“反恐”战与以色列军事伦理的嬗变
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摘要
在国际舆论中,21世纪以来以色列"反恐战"日渐趋向残酷无情,但从以色列自身的视角来看,以色列的"反恐"实践总体上并未脱离以色列国防军"洁净武装"传统信条的"轨道"。以色列"反恐"规范的创制与以色列的"反恐"实践呈现为一种"齐头并进"、相辅相成的态势。"反恐"实践呼唤"反恐"规范的创制,而"反恐"军事伦理诠释和引导"反恐"实践。外延扩大了"恐怖主义"的定义、模糊化平民和战斗人员的区别、重新阐释了"军事必要性"和保护本国战斗人员生命优先于减少连带损伤、另行解释了动用武力的"适度性"等,这些构成了卡希尔和亚德林提出的以色列"反恐"军事伦理的特征。以色列的"反恐"实践及其军事伦理在国际学术界和国际舆论界都引发了激烈的论争,在国际社会仍然以负面态度为主。但以色列国内社会政治的右倾化和宗教化倾向,却为之提供了强大的内在支持。在"民族"与"民主"之间,以色列的民意"天平"出现了向"民族"的明显偏转。秉持宗教锡安主义立场的宗教势力大举渗入以色列国防军,对以色列国防军的"反恐"军事伦理嬗变产生了深远影响。
According to international public opinion, Israel's "fighting terror" has become increasingly merciless since the beginning of the 21 st century. However, from Israel's perspective, the practices of "fighting terror" are still largely in line with the traditional ethical code of "purity of arms" advocated by Israel Defense Forces(IDF). Actually, the creation of Israel's combat code and its practices in "fighting terror" walk hand-in-hand and work in a mutually reinforcing way. The practices call for the creation of norms while the "fighting terror" military ethics interpret and guide the practices. The extended definition of "terrorism", the blurred distinction between civilians and combatants, "military necessity", the precedence given to the protection of combatants' lives over the minimization of collateral damage, the alternative way to interpret the "proportionality" of violence, all constitute the features of Israel's military ethics in "fighting terror" as proposed by Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin. Israel's ‘fighting terror' practices and its military ethics have triggered a heated debate in both the international academic community and the field of international public opinion and thus sparked negative reactions towards Israel. However, the right deviationist trend and religionization in social politics of Israel have rendered them strong internal momentum. Between "nation" and "democracy", Israel's public opinion has shifted the balance in favor of "nation". Influential religious forces holding high the banner of Zionism have massively infiltrated into the IDF, which will exert a far-reaching impact on the evolution of IDF's military ethics of "fighting terror".
According to international public opinion, Israel's "fighting terror" has become increasingly merciless since the beginning of the 21 st century. However, from Israel's perspective, the practices of "fighting terror" are still largely in line with the traditional ethical code of "purity of arms" advocated by Israel Defense Forces(IDF). Actually, the creation of Israel's combat code and its practices in "fighting terror" walk hand-in-hand and work in a mutually reinforcing way. The practices call for the creation of norms while the "fighting terror" military ethics interpret and guide the practices. The extended definition of "terrorism", the blurred distinction between civilians and combatants, "military necessity", the precedence given to the protection of combatants' lives over the minimization of collateral damage, the alternative way to interpret the "proportionality" of violence, all constitute the features of Israel's military ethics in "fighting terror" as proposed by Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin. Israel's ‘fighting terror' practices and its military ethics have triggered a heated debate in both the international academic community and the field of international public opinion and thus sparked negative reactions towards Israel. However, the right deviationist trend and religionization in social politics of Israel have rendered them strong internal momentum. Between "nation" and "democracy", Israel's public opinion has shifted the balance in favor of "nation". Influential religious forces holding high the banner of Zionism have massively infiltrated into the IDF, which will exert a far-reaching impact on the evolution of IDF's military ethics of "fighting terror".
