我国房地产上市公司股权对盈余管理的影响研究
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摘要
研究以我国A股房地产上市公司2008～2016年的数据,从应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理两个方面分析股权集中度、机构投资者持股和股权制衡度对盈余管理的影响。实证检验结果表明:权集中度与盈余管理程度(包括应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理)呈显著的正相关性。股权制衡度能够显著抑制企业真实盈余管理,但无法抑制企业的应计盈余管理水平。机构投资者持股仅能抑制真实盈余管理,对应计盈余管理无显著抑制作用,但区分应计盈余管理方向后,机构投资者持股与正向应计盈余管理显著负相关。
Based on the 2008-2016 data of A-share real estate listed companies in China,the impact of equity concentration,institutional investors' shareholding and shareholding balance on earnings management was analyzed from the aspects of accrued project earnings management and real activity earnings management.The empirical test results showed that there was a significant positive correlation between equity concentration and earnings management(including accrued earnings management and real earnings management).The degree of equity restraint could significantly inhibit the company's real earnings management,but could not restrain the level of the company's accrued earnings management.The increase in the proportion of institutional investors holding shares could effectively inhibit the company's real earnings management.After the sample was grouped according to the accrued earnings management direction,institutional investors' stock ownership was significantly negatively correlated with positive accrued earnings management.
Based on the 2008-2016 data of A-share real estate listed companies in China,the impact of equity concentration,institutional investors' shareholding and shareholding balance on earnings management was analyzed from the aspects of accrued project earnings management and real activity earnings management.The empirical test results showed that there was a significant positive correlation between equity concentration and earnings management(including accrued earnings management and real earnings management).The degree of equity restraint could significantly inhibit the company's real earnings management,but could not restrain the level of the company's accrued earnings management.The increase in the proportion of institutional investors holding shares could effectively inhibit the company's real earnings management.After the sample was grouped according to the accrued earnings management direction,institutional investors' stock ownership was significantly negatively correlated with positive accrued earnings management.
引文
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[3]吴联生,王亚平.盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据:一个综述[J].经济研究,2007(8):143-152.
[4]夏立军,杨海斌.从审计意见看审计质量---上市公司2000年度财务报告审计意见分析[J].中国注册会计师,2002(10):23-26.
[5]宁亚平.盈余管理的定义及其意义研究[J].会计研究,2004(9):62-66.
[6]孙伟,顾旭秋.公允价值视角的投资性房地产用途转换账务处理研究[J].黑龙江八一农垦大学学报,2016,28(4):123-125.
[7]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J].会计研究,1999(9):25-35.
[8]Healy P M.The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1985(1):85-107.
[9]Beyer A,Guttman I,Marinovic I.Earnings management and earnings quality:theory and evidence[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2014,45(2-3):350-357.
[10]Abad D,Cutillasgomariz M F,Sánchezballesta J P,et al.Real Earnings Management and Information Asymmetry in the Equity Market[J].Euro Pean Accounting Review,2018,27(2):209-235.
[11]Rahman,Rashidah Abdul,Ali,et al.Board,audit committee,culture and earning s management:Malaysian evidence[J].Manager Journal,2006,21(7):783-804.
[12]蔡宁.上市公司盈余管理:理论分析与现实思考[D].厦门:厦门大学,2002.
[13]李常青,管连云.股权结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].商业研究,2004(19):48-53.
[14]袁知柱,郝文瀚,王泽燊.管理层激励对企业应计与真实盈余管理行为影响的实证研究[J].管理评论,2014,26(10):18-19.
[15]黄晓波,张钦.制造业上市公司股权结构对真实盈余管理影响的实证研究[J].商业会计,2015(7):50-53.
[16]Jing Yu,Xia Xu.Directional Add-Issuance,Ownership Structure and Earnings Management[J].Commercial Research,2016(5):19-25.
[17]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P.Detecting earnings management[J].Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[18]Roychowdhury S.Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[19]Cohen D A,Zarowin P.Ccrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[20]张国华.我国上市公司盈余管理与公司治理机制关系的实证研究[D].上海:同济大学,2006.