公共服务的“后市场化”道路——以广州环卫服务改革为例
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摘要
我国公共服务市场化改革遇到复杂制度性障碍的关键是政府与市场关系失衡,主要表现为委托-代理问题导致基层政府改革激励下降,市场层面由于政府管控能力不足、目标不明确导致市场缺陷加剧。政府与市场的互动则由于合同约束力有限使政府对市场依赖过大、控制力弱而处于被动状态,关系治理因此失效。为结合政府和市场的优势,重塑关系治理的有效性,广州市政府收回环卫服务发包,调整政府与市场的关系,进入"后市场化"时代——基层政府更加务实,弥补自身不足来应对市场缺陷,以激励发挥基层政府主动性、以监管规范市场运作、将企业管理模式引入政府内部。这种改革的变化为我国公共服务的市场化改革提出了新的思考。
The key of the complicated institutional obstacle in the market reform of public service in our country is the imbalance between the government and the market.The delegate-agency problem leads to the decline of grass-roots government reform incentives.The interaction between the government and the market is limited due to the limited binding force of the contract.A the government dependents on the market so excessively that the control is weak and passive.Combining the strengths of the government and the market to reshape the effectiveness of the relation governance,the Guangzhou municipal government regained the sanitation service,adjusted the relationship between the government and the market and entered the era of"post-marketization".The grass-roots government is more pragmatic and makes up for its own deficiencies to cope with the market defects and applies the enterprise mode into the government management by encouraging grass-roots government initiatively and regulating the operation of the market.The changes of this reform put forward new thinking for the market-oriented reform of public services in our country.
The key of the complicated institutional obstacle in the market reform of public service in our country is the imbalance between the government and the market.The delegate-agency problem leads to the decline of grass-roots government reform incentives.The interaction between the government and the market is limited due to the limited binding force of the contract.A the government dependents on the market so excessively that the control is weak and passive.Combining the strengths of the government and the market to reshape the effectiveness of the relation governance,the Guangzhou municipal government regained the sanitation service,adjusted the relationship between the government and the market and entered the era of"post-marketization".The grass-roots government is more pragmatic and makes up for its own deficiencies to cope with the market defects and applies the enterprise mode into the government management by encouraging grass-roots government initiatively and regulating the operation of the market.The changes of this reform put forward new thinking for the market-oriented reform of public services in our country.
引文
[1]李和中.西方公共管理市场化取向的意义及启示[J].武汉大学学报(社会科学版),2001,(5).
[2][美]萨瓦斯.民营化与公私部门的伙伴关系[M].周志忍,等.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[3]李学.不完全契约、交易费用与治理绩效——兼论公共服务市场化供给模式[J].中国行政管理,2009,(1).
[4]周雪光.组织社会学十讲[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003.
[5]刘泰洪.委托代理理论下地方政府机会主义行为分析[J].中国石油大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(1).
[6]Arrow,Kenneth.“The Economics of Agency”In Principals and Agents[M].J.Pratt and R.Zeckhouser.Cambridge,MA:Harvard Universtiy,1985.
[7]Yang K,Hsieh J Y,Li T S.Contracting Capacity and Perceived Contracting Performance:Nonlinear Effects and the Role of Time[J].Public Administration Review,2009,(69-4).
[8]黄锦荣,叶林.公共服务“逆向合同承包”的制度选择逻辑——以广州市环卫服务改革为例[J].公共行政评论,2011,(5).
[9]王卫.城市治理中的公私伙伴关系:一个街道公共服务外包的实证研究[J].广东社会科学,2010,(3).
[10]徐敏宁.纵向政府组织博弈视角下的公共政策执行失灵探究[J].四川行政学院学报,2009,(6).
[11]Donald F.Kettl.Sharing Power:Public Governance and Private Markets[M].Washington,DC:The Brookings Institution,1993.
[12]詹国彬.需求方缺陷、供给方缺陷与精明买家——政府购买公共服务的困境与破解之道[J].经济社会体制比较,2013,(5).
[13]周志忍.认识市场化改革的新视角[J].中国行政管理,2009,(3).
[14]王世强.政府培育社会组织政策工具的分类与选择[J].学习与实践,2012,(12).
[15]S.Goldsmith.The Twenty-first Century City:Resurrecting Urban America[M].Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.1999.
[16]Oliver E.Williamson.The Economics of Organization:The Transaction Cost Approach[J].The American Journal of Sociology,1981,(3).
[17]Chen Chung An.Antecedents of Contracting-BackIn[J].Administration&Society,2009,(1).