引文
(1)相关数据评析,可参见Therese Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen,“Armed Conflicts,1946-2014,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.52,No.4,2015,pp.536-550。
(2)“伦理”通常与“道德”通用,两者都体现为社会关于某种行为是否正当、正确的共识,都用以约束和规范人类行为,而且都借助社会舆论使社会成员遵守规则。法律也是约束和规范人类行为的社会规则,但它在国内主要依托国家机器的强制力量。在无政府状态下的国际社会,则主要依托国际机制约束、国际舆论压力或者强大国家的强制力才得以维系。作为一种相对“软性”的规范,伦理有时会被国家机器采纳和实施而上升为更加“硬性”的规范,如法律、政策、行为守则等。
(3)如何定义“恐怖主义”和“反恐”,在国际社会存在广泛分歧,迄今尚难达成共识。关于巴勒斯坦人对以色列的袭击究竟是“民族自决”还是“恐怖主义”,以色列的武力反击究竟是否“反恐”,不同国家也有不同认识。本文关注以色列“反恐”实践中的军事伦理嬗变,而非定义之争。基于行文便利,本文对所借用的以色列“恐怖主义”和“反恐”等相关术语,整体上不做政治和道德评判。
(1)在20世纪60~70年代,巴勒斯坦武装组织为影响国际社会对巴以问题的态度,频频制造劫机事件。1968年至1976年间,就劫持了16架次的航班,还33次袭击了包括以色列航空公司办公室在内的民用航空设施。参见Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.40。
(2)1982年和1983年,黎巴嫩真主党发动了多起针对以色列、美国和法国军事和外交目标的自杀式袭击,造成巨大伤亡。到20世纪90年代中期,哈马斯等巴勒斯坦武装组织开始运用自杀式爆炸袭击以色列目标。
(3)典型案例是1982年以色列国防军为清剿巴解组织大举入侵黎巴嫩并轰炸叙利亚南部贝卡谷地,导致近17 000人死亡,其中包括超过1 000名叙利亚军人和3 000名巴解组织战斗人员,其余大多为平民。参见Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.67。
(1)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,pp.131,142.
(2)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.255。根据人权组织“神形”(B’Tselem)的统计,死亡人数为384人。参见https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event。
(1)2001年1月,以色列拘押了1 456名巴勒斯坦人,此后急剧上升,到2007年年初达到近9 000人。而且,以色列议会还于2002年通过了《拘押非法战斗人员法》,允许以色列军方在未证实恐怖罪行前,即可对恐怖嫌犯发出拘押令并予以长期拘押。
(2)2001年7月,以色列下令在巴以边境地区修建“安全墙”,到2010年10月,实际建成了400千米。这些安全墙大多由安装有监控设备的铁丝网组成,也有的由实体水泥墙组成。这些隔离墙大多数都建在巴方土地上,还导致大量巴勒斯坦平民社区、家庭、财产分隔,给巴勒斯坦平民的正常生产、生活带来许多障碍。
(3)安全检查站往往设在通往阿拉伯城镇的道路入口和站点,配以路障。检查站指挥官可随时关闭检查站,以控制潜在“人体炸弹”进入和离开城镇,从而为以色列安全力量反恐争取大量时间。在安全形势紧张的时期,以色列还会长期关闭安全检查站,限制巴勒斯坦人的移动。
(4)Adam Stahl,“The Evolution of Israeli Targeted Operations:Consequences of the Thabet Thabet Operation,”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism,Vol.33,No.2,2010,pp.111-133.
(5)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,pp.311-312.
(6)相关数据可参见人权组织“神形”的统计数据,https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/after-cast-lead/by-date-of-event。
(1)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,pp.148-150.
(1)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.254.
(2)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.263.
(3)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.338.
(4)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.198.
(5)George E.Bisharat,“Violence’s Law:Israel’s Campaign to Transform International Legal Norms,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.42,No.3,2013,pp.68-84.
