竞争对银行风险的影响及传导机制研究
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摘要
基于中国银行业微观数据,运用动态面板系统GMM模型,从资产负债表表内和表外两个角度,研究银行竞争对银行风险的影响及影响渠道,结果表明,从表内来看,银行竞争通过净息差的降低增加了银行风险,遵从传统的"竞争—脆弱"理论;从表外来看,银行竞争通过增加非利息收入降低了银行风险,遵从传统的"竞争—稳定"理论;表外非利息收入的提高是降低银行风险的主要机制。这意味着银行综合化经营不但是银行服务实体经济的要求,而且是降低银行风险的必然选择。因此,银行综合化经营在发挥协同效应和实现范围经济的同时,需要着重提升银行特色化发展及差异化经营的能力。
Based on the micro-data of China's banking industry,this study used a Generalized Method of Moments dynamic panel system to investigate the effect of competition on banking risks and the channels of such an effect from both the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet perspectives.Results show that,on the balance sheet,banking competition increases banking risks by reducing the net interest margin,in line with the traditional "competition fragility" theory.From the off-balance sheet perspective,banking competition reduces bank risk by increasing non-interest income,in line with the traditional "competition stability" theory.The increase in off-balance sheet non-interest income is the main mechanism for reducing banking risks.This indicates that the integrated operation of banks is not only a requirement for the real economy of banking services,but also an inevitable choice for reducing banking risks.Therefore,while the integrated operation of banks has a synergistic effect and realizes economies of scope,we must focus on improving the abilities of characterization development and differentiated operations.
Based on the micro-data of China's banking industry,this study used a Generalized Method of Moments dynamic panel system to investigate the effect of competition on banking risks and the channels of such an effect from both the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet perspectives.Results show that,on the balance sheet,banking competition increases banking risks by reducing the net interest margin,in line with the traditional "competition fragility" theory.From the off-balance sheet perspective,banking competition reduces bank risk by increasing non-interest income,in line with the traditional "competition stability" theory.The increase in off-balance sheet non-interest income is the main mechanism for reducing banking risks.This indicates that the integrated operation of banks is not only a requirement for the real economy of banking services,but also an inevitable choice for reducing banking risks.Therefore,while the integrated operation of banks has a synergistic effect and realizes economies of scope,we must focus on improving the abilities of characterization development and differentiated operations.
引文
[1] 蔡卫星.分支机构市场准入放松、跨区域经营与银行绩效[J].金融研究,2016(6).
[2] Marcus A.J.,1984.Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy.Journal of Banking & Finance,Vol.8,No.4:557-565.
[3] Matutes C.,and X.Vives,1995.Imperfect Competition,Risk Taking,and Regulation in Banking.European Economic Review,Vol.44,No.1:1-34.
[4] Deng S.,and E.Elyasiani,2008.Geographic Diversification,Bank Holding Company Value,and Risk.Journal of Money Credit & Banking,Vol.40,No.6:1217-1238.
[5] 申创,赵胜民.市场竞争度与银行非利息收入关系研究[J].经济评论,2017(1).
[6] 刘莉亚,李明辉,孙莎,杨金强.中国银行业净息差与非利息收入的关系研究[J].经济研究,2014(7).
[7] 周好文,王菁.中国银行业非利息收入与利息收入相关性研究[J].金融经济学研究,2009(1).
[8] Stiglitz J.E.,and A.Weiss,1981.Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.American Economic Review,Vol.71,No.3:393-410.
[9] Santomero A.W.,and Eek-june.Chung,1992.Evidence in Support of Broader Banking Powers.Financial Markets Institutions & Instruments,Vol.1,No.1:1-69.
[10] Stiroh K.J.,and A.Rumble,2006.The Dark Side of Diversification:The Case of US Financial Holding Companies.Journal of Banking and Finance,Vol.30,No.8:2131-2161.
[11] Deyoung R.,and T.Rice,2004.Noninterest Income and Financial Performance at U.S.Commercial Banks.Financial Review,Vol.39,No.1:101-127.
[12] 黄国妍.中国商业银行收入结构多元化能够分散银行风险吗[J].金融经济学研究,2015(6).
[13] Keeley M.C.,1990.Deposit Insurance,Risk and Market Power in Banking.American Economic Review,Vol.80,No.5:1183-1200.
[14] Boyd J.H.,and G.D.Nicoló,2005.The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited.The Journal of Finance,Vol.60,No.3:1329-1343.
[15] Martinez-Miera,D.,and R.Repullo,2010.Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?The Review of Financial Studies,Vol.23,No.10:3638-3664.
[16] 郭晔,赵静.存款竞争、影子银行与银行系统风险——基于中国上市银行微观数据的实证研究[J].金融研究,2017(6).
[17] 张宗益,吴恒宇,吴俊.商业银行价格竞争与风险行为关系——基于贷款利率市场化的经验研究[J].金融研究,2012(7).
[18] 黄晓薇,郭敏,李莹华.利率市场化进程中银行业竞争与风险的动态相关性研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2016(1).
[19] 贾春新,夏武勇,黄张凯.银行分支机构、国有银行竞争与经济增长[J].管理世界,2008(02).
