企业并购重组中异议股东股权(份)回购请求权研究
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摘要
异议股东股权(份)回购请求权又称现金选择权、异议权、估价权等。股权(份)回购请求权是公司法上的请求权,属于自益权,具有形成权的特征。偏好性协调理论实际上是在公司契约理论的基础上对异议股东权利保护提出的一个新的理论支撑,不仅在分析股权回购请求权的产生原因上有重要作用,而且在界定适用范围上有着独特的意义。异议股东回购请求权法律制度在中国的引入呈现出逾淮为枳的困境。上市公司采取的现金选择权成为强制收购的合法工具,与异议股东回购请求权的真义貌合神离。
The repurchase rights for dissent shareholders is also called cash option,dissenter's right,appraisal right and so on.The repurchase rights for dissent shareholders is the right to request in the company law,belonging to the self-benefit right,with the characteristic features of legal formulation right.Preference reconciliation theory is actually a new theoretical support for the protection of dissident shareholder rights on the basis of the company contract theory.It not only plays an important role in the analysis of the reasons for the repurchase rights for dissent shareholders,but also bears unique significance in the definition of application scope.The introduction of the legal institution of repurchase rights for dissent shareholders in China presents dilemmas that it becomes inferior in quality after legal transplant.The cash option used by listed companies has drifted into a legal tool for compulsory acquisitions,and is seemingly in harmony but actually at variance with the repurchase rights for dissent shareholders.
The repurchase rights for dissent shareholders is also called cash option,dissenter's right,appraisal right and so on.The repurchase rights for dissent shareholders is the right to request in the company law,belonging to the self-benefit right,with the characteristic features of legal formulation right.Preference reconciliation theory is actually a new theoretical support for the protection of dissident shareholder rights on the basis of the company contract theory.It not only plays an important role in the analysis of the reasons for the repurchase rights for dissent shareholders,but also bears unique significance in the definition of application scope.The introduction of the legal institution of repurchase rights for dissent shareholders in China presents dilemmas that it becomes inferior in quality after legal transplant.The cash option used by listed companies has drifted into a legal tool for compulsory acquisitions,and is seemingly in harmony but actually at variance with the repurchase rights for dissent shareholders.
引文
[1]江平,李国光.最新公司法条文释义[M].北京:人民法院出版社,2006.
[2] William J.Carney.Fundamental Corporate Changes,Minority Shareholders,and Business Purposes[J].American Bar Foundation Research Journal,1980,5(1).
[3] Joel Seligman.Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy[J].George Washington Law Review,1984,52.
[4] Melvin Aron Eisenberg.The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking[J].California Law Review,1969,57(1).
[5] Guhan Subramanian.Fixing Freezeouts[J].Yale Law Journal,2005,115(2).
[6]甘培忠,刘兰芳,主编.新类型公司诉讼疑难问题研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2009.
[7]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护[M].北京:法律出版社,2004.
[8] Robert C.Clark.Corporate Law[M].Boston:Little,Brown and Company,1986.
[9]Michael Becker.Gestaltungsrecht und Gestaltungsgrund[J].Archiv für die civilistische Praxis,Bd.188,H.1,1988.
[10] Robert B.Thompson.Exit,Liquidity,and Majority Rule:Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law[J].Georgetown Law Journal,1995,84(1).
[11]蒋大兴.公司法的展开与评判——方法、判例、制度[M].北京:法律出版社,2001.
[12]川島いづみ.少数派株主に対する不公正な侵害行為等の救済制度(一)——カナダ会社法における制度の展開——[J].民商法雑誌,第98巻第5号、1988.
[13] Peter V.Letsou.The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law[J].Boston College Law Review,1998,39(5).
[14]刘俊海.新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点[M].北京:法律出版社,2006.
[15]丹尼斯·C.缪勒.公共选择理论[M].杨春学,等,译.北京:中国社会科学出版,1999.
[16]钱玉林.公司法实施问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2014.
[17]郝磊.股东诉讼的实施问题研究[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2012.
[18] Ronald J.Gilson&Jeffrey N.Gordon.Doctrines and Markets:Controlling Controlling Shareholders[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2003,152(2).
[19]藤田真樹.MBOにおける少数株主の保護:少数派株主が会社から締め出されず株主としてとどまる利益の保護を中心として[J].九大法学,第101巻第1号,2010.
[20]小川宏幸.日本法中的企业组织重组以及对于少数股东的保护[M]//王保树,主编.公司重组:理论与实践.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2012.
[21]李哲松.韩国公司法[M].吴日焕,译.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2000.
