合谋视角下的农民合作社绩效与评级
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摘要
本文首先构建了一个中央政府作为委托人、地方政府作为监管者、合作社作为代理人的动态博弈的理论框架,然后基于对农民合作社的微观调查数据建立Logit和Probit模型,分析政社合谋与合作社绩效对农民合作社评级的影响。研究结果表明,具有合谋特征的合作社更容易获得合作社评级;地方政府越看重政治利益,合作社获得评级的概率越低;合作社绩效对获得评级没有显著性影响。
As an important agricultural operating entity,farmer cooperatives play an important role in the rural development and revitalization,and the rating of farmers' cooperatives is an important means to regulate and promote the healthy development of them.This paper first constructs a theoretical framework of the dynamic game among the central government,the local government and the cooperative,in which the central government is the principal,the local government is the regulators,and the cooperative is the agent.Then it establishes the Logit and Probit models based on the micro-survey data of farmers' cooperatives to analyze how political and social collusion and cooperative performance affect the rating of farmer cooperatives.The results show that farmers' cooperatives with collusive characteristics can get ratings.When the local governments focus on political interests,farmers' cooperatives find it difficult to get ratings.The performance of farmers' cooperatives has no significant impact on the rating.This study has theoretical and practical significance for the central government to improve the cooperative rating methods and related policies,and promote the standardized development of cooperatives
As an important agricultural operating entity,farmer cooperatives play an important role in the rural development and revitalization,and the rating of farmers' cooperatives is an important means to regulate and promote the healthy development of them.This paper first constructs a theoretical framework of the dynamic game among the central government,the local government and the cooperative,in which the central government is the principal,the local government is the regulators,and the cooperative is the agent.Then it establishes the Logit and Probit models based on the micro-survey data of farmers' cooperatives to analyze how political and social collusion and cooperative performance affect the rating of farmer cooperatives.The results show that farmers' cooperatives with collusive characteristics can get ratings.When the local governments focus on political interests,farmers' cooperatives find it difficult to get ratings.The performance of farmers' cooperatives has no significant impact on the rating.This study has theoretical and practical significance for the central government to improve the cooperative rating methods and related policies,and promote the standardized development of cooperatives
引文
1. Tirole J,Hierarchies and bureaucracies:On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law,Economics,&Organization,1986,2(2):181~214
2 . Laffont J J,Martimort D.Mechanism design with collusion and correlation.Econometrica,2000,68(2):309~342
3 . Khalil F,Lawarrée J,Scott T J.Private monitoring,collusion,and the timing of information. The RAND Journal of Economics,2015,46(4):872~890
4 . Rahman D.But who will monitor the monitor?.American Economic Review,2012,102(6):2767~97
5 . Tirole J,“A Theory of Collective Reputation”,in J.J.Laffont(ed.)Advances in Economic Theory,2,[C〗.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1992:151~206
6 . Ishiguro S.Collusion and discrimination in organizations.Journal of Economic Theory,2004,116(2):357~369
7 . Roux C,Thni C.Collusion among many firms:The disciplinary power of targeted punishment.Journal of EconomicBehavior&Organization,2015,116:83~93
8 . Harrington Jr J E.Penalties and the deterrence of unlawful collusion.Economics Letters,2014,124(1):33~36
9 . Soboh R A M E,Lansink A O,Giesen G,et al.Performance measurement of the agricultural marketing cooperatives:the gap between theory and practice.Review of Agricultural Economics,2009,31(3):446~469
10 . Fulton M,Giannakas K.Organizational commitment in a mixed oligopoly:Agricultural cooperatives and investor-owned firms.American journal of agricultural economics,2001,83(5):1258~1265
11 . Salazar I,Gorriz C G.Determinants of the differences in the downstream vertical integration and efficiency implications in agricultural cooperatives.The BE Journal of Economic Analysis&Policy,2011,11(1)
12 . Nickell P,Perraudin W,Varotto S.Stability of rating transitions.Journal of Banking&Finance,2000,24(1~2):203~227
13 . Bar-Isaac H,Shapiro J.Ratings quality over the business cycle.Journal of Financial Economics,2013,108(1):62~78
14 . Skreta V,Veldkamp L. Ratings shopping and asset complexity:Atheory of ratings inflation. Journal of Monetary Economics,2009,56(5):678~695
15 . Adams M,Burton B,Hardwick P.The determinants of credit ratings in the United Kingdom insurance industry.Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2003,30(3~4):539~572
16 . Ashbaugh-Skaife H,Collins D W,La Fond R.The effects of corporate governance on firms’credit ratings.Journal of accounting and economics,2006,42(1~2):203~243
17 . Jia R,Nie H.Decentralization,collusion,and coal mine deaths.Review of Economics and Statistics,2017,99(1):105~118
18 .徐旭初,吴彬.治理机制对农民专业合作社绩效的影响———基于浙江省526家农民专业合作社的实证分析.中国农村经济,2010(5):43~55
19 .李道和,陈江华.农民专业合作社绩效分析———基于江西省调研数据.农业技术经济,2014(12):65~75
20 .林乐芬,顾庆康.农户入股农村土地股份合作社决策和绩效评价分析———基于江苏1831份农户调查.农业技术经济,2017(11):49~60
21 .黄胜忠,林坚,徐旭初.农民专业合作社治理机制及其绩效实证分析.中国农村经济,2008(3):65~73
22 .崔宝玉,简鹏,王纯慧.农民专业合作社:绩效测度与影响因素———兼析我国农民专业合作社的发展路径.中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,33(4):106~115
23 .梁巧,吴闻,刘敏,卢海阳.社会资本对农民合作社社员参与行为及绩效的影响.农业经济问题,2014(11):71~79
24 .应瑞瑶,朱哲毅,徐志刚.中国农民专业合作社为什么选择“不规范”.农业经济问题,2017(11):4~13
25 .李云新,王晓璇.农民专业合作社行为扭曲现象及其解释.农业经济问题,2017(4):14~22,110
26 .温涛,王小华,杨丹,朱炯.新形势下农户参与合作经济组织的行为特征、利益机制及决策效果.管理世界,2015(7):82 ~97
27 .杨丹,刘自敏.农村合作社制度下的农户行为研究.经济科学,2016(4):102~113
28 .聂辉华.政企合谋与经济增长:反思“中国模式”.中国人民出版社,2013
29 .周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究.经济研究,2007(7):36~50
30 .赵佳荣.农民专业合作社“三重绩效”评价模式研究.农业技术经济,2010(2):119~127
31 .崔宝玉,简鹏,刘丽珍.农民专业合作社绩效决定与“悖论”———基于AHP-QR的实证研究.农业技术经济,2017(1):109~123
(1)中华人民共和国农业部.“《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》实施十周年座谈会在京召开”.http://jiuban. moa. gov. cn/zwllm/zwdt/201709/t20170904_5802700. htm
*本文的贡献转移支付是泛指合作社向地方官员的利益输送,如聘请地方官员到合作社任职、送礼等
*中共中央《党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定》(中办发[2006]19号)第九条,任期3年以上计算为一个任期
(1)参见:关于印发《国家农民专业合作社示范社评定及监测暂行办法》的通知(农经发[2013]10号)
(2)参见:重庆市农业委员会办公室关于公布《重庆市农民专业合作社示范社评选办法》的通知(渝农发[2010]178号)
*Logit模型的累计分布函数服从逻辑分布,本文稳健性检验部分用Probit模型,该模型的累计分布函数服从正态分布
*合作社法第三十条和三十一条分别规定“农民专业合作社的理事长、理事、经理不得兼任业务性质相同的其他农民专业合作社的理事长、理事、监事、经理”和“执行与农民专业合作社业务有关公务的人员,不得担任农民专业合作社的理事长、理事、监事、经理或者财务会计人员”
2 . Laffont J J,Martimort D.Mechanism design with collusion and correlation.Econometrica,2000,68(2):309~342
3 . Khalil F,Lawarrée J,Scott T J.Private monitoring,collusion,and the timing of information. The RAND Journal of Economics,2015,46(4):872~890
4 . Rahman D.But who will monitor the monitor?.American Economic Review,2012,102(6):2767~97