[20] Nicolo G.D.,2000.Size,Charter Value and Risk in Banking:An International Perspective.International Finance Discussion Papers,197-215.
[21] 黄隽,章艳红.商业银行的风险:规模和非利息收入——以美国为例[J].金融研究,2010(6).
(1)1949～1978年是大一统银行时期,中国只有一家中国人民银行,同时兼顾政策性任务和银行服务业务;1979～1986年是二元银行体系,成立了四大国有商业银行,中国人民银行的银行服务功能分离给四大国有商业银行;再次,1987年起股份制银行兴起、1995年起城市商业银行创立以及中国入WTO之后外资银行开业;最后,2016年至今民营银行兴起。
(2)中国工商银行在中国银行业市场中拥有很强的垄断力量,但是如果由于某种原因(可能是利率管制),其贷款利率和边际成本相差不大,LERNER指数就无法计量中国工商银行已经存在的市场力量。
(3)不同类型的银行分支机构之间、同种类型银行分支机构之间,其存款、贷款和资产规模均是不同的;更有些银行虽然数量较多,但是却并不具有市场垄断力量,如邮政储蓄银行。
(4)由于篇幅有限,本文未列出稳健性检验结果;读者如有需要,可向作者索取。
[2] Marcus A.J.,1984.Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy.Journal of Banking & Finance,Vol.8,No.4:557-565.
[3] Matutes C.,and X.Vives,1995.Imperfect Competition,Risk Taking,and Regulation in Banking.European Economic Review,Vol.44,No.1:1-34.
[4] Deng S.,and E.Elyasiani,2008.Geographic Diversification,Bank Holding Company Value,and Risk.Journal of Money Credit & Banking,Vol.40,No.6:1217-1238.
[5] 申创,赵胜民.市场竞争度与银行非利息收入关系研究[J].经济评论,2017(1).
[6] 刘莉亚,李明辉,孙莎,杨金强.中国银行业净息差与非利息收入的关系研究[J].经济研究,2014(7).
[7] 周好文,王菁.中国银行业非利息收入与利息收入相关性研究[J].金融经济学研究,2009(1).
[8] Stiglitz J.E.,and A.Weiss,1981.Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.American Economic Review,Vol.71,No.3:393-410.
[9] Santomero A.W.,and Eek-june.Chung,1992.Evidence in Support of Broader Banking Powers.Financial Markets Institutions & Instruments,Vol.1,No.1:1-69.
[10] Stiroh K.J.,and A.Rumble,2006.The Dark Side of Diversification:The Case of US Financial Holding Companies.Journal of Banking and Finance,Vol.30,No.8:2131-2161.
[11] Deyoung R.,and T.Rice,2004.Noninterest Income and Financial Performance at U.S.Commercial Banks.Financial Review,Vol.39,No.1:101-127.
[12] 黄国妍.中国商业银行收入结构多元化能够分散银行风险吗[J].金融经济学研究,2015(6).
[13] Keeley M.C.,1990.Deposit Insurance,Risk and Market Power in Banking.American Economic Review,Vol.80,No.5:1183-1200.
[14] Boyd J.H.,and G.D.Nicoló,2005.The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited.The Journal of Finance,Vol.60,No.3:1329-1343.
[15] Martinez-Miera,D.,and R.Repullo,2010.Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure?The Review of Financial Studies,Vol.23,No.10:3638-3664.
[16] 郭晔,赵静.存款竞争、影子银行与银行系统风险——基于中国上市银行微观数据的实证研究[J].金融研究,2017(6).
[17] 张宗益,吴恒宇,吴俊.商业银行价格竞争与风险行为关系——基于贷款利率市场化的经验研究[J].金融研究,2012(7).
[18] 黄晓薇,郭敏,李莹华.利率市场化进程中银行业竞争与风险的动态相关性研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2016(1).
[19] 贾春新,夏武勇,黄张凯.银行分支机构、国有银行竞争与经济增长[J].管理世界,2008(02).
[20] Nicolo G.D.,2000.Size,Charter Value and Risk in Banking:An International Perspective.International Finance Discussion Papers,197-215.
[21] 黄隽,章艳红.商业银行的风险:规模和非利息收入——以美国为例[J].金融研究,2010(6).
(1)1949～1978年是大一统银行时期,中国只有一家中国人民银行,同时兼顾政策性任务和银行服务业务;1979～1986年是二元银行体系,成立了四大国有商业银行,中国人民银行的银行服务功能分离给四大国有商业银行;再次,1987年起股份制银行兴起、1995年起城市商业银行创立以及中国入WTO之后外资银行开业;最后,2016年至今民营银行兴起。
(2)中国工商银行在中国银行业市场中拥有很强的垄断力量,但是如果由于某种原因(可能是利率管制),其贷款利率和边际成本相差不大,LERNER指数就无法计量中国工商银行已经存在的市场力量。
(3)不同类型的银行分支机构之间、同种类型银行分支机构之间,其存款、贷款和资产规模均是不同的;更有些银行虽然数量较多,但是却并不具有市场垄断力量,如邮政储蓄银行。
(4)由于篇幅有限,本文未列出稳健性检验结果;读者如有需要,可向作者索取。