工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究
|
摘要
实施工程质量政府监督是国际惯例,工程质量政府监督的基本形式是政府主管部门委托工程质量监督机构对工程建设主体的质量行为及其结果的政府监督,其本质是双重委托代理过程。工程质量恶性事故频发,一定程度上反映了工程质量政府执法监督的失责与失效,其根源在于工程质量政府监督者的执法监督内生动力不足。因此,基于工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配的激励协同机制值得探讨。针对工程质量政府监督所形成的政府主管部门、政府质量监督机构、质量监督团队(或小组)等多层次管理系统,通过构建参与各方之间的利益分配函数,构建工程质量政府监督多层次激励协调的博弈模型,从第一阶段的合作博弈和第二阶段的非合作博弈求解与推论。合作博弈可求得其奖励系数为λ_0=1-n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i~2),λ_i =1-γ_0~2/γ_i~2 n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i~2);非合作博弈可求得求解可得最佳努力协调程度为a_0~*=(λ_0a_0)/2β_0~2研究结果表明:工程质量政府监督者的努力协调程度与协调成本有关,与其固定成本无关;利益分配系数大小不仅取决于工程质量政府监督者的努力协调效率,而且还与其他方的努力协调效率有关;工程质量监督者在增强自身管理能力时,还要关注与其他方的协调,以提高工程质量政府监督的总体绩效。工程质量政府监督合作共赢的激励协调机制策略是:政府质量监督团队应合理设置监督团队,提高协调效率、降低监督协调成本以实现自身激励价值最大化;质量监督团队(或小组)应建立合作伙伴关系,以努力提高协调效率来实现自身激励价值最大化。研究构架的基于多层次利益分配机制的激励协同机理模型与结论,可为一般公共品的市场治理与监管提供理论支撑与实践借鉴。
The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice.The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted.Its essence is a dual principal-agent process.The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent.Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision.Therefore,the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored.In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments,government quality supervision organizations,quality supervision team(or group)for the government supervision of engineering quality.The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed,and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built.To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game,the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient:λ_0=1-n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i~2),λ_i =1-γ_0~2/γ_i~2 n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i~2);a_0~*=(λ_0a_0)/2β_0~2.The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non =cooperative game.The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs,and had nothing to do with fixed costs.The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors,but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts.The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision.The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly,improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation.Quality supervision team(or group)should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched.It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.
The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice.The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted.Its essence is a dual principal-agent process.The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent.Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision.Therefore,the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored.In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments,government quality supervision organizations,quality supervision team(or group)for the government supervision of engineering quality.The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed,and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built.To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game,the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient:λ_0=1-n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i~2),λ_i =1-γ_0~2/γ_i~2 n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i~2);a_0~*=(λ_0a_0)/2β_0~2.The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non =cooperative game.The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs,and had nothing to do with fixed costs.The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors,but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts.The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision.The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly,improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation.Quality supervision team(or group)should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched.It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.
引文
[1]郭汉丁,张印贤,张宇,等工程质量政府监督多层次激励协同机理研究综述[J].建筑经济,2013,34(2):100-103.
[2]Wu Qiong,Ren Hongbo,Gao Weijun,et al.Benefit allocation for distributed energy network participants applying game theory based solutions[J].Energy,2017,119:384-391.
[3]Mialon S H.Efficient horizontal mergers:The effects of internal capital reallocation and organizational form[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26(4):861-877.
[4]Kaynar N,Karsu O.Equitable decision making approaches over allocations of multiple benefits to multiple entities[J].Omega,2017,(4):1-14.
[5]时茜茜,朱建波,盛昭瀚.重大工程供应链协同合作利益分配研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(5):42-51.
[6]范波,孟卫东,代建生.具有协同效应的合作研发利益分配模型[J].系统工程学报,2015,(1):34-43.
[7]孙蕾,孙绍荣.基于合作博弈的大型基础工程各方利益分配机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2016,(3):1-6.
[8]管百海,胡培.重复合作联合体工程总承包商利益分配机制[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(2):172-176.
[9]胡文发,朱言,何新华.工程项目承包商多层次利益分配与激励机制[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2014,42(9):1437-1443.
[10]黄波,陈晖,黄伟.引导基金模式下协同创新利益分配机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(3):66-75.
[11]吕萍,张云,慕芬芳.总承包商和分包商供应链利益分配研究——基于改进的Shapley值法[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(6):211-216.
[12]谢晶晶,窦祥胜.我国碳市场博弈中的利益分配问题——基于ANP和改进多权重Shapley值方法的研究[J].系统工程,2014,32(9):68-73.
[13]Sarlak R,Nookabadi A.Synchronization in multiechelon supply chain applying timing discount[J].International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology,2012,59(1/4):289.
[14]温修春,何芳,马志强.我国农村土地间接流转供应链联盟的利益分配机制研究——基于“对称互惠共生”视角[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(7):52-58.
[15]胡盛强,张毕西,刘绘珍,等.基于多方博弈的二级网状供应链合作及利润分配研究[J].系统科学学报,2012,20(2):48-51.
[16]张云,吕萍,宋吟秋.总承包工程建设供应链利润分配模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(4):98-104.
