人员流动对风险投资机构联合投资的影响——基于中国风险投资行业的实证研究
|
摘要
联合投资是风险投资机构一种常见的策略选择,能有效地提高机构决策质量、促进初创企业成长。本文以中国1 015家风险投资机构在2000年至2016年间的投资数据为样本,分析了风险投资人的工作流动对风险投资机构间联合投资关系的影响,探讨了地理距离、过往合作关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,风险投资人的工作流动能够促进原任职机构和现任职机构之间联合投资关系的形成;两家机构之间的地理距离越远、过往合作越少,风险投资人个人网络对机构间关系的影响越明显,人员流动对联合投资的促进作用也就越强。本研究加深了对中国情境下风险投资人个人网络、机构间网络互动过程的理解,兼具理论意义和实践价值。
In China, the proportion of syndication in total investments has increased from 28.65%in 2007 to 42.08% in 2017. Extant research on syndication has recognized it as an effective way to mitigate risks and enhance the performance of both VC firms and target ventures. Regarding the antecedents of syndication, scholars have explored a variety of firm level factors that explain the formation of syndication. For example, from the VC firm perspective, VC firms' past experience,reputation, and network positions are key factors influencing their attractiveness to potential syndicate partners; from the target firm perspective, the location and industry of target firms will affect VC syndication decisions. Despite of the growing evidence on the antecedents of syndication, most of prior studies have focused on firm-level factors, but lacked an understanding of how individuals matter in VC syndication formation. However, the effect of venture capitalists' job mobility on syndication has not been addressed by prior literature. Therefore, how does venture capitalists' job mobility influence the likelihood of syndication between the losing and the receiving VC firms? In specific, we test the impact of venture capitalists' job mobility on VC firms' syndication formation, and the moderating roles of two alternative mechanisms: geographic proximity and social proximity. Utilizing the investment data of1 015 VC firms in China over 2000-2016, we find that the mobility of venture capitalists increases the likelihood of syndication between the losing and the receiving VC firms; the larger the geographic distance is, or the less the prior interactions between the two VC firms are, the stronger the positive effect of venture capitalists' job mobility on syndication is. We also employ Rare-event logit models,Heckman two-stage least squares estimations(2 SLS), and Propensity Score Matching(PSM) approach to verify the robustness of the findings. The study contributes to the literature in two ways: First, it explores the individual-and interpersonal-level antecedents of syndication, which complements the prior research focusing on firm-level explanations, and more generally, enhances our understandings of the micro-foundation of alliance formation. Second, by investigating the contingent roles of geographic distance and prior interaction, it reveals the boundary conditions for venture capitalists to make effect on the formation of syndication, contributing to our knowledge of the interplay between individual-and firm-level factors on interfirm collaborations. Additionally, by leveraging China's VC industry as the research context, the study sheds light on the co-evolution of interpersonal and interfirm networks in the Chinese context.
In China, the proportion of syndication in total investments has increased from 28.65%in 2007 to 42.08% in 2017. Extant research on syndication has recognized it as an effective way to mitigate risks and enhance the performance of both VC firms and target ventures. Regarding the antecedents of syndication, scholars have explored a variety of firm level factors that explain the formation of syndication. For example, from the VC firm perspective, VC firms' past experience,reputation, and network positions are key factors influencing their attractiveness to potential syndicate partners; from the target firm perspective, the location and industry of target firms will affect VC syndication decisions. Despite of the growing evidence on the antecedents of syndication, most of prior studies have focused on firm-level factors, but lacked an understanding of how individuals matter in VC syndication formation. However, the effect of venture capitalists' job mobility on syndication has not been addressed by prior literature. Therefore, how does venture capitalists' job mobility influence the likelihood of syndication between the losing and the receiving VC firms? In specific, we test the impact of venture capitalists' job mobility on VC firms' syndication formation, and the moderating roles of two alternative mechanisms: geographic proximity and social proximity. Utilizing the investment data of1 015 VC firms in China over 2000-2016, we find that the mobility of venture capitalists increases the likelihood of syndication between the losing and the receiving VC firms; the larger the geographic distance is, or the less the prior interactions between the two VC firms are, the stronger the positive effect of venture capitalists' job mobility on syndication is. We also employ Rare-event logit models,Heckman two-stage least squares estimations(2 SLS), and Propensity Score Matching(PSM) approach to verify the robustness of the findings. The study contributes to the literature in two ways: First, it explores the individual-and interpersonal-level antecedents of syndication, which complements the prior research focusing on firm-level explanations, and more generally, enhances our understandings of the micro-foundation of alliance formation. Second, by investigating the contingent roles of geographic distance and prior interaction, it reveals the boundary conditions for venture capitalists to make effect on the formation of syndication, contributing to our knowledge of the interplay between individual-and firm-level factors on interfirm collaborations. Additionally, by leveraging China's VC industry as the research context, the study sheds light on the co-evolution of interpersonal and interfirm networks in the Chinese context.
引文
[1]董静,汪立,吴友.地理距离与风险投资策略选择——兼论市场环境与机构特质的调节作用[J].南开管理评论,2017,(2):4-16.