[18]谈毅,慕继丰.论合同治理和关系治理的互补性与有效性[J].公共管理学报,2008,(3).
[19]王雁红.公共服务合同外包的内在冲突与现实挑战[J].经济社会体制比较,2015,(4).
[20]F.L Jeffries,R Reed.Trust and Adaptation in Relational Contracting[J].Academy of Management Review,2000,(25).
[21]P.Klemperer.What really Matters in Auction Design[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2002,(16).
[22]D.M Van Slyke.The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services[J].Public Administration Review,2003,(63).
[23]李智.论公共服务市场化中的政府责任——以广州市环卫行业市场化为例[J].湖北第二师范学院学报,2014,(3).
[24]邹燕.公用事业市场化的特殊性及其含义[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,(6).
(1)其中A级企业注册资金多为500万元以上,B级企业注册资金多为100万元~500万元,C级企业注册资金多为100万元以下。
(2)广州中心城区环卫服务市场化产生的问题及“逆市场化”现象集中于街道的清扫保洁领域,因此笔者将以上六区的环卫服务市场化比例测算限于其街道清扫保洁的外包数量上,并将六区环卫发包开始大规模收回的2013年与最新测算了市场化比例的2015年作为比较年份。
[2][美]萨瓦斯.民营化与公私部门的伙伴关系[M].周志忍,等.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[3]李学.不完全契约、交易费用与治理绩效——兼论公共服务市场化供给模式[J].中国行政管理,2009,(1).
[4]周雪光.组织社会学十讲[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003.
[5]刘泰洪.委托代理理论下地方政府机会主义行为分析[J].中国石油大学学报(社会科学版),2008,(1).
[6]Arrow,Kenneth.“The Economics of Agency”In Principals and Agents[M].J.Pratt and R.Zeckhouser.Cambridge,MA:Harvard Universtiy,1985.
[7]Yang K,Hsieh J Y,Li T S.Contracting Capacity and Perceived Contracting Performance:Nonlinear Effects and the Role of Time[J].Public Administration Review,2009,(69-4).
[8]黄锦荣,叶林.公共服务“逆向合同承包”的制度选择逻辑——以广州市环卫服务改革为例[J].公共行政评论,2011,(5).
[9]王卫.城市治理中的公私伙伴关系:一个街道公共服务外包的实证研究[J].广东社会科学,2010,(3).
[10]徐敏宁.纵向政府组织博弈视角下的公共政策执行失灵探究[J].四川行政学院学报,2009,(6).
[11]Donald F.Kettl.Sharing Power:Public Governance and Private Markets[M].Washington,DC:The Brookings Institution,1993.
[12]詹国彬.需求方缺陷、供给方缺陷与精明买家——政府购买公共服务的困境与破解之道[J].经济社会体制比较,2013,(5).
[13]周志忍.认识市场化改革的新视角[J].中国行政管理,2009,(3).
[14]王世强.政府培育社会组织政策工具的分类与选择[J].学习与实践,2012,(12).
[15]S.Goldsmith.The Twenty-first Century City:Resurrecting Urban America[M].Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.1999.
[16]Oliver E.Williamson.The Economics of Organization:The Transaction Cost Approach[J].The American Journal of Sociology,1981,(3).
[17]Chen Chung An.Antecedents of Contracting-BackIn[J].Administration&Society,2009,(1).
[18]谈毅,慕继丰.论合同治理和关系治理的互补性与有效性[J].公共管理学报,2008,(3).
[19]王雁红.公共服务合同外包的内在冲突与现实挑战[J].经济社会体制比较,2015,(4).
[20]F.L Jeffries,R Reed.Trust and Adaptation in Relational Contracting[J].Academy of Management Review,2000,(25).
[21]P.Klemperer.What really Matters in Auction Design[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2002,(16).
[22]D.M Van Slyke.The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services[J].Public Administration Review,2003,(63).
[23]李智.论公共服务市场化中的政府责任——以广州市环卫行业市场化为例[J].湖北第二师范学院学报,2014,(3).
[24]邹燕.公用事业市场化的特殊性及其含义[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2010,(6).
(1)其中A级企业注册资金多为500万元以上,B级企业注册资金多为100万元~500万元,C级企业注册资金多为100万元以下。
(2)广州中心城区环卫服务市场化产生的问题及“逆市场化”现象集中于街道的清扫保洁领域,因此笔者将以上六区的环卫服务市场化比例测算限于其街道清扫保洁的外包数量上,并将六区环卫发包开始大规模收回的2013年与最新测算了市场化比例的2015年作为比较年份。