摘要
针对我国创新鼓励政策和知识产权保护政策的执行,从演化博弈视角探讨企业创新中开放与独占创新策略与政府决策的演化过程。建立了创新鼓励与知识产权政策影响下的企业开放与独占创新策略的演化博弈模型。根据复制动态方程得到参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略,分析了企业的开放与独占创新策略的影响因素。研究结果表明,系统中群体的开放评价系数、独占转化系数、开放补贴系数、知识产权补贴系数以及采纳开放与独占策略的初始比例,都会对企业开放与独占创新策略产生影响。
Aiming at the implementation of China's innovation encouragement policy and intellectual property protection policy, this paper explores the evolution process of open and appropriability mixed innovation strategy and government decision-making in the process of enterprise innovation from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. An evolutionary game model of the government's open innovation incentive policy, intellectual property encouragement policy and the open and appropriability mixed innovation strategy of the enterprise were established. According to the replication dynamic equation, the participants' behavior evolution law and behavior evolution stability strategy were obtained, and the influencing factors of the enterprise's open and appropriability mixed innovation strategy were analyzed. The results show that the open evaluation coefficient, exclusive conversion coefficient, open subsidy coefficient, intellectual property subsidy coefficient and the initial proportion of adopting open and appropriability strategies in the system will have an impact on the open and exclusive mixed innovation strategy of enterprises.
引文
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