(1)“哈加纳”(Hagana)为以色列建国前主导巴勒斯坦犹太社团的左翼势力所建的自卫武装,建国后成为以色列国防军的主体,并在建国初期收编了犹太社团右翼势力的武装组织。关于“哈加纳”等武装组织的发展和政策演变,可参见Anita Shapira,Land And Power:The Zionist Resort to Force:1881-1948,New York:Oxford University Press,1992。
(2)Tzvi Hauser,“The Spirit of the IDF,”Azure,No.5757,1997,pp.47-72.
(1)笔者就卡希尔在以色列反恐军事伦理塑造中的角色和地位与多位来访的以色列学者交流,都得出了这个结论。如希伯来大学的劳·夏利(Ran Shauli)教授认为,卡希尔对以色列军事伦理方面的影响无人可及(2018年11月12日,上海)。
(2)该高级委员会的成员还有来自以色列国防军人力部、教育部和最高军事检察院等部门的高级官员。
(3)该文件体现出“后锡安主义”意识形态,避免提及锡安主义和犹太民族主义的内容,致力于捍卫以色列的民主特性。该文件的自由主义倾向导致以色列国防军内部中右翼势力的不满。2001年,在国防军教育部门负责人埃拉泽·斯特恩(Elazar Stern)的领导下,修订了新版本,添加了爱国忠诚、人的尊严等方面内容。参见Stuart A.Cohen and Tamir Libel,“Training Military Personnel to Take Moral Decisions in Situations of Ethical Asymmetry Lessons from the Israeli Experience,”in Jarmo Toiskallio,ed.,Ethical Education in the Military:What,How and Why in the 21st Century?Helsinki,Finland:National Defence College,pp.164-182。
(1)亚德林对以色列新反恐战伦理的发展也发挥了重要作用。他于2002年升任少将并任以色列军事学院和国防学院院长,2004年8月至2006年出任以色列驻美武官,回国后出任以色列军事情报局局长。2003年,他受命组建并领导了一个由以色列国防军高级指挥官、哲学家(以卡希尔为主)和律师构成的委员会,致力于探究反恐战中的军事伦理问题。2004年夏,他在“耶路撒冷公共事务中心”举办的活动中发表演讲,初步探讨了以色列在反恐战中面临的困境,并阐述了以色列国防军如何在实现反恐军事需要的同时,努力避免伤及无辜平民。该演讲内容以“反恐中的伦理困境”为题,发表在《耶路撒冷问题简报》上,见Jerusalem Issue Brief,Vol.4,No.8,November 25,2004,亦可参见http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-8.htm。
(2)参见Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:An Israeli Perspective,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.3-32;Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:Principles,”Philosophia,Vol.34,No.1,2006,pp.75-84。
(3)Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Assassination and Preventive Killing,”SAIS Review of International Affairs,Vol.25,No.1,2005,pp.41-57.
(4)Amos Harel,“The Philosopher Who Gave the IDF Moral Justification in Gaza,”Haaretz,February 6,2009,https://www.haaretz.com/1.5071578.
(5)参见Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:An Israeli Perspective,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.3-32。
(1)2016年以色列的《反恐法》也采纳了此种扩大化了的“恐怖主义”和“恐怖行为”定义。以色列著名反恐专家博阿兹·加诺(Boaz Ganor)主张将恐怖主义定义为:“一种故意对平民使用暴力以实现政治目标的暴力斗争方式”。参见Boaz Ganor,The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle:A Guide for Decision Makers,New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers,2008,p.17。
(2)《以色列国防军精神》暗示了战争中保护生命的等级序列,即“我方平民”--“他(敌)方平民”--“我方士兵”--“他方士兵”,此序列契合了“正义战争理论”和国际武装冲突法的要求。而卡希尔和亚德林提出的“反恐战”下保护生命的新等级序列对此作了重大修正。
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(2)Asa Kasher,“The Principle of Distinction,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.6,No.2,2007,pp.152-167.
(3)Emily Amrousi,“We Do not Sanctify Ddeath,”June 22,2012,http://www.israelhayom.com/2012/06/22/we-do-not-sanctify-death/.
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(5)“Human Rights in the Occupied Territories:Annual Report 2007,”B’Tselem,2008.
