与下食品企业监管博弈研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(1):140-150.Cao Y,Yu C Y,Wan G Y.Food company regulation game research under government participation[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2017,37(1):140-150.
[13]Dinham B,Malik S.Pesticides and human rights[J].International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health,2003,9(1):40-52.
[14]Spencer H,Thomas R.Private agri-food standards:Implications for food policy and the agri-food system[J].Food Policy,2005,3(30):241-253.
[15]Bahareh J,Ezeddin M.Developing a Vis/NIR spectroscopic system for fast and non-destructive pesticide residue monitoring in agricultural product[J].Measurement,2016,89:1-6.
[16]陶善信,李丽.农产品质量安全标准对农户生产行为的规制效果分析——基于市场均衡的视角[J].农村经济,2016(2):8-13.Tao S X,Li L.Analysis on regulation effect of agricultural product quality and safety standard on farmers'production behavior—Based on market equilibrium[J].Rural Economy,2016(2):8-13.
[17]Migheli M.Land ownership and use of pesticides.Evidence from the Mekong Delta[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,145:188-198.
[18]Liu E M,Huang J K.Risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers in China[J].Journal of Development Economics,2013,103:202-215.
[19]Song C,Zhuang J.Modeling a Government-Manufacturer-Farmer game for food supply chain risk management[J].Food Control,2017,78:443-455.
[20]詹欣,乔晗.移动近场支付产业可信服务管理平台博弈策略研究——基于双边市场理论视角[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(9):2259-2267.Zhan X,Qiao H.Research on game theory strategy of trusted service management platform in mobile near field payment industry—Based on two sided markets theory[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2016,36(9):2259-2267.
[21]林雪梅.家庭农场经营的组织困境与制度消解[J].管理科学,2014(2):116-117.Lin X M.Organization corner and systematic solutions of family farm management[J].The Management World,2014(2):116-117.
[22]王中亮,石薇.信息不对称视角下的食品安全风险信息交流机制研究——基于参与主体之间的博弈研究[J].上海经济研究,2014(5):66-74.Wang Z L,Shi W.A study on food safety risk communication mechanism under informational asymmetryBased on the interactive game analysis between participation[J].Shanghai Journal of Economics,2014(5):66-74.
[23]李树明,张俊飚,徐卫涛.基于随机前沿分析的出口型农产品生产技术效率研究[J].农业技术经济,2011(3):52-57.Li S M,Zhang J B,Xu W T.The study the efficiency of export agriculture products production technology[J].Journal of Agrotechnical Economics,2011(3):52-57.
[24]佟金萍,秦腾,马剑锋,等.基于随机前沿超越对数函数的江苏能源回弹效应[J].系统工程,2015,33(1):139-145.Tong J P,Qin T,Ma J F,et al.Energy rebound effect in Jiangsu based on stochastic frontier translog production function[J].Systems Engineering,2015,33(1):139-145.
[25]Popp J,Peto K,Nagy J.Pesticide productivity and food security[J].Agronomy for Sustainable Development,2013,33(1):243-255.
[26]Oerke E C.Crop losses to pests[J].Journal of Agricultural Sciences,2006,144(1):31-43.
[27]Alexandre N,Veronique S,Ali K,et al.Total diet study on pesticide residues in France:Levels in food as consumed and chronic dietary risk to consumers[J].Environment International,2012,45(15):135-150.
[28]贺亚琴,冷博峰,冯中朝.基于“超越对数生产函数”对湖北省油菜生长产量的气候影响探讨[J].资源科学,2015,37(7):1465-1473.He Y Q,Leng B F,Feng Z C.The impact of climate factors on rapeseed production in Hubei by using translog production function[J].Resources Science,2015,37(7):1465-1473.
[29]冯华.为何要让小土豆成第四大主粮[N].人民日报,2015-1-7(2).Feng H.Why do we make potatoes to be the No.4 grain[N].People's Daily,2015-1-7(2).
[2]Zhang C,Guanming S,Shen J,et al.Productivity effect and overuse of pesticide in crop production in China[J].Journal of Integrative Agriculture,2015,14(9):1903-1910.
[3]Cooper J,Dobson H.The benefits of pesticides to mankind and the environment[J].Crop Protection,2007,26(9):1337-1348.
[4]Fisher M C,Henk D A,Briggs C J,et al.Emerging fungal threats to animal,plant and ecosystem health[J].Nature,2012,484(7393):186-194.
[5]Verger P J P,Boobis A R.Reevaluate pesticides for food security and safety[J].Science,2013,341(6147):717-718.
[6]杨波.适应WTO规则的食品安全体系建设研究[J].农业经济问题,2011(9):31-34.Yang B.A study of the construction of food safety system adjusted to the rules of WTO[J].Issues in Agricultural Economy,2011(9):31-34.
[7]朱文玉.我国生态农产品认证制度的缺陷及其完善[J].学术交流,2010(3):57-59.Zhu W Y.Disadvantages and improvements of certification system of Chinese ecological agricultural products[J].Academic Exchange,2010(3):57-59.
