员工持股计划与企业创新
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摘要
文章基于利益共享和相互监督理论,以2014-2016年A股非金融类上市公司为样本,实证检验了实施员工持计划中给非高管员工授予股票期权对上市公司创新产出的影响。实证结果显示:员工持股计划与企业创新产出的数量和创新质量均显著为正;非国有企业实施员工持股计划对创新的促进效果要高于国有企业;来自员工自有资金的方式与创新产出显著为负。用PSM控制了样本自选择偏误可能产生的内生性问题以后以上结论依然成立。研究结论从非高管员工的角度对员工持股计划的实施效果进行了检验,并期望对制定员工持股计划方案时具有一定启发的作用。
Based on the theory of benefit sharing and mutual supervision,this paper takes A shares non-financial listed companies in 2014-2016 as a sample And tests the effect of ESOP on the innovation output of listed companies. The empirical results show that:(1)The number and quality of innovation outputs present a significant positive relation with the implementation of ESOP.(2)The promotion effect of ESOP on innovation in non state-owned enterprises is better than that in stateowned enterprises.(3)The way of employee's own funds exhibits a significantly negative relation with the innovation output.After controlling the endogenous problem that may arise from sample selections,the above conclusions are still valid. It is expected to be helpful to the implementation of ESOP and the formulation of ESOP policy.
Based on the theory of benefit sharing and mutual supervision,this paper takes A shares non-financial listed companies in 2014-2016 as a sample And tests the effect of ESOP on the innovation output of listed companies. The empirical results show that:(1)The number and quality of innovation outputs present a significant positive relation with the implementation of ESOP.(2)The promotion effect of ESOP on innovation in non state-owned enterprises is better than that in stateowned enterprises.(3)The way of employee's own funds exhibits a significantly negative relation with the innovation output.After controlling the endogenous problem that may arise from sample selections,the above conclusions are still valid. It is expected to be helpful to the implementation of ESOP and the formulation of ESOP policy.
引文
[1]CHANG X,FU K,LOW A,et al.Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(1):168-188.
[2]黄群慧,余菁,王欣,等.新时期中国员工持股制度研究[J].中国工业经济,2014(7):5-16.
[3]陈华东.管理者任期、股权激励与企业创新研究[J].中国软科学,2016(8):112-126.
[4]翟胜宝,陈紫薇.高管股权激励与企业创新[J].北京工商大学学报,2016,31(1):85-93.
[5]姜英兵,于雅萍.谁是更直接的创新者?——核心员工股权激励与企业创新[J].经济管理,2017,39(3):109-127.
[6]CORE J E,GUAY W R.Stock option plans for non-executive employees[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,61(2):253-287.
[7]陈艳艳.员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果研究[J].管理评论,2015(5):123-129.
[8]OYER P,SCHAEFER S.Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?:An empirical examination of alternative theories[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,76(1):99-133.
[9]赵渊.上市公司员工持股计划之优劣评析——以人力资本输入为视角[J].法制与社会,2013(1):196-206.
[10]WEITZMAN M,KRUSE D.Profit sharing and productivity[M].Washington:Brookings Institution Press,1990:95-142.
[11]王砾,代昀昊,孔东民.激励相容:上市公司员工持股计划的公告效应[J].经济学动态,2017(2):37-50.
[12]黄淑和.贯彻三中全会精神深化国资国企改革[J].国企,2014(1):22-24.
[13]张小宁.经营者报酬、员工持股与上市公司绩效分析[J].世界经济,2002(10):57-64.
[14]JONES D C,KATO T.The productivity effects of employee stock-ownership plans and bonuses:evidence from japanese panel data[J].American Economic Review,1995,85(3):391-414.
[15]KIM E H,OUIME P.Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership:Motives and Outcomes[J].The Journal of Finance,2014,69(3):1273-1319.
[16]章卫东,罗国民,陶媛媛.上市公司员工持股计划的股东财富效应研究——来自我国证券市场的经验数据[J].北京工商大学学报:社会科学版,2016,31(2):61-70.
[17]KANDEL E,LAZEAR E P.Peer pressure and partnership[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(4):801-817.