(1)“Adalah v.GOC Central Command,IDF,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.2,2004-2005,The Supreme Court of Israel and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Jerusalem,May 2006,pp.183-208.
(2)“Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v.Minister of Defence,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.3,2006-2009,The Supreme Court of Israel,The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,August 2009,pp.36-84.
(1)“Public Committee against Torture in Israel V.Government of Israel,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.3,2006-2009,The Supreme Court of Israel,The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,August 2009,pp.85-162.
(2)“Iyyad v.State of Israel,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.3,2006-2009,The Supreme Court of Israel,The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,August 2009,pp.245-320.
(1)The Occupation’s Fig Leaf:Israel’s Military Law Enforcement System as a Whitewash Mechanism,B’Tselem,May 2016.
(2)The Occupation’s Fig Leaf:Israel’s Military Law Enforcement System as a Whitewash Mechanism,B’Tselem,May 2016,p.16.
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(1)Paul Robinson,“The Ethics of the Strong against the Tactics of the Weak:A Response to Kasher and Yadlin’s‘Military Ethics of Fighting Terror’,”Philosophia,Vol.36,No.2,2008,pp.195-202.
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(1)Michael Walzer,“War Fair,”The New Republic,July 31,2006,pp.15-16.
(2)Asa Kasher,“Operation Cast Lead and the Ethics of Just War,”Azure,Vol.37,No.5769,2009,pp.1-18.
(1)Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer,“Israel:Civilians&Combatants,”The New York Review of Books,Vol.56,No.8,2009,https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/05/14/israel-civilianscombatants/.
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(5)Emily Amrousi,“We Do Not Sanctify Death,”June 22,2012,http://www.israelhayom.com/2012/06/22/we-do-not-sanctify-death/.
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(3)George E.Bisharat,“Violence’s Law:Israel’s Campaign to Transform International Legal Norms,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.42,No.3,2013,pp.68-84.
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(5)Benny Avni,“Assassin’s Creed:Taking out Individuals as a War Strategy,”Newsweek,August22,2014,https://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/05/assassins-creed-taking-out-individuals-war-strategy-266296.html.
(1)Lisa Hajjar,“International Humanitarian Law and‘War on Terror’:A Comparative Analysis of Israeli and American Doctrines,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.36,No.1,2006,pp.21-42.
(2)Yagil Levy,“The Gaza Fighting:Did Israel Shift Risk from Its Solders to Civilians,”Middle East Policy,Vol.24,No.3,2017,p.132.
(3)Michael Walzer,“Israel Must Defeat Hamas,But Also Must Do More to Limit Civilian Deaths,”July 31,2014,https://newrepublic.com/article/118908/2014-gaza-war-how-should-israelfight-asymmetrical-war-hamas.
(4)Boaz Ganor,“A Call To Revise The Geneva Conventions,”The San Francisco Chronicle,January 15,2009,p.B7.
(1)Charli Carpenter,“Fighting the Laws of War:Protecting Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.90,No.2,2011,pp.146-152.
