超竞争环境下企业困境并购定价与时机研究
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摘要
在超竞争环境下企业面临的竞争环境越来越动荡,企业的竞争优势呈现出短期性与临时性的特点,为了快速发展,越来越多的企业选择并购。本文以超竞争环境为研究背景,运用期权博弈理论,分析并建立了存在竞争对手的企业困境并购定价与时机选择模型,通过模型求解得到并购中主并企业给予目标企业的最优价值以及主并企业的最佳并购时机;此外,通过数值模拟重点分析了三个超竞争特征因子(竞争强度、竞争不确定性、企业价值损失因子)、企业困境因子以及竞争对手的溢价水平对企业困境并购时机的影响。本文研究发现:(1)被并企业得到的价值补偿比例及主并企业最佳并购时机均受到各超竞争特征因子、企业困境因子以及竞争对手溢价水平的综合影响;(2)竞争对手的存在会使目标企业得到的价值补偿比例增加;(3)超竞争环境下企业困境并购中主并企业的最佳并购时机取决于并购双方的相对价值比;(4)随着可能导致双方谈判破裂因素、事件的增多以及企业财务困境程度的增加,主并企业提前进行并购的可能性增加;(5)随着竞争强度、竞争不确定性、竞争对手造成溢价水平的增加,主并企业推迟并购时机的可能性增大。
With the advent of the era of hyper-competition,an enterprise's survival environment has undergone great changes.As the speed of technology updating has become faster and faster and the competition of market has become more and more drastic,enterprises will be stuck in stagnation and even bankruptcy if it fails to keep pace with technology innovation or makes wrong management decision.An enterprise's financial distress would not only bring a harmful effect to itself,but also lead to losses of investors,creditors and other stakeholders.As a result,how to solve the financial distress has drawn more attention.The better way to solve financial distress is merger and acquisition,because the target firms can obtain money and technology from the acquirer firm.But for the acquirer firm,assessing distressed firm's value may faces greater risk.On the other hand,firm distressed M&A happens and implements in a short time,which leads to a limitation on time for the acquirer firms to take full consideration.Consequently,the acquirer firms should be more discreet about making the M&A decisions.In order to maximize the value of M&A,the acquirer firms have to select the optimal M&A timing and estimate the reasonable value of the acquired firms.In this paper,the option game method is applied to improve the management flexibility of firm distressed M&A'decision making,as well as reduce the risk of firm distressed M&A to the maximum under the Hyper-competition environment.Due to the unique option game characteristics of the firm distressed M&A under the hyper-competitive environment,three Hyper-competition characteristic factors(the variables that lead to negotiation breakdown or the number of negotiation breakdown,competitive intensity and competitive uncertainty)and a firm distressed M&A characteristic factor are used to analyze the firm distressed M&A decision makings under the condition of one-time payment competitors exist.Meanwhile,those models are applied into practice to change the distressed firm's financial status and make theacquirer firms profit growth.By means of the model calculation,case simulation and parameter analysis,several main conclusions are obtained as follows:(1)Under the Hyper-competition environment,the firm distressed M&A value compensation ratio that the acquired firms are given by the acquiring firms and the optimal M&A timing of acquiring firms are influenced by the competitive intensity,the competitive uncertainty,the cognitive distance and the bargaining power of two parties of the M&A.(2)Under the Hyper-competition environment,the optimal firm distressed M&A timing greatly depends on the relative value ratio between the acquiring firms and acquired firms,but is not directly related to the accumulated value of any relevant firms.(3)Under the Hyper-competition environment,there are two unequal value of waiting options existing in the process of firm distressed M&A,which means there are two optimal M&A timings.The acquiring firms should implement the M&A when the relative value ratio between the acquiring firms and acquired firms increases from below the lower limit of the M&A threshold to the lower limit of the M&A threshold,or when it decreases from above the upper limit of the M&A threshold to the upper limit of the M&A threshold.(4)Under the Hyper-competition environment,both the acquirer firms and target firms are willing to quote a price in advance and the acquirer firms occupy aposition of advantage in the process of game.
