中国式财政分权、地方政府竞争与循环经济绩效——基于动态广义空间模型的分析
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摘要
本文运用主成分分析法和功效系数法测算出2007～2016年中国省域循环经济绩效值,并基于动态广义空间模型,检验了中国式财政分权、地方政府竞争对循环经济绩效的影响。研究表明:中国式财政分权对循环经济绩效的影响为负,且这种负向影响通过区域间的"空间溢出"作用进一步导致循环经济绩效的下降;地方政府竞争对循环经济绩效的影响呈倒"U"型曲线特征;中国式财政分权与地方政府竞争的交互作用对循环经济绩效的影响在不同空间权重矩阵中并不稳定。最后,本文就如何提升循环经济绩效提出了相应的政策建议。
This paper calculates the value of China's provincial circular economy performance of from 2007 to2016 by using principal component analysis and efficiency coefficient method, and tests the impact of Chinesestyle fiscal decentralization and local government competition on circular economy performance based on the dynamic generalized spatial model. The research shows that, the impact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on circular economy performance is negative, and this negative impact further reduces circular economy performance through the "spillover effect" between different regions. The impact of the local government competition on circular economy performance has the characteristic of inverted-U type. Chinese-style fiscal decentralization, local government competition's comprehensive effect on circular economy performance is unstable by using different spatial weight matrix. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to improve circular economy performance in China.
This paper calculates the value of China's provincial circular economy performance of from 2007 to2016 by using principal component analysis and efficiency coefficient method, and tests the impact of Chinesestyle fiscal decentralization and local government competition on circular economy performance based on the dynamic generalized spatial model. The research shows that, the impact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on circular economy performance is negative, and this negative impact further reduces circular economy performance through the "spillover effect" between different regions. The impact of the local government competition on circular economy performance has the characteristic of inverted-U type. Chinese-style fiscal decentralization, local government competition's comprehensive effect on circular economy performance is unstable by using different spatial weight matrix. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to improve circular economy performance in China.
引文
(1)徐国祥,龙硕,李波.中国财政分权度指数的编制及其与增长、均等的关系研究[J].统计研究,2016(9):36-46.
(2)谢贞发,张玮.中国财政分权与经济增长——一个荟萃回归分析[J].经济学(季刊),2015(2):435-452.
(1)V. J. Martinez, P. S. Lago, and A. Sacchi,“The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization:A Survey”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 2017,31(4):1095-1129.
(2)周黎安.“官场+市场”与中国增长故事[J].社会, 2018(2):1-45.
(3)刘承礼.中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演[J].经济学家,2011(7):61-69.
(4)龚锋,雷欣.中国式财政分权的数量测度[J].统计研究, 2010(10):47-55.
(5)周飞舟.分税制十年:制度及其影响[J].中国社会科学, 2006(6):100-115+205.
(6)H. H. Jin, Y. Y. Qian, and B. R. Weingast,“Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism, Chinese Style”, Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(9-10):1719-1742.
(7)李斌,曹万林.环境规制对我国循环经济绩效的影响研究——基于生态创新的视角[J].中国软科学, 2017(6):140-154.
(8)周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究, 2007(7):36-50.
(1)卞元超,宋凯艺,白俊红.双重分权、竞争激励与绿色全要素生产率提升[J].产业经济评论,2018(3):15-34.
(2)蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究,2008(6):4-11+36.
(3)卢真,李升,谭云.从优化税务营商环境角度看国税地税征管体制改革[J].税务研究,2018(8):18-20.
(4)A. P. Kyriacou, G. L. Muinelo, and S. O. Roca,“Regional Inequalities, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Quality”, Regional Studies, 2017, 51(6):945-957.
(5)罗能生,王玉泽.财政分权、环境规制与区域生态效率——基于动态空间杜宾模型的实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(4):110-118.
(6)黄建欢,谢优男,余燕团.城市竞争、空间溢出与生态效率:高位压力和低位吸力的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018(3):1-12.
(1)J. P. Elhorst,“Matlab Software for Spatial Panels”, International Regional Science Review, 2014, 37(3):389-405.
(1)王晓红,冯严超.环境规制对中国循环经济绩效的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2018(7):136-147.
(2)A. Hasanli,“Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth:A Dilemma between Theory and Empiricism”, Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2017, 20(3):77-94.
(3)徐国祥,龙硕,李波.中国财政分权度指数的编制及其与增长、均等的关系研究[J].统计研究, 2016(9):36-46.
(1)Z. Sun, C. P. Chang, and Y. Hao,“Fiscal Decentralization and China's Provincial Economic Growth:A Panel Data Analysis for China's Tax Sharing System”, Quality&Quantity, 2017, 51(5):2267-2289.
(2)谢贞发,张玮.中国财政分权与经济增长——一个荟萃回归分析[J].经济学(季刊),2015(2):435-452.
(1)V. J. Martinez, P. S. Lago, and A. Sacchi,“The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization:A Survey”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 2017,31(4):1095-1129.
(2)周黎安.“官场+市场”与中国增长故事[J].社会, 2018(2):1-45.
(3)刘承礼.中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演[J].经济学家,2011(7):61-69.
(4)龚锋,雷欣.中国式财政分权的数量测度[J].统计研究, 2010(10):47-55.
(5)周飞舟.分税制十年:制度及其影响[J].中国社会科学, 2006(6):100-115+205.
(6)H. H. Jin, Y. Y. Qian, and B. R. Weingast,“Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism, Chinese Style”, Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89(9-10):1719-1742.
(7)李斌,曹万林.环境规制对我国循环经济绩效的影响研究——基于生态创新的视角[J].中国软科学, 2017(6):140-154.
(8)周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究, 2007(7):36-50.
(1)卞元超,宋凯艺,白俊红.双重分权、竞争激励与绿色全要素生产率提升[J].产业经济评论,2018(3):15-34.
(2)蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究,2008(6):4-11+36.
(3)卢真,李升,谭云.从优化税务营商环境角度看国税地税征管体制改革[J].税务研究,2018(8):18-20.
(4)A. P. Kyriacou, G. L. Muinelo, and S. O. Roca,“Regional Inequalities, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Quality”, Regional Studies, 2017, 51(6):945-957.
(5)罗能生,王玉泽.财政分权、环境规制与区域生态效率——基于动态空间杜宾模型的实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(4):110-118.
(6)黄建欢,谢优男,余燕团.城市竞争、空间溢出与生态效率:高位压力和低位吸力的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018(3):1-12.
(1)J. P. Elhorst,“Matlab Software for Spatial Panels”, International Regional Science Review, 2014, 37(3):389-405.
(1)王晓红,冯严超.环境规制对中国循环经济绩效的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2018(7):136-147.
(2)A. Hasanli,“Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth:A Dilemma between Theory and Empiricism”, Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2017, 20(3):77-94.
(3)徐国祥,龙硕,李波.中国财政分权度指数的编制及其与增长、均等的关系研究[J].统计研究, 2016(9):36-46.
(1)Z. Sun, C. P. Chang, and Y. Hao,“Fiscal Decentralization and China's Provincial Economic Growth:A Panel Data Analysis for China's Tax Sharing System”, Quality&Quantity, 2017, 51(5):2267-2289.