政府补助信号效应的实证研究
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摘要
本文采用A股上市公司2012～2016年数据,研究政府补助对投资者的投资引导的信号作用。研究发现:受到政府补助的企业能够得到社会投资者跟进,验证了政府补助发挥引导社会投资者的信号效应,当企业的盈利能力受到质疑时,理性的社会投资者会放弃跟进政府补助以追求自身的投资目标;而盈余管理的隐蔽性又导致部分理性的社会投资者不能有效识别企业盈余管理等深层次的操控行为,盈余管理对于政府补助信号效应起正向的调节作用。机构投资者能够识别企业盈余管理;对于陷入财务困境的企业,机构投资者不会因为政府补助而增加企业投资。
Based on the behavior of following up government subsidy,social investors are classified to rationality and partial rationality; the signal effect of government subsidy on the behavioral characteristics of social investors is tested by adopting the 2012 ～2016 data of A-share listed companies in this paper. Enterprises subsidized by the government can get more follow-up social capital. When the company's profitability is questioned,rational social capital will abandon the follow-up of government subsidies in pursuit of their own investment goals; however,partially rational social capital investors will step up their follow-up of government subsidies because the concealment of earnings management leads to that some partially rational social capital cannot effectively identify deep-seated control actions such as corporate earnings management,the signal effects of government subsidies are moderated by earnings management. Institutional investors can identify earnings management. For enterprises in financial distress,institutional investors will not increase corporate investment because of government subsidies.
Based on the behavior of following up government subsidy,social investors are classified to rationality and partial rationality; the signal effect of government subsidy on the behavioral characteristics of social investors is tested by adopting the 2012 ～2016 data of A-share listed companies in this paper. Enterprises subsidized by the government can get more follow-up social capital. When the company's profitability is questioned,rational social capital will abandon the follow-up of government subsidies in pursuit of their own investment goals; however,partially rational social capital investors will step up their follow-up of government subsidies because the concealment of earnings management leads to that some partially rational social capital cannot effectively identify deep-seated control actions such as corporate earnings management,the signal effects of government subsidies are moderated by earnings management. Institutional investors can identify earnings management. For enterprises in financial distress,institutional investors will not increase corporate investment because of government subsidies.
引文
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[23]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(9):64~72.
[24]汪玉兰,易朝辉.投资组合的权重重要吗?——基于机构投资者对盈余管理治理效应的实证研究[J].会计研究,2017,(5):53~59.
[25]潘琰,辛清泉.解读企业信息需求——基于机构投资者的信息需求探索[J].会计研究,2004,(12):14~22.
[26] Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P. Detecting Earnings Management[J]. Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193~225.
[27] Roychowdhury S. Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2006,42(3):335~370.
[28] Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management Activities Around Seasoned Equity Offerings[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(1):2~19.
[2] Eui Young Lee,Cin B C. The Effect of Risk-sharing Government Subsidy on Corporate R&D Investment:Empirical Evidence from Korea[J]. Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2010,77(6):881~890.
[3] Philipp Boeing. The Allocation and Effectiveness of China's R&D Subsidies-Evidence from Listed Firms[J]. Research Policy,2016,45(9):1774~1789.
[4] Aihua Wu. The Signal Effect of Government R&D Subsidies in China:Do Ownership Matter?[J]. Technological Forecasting&Social Change,2016,(10):117.
[5]郭晓丹,何文韬.战略性新兴产业政府R&D补贴信号效应的动态分析[J].经济学动态,2011,(9):88~93.
[6]雷鹏,梁彤缨,陈修德,等.融资约束视角下政府补助对企业研发效率的影响研究[J].软科学,2015,29(3):38~42.
[7] Robin Kleer. Government R&D Subsidies as a Signal for Private Investors[J]. Research Policy, 2010, 39(10):1361~1374.
[8]潘越,戴亦一,李财喜.政治关联与财务困境公司的政府补助——来自中国ST公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(5):6~17.
[9]杜勇,陈建英.政治关联、慈善捐赠与政府补助——来自中国亏损上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2016,42(5):4~14.
[10] Berger A N,Udell G F. The Economics of Small Business Finance:The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,1998,22(6-8):613~673.
[11] Meuleman M,Maeseneire W D. Do R&D Subsidies Affect SMEs'Access to External Financing?[J]. Research Policy,2012,41(3):580~591.
[12] Ueda,Masako. Banks Versus Venture Capital:Project Evaluation,Screening, and Expropriation[J]. Journal of Finance,2010,59(2):601~621.
[13] Tzelepis D,Skuras D. The Effects of Regional Capital Subsidies on Firm Performance:An Empirical Study[J]. Journal of Small Business&Enterprise Development,2004,11(1):121~129.
[14]鄢波,王华,杜勇.地方上市公司数量、产权影响与政府的扶持之手[J].经济管理,2014,36(7):164~175.
[15]黄蓉,赵黎鸣.政府补助:保壳还是培优[J].暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2011,33(1):66~73,163.
[16]马永强,赖黎,曾建光.盈余管理方式与信贷资源配置[J].会计研究,2014,(12):39~45,95.
[17] Chaney P K,Lewis C M. Earnings Management and Firm Valuation Under Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,1995,1(3-4):319~345.
[18] Chopra N,Lakonishok J,Ritter J R. Measuring Abnormal Performance:Do Stocks Overreact?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1992,31(2):235~268.
[19]史永东,王谨乐.中国机构投资者真的稳定市场了吗?[J].经济研究,2014,(12):100~112.
[20]毛磊,王宗军,王玲玲.机构投资者持股偏好、筛选策略与企业社会绩效[J].管理科学,2012,25(3):21~33.
[21]石良平,李洋.机构投资者介入公司治理的作用研究[J].上海经济研究,2007,(7):83~90.
[22] Hope,Ole Kristian. Large Shareholders and Accounting Research[J]. China Journal of Accounting Research, 2013, 6(1):3~20.
[23]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(9):64~72.
[24]汪玉兰,易朝辉.投资组合的权重重要吗?——基于机构投资者对盈余管理治理效应的实证研究[J].会计研究,2017,(5):53~59.
[25]潘琰,辛清泉.解读企业信息需求——基于机构投资者的信息需求探索[J].会计研究,2004,(12):14~22.
[26] Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P. Detecting Earnings Management[J]. Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193~225.
[27] Roychowdhury S. Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2006,42(3):335~370.
[28] Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management Activities Around Seasoned Equity Offerings[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(1):2~19.
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