美国对华接触政策为何曾长期延续?
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摘要
自中美建交以来,美国执行四十余年的对华接触政策不仅促进了两国关系的发展,还为整个亚太地区的和平与繁荣创造了条件。然而,这个惠及多方的政策选项,近年来却在美国战略界的质疑声中难以为继。在此背景下,理解这一政策为何曾在过去长期延续,就成为一个颇具现实意义的问题。本文在界定接触政策的基础上,对聚焦这一问题的现有研究进行梳理和评价。一种观点认为,实力优势、相互依赖以及美国战略重心的转移促使美国长期对华接触。另一种观点认为,战略精英、意识形态和利益集团推动美国长期对华接触。还有一种观点认为,中国的战略欺骗与克制说服美国长期对华接触。这些观点都存在不足:结构约束只是减少了美国的对华政策选项,并不能说明美国选择接触政策的原因;国内政治固然会影响美国对华接触的战略判断,但中国因素也不容忽视;中国对美战略虽有说服美国对华接触的可能,但目前仍缺乏可靠的实证分析。由此可见,结构约束对美国对华政策的影响相对有限,学界必须更加重视中国对美战略与美国国内政治之间的互动及其对美国对华政策的影响。
Since the establishment of the diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.,the U.S.has adopted engagement policy toward China for 40 years,which has not only promoted the development of the bilateral relations,but also contributed to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.However,such a constructive policy is questioned and challenged by U.S.strategists and seems difficult to sustain.In such context,understanding why the U.S.has maintained the engagement policy for 40 years has become a task of practical significance.The paper reviews three existing explanations for the question on the basis of a definition of U.S.engagement policy toward China.The"structural constraints"explanation holds that power advantage,interdependence and the transfer of the U.S.strategic gravity led to U.S.engagement policy toward China.The"domestic politics"explanation emphasizes the key role of strategic elites,ideology and interests groups.And the"China's strategies"explanation argues that China convinced the U.S.to adopt engagement policy through strategic deception and restraint.All these explanations are somewhat problematic."Structural constraints"only reduces U.S.policy options toward China,but fails to account for the U.S.choice of engagement.Although "domestic politics"does have an impact on the strategic assessment of the U.S.engagement with China,China factor should not be neglected.China's strategies probably are effective in convincing the U.S.to adopt engagement policy.But there is a lack of reliable empirical evidence.Therefore,to provide a satisfying answer to the question,researchers should probably pay more attention to the interaction between China's strategies and the U.S.domestic politics and the impact of such interaction on U.S.policy toward China.
Since the establishment of the diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.,the U.S.has adopted engagement policy toward China for 40 years,which has not only promoted the development of the bilateral relations,but also contributed to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.However,such a constructive policy is questioned and challenged by U.S.strategists and seems difficult to sustain.In such context,understanding why the U.S.has maintained the engagement policy for 40 years has become a task of practical significance.The paper reviews three existing explanations for the question on the basis of a definition of U.S.engagement policy toward China.The"structural constraints"explanation holds that power advantage,interdependence and the transfer of the U.S.strategic gravity led to U.S.engagement policy toward China.The"domestic politics"explanation emphasizes the key role of strategic elites,ideology and interests groups.And the"China's strategies"explanation argues that China convinced the U.S.to adopt engagement policy through strategic deception and restraint.All these explanations are somewhat problematic."Structural constraints"only reduces U.S.policy options toward China,but fails to account for the U.S.choice of engagement.Although "domestic politics"does have an impact on the strategic assessment of the U.S.engagement with China,China factor should not be neglected.China's strategies probably are effective in convincing the U.S.to adopt engagement policy.But there is a lack of reliable empirical evidence.Therefore,to provide a satisfying answer to the question,researchers should probably pay more attention to the interaction between China's strategies and the U.S.domestic politics and the impact of such interaction on U.S.policy toward China.
引文
(1)牛军:《轮回:中美关系与亚太秩序演变(1978—2018)》,《美国研究》,2018年第6期,第9—25页。
(2)Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.2,March 2018,pp.60-70.