(2)“伦理”通常与“道德”通用,两者都体现为社会关于某种行为是否正当、正确的共识,都用以约束和规范人类行为,而且都借助社会舆论使社会成员遵守规则。法律也是约束和规范人类行为的社会规则,但它在国内主要依托国家机器的强制力量。在无政府状态下的国际社会,则主要依托国际机制约束、国际舆论压力或者强大国家的强制力才得以维系。作为一种相对“软性”的规范,伦理有时会被国家机器采纳和实施而上升为更加“硬性”的规范,如法律、政策、行为守则等。
(3)如何定义“恐怖主义”和“反恐”,在国际社会存在广泛分歧,迄今尚难达成共识。关于巴勒斯坦人对以色列的袭击究竟是“民族自决”还是“恐怖主义”,以色列的武力反击究竟是否“反恐”,不同国家也有不同认识。本文关注以色列“反恐”实践中的军事伦理嬗变,而非定义之争。基于行文便利,本文对所借用的以色列“恐怖主义”和“反恐”等相关术语,整体上不做政治和道德评判。
(1)在20世纪60~70年代,巴勒斯坦武装组织为影响国际社会对巴以问题的态度,频频制造劫机事件。1968年至1976年间,就劫持了16架次的航班,还33次袭击了包括以色列航空公司办公室在内的民用航空设施。参见Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.40。
(2)1982年和1983年,黎巴嫩真主党发动了多起针对以色列、美国和法国军事和外交目标的自杀式袭击,造成巨大伤亡。到20世纪90年代中期,哈马斯等巴勒斯坦武装组织开始运用自杀式爆炸袭击以色列目标。
(3)典型案例是1982年以色列国防军为清剿巴解组织大举入侵黎巴嫩并轰炸叙利亚南部贝卡谷地,导致近17 000人死亡,其中包括超过1 000名叙利亚军人和3 000名巴解组织战斗人员,其余大多为平民。参见Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.67。
(1)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,pp.131,142.
(2)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.255。根据人权组织“神形”(B’Tselem)的统计,死亡人数为384人。参见https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event。
(1)2001年1月,以色列拘押了1 456名巴勒斯坦人,此后急剧上升,到2007年年初达到近9 000人。而且,以色列议会还于2002年通过了《拘押非法战斗人员法》,允许以色列军方在未证实恐怖罪行前,即可对恐怖嫌犯发出拘押令并予以长期拘押。
(2)2001年7月,以色列下令在巴以边境地区修建“安全墙”,到2010年10月,实际建成了400千米。这些安全墙大多由安装有监控设备的铁丝网组成,也有的由实体水泥墙组成。这些隔离墙大多数都建在巴方土地上,还导致大量巴勒斯坦平民社区、家庭、财产分隔,给巴勒斯坦平民的正常生产、生活带来许多障碍。
(3)安全检查站往往设在通往阿拉伯城镇的道路入口和站点,配以路障。检查站指挥官可随时关闭检查站,以控制潜在“人体炸弹”进入和离开城镇,从而为以色列安全力量反恐争取大量时间。在安全形势紧张的时期,以色列还会长期关闭安全检查站,限制巴勒斯坦人的移动。
(4)Adam Stahl,“The Evolution of Israeli Targeted Operations:Consequences of the Thabet Thabet Operation,”Studies in Conflict&Terrorism,Vol.33,No.2,2010,pp.111-133.
(5)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,pp.311-312.
(6)相关数据可参见人权组织“神形”的统计数据,https://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/after-cast-lead/by-date-of-event。
(1)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,pp.148-150.
(1)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.254.
(2)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.263.
(3)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.338.
(4)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.198.
(5)George E.Bisharat,“Violence’s Law:Israel’s Campaign to Transform International Legal Norms,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.42,No.3,2013,pp.68-84.
(1)“哈加纳”(Hagana)为以色列建国前主导巴勒斯坦犹太社团的左翼势力所建的自卫武装,建国后成为以色列国防军的主体,并在建国初期收编了犹太社团右翼势力的武装组织。关于“哈加纳”等武装组织的发展和政策演变,可参见Anita Shapira,Land And Power:The Zionist Resort to Force:1881-1948,New York:Oxford University Press,1992。
(2)Tzvi Hauser,“The Spirit of the IDF,”Azure,No.5757,1997,pp.47-72.
