中央环保督察改善空气质量了吗?——基于双重差分模型的实证研究
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摘要
作为环保领域的重大制度创新,中央环保督察已在全国范围开展深入实践。论文在对其实施特点分析基础上,使用双重差分模型研究中央环保督察对空气质量的影响效果。研究发现,督察城市与其相邻非督察城市的空气质量状况及变化趋势非常一致,可能存在污染物跨域流动及治理溢出效应,中央环保督察的净效应不显著;而与其不相邻的非督察城市相比,中央环保督察的开展使督察城市PM10、SO_2、CO、NO_2浓度显著降低,但其对PM2.5、O_3影响不显著。PM2.5、O_3等二次污染物治理更复杂,需进一步关注。此外,中央环保督察不同环节对空气质量的影响存在差异。在国家环境监督体系由"督企"向"督政"延伸背景下,论文拓展了对中央环保督察这一制度创新的特征及效果的理解。
As a major institutional innovation in the field of Chinese environmental protection,the central environmental protection inspection has been carried out in-depth across the country. Based on an analysis of its implementation, this study conducted differences-in-differences analysis to investigate the effect,if any,of inspection on air quality. It was found that the status and trends of air quality of inspected cities and neighboring non-inspection cities were very similar,and the cross-regional flow of pollutants and spillover effects may exist. Therefore,the net effect of central environmental protection inspection was not significant. Although compared with uninspected cities not adjacent to them, cities subject to the central environmental protection inspection had significantly reduced concentrations of PM10,SO_2,CO,and NO_2,but the impact on PM2. 5 and O_3 pollutants was not significant. The control of secondary pollutants such as PM2. 5 and O_3 is more complicated and needs further attention. In addition,the impact of different processes of the central environmental protection inspection on air quality was different. In the context of the extension of the national environmental supervision system from "supervising enterprises"to "supervising local governments ",the paper expands our understanding of the implementation and effects of central environmental protection inspection as an innovation.
As a major institutional innovation in the field of Chinese environmental protection,the central environmental protection inspection has been carried out in-depth across the country. Based on an analysis of its implementation, this study conducted differences-in-differences analysis to investigate the effect,if any,of inspection on air quality. It was found that the status and trends of air quality of inspected cities and neighboring non-inspection cities were very similar,and the cross-regional flow of pollutants and spillover effects may exist. Therefore,the net effect of central environmental protection inspection was not significant. Although compared with uninspected cities not adjacent to them, cities subject to the central environmental protection inspection had significantly reduced concentrations of PM10,SO_2,CO,and NO_2,but the impact on PM2. 5 and O_3 pollutants was not significant. The control of secondary pollutants such as PM2. 5 and O_3 is more complicated and needs further attention. In addition,the impact of different processes of the central environmental protection inspection on air quality was different. In the context of the extension of the national environmental supervision system from "supervising enterprises"to "supervising local governments ",the paper expands our understanding of the implementation and effects of central environmental protection inspection as an innovation.
引文
艾云(2011).上下级政府间“考核检查”与“应对”过程的组织学分析——以A县“计划生育”年终考核为例.社会,31(3):68-87.
常纪文、王鑫(2016).由督企、督政到督地方党委:环境监督模式转变的历史逻辑.环境保护,44(7):18-23.
陈海嵩(2017).环保督察制度法治化:定位、困境及其出路.法学评论,3:176-187.
陈家建(2015).督查机制:科层运动化的实践渠道.公共行政评论,2:5-21.
董强、李小云(2009).农村公共政策执行过程中的监督软化——以G省X镇计划生育政策的落实为例.中国行政管理,12:77-81.
冯贵霞(2016).“共识互动式”环保政策执行网络的形成——以环保约谈制为例.东岳论丛,37(4):55-61.
何彬、潘新美(2017).环境监管对污染物排放的影响:基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析.公共行政评论,5:26-45.
李晓菊(2017).中央环保督察信访工作经验及建议.环境保护,13:62-64.
刘骥、熊彩(2015).解释政策变通:运动式治理中的条块关系.公共行政评论,6:88-112.
倪星、原超(2014).地方政府的运动式治理是如何走向“常规化”的?——基于S市市监局“清无”专项行动的分析.公共行政评论,7(2):70-96.