[17]曹霞,张路蓬.基于利益分配的创新网络合作密度演化研究[J].系统工程学报,2016,(1):1-12.
[18]郭汉丁,郝海,张印贤.工程质量政府监督代理链分析与多层次激励机制探究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(6):82-90.
[19]何清华,范道安,谢坚勋,等.重大工程实施主体组织模式演化与博弈[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2016,44(12):1956-1961.
[20]王颖林,刘继才,赖芨宇.基于投资方投机行为的PPP项目激励机制博弈研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(2):223-232.
[21]陈洪转,方志耕,刘思峰等.复杂产品主制造商-供应商协同合作最优成本分担激励研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):98-105.
[22]郑鑫,叶明海.跨边界协同激励对销售人员绩效的影响机制研究[J].管理世界,2015,(11):184-185.
[23]叶伟巍,梅亮,李文,等.协同创新的动态机制与激励政策——基于复杂系统理论视角[J].管理世界,2014,(6):79-91.
[24]Shang Tiancheng,Zhang Kai,Liu Peihong,et al.What to allocate and how to allocate?—Benefit allocation in Shared Savings Energy Performance Contracting Projects[J].Energy,2015,91:60-71.
[25]Pobitzer A,Sklvik A M,Bjrk R N.Allocation System Setup Optimization in a Cost-Benefit Perspective[J].Journal of Petroleum Science&Engineering,2016,147(11):707-717.
[26]曹启龙,周晶,盛昭瀚.基于声誉效应的PPP项目动态激励契约模型[J].软科学,2016,30(12):20-23.
[2]Wu Qiong,Ren Hongbo,Gao Weijun,et al.Benefit allocation for distributed energy network participants applying game theory based solutions[J].Energy,2017,119:384-391.
[3]Mialon S H.Efficient horizontal mergers:The effects of internal capital reallocation and organizational form[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26(4):861-877.
[4]Kaynar N,Karsu O.Equitable decision making approaches over allocations of multiple benefits to multiple entities[J].Omega,2017,(4):1-14.
[5]时茜茜,朱建波,盛昭瀚.重大工程供应链协同合作利益分配研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(5):42-51.
[6]范波,孟卫东,代建生.具有协同效应的合作研发利益分配模型[J].系统工程学报,2015,(1):34-43.
[7]孙蕾,孙绍荣.基于合作博弈的大型基础工程各方利益分配机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2016,(3):1-6.
[8]管百海,胡培.重复合作联合体工程总承包商利益分配机制[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(2):172-176.
[9]胡文发,朱言,何新华.工程项目承包商多层次利益分配与激励机制[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2014,42(9):1437-1443.
[10]黄波,陈晖,黄伟.引导基金模式下协同创新利益分配机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(3):66-75.
[11]吕萍,张云,慕芬芳.总承包商和分包商供应链利益分配研究——基于改进的Shapley值法[J].运筹与管理,2012,21(6):211-216.
[12]谢晶晶,窦祥胜.我国碳市场博弈中的利益分配问题——基于ANP和改进多权重Shapley值方法的研究[J].系统工程,2014,32(9):68-73.
[13]Sarlak R,Nookabadi A.Synchronization in multiechelon supply chain applying timing discount[J].International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology,2012,59(1/4):289.
[14]温修春,何芳,马志强.我国农村土地间接流转供应链联盟的利益分配机制研究——基于“对称互惠共生”视角[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(7):52-58.
[15]胡盛强,张毕西,刘绘珍,等.基于多方博弈的二级网状供应链合作及利润分配研究[J].系统科学学报,2012,20(2):48-51.
[16]张云,吕萍,宋吟秋.总承包工程建设供应链利润分配模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(4):98-104.
[17]曹霞,张路蓬.基于利益分配的创新网络合作密度演化研究[J].系统工程学报,2016,(1):1-12.
[18]郭汉丁,郝海,张印贤.工程质量政府监督代理链分析与多层次激励机制探究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(6):82-90.
[19]何清华,范道安,谢坚勋,等.重大工程实施主体组织模式演化与博弈[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2016,44(12):1956-1961.
[20]王颖林,刘继才,赖芨宇.基于投资方投机行为的PPP项目激励机制博弈研究[J].管理工程学报,2016,30(2):223-232.
[21]陈洪转,方志耕,刘思峰等.复杂产品主制造商-供应商协同合作最优成本分担激励研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):98-105.
[22]郑鑫,叶明海.跨边界协同激励对销售人员绩效的影响机制研究[J].管理世界,2015,(11):184-185.
[23]叶伟巍,梅亮,李文,等.协同创新的动态机制与激励政策——基于复杂系统理论视角[J].管理世界,2014,(6):79-91.
[24]Shang Tiancheng,Zhang Kai,Liu Peihong,et al.What to allocate and how to allocate?—Benefit allocation in Shared Savings Energy Performance Contracting Projects[J].Energy,2015,91:60-71.
[25]Pobitzer A,Sklvik A M,Bjrk R N.Allocation System Setup Optimization in a Cost-Benefit Perspective[J].Journal of Petroleum Science&Engineering,2016,147(11):707-717.
[26]曹启龙,周晶,盛昭瀚.基于声誉效应的PPP项目动态激励契约模型[J].软科学,2016,30(12):20-23.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |