基于量子博弈的产学研协同创新激励机制研究
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摘要
本文引入了量子博弈的分析范式来研究产学研协同创新的激励机制,构建了产学研协同创新的量子博弈模型.对是否考虑纠缠态的情形做了比较研究,结果表明,考虑了纠缠态后,努力的一方不必再承担对方"背叛"的风险,在一定程度上解决了经典博弈中的"囚徒困境"问题.在产学研协同创新的情境下,协同双方需要在协同开始前商榷并委托第三方确定可被观测到的、易于量化的相关绩效指标,并签订"纠缠合同",确保协同双方均没有动机去采取非量子策略,这时采用最大努力程度的完全量子策略对协同双方来说均是最优的.
This paper employs the quantum game paradigm to study the incentive mechanism of the industry-university-institute(IUI for short)collaborative innovation,and construct the IUI collaborative innovation model.The result indicates that the quantum game analysis shows great advantage over the classical game model,and implies that considering entanglement of states,the hardworking side will not take the risk of the other side's betrayal,which resolves the "Prisoners',Dilemma" in the classical game theory to some degree.In the IUI collaboration case,both sides need to negotiate and delegate a third party to formulate some performance indicators,and they also need to sign an "entanglement contract" to ensure that neither of them has the motivation to deviate from the quantum strategy.Thus,the quantum strategy with maximal effort is the most profitable.
This paper employs the quantum game paradigm to study the incentive mechanism of the industry-university-institute(IUI for short)collaborative innovation,and construct the IUI collaborative innovation model.The result indicates that the quantum game analysis shows great advantage over the classical game model,and implies that considering entanglement of states,the hardworking side will not take the risk of the other side's betrayal,which resolves the "Prisoners',Dilemma" in the classical game theory to some degree.In the IUI collaboration case,both sides need to negotiate and delegate a third party to formulate some performance indicators,and they also need to sign an "entanglement contract" to ensure that neither of them has the motivation to deviate from the quantum strategy.Thus,the quantum strategy with maximal effort is the most profitable.
引文
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[14]Brandenburger A.The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2010,69(1):175-183.
[15]Iqbal A,Toor A H.Evolutionarily stable strategies in quantum games[J].Physics Letters A,2001,280(5):249-256.
[16]Huang Z,Qiu D.Quantum games under decoherence[J].International Journal of Theoretical Physics,2016,55(2):965-992.
[17]Groisman B.When quantum games can be played classically:In support of van Enk-Pike's assertion[J].arXiv.org,2018,83(1):1-3.
[18]Iqbal A,Chappell J M,Abbott D.Social optimality in quantum Bayesian games[J].Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications,2015,436:798-805.
[19]Li A,Yong X.Entanglement guarantees emergence of cooperation in quantum prisoner's dilemma games on networks[J].Scientific Reports,2015,4(1):1-4.
[20]郑君君,张平,蒋伟良,等.面对异质竞买者风投退出困境与量子博弈均衡[J]·管理科学学报,2015,18(4):62-72.Zheng J J,Zhang P,Jiang W L,et al.Venture capital exit dilemma and quantum equilibrium in presence of heterogeneous bidders[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China,2015,18(4):62-72.
[21]黄德才,汤胜龙.基于网格的量子博弈聚类算法[J].计算机科学,2014,41(10):261-265.Huang D C,Tang S L.Clustering algorithm based on quantum game and grid[J].Computer Science,2014,41(10):261-265.
[22]鞠治安,潘平,周惠玲.超越经典博弈思维形式之量子博弈的思维形式[J].重庆理工大学学报(社会科学),2017,31(4):14-19.Ju Z A,Pan P,Zhou H L.The thinking mode of quantum game beyond the classical game thinking mode[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology,2017,31(4):14-19.
[23]丁卫平,王建东,施全,等.基于种群混合协同联盟的属性量子博弈均衡约简[J].电子学报,2015,38(1):45-53.Ding W P,Wang J D,Shi Q,et al.Attribute equilibrium reduction with quantum game based on mixed co-evolutionary populations,collaboration[J].Acta Electronica Sinica,2015,38(1):45-53.
[24]Sun M,Lu D,Ju C,et al.An applicable multiple-player's quantum market game[J].Journal of University of Science and Technology of China,2012,42(4):259-264.
[25]兰立山.量子博弈的理性选择研究[D].贵阳:贵州大学,2016.Lan L S.Research on rational selection in the quantum game[D].Guiyang:Guizhou University,2016.
[26]郑辉,潘平,杨明.量子博弈中的信息思维研究[J].贵州大学学报(自然科学版),2014,31(6):137-140.Zheng H,Pan P,Yang M.Thinking research information in quantum game[J].Journal of Guizhou University(Natural Science),2014,31(6):137-140.
[27]程培,王先甲.产量竞争下量子博弈刻划的结盟特征函数及特性[J].统计与决策,2017,473(5):41-45.Cheng P,Wang X J.The characteristic function and property of coalition of quantum game under production competition[J].Statistics and Decision,2017,473(5):41-45.
[28]Iqbal A,Toor A H.Quantum mechanics gives stability to a Nash equilibrium[J].Physical Review A,2002,65(2):1-11.
[29]Iqbal A,Cheon T,Abbott D.Probabilistic analysis of three-player symmetric quantum games played using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm setting[J].Physics Letters A,2008,372(44):6564-6577.
