采用混合图的双向异质频谱拍卖算法
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摘要
为了解决频谱稀缺的问题,提高频谱利用率,采用频谱拍卖方法激励主用户(卖家)出售空闲的频谱,次用户(买家)通过在拍卖中获胜得以接入其急需的频谱,提出了一种采用混合图的双向异质频谱拍卖算法(Double Auction based on Mixed Graph for heterogeneous spectrums,MGDA)。该算法使用混合图能够更准确地量化买家之间对于频谱的干扰情况,使频谱交易数量最大化,显著提高了频谱利用率。MGDA还考虑了频谱的异质性,允许买家表达对不同频率频谱的偏好,为不同的频谱建立不同的频谱干扰图。仿真结果表明,MGDA在空间利用率、买家满意度和拍卖收益等方面具有良好的性能,空间利用率比采用无向图的拍卖算法提高5.8%～13.6%。
In order to solve the problem of spectrum scarcity and improve the spectrum efficiency,the spectrum auction mechanism is used to encourage primary users( sellers) to lease their idle spectrums,while secondary users( buyers) can access the spectrums they desperately need by winning in the auction. A double auction algorithm based on mixed graph for heterogeneous spectrums called MGDA is proposed.The algorithm constructs a mixed graph which can more accurately coordinate the interference among buyers for the spectrums,thus maximizing the number of spectrum transactions and significantly improving spectrum utilization.Furthermore,considering the heterogeneity of the spectrums,buyers are allowed to express their personalized preferences for heterogeneous spectrums and create different interference graph for different spectrums.Simulation results show that MGDA obtains a lot of benefits in terms of spatial efficiency,buyer satisfaction and auction's revenue. As for the spatial efficiency,MGDA is 5.8% ～ 13. 6% higher than the auction mechanisms based on undirected graph.
In order to solve the problem of spectrum scarcity and improve the spectrum efficiency,the spectrum auction mechanism is used to encourage primary users( sellers) to lease their idle spectrums,while secondary users( buyers) can access the spectrums they desperately need by winning in the auction. A double auction algorithm based on mixed graph for heterogeneous spectrums called MGDA is proposed.The algorithm constructs a mixed graph which can more accurately coordinate the interference among buyers for the spectrums,thus maximizing the number of spectrum transactions and significantly improving spectrum utilization.Furthermore,considering the heterogeneity of the spectrums,buyers are allowed to express their personalized preferences for heterogeneous spectrums and create different interference graph for different spectrums.Simulation results show that MGDA obtains a lot of benefits in terms of spatial efficiency,buyer satisfaction and auction's revenue. As for the spatial efficiency,MGDA is 5.8% ～ 13. 6% higher than the auction mechanisms based on undirected graph.
引文
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[14] KASH I A,MURTY R,PARKES D C.Enabling spectrum sharing in secondary market auctions[J].IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,2014,13(3):556-568.
[15] WANG Q,YE B,LU S,et al.A truthful Qo S-aware spectrum auction with spatial reuse for large-scale networks[J].IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,2014,25(10):2499-2508.
[16] LI H,WU C,LI Z.Socially-optimal online spectrum auctions for secondary wireless communication[C]//Proceedings of 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.Kowloon:IEEE,2015:2047-2055.
[2]郑诗庭,蒙云番,邢杰,等.基于网络编码的衰落信道频谱感知算法[J].电讯技术,2015,55(9):964-971.
[3] GOLDSMITH A,JAFAR S A,MARIC I,et al. Breaking spectrum gridlock with cognitive radios:an information theoretic perspective[J]. Proceedings of the IEEE,2009,97(5):894-914.
[4] ZHOU X,ZHENG H.Trust:a general framework for truthful double spectrum auctions[C]//Proceedings of 2009IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Rio de Janeiro:IEEE,2009:999-1007.
[5] WU F,VAIDYA N.A strategy-proof radio spectrum auction mechanism in noncooperative wireless networks[J].IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,2013,12(5):885-894.
[6] FENG X J,CHEN Y J,ZHANG J,et al.TAHES:truthful double auction for heterogeneous spectrums[C]//Proceedings of 2012 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.Orlando:IEEE,2012:3076-3080.
[7] WANG H,NGUYEN D N,DUTKIEWICZ E,et al.Negotiable auction based on mixed graph:a novel spectrum sharing framework[J].IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking,2017,3(3):390-403.
[8] DONG W,RALLAPALLI S,QIU L,et al.Double auctions for dynamic spectrum allocation[J].IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,2016,24(4):2485-2497.
[9] CHEN Z,WEI X M,ZHONG H,et al.Secure,efficient and practical double spectrum auction[C]//Proceedings of2017 IEEE/ACM 25th International Symposium on Quality of Service.Vilanovaila Geltru:IEEE,2017:1-6.
[10] GAO L,HUANG J,CHEN Y,et al.Contr Auction:an integrated contract and auction design for dynamic spectrum sharing[C]//Proceedings of 2012 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems.Princeton:IEEE,2012:1-6.
[11] CHEN Y,ZHANG J,WU K,et al. TAMES:a truthful double auction for multi-demand heterogeneous spectrums[J].IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,2014,25(11):3012-3024.
[12] ZHU R,SHIN K G.Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization[C]//Proceedings of 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.Kowloon:IEEE,2015:918-926.
[13] GOPINATHAN A,LI Z,WU C.Strategy-proof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets[C]//Proceedings of 2011 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Shanghai:IEEE,2011:3020-3028.
[14] KASH I A,MURTY R,PARKES D C.Enabling spectrum sharing in secondary market auctions[J].IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,2014,13(3):556-568.
[15] WANG Q,YE B,LU S,et al.A truthful Qo S-aware spectrum auction with spatial reuse for large-scale networks[J].IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,2014,25(10):2499-2508.
[16] LI H,WU C,LI Z.Socially-optimal online spectrum auctions for secondary wireless communication[C]//Proceedings of 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.Kowloon:IEEE,2015:2047-2055.