考虑偏好异质特征的锦标竞赛激励结构与效果分析
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摘要
引入心理偏好的锦标竞赛是目前的研究热点,但是忽略了偏好的异质特征。对此,采用行为博弈论方法,研究基于异质偏好分组的分类竞赛和混同竞赛,比较二者的激励结构和激励效果。结果表明:在激励结构方面,无论是奖励强度还是保障强度,自利偏好者之间的分类竞赛总是最大,并且除非偏好异质度较大公平偏好者之间的分类竞赛总是最小而混同竞赛总是居中;在激励效果方面,自利偏好者虽然参与分类竞赛只能够得到最低期望效用即保留效用但是参与混同竞赛可以得到更多期望效用,而公平偏好者参与分类竞赛和混同竞赛都只能够得到最低期望效用即保留效用,委托人的期望利润在分类竞赛下比混同竞赛要多。因此,考虑参赛者的偏好异质特征,甄别偏好类型,制定恰当的激励结构,对提高锦标竞赛的激励效果是必要的。
The tournament incorporating psychological preferences has become a research focus. But it ignores the heterogeneity of preferences. This paper studies the separating and the pooling tournament and compares the incentive structures and effects in behavioral game theory,which are based on grouping by the types of preferences. It is found that on the side of incentive structures,both the prize intensity and the guaranteed intensity of the separating tournament among the selfish agents are always the biggest,while unless the extent of heterogeneity is very significant those of separating tournament among the agents preferring fairness are the smallest,and on the side of incentive effects,the agents preferring fairness can only gain the reservation utility in both the pooling and the separating tournament,while the selfish agents gain more utility in the separating although in the pooling tournament they can only gain the reservation utility too,and the principal can get more profits in the separating tournament. Therefore,it is necessary for promoting the incentive efficiency of tournament to take the heterogeneity of preferences into account,screen the preferences of employees,and make suitable incentive structures.
The tournament incorporating psychological preferences has become a research focus. But it ignores the heterogeneity of preferences. This paper studies the separating and the pooling tournament and compares the incentive structures and effects in behavioral game theory,which are based on grouping by the types of preferences. It is found that on the side of incentive structures,both the prize intensity and the guaranteed intensity of the separating tournament among the selfish agents are always the biggest,while unless the extent of heterogeneity is very significant those of separating tournament among the agents preferring fairness are the smallest,and on the side of incentive effects,the agents preferring fairness can only gain the reservation utility in both the pooling and the separating tournament,while the selfish agents gain more utility in the separating although in the pooling tournament they can only gain the reservation utility too,and the principal can get more profits in the separating tournament. Therefore,it is necessary for promoting the incentive efficiency of tournament to take the heterogeneity of preferences into account,screen the preferences of employees,and make suitable incentive structures.
引文
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[15]Pradeep D,John G,Haimanko O.Prizes versus wages with envy and pride[J].Japanese Economic Review,2013,64(1):98-121.
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[17]Christian G,Dirk S.Envy and compassion in tournaments[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2005,14(1):187-207.
[18]魏光兴,蒲勇健.公平偏好与锦标激励[J].管理科学,2006,19(2):42-47.
[19]李训,曹国华.公平偏好员工的锦标激励研究[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(1):143-144.
[20]David G,Rebecca S.Fairness and desert in tournaments[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2010,69(4):346-364.
[21]黄邦根.公平偏好、高管团队锦标激励与企业绩效[J].商业经济与管理,2012,23(11):62-70.
[22]Magnus H,Martin K.Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests[J].Economics Letters,2013,120(4):276-279.
[23]Gerald E,Sabrina T.Envy and loss aversion in tournaments[J].Journal of Economic Psychology,2013,34(2):240-255.
[24]刘新民,刘晨曦,纪大琳.基于公平偏好的三阶段锦标激励模型研究[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(3):257-263.
[25]David G,Rebecca S.Desert and inequity aversion in teams[J].Journal of Public Economics,2015,123(1):42-54.
[26]Dixit A K.Strategic behavior in contests[J].American economic reviews,1987,77(5):891-898.
[27]Peter J J,Matthias K.Human capital investments in asymmetric corporate tournaments[J].Journal of Economics and Business,2008,60(4):312-331.
[28]Fehr E,Schmidt K M.A theory of fairness,competition and cooperation[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999,114(3):817-868.
[2]Lazear E P.Pay Equality and industrial politics[J].Journal of Political Economy,1989,97(3):561-580.
[3]王哲伟.竞赛理论研究的新进展[J].经济学动态,2012(7):105-110.
[4]Steffen A,Falk A,Matthias W.Promotions and incentives:the case of multistage elimination tournaments[J].Journal of Labor Economics,2012,30(1):149-174.
[5]Omesh K,Williams R.Tournament incentives,firm risk,and corporate policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(5):350-376.
[6]Michael W.Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2013,31(2):198-210.
[7]常逢彩,兰燕飞.基于多任务的锦标赛模型[J].系统工程,2013,31(3):93-99.
[8]朱浩,傅强,黎秀秀.基于异质性地方政府激励锦标赛模型及政策意义[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(1):109-115.
[9]马晓敏,祁怀锦.CFO锦标赛激励与税收激进行为研究[J].商业研究,2017(2):126-132.
[10]Dmitriy Knyazev.Optimal prize structures in elimination contests[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2017,139(7):32-48.
[11]Matthias K.Emotions in tournaments[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2008,67(2):204-214.
[12]魏光兴,蒲勇健.工作竞赛中的心理偏好研究[J].系统工程学报,2008,23(3):325-330.
[13]李绍芳,郭心毅,蒲勇健.行为人具有涉他偏好的锦标激励研究[J].技术经济,2010,29(1):122-127.
[14]Michael K,Aaron N,Birendra R.Tournament outcomes and pro-social behavior[J].Journal of Economic Psychology,2013,39(4):387-401.
[15]Pradeep D,John G,Haimanko O.Prizes versus wages with envy and pride[J].Japanese Economic Review,2013,64(1):98-121.
[16]张晶,韩李利,梁巧转,唐梦嫒.具有涉他偏好的地方官员晋升锦标激励研究[J].西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2015,35(1):54-60.
[17]Christian G,Dirk S.Envy and compassion in tournaments[J].Journal of Economics&Management Strategy,2005,14(1):187-207.
[18]魏光兴,蒲勇健.公平偏好与锦标激励[J].管理科学,2006,19(2):42-47.
[19]李训,曹国华.公平偏好员工的锦标激励研究[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(1):143-144.
[20]David G,Rebecca S.Fairness and desert in tournaments[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2010,69(4):346-364.
[21]黄邦根.公平偏好、高管团队锦标激励与企业绩效[J].商业经济与管理,2012,23(11):62-70.
[22]Magnus H,Martin K.Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests[J].Economics Letters,2013,120(4):276-279.
[23]Gerald E,Sabrina T.Envy and loss aversion in tournaments[J].Journal of Economic Psychology,2013,34(2):240-255.
[24]刘新民,刘晨曦,纪大琳.基于公平偏好的三阶段锦标激励模型研究[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(3):257-263.
[25]David G,Rebecca S.Desert and inequity aversion in teams[J].Journal of Public Economics,2015,123(1):42-54.
[26]Dixit A K.Strategic behavior in contests[J].American economic reviews,1987,77(5):891-898.
[27]Peter J J,Matthias K.Human capital investments in asymmetric corporate tournaments[J].Journal of Economics and Business,2008,60(4):312-331.
[28]Fehr E,Schmidt K M.A theory of fairness,competition and cooperation[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999,114(3):817-868.
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