(3)关于“对华接触失败论”的讨论,参见邵育群:《“对华接触失败论”之后是什么?》,《国际关系研究》,2018年第1期,第35—41页;Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.2,2018,pp.60-70;Jeffrey Bader,“U.S.-China Relations:Is It Time to End the Engagement?” Policy Brief,Brookings Institution,September 2018,https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-china-relations-is-it-time-to-end-the-engagement/;David Dollar,et al.,“Avoiding War:Containment,Competition,and Cooperation in U.S.-China Relations”,A Brookings Interview,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/fp_20171121_china_interview.pdf。
(4)National Security Strategy of the United States of America,December 2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
(5)Keith Bradsher and Steven Lee Myer,“Trump's Trader War Is Rattling China's Leaders”,The New York Times,August 14,2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump-xi-jinping-.html.
(6)“Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China”,The White House,October 4,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(7)倪峰:《常规因素与非常规因素汇合——美国对华政策的质变》,《现代国际关系》,2018年第7期,第15—23页;Jeffrey Bader,“U.S.-China Relations:Is It Time to End the Engagement?”牛军:《轮回:中美关系与亚太秩序演变(1978—2018)》,第9—25页;胡然、赵建伟、王缉思:《冰冻三尺,非一日之寒:对近十年来中美关系的回溯与分析》,载北京大学国际战略研究院编:《中国国际战略评论2018(下)》,世界知识出版社,2018年,第1—28页;达巍:《世界秩序的变局与中美关系的范式性转折》,载北京大学国际战略研究院编:《中国国际战略评论2018(下)》,第29—38页;赵穗生:《从“错位的共识”到竞争对手:美国对华政策40年》,《人民论坛·学术前沿》,2018年第23期(上),第19—35页。
(8)虽然这个问题得到了广泛关注,但学者们提出问题的方式却不只一种,如美国冷战后为何对中国采取软制衡而不是硬制衡?克林顿政府对华政策为何转向全面接触?为什么美国在明知中国是潜在竞争对手的情况下依然帮助中国发展?但这些问题的基本指向都是对华接触政策的延续性。参见Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“If Not Soft Balancing,Then What?Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S.Policy Toward China”,Security Studies,Vol.17,No.2,2008,p.380;David M.Edelestein,Over the Horizon:Time,Uncertainty,and the Rise of Great Powers,Cornell University Press,2017,p.2;Chi-hung Wei,“Engaging a State that Resists Sanctions Pressure:U.S.Policy Toward China,1992—1994”,Millennium:Journal of International Studies,Vol.43,No.2,2015,pp.429-449。
(9)张曙光:《接触外交:尼克松政府与解冻中美关系》,世界知识出版社,2009年。
(10)参见冷战后美国政府历次发布的《美国国家安全战略》报告关于中国的部分,以及Aaron Friedberg,“The Debate over U.S.China Strategy”,Survival,Vol.57,No.3,2015,pp.89-110;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,Survival,Vol.60,No.3,2018,pp.7-64。
(11)John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,W.W.Norton & Company,2001.
(12)中国从与美国交往的过程中获得的各种收益,参见:Hugo Meijer,Trading with the Enemy:The Making of Export Control Policy Toward the People's Republic of China,Oxford University Press,2016,pp.2-3;Suisheng Zhao,“American Reflections on the Engagement with China and Responses to President Xi's New Model of Major Power Relations”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.26,No.106,2017,pp.489-503。弗里德伯格的大多数文章都持这样的观点:Aaron L.Friedberg,“Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”,Survival,Vol.60,No.1,2018,pp.7-40;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64。布莱克维尔和阿什利也持相同的观点:Robert D.Blackwill and Ashley J.Tellis,“Revisiting U.S.Grand Strategy Toward China”,Council Special Report,No.72,March 2015,Council on Foreign Relations,p.4。
(13)中国的GDP增长率见国家统计局网站,http://data.stats.gov.cn/ks.htm?cn=C01&zb=A0501。
(14)中美全面交往带给中国的技术收益,参见Hugo Meijer,Trading with the Enemy:The Making of Export Control Policy Toward the People's Republic of China,pp.2-3。
(15)中美军费数据对比,见斯德哥尔摩和平研究所网站数据,http://visuals.sipri.org/。
(16)[美]白永辉:《从“利益攸关方”到“战略保证”——政治—经济的分析视角》,赵明昊译,于铁军校,《国际政治研究》,2010年第2期,第105—119页;赵穗生:《奥巴马对华积极接触政策及其挑战》,《美国问题研究》,2011年第1期,第1—23页。
(17)Stephanie Condon,“Obama:‘We Welcome China's Rise’”,CBS News,January 20,2011,https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-we-welcome-chinas-rise/;Daniel Halper,“Hillary:We ‘Welcome China's Rise’”,The Weekly Standard,January 31,2013,https://www.weeklystandard.com/daniel-halper/hillary-we-welcome-chinas-rise.