With the advent of the era of hyper-competition,an enterprise's survival environment has undergone great changes.As the speed of technology updating has become faster and faster and the competition of market has become more and more drastic,enterprises will be stuck in stagnation and even bankruptcy if it fails to keep pace with technology innovation or makes wrong management decision.An enterprise's financial distress would not only bring a harmful effect to itself,but also lead to losses of investors,creditors and other stakeholders.As a result,how to solve the financial distress has drawn more attention.The better way to solve financial distress is merger and acquisition,because the target firms can obtain money and technology from the acquirer firm.But for the acquirer firm,assessing distressed firm's value may faces greater risk.On the other hand,firm distressed M&A happens and implements in a short time,which leads to a limitation on time for the acquirer firms to take full consideration.Consequently,the acquirer firms should be more discreet about making the M&A decisions.In order to maximize the value of M&A,the acquirer firms have to select the optimal M&A timing and estimate the reasonable value of the acquired firms.In this paper,the option game method is applied to improve the management flexibility of firm distressed M&A'decision making,as well as reduce the risk of firm distressed M&A to the maximum under the Hyper-competition environment.Due to the unique option game characteristics of the firm distressed M&A under the hyper-competitive environment,three Hyper-competition characteristic factors(the variables that lead to negotiation breakdown or the number of negotiation breakdown,competitive intensity and competitive uncertainty)and a firm distressed M&A characteristic factor are used to analyze the firm distressed M&A decision makings under the condition of one-time payment competitors exist.Meanwhile,those models are applied into practice to change the distressed firm's financial status and make theacquirer firms profit growth.By means of the model calculation,case simulation and parameter analysis,several main conclusions are obtained as follows:(1)Under the Hyper-competition environment,the firm distressed M&A value compensation ratio that the acquired firms are given by the acquiring firms and the optimal M&A timing of acquiring firms are influenced by the competitive intensity,the competitive uncertainty,the cognitive distance and the bargaining power of two parties of the M&A.(2)Under the Hyper-competition environment,the optimal firm distressed M&A timing greatly depends on the relative value ratio between the acquiring firms and acquired firms,but is not directly related to the accumulated value of any relevant firms.(3)Under the Hyper-competition environment,there are two unequal value of waiting options existing in the process of firm distressed M&A,which means there are two optimal M&A timings.The acquiring firms should implement the M&A when the relative value ratio between the acquiring firms and acquired firms increases from below the lower limit of the M&A threshold to the lower limit of the M&A threshold,or when it decreases from above the upper limit of the M&A threshold to the upper limit of the M&A threshold.(4)Under the Hyper-competition environment,both the acquirer firms and target firms are willing to quote a price in advance and the acquirer firms occupy aposition of advantage in the process of game.
引文
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[4]雷星晖,李来俊.竞争环境下基于期权博弈的R&D投资决策研究[J].管理科学,2004,17(1):85-89.
[5]陈珠明,杨华李.基于实物期权的企业兼并行为分析[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(1):29-35.
[6]段世霞,扈文秀.基于期权博弈的企业兼并时机研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(3):151-160.
[7]郑湘明,陈晓红.基于非完全信息期权博弈的企业并购决策时机[J].系统工程,2011,29(07):81-84.
[8]章伟果,扈文秀,安芮瑶,等.动态竞争并购下的竞价策略选择和进入时机确定[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(5):1110-1121.
[9]徐斌,俞静,谢贵荣.基于二叉树期权模型的企业兼并价格确定的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,7(7):134
[10]Asquith P,Gertner R,Scharfstein D.Anatomy of financial distress:An examination of junk-bond issuers[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(3):625-658.
[11]Lai J,Sudarsanam S.Corporate restructuring in response to performance decline:Impact of ownership,governance and lenders[J].European Finance Review,1997,1(1):197-233.