戚建刚、余海洋(2018).论作为运动型治理机制之“中央环保督察制度”——兼与陈海嵩教授商榷.理论探讨,2:157-164.
任恒(2018).我国环境问责制度建设中的“党政同责”理念探析.北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2:49-55.
石庆玲、陈诗一、郭峰(2017).环保部约谈与环境治理:以空气污染为例.统计研究,34(10):88-97.
沈洪涛、周艳坤(2017).环境执法监督与企业环境绩效:来自环保约谈的准自然实验证据.南开管理评论,6:73-82.
盛明科、李代明 (2018).生态政绩考评失灵与环保督察——规制地方政府间“共谋”关系的制度改革逻辑.吉首大学学报(社会科学版),39(4):48-56.
唐皇凤(2007).常态社会与运动式治理——中国社会治安治理中的“严打”政策研究.开放时代,3:115-129.
吴建南、文婧、秦朝(2018).环保约谈管用吗?——来自中国城市大气污染治理的证据.中国软科学,11:66-75.
于会文(2017).环保督察的“四川路径”.环境保护,45(8):27-31.
张华(2016).地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释.中国工业经济,7:74-90.
钟兴菊(2017).地方性知识与政策执行成效——环境政策地方实践的双重话语分析.公共管理学报,1:38-48.
周雪光 (2012).运动型治理机制:中国国家治理的制度逻辑再思考.开放时代,9:105-125.
Cai,H.,Chen,Y.& Gong,Q.(2016).Polluting Thy Neighbor:Unintended Consequences of China's Pollution Reduction Mandates.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,76:86-104.
Chen,Y.,Jin,G.Z.,Kumar,N.& Shi,G.(2012).Gaming in Air Pollution Data?Lessons From China.The B.E.Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,12(3):1-43.
Liang,J.& Langbein,L.(2015).Performance Management,High-Powered Incentives,and Environmental Policies in China.International Public Management Journal,18(3):346-385.
Ma,Y.R.,Ji,Q.& Fan,Y.(2016).Spatial Linkage Analysis of the Impact of Regional Economic Activities on Pm2.5 Pollution in China.Journal of Cleaner Production,139:1157-1167.
Qi,Y.& Zhang,L.(2014).Local Environmental Enforcement Constrained by Central-Local Relations in China.Environmental Policy and Governance,24(3):216-232.
Van Rooij,B.(2006).Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law:Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns.Development and Change,37(1):57-74.
Wu,J.,Xu,M.& Zhang,P.(2018).The Impact of Governmental Performance Assessment Policy and Citizen Participation on Improving Environmental Performance across Chinese Provinces.Journal of Cleaner Production,184:227-238.
Wu,X.,Chen,Y.,Guo,J.,Wang,G.& Gong,Y.(2016).Spatial Concentration,Impact Factors and Prevention-Control Measures of Pm 2.5,Pollution in China.Natural Hazards,86(1):1-18.
Yee,W.H.,Tang,S.Y.& Lo,C.W.H.(2014).Regulatory Compliance WhentheRule of Law Is Weak:Evidence From China's Environmental Reform.Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,26(1):95-112.
Zhan,X.,Lo,C.W.H.& Tang,S.Y.(2013).Contextual Changes and Environmental Policy Implementation:A Longitudinal Study of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Guangzhou,China.Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,24(4):1005-1035.
Zhou,X.,Lian,H.,Ortolano,L.& Ye,Y.(2013).A Behavioral Model of “Muddling Through” in the Chinese Bureaucracy:The Case of Environmental Protection.China Journal,70(1):120-147.
常纪文、王鑫(2016).由督企、督政到督地方党委:环境监督模式转变的历史逻辑.环境保护,44(7):18-23.
陈海嵩(2017).环保督察制度法治化:定位、困境及其出路.法学评论,3:176-187.
陈家建(2015).督查机制:科层运动化的实践渠道.公共行政评论,2:5-21.
董强、李小云(2009).农村公共政策执行过程中的监督软化——以G省X镇计划生育政策的落实为例.中国行政管理,12:77-81.