(1)笔者就卡希尔在以色列反恐军事伦理塑造中的角色和地位与多位来访的以色列学者交流,都得出了这个结论。如希伯来大学的劳·夏利(Ran Shauli)教授认为,卡希尔对以色列军事伦理方面的影响无人可及(2018年11月12日,上海)。
(2)该高级委员会的成员还有来自以色列国防军人力部、教育部和最高军事检察院等部门的高级官员。
(3)该文件体现出“后锡安主义”意识形态,避免提及锡安主义和犹太民族主义的内容,致力于捍卫以色列的民主特性。该文件的自由主义倾向导致以色列国防军内部中右翼势力的不满。2001年,在国防军教育部门负责人埃拉泽·斯特恩(Elazar Stern)的领导下,修订了新版本,添加了爱国忠诚、人的尊严等方面内容。参见Stuart A.Cohen and Tamir Libel,“Training Military Personnel to Take Moral Decisions in Situations of Ethical Asymmetry Lessons from the Israeli Experience,”in Jarmo Toiskallio,ed.,Ethical Education in the Military:What,How and Why in the 21st Century?Helsinki,Finland:National Defence College,pp.164-182。
(1)亚德林对以色列新反恐战伦理的发展也发挥了重要作用。他于2002年升任少将并任以色列军事学院和国防学院院长,2004年8月至2006年出任以色列驻美武官,回国后出任以色列军事情报局局长。2003年,他受命组建并领导了一个由以色列国防军高级指挥官、哲学家(以卡希尔为主)和律师构成的委员会,致力于探究反恐战中的军事伦理问题。2004年夏,他在“耶路撒冷公共事务中心”举办的活动中发表演讲,初步探讨了以色列在反恐战中面临的困境,并阐述了以色列国防军如何在实现反恐军事需要的同时,努力避免伤及无辜平民。该演讲内容以“反恐中的伦理困境”为题,发表在《耶路撒冷问题简报》上,见Jerusalem Issue Brief,Vol.4,No.8,November 25,2004,亦可参见http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-8.htm。
(2)参见Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:An Israeli Perspective,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.3-32;Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:Principles,”Philosophia,Vol.34,No.1,2006,pp.75-84。
(3)Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Assassination and Preventive Killing,”SAIS Review of International Affairs,Vol.25,No.1,2005,pp.41-57.
(4)Amos Harel,“The Philosopher Who Gave the IDF Moral Justification in Gaza,”Haaretz,February 6,2009,https://www.haaretz.com/1.5071578.
(5)参见Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:An Israeli Perspective,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.3-32。
(1)2016年以色列的《反恐法》也采纳了此种扩大化了的“恐怖主义”和“恐怖行为”定义。以色列著名反恐专家博阿兹·加诺(Boaz Ganor)主张将恐怖主义定义为:“一种故意对平民使用暴力以实现政治目标的暴力斗争方式”。参见Boaz Ganor,The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle:A Guide for Decision Makers,New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers,2008,p.17。
(2)《以色列国防军精神》暗示了战争中保护生命的等级序列,即“我方平民”--“他(敌)方平民”--“我方士兵”--“他方士兵”,此序列契合了“正义战争理论”和国际武装冲突法的要求。而卡希尔和亚德林提出的“反恐战”下保护生命的新等级序列对此作了重大修正。
(1)Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:Principles,”Philosophia,Vol.34,No.1,2006,pp.75-84.
(2)Asa Kasher,“The Principle of Distinction,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.6,No.2,2007,pp.152-167.
(3)Emily Amrousi,“We Do not Sanctify Ddeath,”June 22,2012,http://www.israelhayom.com/2012/06/22/we-do-not-sanctify-death/.
(1)Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Determining Norms for Warfare in New Situations:Between Military and the Laws of War,”Military and Strategic Affairs,Vol.5,No.1,2013,pp.95-117.
(1)Elie Holzer,“Attitudes Towards the Use of Military Force in Ideological Currents of Religious Zionism,”in Lawrence Schiffman and Joel B.Wolowelsky,eds.,War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition,New York:Yeshiva University Press,2007,pp.341-413.
(2)Amos Harel,“Israel’s Evolving Military:The IDF Adapts to New Threats,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.95,No.4,2016,pp.43-50.
(3)Yagil Levy,“Religious Authorities in the Military and Civilian Control:The Case of the Israeli Defense Force,”Politics&Society,Vol.44,No.2,2016,pp.1-28.
(4)Yagil Levy,“The Israeli Military:Imprisoned by the Religious Community,”Middle East Policy,Vol.18,No.2,2011,pp.67-83.