[18]MARIANNA M,LANE P J,GOMEZ-MEJIA L R.CEO incentives,innovation and performance in technology-intensive firms:a reconciliation outcome and behavior-based incentive schemes[J].Strategic Management Journal,2006,27(11):1057-1080.
[19]陈效东.谁才是企业创新的真正主体:高管人员还是核心员工[J].财贸经济,2017(12):127-144.
[20]BLASI J R,KRUSE D L,PARK R.Prevalence,characteristics,and employee views of financial participation in enterprises[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2010:41-75.
[21]李博.2016年深市公司股权激励与员工持股计划情况分析[J].证券市场导报,2017(12):45-56.
[22]张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,等.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017(5):161-174.
[23]BAKER G P,JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Compensation and incentives:Practice vs.Theory[J].Journal of Finance,1988,43(2):593-616.
[24]DRAGO R,GARVEY G T.Incentives for helping on the Job:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1998,16(1):1-25.
[25]FEHR E,GAECHTER S.Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(3):980-984.
[26]BOCHET O,PAGE T,PUTTERMAN L.Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2006,60(2):11-26.
[27]KNEZ M,SIMESTER D.Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at Continental Airlines[J].Journal of Labor Economics,2001,19(5):743-772.
[28]KALMI P,PENDLETON A,POUTSMA E.The relationship between financial participation and other forms of employee participation:New survey evidence from Europe[J].Economic&Industrial Democracy,2006,27(4):637-667.
[29]HALL B H,LERNER J.Chapter 14-The Financing of R&D and innovation.Handbook of the Economics of Innovation[M].North Holland:Elsevier’s Science&Technology,2010:609-639.
[30]EDERER F,MANSO G.Is pay for performance detrimental to innovation[J].Management Science,2013,15(7):1496-1513.
[31]呼建光,毛志宏.新时期员工持股计划:止步还是前行[J].南方经济,2016(7):95-111.
[32]HOCHBERG Y V,LINDSEY L.Incentives,targeting,and firm performance:An analysis of non-executive stock options[J].The Society for Financial Studies,2010,23(11):4148-4186.
[33]黎文靖,郑曼妮.实质性创新还是策略性创新?——宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J].经济研究,2016(4):60-73.
[34]TIAN X,WANG T Y.Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation[J].Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(1):211-255.
[35]肖星,陈婵.激励水平、约束机制与上市公司股权激励计划[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(1):24-32.
[36]卢闯,孙健,张修平,等.股权激励与上市公司投资行为——基于倾向得分配对方法的分析[J].中国软科学,2015(5):110-118.
[37]LIAN Y,SU Z,GU Y.The effects of employee stock option plans on operating performance in Chinese firms[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2015,54(1):141-159.
[38]LIAN Y,SU Z,GU Y.Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM:Evidence from China[J].Frontiers of Business Research in China,2011,5(2):266-290.
(1)通过WIND数据库中《员工持股计划预案公告》整理获得,资金来源主要有员工薪酬及自筹资金、向第三方融资、持股计划奖励金、股东或者实际控制人借款和大股东无偿赠送等。
[2]黄群慧,余菁,王欣,等.新时期中国员工持股制度研究[J].中国工业经济,2014(7):5-16.
[3]陈华东.管理者任期、股权激励与企业创新研究[J].中国软科学,2016(8):112-126.
[4]翟胜宝,陈紫薇.高管股权激励与企业创新[J].北京工商大学学报,2016,31(1):85-93.
[5]姜英兵,于雅萍.谁是更直接的创新者?——核心员工股权激励与企业创新[J].经济管理,2017,39(3):109-127.
[6]CORE J E,GUAY W R.Stock option plans for non-executive employees[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,61(2):253-287.
[7]陈艳艳.员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果研究[J].管理评论,2015(5):123-129.
[8]OYER P,SCHAEFER S.Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?:An empirical examination of alternative theories[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,76(1):99-133.
[9]赵渊.上市公司员工持股计划之优劣评析——以人力资本输入为视角[J].法制与社会,2013(1):196-206.
[10]WEITZMAN M,KRUSE D.Profit sharing and productivity[M].Washington:Brookings Institution Press,1990:95-142.