[2]黄福广,贾西猛,田莉.风险投资机构高管团队知识背景与高科技投资偏好[J].管理科学,2016,(5):31-44.
[3]龙玉,赵海龙,张新德,等.时空压缩下的风险投资——高铁通车与风险投资区域变化[J].经济研究,2017,(4):195-208.
[4]孙淑伟,俞春玲.社会关系网络与风险投资的退出业绩——基于效率与效益视角的双重考察[J].外国经济与管理,2018,(1):107-123.
[5]Bermiss Y S, Greenbaum B E. Loyal to whom? The effect of relational embeddedness and managers’ mobility on market tie dissolution[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2016, 61(2):254-290.
[6]Bermiss Y S, Murmann J P. Who matters more? The impact of functional background and top executive mobility on firm survival[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2015, 36(11):1697-1716.
[7]Campbell B A, Ganco M, Franco A M, et al. Who leaves, where to, and why worry? Employee mobility, entrepreneurship and effects on source firm performance[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2012, 33(1):65-87.
[8]Chatterji A K, De Figueiredo Jr R J P, Rawley E. Learning on the job? Employee mobility in the asset management industry[J].Management Science,2016, 62(10):2804-2819.
[9]Ewens M, Rhodes-Kropf M. Is a VC partnership greater than the sum of its partners?[J]. The Journal of Finance,2015, 70(3):1081-1113.
[10]Gompers P A, Mukharlyamov V, Xuan Y H. The cost of friendship[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2016, 119(3):626-644.
[11]Gu Q, Lu X H. Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation:A study of venture capital syndication in China[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2014, 35(5):739-750.
[12]Hochberg Y V, Lindsey L A, Westerfield M M. Resource accumulation through economic ties:Evidence from venture capital[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2015, 118(2):245-267.
[13]Jain A. Learning by hiring and change to organizational knowledge:Countering obsolescence as organizations age[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016, 37(8):1667-1687.
[14]Liu Y, Maula M. Local partnering in foreign ventures:Uncertainty, experiential learning, and syndication in cross-border venture capital investments[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2016, 59(4):1407-1429.
[15]Mawdsley J K, Somaya D. Employee mobility and organizational outcomes:An integrative conceptual framework and research agenda[J]. Journal of Management,2016, 42(1):85-113.
[16]Tan D, Rider C I. Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2017, 38(9):1848-1874.
[17]Zhang L, Gupta A K, Hallen B L. The conditional importance of prior ties:A group-level analysis of venture capital syndication[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2017, 60(4):1360-1386.
[18]Zhelyazkov P I, Gulati R. After the break-up:The relational and reputational consequences of withdrawals from venture capital syndicates[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2016, 59(1):277-301.
(1)根据CVsource数据库“VC/PE融资”数据整理而来。
(1)联合投资的概念有广义和狭义之分,本文采用的是狭义联合投资的定义,即两家或两家以上的机构在同一轮次投资同一个项目,而广义联合投资的定义是指两家或两家以上的机构投资同一个项目,投资时间和轮次可以有先后。
(2)根据CVsource数据库“VC/PE融资”数据整理而来。
(1)案例1:IDG李丰离职创立峰瑞资本(2015年),资料来源:“李丰:因为看到这个趋势,我从IDG离职出来创业”,中欧商业评论报道,2015年12月11日。案例2:启明创投童士豪离职加入纪源资本(2013年),资料来源:“纪源资本童士豪:我为什么加入纪源资本”,东方财经,2014年9月19日。
(1)本文的结果并未受到样本选择的影响,在全样本(514 605个观测值)和子样本(18 637个观测值)中结果一致。
(2)本研究仅关注了风险投资机构中高层管理者的流动,包括合伙人、总裁或副总裁。
(3)对于潜在的重名问题,我们通过搜索风险投资人的个人工作经历进行了筛查。
(4)对于总部在中国的风险投资机构,我们采用的是总部的地理位置;对于总部在国外的风险投资机构,我们采用的是其中国区办公室的地理位置。
(1)行业分类参考了CVsource以及国标行业分类标准,具体划分成:传统制造业、互联网和相关服务、计算机及电子设备硬件、软件和信息技术服务业、电信通讯行业、医疗行业、教育及文娱、商务与技术服务、金融业、能源及矿业、批发和零售业、其他行业等12个行业。地区是结合风险投资事件的区域分布划分的,具体分成五大区域:(1)北京;(2)江苏、浙江、上海;(3)广东、福建;(4)港澳台及海外;(5)其他省份。投资阶段是根据CVsource数据库的分类,划分成:早期、发展期、扩张期、获利期。
(1)考虑到机构在创立初期更有可能招人、导致人员流动,但对联合投资的决策无直接影响,本文选择了两家投资机构中是否有在2012-2014年间成立的新机构作为工具变量。实证结果表明,是否有新成立的机构仅对第一阶段(人员流动)有显著影响,对第二阶段(联合投资)的作用不显著,因此是一个合适的工具变量。
[2]黄福广,贾西猛,田莉.风险投资机构高管团队知识背景与高科技投资偏好[J].管理科学,2016,(5):31-44.