(1)Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Zipi Israeli,“Between A‘Jewish and Democratic State’and Issues of National Security,”in Shlomo Brom and Anat Kurz,eds.,Strategic Survey for Israel 2017-2018,Tel Aviv:Institute for National Security Studies,2017,p.119.
(2)Stuart A.Cohen,“Dilemmas of Military Service in Israel:The Religious Dimension,”in Lawrence Schiffman and Joel B.Wolowelsky,eds.,War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition,New York:Yeshiva University Press,2007,pp.328-329.
(3)Shaul Kimhi and Asa Kasher,“Moral Dilemmas in Military Situations:Proportionality Principle,Religiosity,Political Attitudes,and Authoritarian Personality,”Military Psychology,Vol.27,No.3,2015,pp.169-184.
(4)Stuart A.Cohen,“The Quest for a Corpus of Jewish Military Ethics in Modern Israel,”Journal of Israeli History,Vol.26,No.1,2007,pp.35-66.
(5)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.288.
(6)Isreal Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky,Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel,London:Pluto Press,2004,p.71.
(1)Elie Holzer,“Attitudes Towards the Use of Military Force in Ideological Currents of Religious Zionism,”in Lawrence Schiffman and Joel B.Wolowelsky,eds.,War and Peace in the Jewish Tradition,New York:Yeshiva University Press,2007,pp.341-413.
(2)Matthew Wagner,“Eliyahu advocates carpet bombing Gaza,”The Jerusalem Post,May 30,2007.
(3)Yagil Levy,“Religious Authorities in the Military and Civilian Control:The Case of the Israeli Defense Force,”Politics&Society,Vol.44,No.2,2016,pp.1-28.
(1)Asa Kasher,“I Wrote the IDF Code of Ethics.Here’s My Take on the Hebron Shooting,”Forward,April 6,2016,https://forward.com/opinion/337841/i-wrote-the-idf-code-of-ethics-heres-mytake-on-the-hebron-shooting/.
(2)William Booth and Ruth Eglash,“The Military Trial That’s Tearing Israel Apart,”The Washington Post,November 1,2016,https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-militarytrial-thats-tearing-israel-apart/2016/11/01/7f0d203c-9b93-11e6-b552-b1f85e484086_story.html?utm_te rm=.2585ce238c18.
(3)Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Zipi Israeli,“Between a‘Jewish and Democratic State’and Issues of National Security,”in Shlomo Brom and Anat Kurz,eds.,Strategic Survey for Israel 2017-2018,Tel Aviv:Institute for National Security Studies,2017,pp.106-130.
(4)Gili Cohen,“Reservists From Elite IDF Intel Unit Refuse to Serve Over Palestinian‘Persecution’,”September 12,2014,https://www.haaretz.com/43-ex-unit-8200-soldiers-to-refusereserve-duty-1.5264418.
(5)“Human Rights in the Occupied Territories:Annual Report 2007,”B’Tselem,2008.
(1)“Adalah v.GOC Central Command,IDF,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.2,2004-2005,The Supreme Court of Israel and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Jerusalem,May 2006,pp.183-208.
(2)“Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v.Minister of Defence,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.3,2006-2009,The Supreme Court of Israel,The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,August 2009,pp.36-84.
(1)“Public Committee against Torture in Israel V.Government of Israel,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.3,2006-2009,The Supreme Court of Israel,The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,August 2009,pp.85-162.
(2)“Iyyad v.State of Israel,”in Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court:Fighting Terrorism within the Law,Vol.3,2006-2009,The Supreme Court of Israel,The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,August 2009,pp.245-320.
(1)The Occupation’s Fig Leaf:Israel’s Military Law Enforcement System as a Whitewash Mechanism,B’Tselem,May 2016.
(2)The Occupation’s Fig Leaf:Israel’s Military Law Enforcement System as a Whitewash Mechanism,B’Tselem,May 2016,p.16.
(3)Yonah Jeremy Bob,“Is The IDF Ready For Its Next Legal War?”July 27,2018,https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/is-the-idf-ready-for-its-next-legal-war-563568.