冯贵霞(2016).“共识互动式”环保政策执行网络的形成——以环保约谈制为例.东岳论丛,37(4):55-61.
何彬、潘新美(2017).环境监管对污染物排放的影响:基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析.公共行政评论,5:26-45.
李晓菊(2017).中央环保督察信访工作经验及建议.环境保护,13:62-64.
刘骥、熊彩(2015).解释政策变通:运动式治理中的条块关系.公共行政评论,6:88-112.
倪星、原超(2014).地方政府的运动式治理是如何走向“常规化”的?——基于S市市监局“清无”专项行动的分析.公共行政评论,7(2):70-96.
戚建刚、余海洋(2018).论作为运动型治理机制之“中央环保督察制度”——兼与陈海嵩教授商榷.理论探讨,2:157-164.
任恒(2018).我国环境问责制度建设中的“党政同责”理念探析.北京工业大学学报(社会科学版),2:49-55.
石庆玲、陈诗一、郭峰(2017).环保部约谈与环境治理:以空气污染为例.统计研究,34(10):88-97.
沈洪涛、周艳坤(2017).环境执法监督与企业环境绩效:来自环保约谈的准自然实验证据.南开管理评论,6:73-82.
盛明科、李代明 (2018).生态政绩考评失灵与环保督察——规制地方政府间“共谋”关系的制度改革逻辑.吉首大学学报(社会科学版),39(4):48-56.
唐皇凤(2007).常态社会与运动式治理——中国社会治安治理中的“严打”政策研究.开放时代,3:115-129.
吴建南、文婧、秦朝(2018).环保约谈管用吗?——来自中国城市大气污染治理的证据.中国软科学,11:66-75.
于会文(2017).环保督察的“四川路径”.环境保护,45(8):27-31.
张华(2016).地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释.中国工业经济,7:74-90.
钟兴菊(2017).地方性知识与政策执行成效——环境政策地方实践的双重话语分析.公共管理学报,1:38-48.
周雪光 (2012).运动型治理机制:中国国家治理的制度逻辑再思考.开放时代,9:105-125.
Cai,H.,Chen,Y.& Gong,Q.(2016).Polluting Thy Neighbor:Unintended Consequences of China's Pollution Reduction Mandates.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,76:86-104.
Chen,Y.,Jin,G.Z.,Kumar,N.& Shi,G.(2012).Gaming in Air Pollution Data?Lessons From China.The B.E.Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,12(3):1-43.
Liang,J.& Langbein,L.(2015).Performance Management,High-Powered Incentives,and Environmental Policies in China.International Public Management Journal,18(3):346-385.
Ma,Y.R.,Ji,Q.& Fan,Y.(2016).Spatial Linkage Analysis of the Impact of Regional Economic Activities on Pm2.5 Pollution in China.Journal of Cleaner Production,139:1157-1167.
Qi,Y.& Zhang,L.(2014).Local Environmental Enforcement Constrained by Central-Local Relations in China.Environmental Policy and Governance,24(3):216-232.
Van Rooij,B.(2006).Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law:Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns.Development and Change,37(1):57-74.
Wu,J.,Xu,M.& Zhang,P.(2018).The Impact of Governmental Performance Assessment Policy and Citizen Participation on Improving Environmental Performance across Chinese Provinces.Journal of Cleaner Production,184:227-238.
Wu,X.,Chen,Y.,Guo,J.,Wang,G.& Gong,Y.(2016).Spatial Concentration,Impact Factors and Prevention-Control Measures of Pm 2.5,Pollution in China.Natural Hazards,86(1):1-18.
Yee,W.H.,Tang,S.Y.& Lo,C.W.H.(2014).Regulatory Compliance WhentheRule of Law Is Weak:Evidence From China's Environmental Reform.Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,26(1):95-112.
Zhan,X.,Lo,C.W.H.& Tang,S.Y.(2013).Contextual Changes and Environmental Policy Implementation:A Longitudinal Study of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Guangzhou,China.Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,24(4):1005-1035.
Zhou,X.,Lian,H.,Ortolano,L.& Ye,Y.(2013).A Behavioral Model of “Muddling Through” in the Chinese Bureaucracy:The Case of Environmental Protection.China Journal,70(1):120-147.