[3]龙玉,赵海龙,张新德,等.时空压缩下的风险投资——高铁通车与风险投资区域变化[J].经济研究,2017,(4):195-208.
[4]孙淑伟,俞春玲.社会关系网络与风险投资的退出业绩——基于效率与效益视角的双重考察[J].外国经济与管理,2018,(1):107-123.
[5]Bermiss Y S, Greenbaum B E. Loyal to whom? The effect of relational embeddedness and managers’ mobility on market tie dissolution[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2016, 61(2):254-290.
[6]Bermiss Y S, Murmann J P. Who matters more? The impact of functional background and top executive mobility on firm survival[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2015, 36(11):1697-1716.
[7]Campbell B A, Ganco M, Franco A M, et al. Who leaves, where to, and why worry? Employee mobility, entrepreneurship and effects on source firm performance[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2012, 33(1):65-87.
[8]Chatterji A K, De Figueiredo Jr R J P, Rawley E. Learning on the job? Employee mobility in the asset management industry[J].Management Science,2016, 62(10):2804-2819.
[9]Ewens M, Rhodes-Kropf M. Is a VC partnership greater than the sum of its partners?[J]. The Journal of Finance,2015, 70(3):1081-1113.
[10]Gompers P A, Mukharlyamov V, Xuan Y H. The cost of friendship[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2016, 119(3):626-644.
[11]Gu Q, Lu X H. Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation:A study of venture capital syndication in China[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2014, 35(5):739-750.
[12]Hochberg Y V, Lindsey L A, Westerfield M M. Resource accumulation through economic ties:Evidence from venture capital[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2015, 118(2):245-267.
[13]Jain A. Learning by hiring and change to organizational knowledge:Countering obsolescence as organizations age[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016, 37(8):1667-1687.
[14]Liu Y, Maula M. Local partnering in foreign ventures:Uncertainty, experiential learning, and syndication in cross-border venture capital investments[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2016, 59(4):1407-1429.
[15]Mawdsley J K, Somaya D. Employee mobility and organizational outcomes:An integrative conceptual framework and research agenda[J]. Journal of Management,2016, 42(1):85-113.
[16]Tan D, Rider C I. Let them go? How losing employees to competitors can enhance firm status[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2017, 38(9):1848-1874.
[17]Zhang L, Gupta A K, Hallen B L. The conditional importance of prior ties:A group-level analysis of venture capital syndication[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2017, 60(4):1360-1386.
[18]Zhelyazkov P I, Gulati R. After the break-up:The relational and reputational consequences of withdrawals from venture capital syndicates[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2016, 59(1):277-301.
(1)根据CVsource数据库“VC/PE融资”数据整理而来。
(1)联合投资的概念有广义和狭义之分,本文采用的是狭义联合投资的定义,即两家或两家以上的机构在同一轮次投资同一个项目,而广义联合投资的定义是指两家或两家以上的机构投资同一个项目,投资时间和轮次可以有先后。
(2)根据CVsource数据库“VC/PE融资”数据整理而来。
(1)案例1:IDG李丰离职创立峰瑞资本(2015年),资料来源:“李丰:因为看到这个趋势,我从IDG离职出来创业”,中欧商业评论报道,2015年12月11日。案例2:启明创投童士豪离职加入纪源资本(2013年),资料来源:“纪源资本童士豪:我为什么加入纪源资本”,东方财经,2014年9月19日。
(1)本文的结果并未受到样本选择的影响,在全样本(514 605个观测值)和子样本(18 637个观测值)中结果一致。
(2)本研究仅关注了风险投资机构中高层管理者的流动,包括合伙人、总裁或副总裁。
(3)对于潜在的重名问题,我们通过搜索风险投资人的个人工作经历进行了筛查。
(4)对于总部在中国的风险投资机构,我们采用的是总部的地理位置;对于总部在国外的风险投资机构,我们采用的是其中国区办公室的地理位置。
(1)行业分类参考了CVsource以及国标行业分类标准,具体划分成:传统制造业、互联网和相关服务、计算机及电子设备硬件、软件和信息技术服务业、电信通讯行业、医疗行业、教育及文娱、商务与技术服务、金融业、能源及矿业、批发和零售业、其他行业等12个行业。地区是结合风险投资事件的区域分布划分的,具体分成五大区域:(1)北京;(2)江苏、浙江、上海;(3)广东、福建;(4)港澳台及海外;(5)其他省份。投资阶段是根据CVsource数据库的分类,划分成:早期、发展期、扩张期、获利期。
(1)考虑到机构在创立初期更有可能招人、导致人员流动,但对联合投资的决策无直接影响,本文选择了两家投资机构中是否有在2012-2014年间成立的新机构作为工具变量。实证结果表明,是否有新成立的机构仅对第一阶段(人员流动)有显著影响,对第二阶段(联合投资)的作用不显著,因此是一个合适的工具变量。