[12]Kahl M.Financial distress as a selection mechanism:Evidence from the United States[D].Working Paper,University of California Los Angeles,2001.
[13]Mason R,Weeds H,Ltd L,et al.Can greater uncertainty hasten investment?[R].University of Southampton,2003.
[14]Almeida H,Campello M,Weisbach M S.Corporate financial and investment policies when future financing is not frictionless[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):675-693.
[15]Tian Lihui.Bank loans,managerial agency costs,and government ownership[D].Working Paper,Peking University,2004.
[16]Garnaut R,Song Ligang,Yao Yang.SOE Restructuring in China[R].Working Paper,Australian National University,2004.
[17]Allen F,Qian Jun,Qian Meijun.Law,finance,and economic growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[18]刘彦文.上市公司财务危机预警模型研究[D].大连:大连理工大学,2009.
[19]李丽君,刘杰,孙世敏.供应链视角下企业财务困境传递及控制问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):46-51.
[20]Lyandres E,Zhdanov A.Accelerated investment effect of risky debt[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(11):2587-2599.
[21]Karlin S,Taylor H.A first course in stochastic processes,second edition[M].New York:Academic press,1975.
[22]Dixit A K,Pindyck R S.Investment under uncertainty[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1994.
[2]Simit H T J.Acquisition strategies as option games[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2001,14(2):79-89.
[3]Barraclough K,Robinson D T,Smith T,et al.Using option prices to infer overpayments and synergies in M&A transactions[J].Review of Financial Studies,2013,26(3):695-722.
[4]雷星晖,李来俊.竞争环境下基于期权博弈的R&D投资决策研究[J].管理科学,2004,17(1):85-89.
[5]陈珠明,杨华李.基于实物期权的企业兼并行为分析[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(1):29-35.
[6]段世霞,扈文秀.基于期权博弈的企业兼并时机研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(3):151-160.
[7]郑湘明,陈晓红.基于非完全信息期权博弈的企业并购决策时机[J].系统工程,2011,29(07):81-84.
[8]章伟果,扈文秀,安芮瑶,等.动态竞争并购下的竞价策略选择和进入时机确定[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(5):1110-1121.
[9]徐斌,俞静,谢贵荣.基于二叉树期权模型的企业兼并价格确定的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,7(7):134
[10]Asquith P,Gertner R,Scharfstein D.Anatomy of financial distress:An examination of junk-bond issuers[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(3):625-658.
[11]Lai J,Sudarsanam S.Corporate restructuring in response to performance decline:Impact of ownership,governance and lenders[J].European Finance Review,1997,1(1):197-233.
[12]Kahl M.Financial distress as a selection mechanism:Evidence from the United States[D].Working Paper,University of California Los Angeles,2001.
[13]Mason R,Weeds H,Ltd L,et al.Can greater uncertainty hasten investment?[R].University of Southampton,2003.
[14]Almeida H,Campello M,Weisbach M S.Corporate financial and investment policies when future financing is not frictionless[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):675-693.
[15]Tian Lihui.Bank loans,managerial agency costs,and government ownership[D].Working Paper,Peking University,2004.
[16]Garnaut R,Song Ligang,Yao Yang.SOE Restructuring in China[R].Working Paper,Australian National University,2004.
[17]Allen F,Qian Jun,Qian Meijun.Law,finance,and economic growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[18]刘彦文.上市公司财务危机预警模型研究[D].大连:大连理工大学,2009.
[19]李丽君,刘杰,孙世敏.供应链视角下企业财务困境传递及控制问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):46-51.
[20]Lyandres E,Zhdanov A.Accelerated investment effect of risky debt[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(11):2587-2599.
[21]Karlin S,Taylor H.A first course in stochastic processes,second edition[M].New York:Academic press,1975.
[22]Dixit A K,Pindyck R S.Investment under uncertainty[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1994.