[2]唐国锋,但斌,宋寒.多任务道德风险下应用服务外包激励机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(5):1175-1184.Tang G F,Dan B,Song H.Research on the incentive mechanism for multi-task moral hazard in application service outsourcing[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2013,33(5):1175-1184.
[3]曹柬,胡强,吴晓波,等.基于EPR制度的政府与制造商激励契约设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(3):610-621.Cao J,Hu Q,Wu X B,et al.Incentive mechanism between government and manufacturers based on EPR system[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2013,33(3):610-621.
[4]陈卫东,李晓晓.企业与科研单位协同创新产出水平提升机制[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(8):2141-2151.Chen W D,Li X X.The effort improving mechanisms of firms and R&D institutions[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2017,37(8):2141-2151.
[5]贺一堂,谢富纪,陈红军.产学研合作创新利益分配的激励机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(9):2244-2255.He Y T,Xie F J,Chen H J.Research on the incentive mechanism of profit allocation in the industry-universityinstitute collaboration innovation[J].Systems Engineering—Theory&Practice,2017,37(9):2244-2255.
[6]Huang M,Chen D.How can academic innovation performance in university-industry collaboration be improved?[J].Technological Forecasting and Social Change,2017,123:210-215.
[7]Meyer D A.Quantum strategies[J].Physical Review Letters,1999,82(5):1052-1059.
[8]Eisert J,Wilkens M,Lewenstein M.Quantum games and quantum strategies[J].Physical Review Letters,1999,87(6):3077-3080.
[9]Haven E,Khrennikov A.The palgrave handbook of quantum models in social science[M].London:Macmillan Publishers Ltd.,2017.
[10]Iqbal A,Chappell J M,Li Q,et al.A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information[J].Quantum Information Processing,2014,13:2783-2800.
[11]Balakrishnan S.Influence of initial conditions in 2x2 symmetric games[J].Quantum Information Processing,2014,13:2645-2651.
[12]Weng G F,Yu Y.Playing quantum games by a scheme with pre-and post-selection[J].Quantum Information Processing,2016,15:147-165.
[13]Situ H.Quantum Bayesian game with symmetric and asymmetric information[J].Quantum Information Processing,2015,14:1827-1840.
[14]Brandenburger A.The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,2010,69(1):175-183.
[15]Iqbal A,Toor A H.Evolutionarily stable strategies in quantum games[J].Physics Letters A,2001,280(5):249-256.
[16]Huang Z,Qiu D.Quantum games under decoherence[J].International Journal of Theoretical Physics,2016,55(2):965-992.
[17]Groisman B.When quantum games can be played classically:In support of van Enk-Pike's assertion[J].arXiv.org,2018,83(1):1-3.
[18]Iqbal A,Chappell J M,Abbott D.Social optimality in quantum Bayesian games[J].Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications,2015,436:798-805.
[19]Li A,Yong X.Entanglement guarantees emergence of cooperation in quantum prisoner's dilemma games on networks[J].Scientific Reports,2015,4(1):1-4.
[20]郑君君,张平,蒋伟良,等.面对异质竞买者风投退出困境与量子博弈均衡[J]·管理科学学报,2015,18(4):62-72.Zheng J J,Zhang P,Jiang W L,et al.Venture capital exit dilemma and quantum equilibrium in presence of heterogeneous bidders[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China,2015,18(4):62-72.
[21]黄德才,汤胜龙.基于网格的量子博弈聚类算法[J].计算机科学,2014,41(10):261-265.Huang D C,Tang S L.Clustering algorithm based on quantum game and grid[J].Computer Science,2014,41(10):261-265.
[22]鞠治安,潘平,周惠玲.超越经典博弈思维形式之量子博弈的思维形式[J].重庆理工大学学报(社会科学),2017,31(4):14-19.Ju Z A,Pan P,Zhou H L.The thinking mode of quantum game beyond the classical game thinking mode[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology,2017,31(4):14-19.
[23]丁卫平,王建东,施全,等.基于种群混合协同联盟的属性量子博弈均衡约简[J].电子学报,2015,38(1):45-53.Ding W P,Wang J D,Shi Q,et al.Attribute equilibrium reduction with quantum game based on mixed co-evolutionary populations,collaboration[J].Acta Electronica Sinica,2015,38(1):45-53.
[24]Sun M,Lu D,Ju C,et al.An applicable multiple-player's quantum market game[J].Journal of University of Science and Technology of China,2012,42(4):259-264.
[25]兰立山.量子博弈的理性选择研究[D].贵阳:贵州大学,2016.Lan L S.Research on rational selection in the quantum game[D].Guiyang:Guizhou University,2016.
[26]郑辉,潘平,杨明.量子博弈中的信息思维研究[J].贵州大学学报(自然科学版),2014,31(6):137-140.Zheng H,Pan P,Yang M.Thinking research information in quantum game[J].Journal of Guizhou University(Natural Science),2014,31(6):137-140.
[27]程培,王先甲.产量竞争下量子博弈刻划的结盟特征函数及特性[J].统计与决策,2017,473(5):41-45.Cheng P,Wang X J.The characteristic function and property of coalition of quantum game under production competition[J].Statistics and Decision,2017,473(5):41-45.
[28]Iqbal A,Toor A H.Quantum mechanics gives stability to a Nash equilibrium[J].Physical Review A,2002,65(2):1-11.
[29]Iqbal A,Cheon T,Abbott D.Probabilistic analysis of three-player symmetric quantum games played using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm setting[J].Physics Letters A,2008,372(44):6564-6577.
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