制造商与物流公司演化博弈系统动力学模型
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摘要
针对目前制造商与物流公司之间所存在的道德风险问题,利用演化博弈理论和系统动力学理论研究了双方策略博弈的演化过程,提出了能够降低该供应链中道德风险的策略。首先基于制造商和物流公司合作过程中的诚信和败德行为,建立了其道德风险的演化博弈模型并分析了演化路径。根据制造商与物流公司的博弈演化模型建立了它们的系统动力学模型,利用vensim PLE5.6a软件仿真系统动力学模型验证了演化博弈模型的分析结果。最后利用仿真分析结果提出了能够有效降低供应链道德风险的双边动态惩罚策略。
As the problem of moral hazard exists in current manufacturers and logistics companies,the paper used evolutionary game and system dynamics theory to study on the evolution of moral hazard,put forward strategy that can reduce the moral hazard in the supply chain..Firstly,based on the integrity and immoral behavior of the process of cooperation between the manufacturer and logistics company,the paper established the evolutionary game model of moral hazard and analyzes the evolutionary path.According to the game evolution model of manufacturers and logistics company the system dynamics model was established and used vensim PLE5.6a simulates the evolutionary equilibrium and validate the result of analysis.Finally put forward the two sides of the dynamic penalty strategy that can effectively reduce the risk of supply chain by the simulation results.
As the problem of moral hazard exists in current manufacturers and logistics companies,the paper used evolutionary game and system dynamics theory to study on the evolution of moral hazard,put forward strategy that can reduce the moral hazard in the supply chain..Firstly,based on the integrity and immoral behavior of the process of cooperation between the manufacturer and logistics company,the paper established the evolutionary game model of moral hazard and analyzes the evolutionary path.According to the game evolution model of manufacturers and logistics company the system dynamics model was established and used vensim PLE5.6a simulates the evolutionary equilibrium and validate the result of analysis.Finally put forward the two sides of the dynamic penalty strategy that can effectively reduce the risk of supply chain by the simulation results.
引文
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[7]蔡玲如,吴思俊,陈双.供应商与零售商演化博弈系统动力学模型[J].汕头大学学报:自然科学版,2015,30(1):53-63.(Cai Ling-ru,Wu Si-jun,Chen Shuang.A System Dynamics Model for Evolutionary Game Between Suppliers and Retailers[J].Journal of Shantou University:Natural Science,2015,30(1):53-63.)
[8]李春发,王治莹.生态工业链中企业间合作关系的演化博弈分析[J].大连理工学报:社会科学版,2012,33(3):12-17.(Li Chun-fa,Wang Zhi-ying.Evolution Game Analysis of Cooperative Relationships among Enterprises in Eco-Industrial Chain[J].Journal of Dalian University of Technology:Social Science,2012,33(3):12-17.)
[9]王超峰,帅斌.基于横向调度的服务备件物流系统动力学模型与仿真[J].计算机应用,2014,33(4):1153-1156.(Wang Chao-feng,Shuai Bin.Service parts logistics system dynamics model and simulation based on lateral transshipment[J].Journal of Computer Applications,2014,33(4):1153-1156.)
[10]刘利军,郑晨生.基于供应链管理的物流外包决策研究[J].机械设计与制造,2006(3):168-169.(Liu Li-jun,Zheng Chen-sheng.The study of logistics outsourcing based on supply chain management[J].Machinery Design&Manufacture,2006(3):168-169.)
[2]Baiman S,Fischer P E,Rajan M V.Performance measurement and design in supply chains[J].Management Science,2001,47(1):173-188.
[3]张波,黄培清.双重道德风险下帕累托有效的供应链合约[J].上海交通大学学报,2007,41(12):2001-2005.(Zhang Bo,Huang Pei-qing.On Pareto-Efficient Contract with Double Moral Hazard in Supply Chain[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2007,41(12):2001-2005.)
[4]黄波,李宇雨,丁旭.供应链纵向合作研发道德风险及利益分配方式选择[J].现代管理科学,2011(8):49-51.(Huang Bo,Li Yu-yu,Ding Xu.Supply chain vertical cooperation in R&D moral hazard Benefit distribution mode[J].Modern Management Science,2011(8):49-51.)
[5]Forrester J W.Industrial Dynamics:A Breakthrough for Decision Makers[J].Harvard Business Review,1958,36(4):37-66.
[6]慕静,毛金月.供应链网络道德风险演化与仿真研究[J].运筹与管理,2013,22(4):68-76.(Mu Jing,Mao Jin-yue.A Study on Evolution and Simulation of Moral Hazard in Supply Chain Networks[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2013,22(4):68-76.)
[7]蔡玲如,吴思俊,陈双.供应商与零售商演化博弈系统动力学模型[J].汕头大学学报:自然科学版,2015,30(1):53-63.(Cai Ling-ru,Wu Si-jun,Chen Shuang.A System Dynamics Model for Evolutionary Game Between Suppliers and Retailers[J].Journal of Shantou University:Natural Science,2015,30(1):53-63.)
[8]李春发,王治莹.生态工业链中企业间合作关系的演化博弈分析[J].大连理工学报:社会科学版,2012,33(3):12-17.(Li Chun-fa,Wang Zhi-ying.Evolution Game Analysis of Cooperative Relationships among Enterprises in Eco-Industrial Chain[J].Journal of Dalian University of Technology:Social Science,2012,33(3):12-17.)
[9]王超峰,帅斌.基于横向调度的服务备件物流系统动力学模型与仿真[J].计算机应用,2014,33(4):1153-1156.(Wang Chao-feng,Shuai Bin.Service parts logistics system dynamics model and simulation based on lateral transshipment[J].Journal of Computer Applications,2014,33(4):1153-1156.)
[10]刘利军,郑晨生.基于供应链管理的物流外包决策研究[J].机械设计与制造,2006(3):168-169.(Liu Li-jun,Zheng Chen-sheng.The study of logistics outsourcing based on supply chain management[J].Machinery Design&Manufacture,2006(3):168-169.)