(18)中国问题被政治化的历史叙述,见Robert L.Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen:The Politics of U.S.-China Relations,1989—2000,Brookings Institution Press,2003。
(19)历次美国对华政策大辩论的代表作,参见:David Shambaugh,“Containment or Engagement of China?Calculating Beijing's Responses”,International Security,Vol.21,No.2,Fall 1996,pp.180-209;Thomas J.Christensen,“Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?The Rise of China and U.S.Policy Toward East Asia”,International Security,Vol.31,No.1,Summer 2006,pp.81-126;Suisheng Zhao,“American Reflections on the Engagement with China and Responses to President Xi's New Model of Major Power Relations”,pp.489-503;Aaron Friedberg,“The Debate over U.S.China Strategy”,pp.89-110;陶文钊:《美国对华政策大辩论》,《现代国际关系》,2016年第1期,第19—28页;[美]何汉理:《美国国内对华政策辩论与中美关系未来》,《美国问题研究》,2016年第1期,第1—9页。
(20)Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross,eds.,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,Routledge,1999,pp.1-32.其他的政策选项还有预防性战争、制衡、搭便车、捆绑和推卸责任等。
(21)保罗·肯尼迪在《战略与外交:1870—1945》一书中对绥靖政策作出了经典定义,绥靖政策是指通过理性协商与妥协的方式,承认并满足(特定行为体的)不满,从而在避免成本高昂、残酷危险的武装冲突的前提下解决国际(或国内)争端。参见Paul Kennedy,“The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy,1865—1939”,in Paul Kennedy,Strategy and Diplomacy,1870—1945,Fontana Press,1984,p.16。
(22)对接触政策与绥靖政策的辨析,参见Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,pp.1-32;Stephen R.Rock,Appeasement in International Politics,The University Press of Kentucky,2000,pp.21-23。对战略视野的讨论,参见David M.Edelestein,Over the Horizon:Time,Uncertainty,and the Rise of Great Powers。
(23)对国际秩序稳定性的讨论,参见奥根斯基和吉尔平的论述。Robert Gilpin,War and Change in World Politics,Cambridge University Press,1981,pp.50-105;A.F.K.Organski,World Politics,2nd Edition,Alfred A.Knopf,1968,pp.363-376.