5 . Tirole J,“A Theory of Collective Reputation”,in J.J.Laffont(ed.)Advances in Economic Theory,2,[C〗.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1992:151~206
6 . Ishiguro S.Collusion and discrimination in organizations.Journal of Economic Theory,2004,116(2):357~369
7 . Roux C,Thni C.Collusion among many firms:The disciplinary power of targeted punishment.Journal of EconomicBehavior&Organization,2015,116:83~93
8 . Harrington Jr J E.Penalties and the deterrence of unlawful collusion.Economics Letters,2014,124(1):33~36
9 . Soboh R A M E,Lansink A O,Giesen G,et al.Performance measurement of the agricultural marketing cooperatives:the gap between theory and practice.Review of Agricultural Economics,2009,31(3):446~469
10 . Fulton M,Giannakas K.Organizational commitment in a mixed oligopoly:Agricultural cooperatives and investor-owned firms.American journal of agricultural economics,2001,83(5):1258~1265
11 . Salazar I,Gorriz C G.Determinants of the differences in the downstream vertical integration and efficiency implications in agricultural cooperatives.The BE Journal of Economic Analysis&Policy,2011,11(1)
12 . Nickell P,Perraudin W,Varotto S.Stability of rating transitions.Journal of Banking&Finance,2000,24(1~2):203~227
13 . Bar-Isaac H,Shapiro J.Ratings quality over the business cycle.Journal of Financial Economics,2013,108(1):62~78
14 . Skreta V,Veldkamp L. Ratings shopping and asset complexity:Atheory of ratings inflation. Journal of Monetary Economics,2009,56(5):678~695
15 . Adams M,Burton B,Hardwick P.The determinants of credit ratings in the United Kingdom insurance industry.Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2003,30(3~4):539~572
16 . Ashbaugh-Skaife H,Collins D W,La Fond R.The effects of corporate governance on firms’credit ratings.Journal of accounting and economics,2006,42(1~2):203~243
17 . Jia R,Nie H.Decentralization,collusion,and coal mine deaths.Review of Economics and Statistics,2017,99(1):105~118
18 .徐旭初,吴彬.治理机制对农民专业合作社绩效的影响———基于浙江省526家农民专业合作社的实证分析.中国农村经济,2010(5):43~55
19 .李道和,陈江华.农民专业合作社绩效分析———基于江西省调研数据.农业技术经济,2014(12):65~75
20 .林乐芬,顾庆康.农户入股农村土地股份合作社决策和绩效评价分析———基于江苏1831份农户调查.农业技术经济,2017(11):49~60
21 .黄胜忠,林坚,徐旭初.农民专业合作社治理机制及其绩效实证分析.中国农村经济,2008(3):65~73
22 .崔宝玉,简鹏,王纯慧.农民专业合作社:绩效测度与影响因素———兼析我国农民专业合作社的发展路径.中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,33(4):106~115
23 .梁巧,吴闻,刘敏,卢海阳.社会资本对农民合作社社员参与行为及绩效的影响.农业经济问题,2014(11):71~79
24 .应瑞瑶,朱哲毅,徐志刚.中国农民专业合作社为什么选择“不规范”.农业经济问题,2017(11):4~13
25 .李云新,王晓璇.农民专业合作社行为扭曲现象及其解释.农业经济问题,2017(4):14~22,110
26 .温涛,王小华,杨丹,朱炯.新形势下农户参与合作经济组织的行为特征、利益机制及决策效果.管理世界,2015(7):82 ~97
27 .杨丹,刘自敏.农村合作社制度下的农户行为研究.经济科学,2016(4):102~113
28 .聂辉华.政企合谋与经济增长:反思“中国模式”.中国人民出版社,2013
29 .周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究.经济研究,2007(7):36~50
30 .赵佳荣.农民专业合作社“三重绩效”评价模式研究.农业技术经济,2010(2):119~127
31 .崔宝玉,简鹏,刘丽珍.农民专业合作社绩效决定与“悖论”———基于AHP-QR的实证研究.农业技术经济,2017(1):109~123
(1)中华人民共和国农业部.“《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》实施十周年座谈会在京召开”.http://jiuban. moa. gov. cn/zwllm/zwdt/201709/t20170904_5802700. htm
*本文的贡献转移支付是泛指合作社向地方官员的利益输送,如聘请地方官员到合作社任职、送礼等
*中共中央《党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定》(中办发[2006]19号)第九条,任期3年以上计算为一个任期
(1)参见:关于印发《国家农民专业合作社示范社评定及监测暂行办法》的通知(农经发[2013]10号)
(2)参见:重庆市农业委员会办公室关于公布《重庆市农民专业合作社示范社评选办法》的通知(渝农发[2010]178号)
*Logit模型的累计分布函数服从逻辑分布,本文稳健性检验部分用Probit模型,该模型的累计分布函数服从正态分布
*合作社法第三十条和三十一条分别规定“农民专业合作社的理事长、理事、经理不得兼任业务性质相同的其他农民专业合作社的理事长、理事、监事、经理”和“执行与农民专业合作社业务有关公务的人员,不得担任农民专业合作社的理事长、理事、监事、经理或者财务会计人员”