生物学双维主义——对心身关系问题的一种可能立场
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摘要
心身关系问题(The Mind-Body Problem)是当代心灵哲学的最核心论题,它指涉着心灵现象与物理现象之间具有怎样的关系。本文将以当代认知神经科学为基础,对现今关于这一问题最具代表性的若干理论,如查莫斯的"自然主义二元论",塞尔的"生物学自然主义",丹尼特的"功能主义"等进行重审,并指出这些理论的缺陷主要是由于三个原因所致:第一、对"存在"内涵的混淆;第二、对传统哲学中"实体"与"属性"的盲目沿用;第三、对研究者是人本身的忽视。本文由此提出一种名为"生物学双维主义"的可能立场,以说明从"人"这一生物物理系统出发,对"心身关系"问题所应当采取的合理解决方案。
The Mind-Body Problem is the most crucial topic of contemporary philosophy of mind, which refers to the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. Based on the cognitive neuroscience, this paper will reexamine some representative ideas, such as David Chalmers' "Naturalistic Dualism", John Searle's"Biological Naturalism", Daniel Dennett's "Functionalism" etc. It will point out that three reasons lead to the failure of these theories: firstly, the confusion of the connotation of "being"; secondly, the blind use of "entity" and"attribute" in traditional philosophy; thirdly, the neglect of the fact that the researchers themselves are humans.This paper will propose a possible stance called "The Biological Dual-Dimensionalism" to provide a rational solution to The Mind-Body Problem from the perspective of humans as biophysical systems themselves.
The Mind-Body Problem is the most crucial topic of contemporary philosophy of mind, which refers to the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. Based on the cognitive neuroscience, this paper will reexamine some representative ideas, such as David Chalmers' "Naturalistic Dualism", John Searle's"Biological Naturalism", Daniel Dennett's "Functionalism" etc. It will point out that three reasons lead to the failure of these theories: firstly, the confusion of the connotation of "being"; secondly, the blind use of "entity" and"attribute" in traditional philosophy; thirdly, the neglect of the fact that the researchers themselves are humans.This paper will propose a possible stance called "The Biological Dual-Dimensionalism" to provide a rational solution to The Mind-Body Problem from the perspective of humans as biophysical systems themselves.
引文
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[2]Chalmers,D.The Cognitive Neurosciences III[M].Cambridge:The MIT Press,2004,22.
[3]Searle,J.Mind:A Brief Introduction[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2005,78-79.
[4]Searle,J.The Mystery of Consciousness[M].New York:The New York Review of Books,1997,110-111.
[5]叶峰.为什么相信还原的物理主义[J].学术月刊,2017,(2):34-43.
[6]Churchland,P.'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes'[A],Lycan,W.(Eds)Mind and Cognition:A Reader[C],New Jersey:Wiley-Blackwell,1991,126.
[7]Dennett,D.Consciousness Explained[M].Boston:Little,Brown and Co.Press,1991.
[8]聂敏里.论巴门尼德的“存在”[J].中国人民大学学报,2002,16(1):45-52.
[9]聂敏里.《物理学》第一卷中亚里士多德对巴门尼德存在论的批判(上)[J].哲学研究,2009,(12):61-68.
[10]聂敏里.《物理学》第一卷中亚里士多德对巴门尼德存在论的批判(下)[J].哲学研究,2010,(1):92-98.
[11]聂敏里.亚里士多德与海德格尔:一个存在论的比较研究[J].哲学研究,2015,(1):86-93.
[12]Edelman,G.,Tononi,G.A Universe of Consciousness:How Matter Becomes Imagination[M].New York,NY:Basic Books.Press,2000,137-138.
[13]Damasio,A.Self Comes to Mind:Constructing the Conscious brain[M].New York:Vintage Books.Press,2012,167-187.
[14]Shimojo,S.,Nakayama,K.'Real world occlusion constraints and binocular rivalry'[J].Vision Research,1990,30(1):69-80.
[15]Leopold,D.,Logothetis,N.'Activity Changes in Early Visual Cortex Reflect Monkeys' Percepts During Binocular Rivalry'[J].Nature,1996,379(6565):549-553.
[16]Kentridge,R.,Heywood,C.'Weiskrantz L.Attention Without Awareness in Blindsight'[J].Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences,2011,266(1430):1805-1811.
[17]Aristotle.'CATEGORIES'[A],Barnes,J.(Ed)The Complete Works of Aristotle[C],Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1991,2a5-2a12.
[18]Goldstein,E.Cognitive Psychology:Connecting Mind,Research and Everyday Experience(3rd edition)[M].Belmont CA:Cengage Learning,2010,38.
[19]Servos,P.,Engel,S.,Gati,J.'fMRI Evidence for an Inverted Face Representation in Human Somatosensory Cortex'[J].Neuroreport,1999,10(7):1393.
[20]Madole,K.,Oakes,L.'Making Sense of Infant Categorization:Stable Processes and Changing Representations'[J].Developmental Review,1999,19(2):263-296.
[21]Edelman,G.Second Nature:Brain Science and Human Knowledge[M].New Haven:Yale University Press,2006,23-24.
[22]Putnam,H.'Brains in A Vat'[A],DeRose,K.(Ed)Skepticism:A Contemporary Reader[C],Oxford:Oxford University Press,1999,30-31.
[23]Berkeley,G.A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge[M].New York:Dover Publications,2003.
[24]Mariella,P.,Giulia,G.,Giorgi,o S.'A Functionally Relevant Tool for the Body Following Spinal Cord Injury'[J].Plos One,2013,8(3):e58312.
[25]Descartes,R.Meditations on First Philosophy:with Selections from the Objections and Replies[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2008,103.
[26]Heil,J.Philosophy of Mind:A Contemporary Introduction[M].New York:Routledge,1998,22.