[11]王砾,代昀昊,孔东民.激励相容:上市公司员工持股计划的公告效应[J].经济学动态,2017(2):37-50.
[12]黄淑和.贯彻三中全会精神深化国资国企改革[J].国企,2014(1):22-24.
[13]张小宁.经营者报酬、员工持股与上市公司绩效分析[J].世界经济,2002(10):57-64.
[14]JONES D C,KATO T.The productivity effects of employee stock-ownership plans and bonuses:evidence from japanese panel data[J].American Economic Review,1995,85(3):391-414.
[15]KIM E H,OUIME P.Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership:Motives and Outcomes[J].The Journal of Finance,2014,69(3):1273-1319.
[16]章卫东,罗国民,陶媛媛.上市公司员工持股计划的股东财富效应研究——来自我国证券市场的经验数据[J].北京工商大学学报:社会科学版,2016,31(2):61-70.
[17]KANDEL E,LAZEAR E P.Peer pressure and partnership[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(4):801-817.
[18]MARIANNA M,LANE P J,GOMEZ-MEJIA L R.CEO incentives,innovation and performance in technology-intensive firms:a reconciliation outcome and behavior-based incentive schemes[J].Strategic Management Journal,2006,27(11):1057-1080.
[19]陈效东.谁才是企业创新的真正主体:高管人员还是核心员工[J].财贸经济,2017(12):127-144.
[20]BLASI J R,KRUSE D L,PARK R.Prevalence,characteristics,and employee views of financial participation in enterprises[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2010:41-75.
[21]李博.2016年深市公司股权激励与员工持股计划情况分析[J].证券市场导报,2017(12):45-56.
[22]张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,等.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究,2017(5):161-174.
[23]BAKER G P,JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Compensation and incentives:Practice vs.Theory[J].Journal of Finance,1988,43(2):593-616.
[24]DRAGO R,GARVEY G T.Incentives for helping on the Job:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1998,16(1):1-25.
[25]FEHR E,GAECHTER S.Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(3):980-984.
[26]BOCHET O,PAGE T,PUTTERMAN L.Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2006,60(2):11-26.
[27]KNEZ M,SIMESTER D.Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at Continental Airlines[J].Journal of Labor Economics,2001,19(5):743-772.
[28]KALMI P,PENDLETON A,POUTSMA E.The relationship between financial participation and other forms of employee participation:New survey evidence from Europe[J].Economic&Industrial Democracy,2006,27(4):637-667.
[29]HALL B H,LERNER J.Chapter 14-The Financing of R&D and innovation.Handbook of the Economics of Innovation[M].North Holland:Elsevier’s Science&Technology,2010:609-639.
[30]EDERER F,MANSO G.Is pay for performance detrimental to innovation[J].Management Science,2013,15(7):1496-1513.
[31]呼建光,毛志宏.新时期员工持股计划:止步还是前行[J].南方经济,2016(7):95-111.
[32]HOCHBERG Y V,LINDSEY L.Incentives,targeting,and firm performance:An analysis of non-executive stock options[J].The Society for Financial Studies,2010,23(11):4148-4186.
[33]黎文靖,郑曼妮.实质性创新还是策略性创新?——宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J].经济研究,2016(4):60-73.
[34]TIAN X,WANG T Y.Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation[J].Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(1):211-255.
[35]肖星,陈婵.激励水平、约束机制与上市公司股权激励计划[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(1):24-32.
[36]卢闯,孙健,张修平,等.股权激励与上市公司投资行为——基于倾向得分配对方法的分析[J].中国软科学,2015(5):110-118.
[37]LIAN Y,SU Z,GU Y.The effects of employee stock option plans on operating performance in Chinese firms[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2015,54(1):141-159.
[38]LIAN Y,SU Z,GU Y.Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM:Evidence from China[J].Frontiers of Business Research in China,2011,5(2):266-290.
(1)通过WIND数据库中《员工持股计划预案公告》整理获得,资金来源主要有员工薪酬及自筹资金、向第三方融资、持股计划奖励金、股东或者实际控制人借款和大股东无偿赠送等。