[8]Theodoros S,Stefanou S E,Oude L A.Can economic incentives encourage actual reductions in pesticide use and environmental spillovers[J].Agricultural Economics,2012,43(3):267-276.
[9]黄祖辉,钟颖琦,王晓莉.不同政策对农户农药施用行为的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(8):148-155.Huang Z H,Zhong Y Q,Wang X L.Study on the impacts of government policy on farmers'pesticide application behavior[J].China Population,Resource and Environment,2016,26(8):148-155.
[10]田一辉,朱庆华.政府价格补贴下绿色供应链管理扩散博弈模型[J]·系统工程学报,2016,31(4):526-535.Tian Y H,Zhu Q H.Game model for different of green supply chain management based on price subsides of the government[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2016,31(4):526-535.
[11]Florence J,Jean P B,Laurence G.An economic analysis of the possibility of reducing pesticides in French field crops[J].Ecological Economics,2011,70(9):1638-1648.
[12]曹裕,俞传艳,万光羽.政府参与下食品企业监管博弈研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(1):140-150.Cao Y,Yu C Y,Wan G Y.Food company regulation game research under government participation[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2017,37(1):140-150.
[13]Dinham B,Malik S.Pesticides and human rights[J].International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health,2003,9(1):40-52.
[14]Spencer H,Thomas R.Private agri-food standards:Implications for food policy and the agri-food system[J].Food Policy,2005,3(30):241-253.
[15]Bahareh J,Ezeddin M.Developing a Vis/NIR spectroscopic system for fast and non-destructive pesticide residue monitoring in agricultural product[J].Measurement,2016,89:1-6.
[16]陶善信,李丽.农产品质量安全标准对农户生产行为的规制效果分析——基于市场均衡的视角[J].农村经济,2016(2):8-13.Tao S X,Li L.Analysis on regulation effect of agricultural product quality and safety standard on farmers'production behavior—Based on market equilibrium[J].Rural Economy,2016(2):8-13.
[17]Migheli M.Land ownership and use of pesticides.Evidence from the Mekong Delta[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,145:188-198.
[18]Liu E M,Huang J K.Risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers in China[J].Journal of Development Economics,2013,103:202-215.
[19]Song C,Zhuang J.Modeling a Government-Manufacturer-Farmer game for food supply chain risk management[J].Food Control,2017,78:443-455.
[20]詹欣,乔晗.移动近场支付产业可信服务管理平台博弈策略研究——基于双边市场理论视角[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(9):2259-2267.Zhan X,Qiao H.Research on game theory strategy of trusted service management platform in mobile near field payment industry—Based on two sided markets theory[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2016,36(9):2259-2267.
[21]林雪梅.家庭农场经营的组织困境与制度消解[J].管理科学,2014(2):116-117.Lin X M.Organization corner and systematic solutions of family farm management[J].The Management World,2014(2):116-117.
[22]王中亮,石薇.信息不对称视角下的食品安全风险信息交流机制研究——基于参与主体之间的博弈研究[J].上海经济研究,2014(5):66-74.Wang Z L,Shi W.A study on food safety risk communication mechanism under informational asymmetryBased on the interactive game analysis between participation[J].Shanghai Journal of Economics,2014(5):66-74.
[23]李树明,张俊飚,徐卫涛.基于随机前沿分析的出口型农产品生产技术效率研究[J].农业技术经济,2011(3):52-57.Li S M,Zhang J B,Xu W T.The study the efficiency of export agriculture products production technology[J].Journal of Agrotechnical Economics,2011(3):52-57.
[24]佟金萍,秦腾,马剑锋,等.基于随机前沿超越对数函数的江苏能源回弹效应[J].系统工程,2015,33(1):139-145.Tong J P,Qin T,Ma J F,et al.Energy rebound effect in Jiangsu based on stochastic frontier translog production function[J].Systems Engineering,2015,33(1):139-145.
[25]Popp J,Peto K,Nagy J.Pesticide productivity and food security[J].Agronomy for Sustainable Development,2013,33(1):243-255.
[26]Oerke E C.Crop losses to pests[J].Journal of Agricultural Sciences,2006,144(1):31-43.
[27]Alexandre N,Veronique S,Ali K,et al.Total diet study on pesticide residues in France:Levels in food as consumed and chronic dietary risk to consumers[J].Environment International,2012,45(15):135-150.
[28]贺亚琴,冷博峰,冯中朝.基于“超越对数生产函数”对湖北省油菜生长产量的气候影响探讨[J].资源科学,2015,37(7):1465-1473.He Y Q,Leng B F,Feng Z C.The impact of climate factors on rapeseed production in Hubei by using translog production function[J].Resources Science,2015,37(7):1465-1473.
[29]冯华.为何要让小土豆成第四大主粮[N].人民日报,2015-1-7(2).Feng H.Why do we make potatoes to be the No.4 grain[N].People's Daily,2015-1-7(2).