(1)Nick Fotion,“Transforming and Expanding the Kasher/Yadlin Theory on the Ethics of Fighting Wars against Terrorism,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.33-43.
(2)Bashshar Haydar,“The Ethics of Fighting Terror and the Priority of Citizens,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.52-59.
(1)Paul Robinson,“The Ethics of the Strong against the Tactics of the Weak:A Response to Kasher and Yadlin’s‘Military Ethics of Fighting Terror’,”Philosophia,Vol.36,No.2,2008,pp.195-202.
(2)Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:Response,”Journal of Military Ethics,Vol.4,No.1,2005,pp.60-70.
(3)Daniel Byman,A High Price:The Triumphs&Failures of Israel Counterterrorism,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.368.
(4)Human Rights Council,Human Rights In Palestine And Other Occupied Arab Territories,September 15,2009.
(1)Michael Walzer,“War Fair,”The New Republic,July 31,2006,pp.15-16.
(2)Asa Kasher,“Operation Cast Lead and the Ethics of Just War,”Azure,Vol.37,No.5769,2009,pp.1-18.
(1)Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer,“Israel:Civilians&Combatants,”The New York Review of Books,Vol.56,No.8,2009,https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/05/14/israel-civilianscombatants/.
(2)Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin,“‘Israel&the Rules of War’:An Exchange,”The New York Review of Books,Vol.56,No.10,2009,https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/06/11/israel-the-rulesof-war-an-exchange/.
(3)Asa Kasher,“A Moral Evaluation of the Gaza War-Operation Cast Lead,”February 4,2010,http://jcpa.org/article/a-moral-evaluation-of-the-gaza-war-%E2%80%93-operation-cast-lead/.
(4)David Horovitz,“The Moralist,”The Jerusalem Post,April 22,2011,http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Editors-Notes-The-moralist.
(5)Emily Amrousi,“We Do Not Sanctify Death,”June 22,2012,http://www.israelhayom.com/2012/06/22/we-do-not-sanctify-death/.
(1)Jerome Slater,“Just War Moral Philosophy and the 2008-09 Israeli Campaign in Gaza,”International Security,Vol.37,No.2,2012,pp.44-80.
(2)Muhammad Ali Khalidi,“‘The Most Moral Army in the World’:The New‘Ethical Code’of the Israeli Military and the War on Gaza,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.39,No.3,2010,pp.6-23.
(3)George E.Bisharat,“Violence’s Law:Israel’s Campaign to Transform International Legal Norms,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.42,No.3,2013,pp.68-84.
(4)Ronen Bergmannen,“How Israel Won a War but Paid a High Moral Price,”Foreign Policy Website,February 3,2018,http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/03/how-israel-won-the-war-againstsuicide-bombers-but-lost-its-moral-compass-ronen-bergman/.
(5)Benny Avni,“Assassin’s Creed:Taking out Individuals as a War Strategy,”Newsweek,August22,2014,https://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/05/assassins-creed-taking-out-individuals-war-strategy-266296.html.
(1)Lisa Hajjar,“International Humanitarian Law and‘War on Terror’:A Comparative Analysis of Israeli and American Doctrines,”Journal of Palestine Studies,Vol.36,No.1,2006,pp.21-42.
(2)Yagil Levy,“The Gaza Fighting:Did Israel Shift Risk from Its Solders to Civilians,”Middle East Policy,Vol.24,No.3,2017,p.132.
(3)Michael Walzer,“Israel Must Defeat Hamas,But Also Must Do More to Limit Civilian Deaths,”July 31,2014,https://newrepublic.com/article/118908/2014-gaza-war-how-should-israelfight-asymmetrical-war-hamas.
(4)Boaz Ganor,“A Call To Revise The Geneva Conventions,”The San Francisco Chronicle,January 15,2009,p.B7.
(1)Charli Carpenter,“Fighting the Laws of War:Protecting Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.90,No.2,2011,pp.146-152.