[22]林仁光.论公司合并及其他变更营运政策之重大行为与少数股东股份回购请求权之行使[J].东吴大学法律学报,1995,11(2).
[23] Joel Seligman.Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy[J].George Washington Law Review,1984,52.
[24]方立维,徐步云.兼并与收购上市公司的反垄断规制[M].北京:知识产权出版社,2011.
[25]施天涛.公司法论[M].北京:法律出版社,2006.
[26]陈丽洁.公司合并法律问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2001.
[27]何美欢.公众公司及其股权证券[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[28] Robert W.Hamilton,Richard D.Freer.The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell[M].St.Paul,MN:West Academic Publishing,2011.
[29]周友苏.新公司法论[M].北京:法律出版社,2006.
(1)Weinberger v.UOP,Inc.,457A.2d701(Del.1983).
(2)这是指在帕累托效率下,只要获益者的所得大于损失者的所得,而获益者对损失者补偿损失后仍有剩余,仍允许改变资源分配。
(3)参见洪虎:《全国人大法律委员会关于〈中华人民共和国公司法〉(修订草案)修改情况的汇报》,载于《全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报》2005年第7期。
[2] William J.Carney.Fundamental Corporate Changes,Minority Shareholders,and Business Purposes[J].American Bar Foundation Research Journal,1980,5(1).
[3] Joel Seligman.Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy[J].George Washington Law Review,1984,52.
[4] Melvin Aron Eisenberg.The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking[J].California Law Review,1969,57(1).
[5] Guhan Subramanian.Fixing Freezeouts[J].Yale Law Journal,2005,115(2).
[6]甘培忠,刘兰芳,主编.新类型公司诉讼疑难问题研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2009.
[7]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护[M].北京:法律出版社,2004.
[8] Robert C.Clark.Corporate Law[M].Boston:Little,Brown and Company,1986.
[9]Michael Becker.Gestaltungsrecht und Gestaltungsgrund[J].Archiv für die civilistische Praxis,Bd.188,H.1,1988.
[10] Robert B.Thompson.Exit,Liquidity,and Majority Rule:Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law[J].Georgetown Law Journal,1995,84(1).
[11]蒋大兴.公司法的展开与评判——方法、判例、制度[M].北京:法律出版社,2001.
[12]川島いづみ.少数派株主に対する不公正な侵害行為等の救済制度(一)——カナダ会社法における制度の展開——[J].民商法雑誌,第98巻第5号、1988.
[13] Peter V.Letsou.The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law[J].Boston College Law Review,1998,39(5).
[14]刘俊海.新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点[M].北京:法律出版社,2006.
[15]丹尼斯·C.缪勒.公共选择理论[M].杨春学,等,译.北京:中国社会科学出版,1999.
[16]钱玉林.公司法实施问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2014.
[17]郝磊.股东诉讼的实施问题研究[M].北京:中国法制出版社,2012.
[18] Ronald J.Gilson&Jeffrey N.Gordon.Doctrines and Markets:Controlling Controlling Shareholders[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2003,152(2).
[19]藤田真樹.MBOにおける少数株主の保護:少数派株主が会社から締め出されず株主としてとどまる利益の保護を中心として[J].九大法学,第101巻第1号,2010.
[20]小川宏幸.日本法中的企业组织重组以及对于少数股东的保护[M]//王保树,主编.公司重组:理论与实践.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2012.
[21]李哲松.韩国公司法[M].吴日焕,译.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2000.
[22]林仁光.论公司合并及其他变更营运政策之重大行为与少数股东股份回购请求权之行使[J].东吴大学法律学报,1995,11(2).
[23] Joel Seligman.Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy[J].George Washington Law Review,1984,52.
[24]方立维,徐步云.兼并与收购上市公司的反垄断规制[M].北京:知识产权出版社,2011.
[25]施天涛.公司法论[M].北京:法律出版社,2006.
[26]陈丽洁.公司合并法律问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2001.
[27]何美欢.公众公司及其股权证券[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[28] Robert W.Hamilton,Richard D.Freer.The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell[M].St.Paul,MN:West Academic Publishing,2011.
[29]周友苏.新公司法论[M].北京:法律出版社,2006.
(1)Weinberger v.UOP,Inc.,457A.2d701(Del.1983).
(2)这是指在帕累托效率下,只要获益者的所得大于损失者的所得,而获益者对损失者补偿损失后仍有剩余,仍允许改变资源分配。
(3)参见洪虎:《全国人大法律委员会关于〈中华人民共和国公司法〉(修订草案)修改情况的汇报》,载于《全国人民代表大会常务委员会公报》2005年第7期。