(24)关于通过绥靖争取时间的讨论,参见Norrin M.Ripsman and Jack S.Levy,“Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930”,International Security,Vol.33,No.2,Fall 2008,pp.148-181。将接触作为威慑准备的讨论,参见Dong Jung Kim,“Economic Deterrence Through Economic Engagement”,Foreign Policy Analysis,Vol.15,No.2,April 2019,pp.176-186,https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/ory00。
(25)关于释放善意信号的研究,参见:Robert Powell,“Uncertainty,Shifting Power,and Appeasement”,American Political Science Review,Vol.90,No.4,December 1996,pp.749-764;Shiping Tang and Evan Braden Montgomery,“Uncertainty and Reassurance in International Politics”,International Security,Vol.32,No.1,Summer 2007,pp.193-200;Andrew Kydd,“Trust,Reassurance,and Cooperation”,International Organization,Vol.54,No.2,Spring 2000,pp.325-357;Shiping Tang,“Reassurance:A Defensive Realism Theory of Cooperation-Building”,in Shiping Tang,A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time:Defensive Realism,Palgrave Macmillan,2010,pp.129-162;Evan Braden Montgomery,“Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma:Realism,Reassurance,and the Problem of Uncertainty”,International Security,Vol.31,No.2,Fall 2006,pp.151-185。
(26)关于现状国倾向于寻求安全的研究,参见:Jeffrey W.Taliaferro,“Security Seeking Under Anarchy:Defensive Realism Revisited”,International Security,Vol.25,No.3,Winter 2000/01,pp.128-161;Andrew Kydd,“Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”,Security Studies,Vol.7,No.1,1997,pp.114-155。
(27)对遏制政策内容的讨论,参见John Lewis Gaddis,Strategies of Containment:A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War,Oxford University Press,2005,p.35。
(28)关于判断战略意图的讨论,参见[美]罗伯特·杰维斯:《国际政治中的知觉与错误知觉》,秦亚青译,上海人民出版社,2015年,第二章、第三章,第34—123页;Sebastian Rosato,“The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers”,International Security,Vol.39,No.3,Winter 2014/2015,pp.48-88;Keren Yarhi-Milo,“In the Eye of the Beholder:How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries”,International Security,Vol.38,No.1,Summer 2013,pp.7-51。
(29)米尔斯海默对绥靖政策的批评,参见[美]约翰·米尔斯海默:《大国政治的悲剧(修订版)》,王义桅、唐小松译,上海人民出版社,2014年,第156页。
(30)德国两次崛起失败的直接原因是,在前后两个崛起进程中德国最终都诉诸扩张主义政策,从而招致其他国家的联合制衡。
(31)关于英美和解的讨论,参见:Chad E.Nelson,“Why the Great Powers Permitted the Creation of an American Hegemon”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.132,No.4,2017/18,pp.685-718;Charles A.Kupchan,How Enemies Become Friends:The Sources of Stable Peace,Princeton University Press,2010,pp.73-111。
(32)对现状国接触崛起国倾向的讨论,参见Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,p.9。
(33)关于预防性战争与权力转移理论的讨论,参见Jack S.Levy,“Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War”,World Politics,Vol.40,No.1,1987,pp.82-107。
(34)关于理性绥靖的讨论,参见Daniel Treisman,“Rational Appeasement”,International Organization,Vol.58,No.2,Spring 2004,pp.345-373。
(35)关于攻防理论的讨论,参见:Charles L.Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,“What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Security,Vol.22,No.3,Spring 1998,pp.44-82;Macro Nilsson,“Offense-Defense Balance,War Duration,and the Security Dilemma”,Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.56,No.3,2012,pp.467-489。
(36)Evan Braden Montgomery,“Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma:Realism,Reassurance,and the Problem of Uncertainty”,pp.151-185.
(37)Stephen R.Rock,Appeasement in International Politics,pp.18-19;Andrew Kydd,“Trust,Reassurance,and Cooperation”,pp.330-333.
(38)关于寻求安全的现状国之间能够避免冲突、维持和平的研究,参见Andrew Kydd,“Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”,pp.114-155。
(39)关于寻求安全的现状国之间能够避免冲突、维持和平的研究,参见Andrew Kydd,“Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”,pp.114-155。
(40)对于相互依赖与冲突行为的研究,参见:Dale C.Copeland,“Economic Interdependence and War:A Theory of Trade Expectations”,International Security,Vol.20,No.4,Spring 1996,pp.5-41;Etel Solingen,“Domestic Coalitions,Internationalization,and War:Then and Now”,International Security,Vol.39,No.1,Summer 2014,pp.44-70。
(41)Norrin M.Ripsman and Jack S.Levy,“Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930”,pp.148-181.
(42)Peter Trubowitz and Peter Harris,“When States Appease:British Appeasement in the 1930s”,Review of International Studies,Vol.41,No.2,2015,pp.289-311;Alexander Anievas,“The International Political Economy of Appeasement:The Social Sources of British Foreign Policy During the 1930s”,Review of International Studies,Vol.37,No.2,April 2011,pp.601-629.
(43)张曙光:《接触外交:尼克松政府与解冻中美关系》;樊超:《合作与共赢:蜜月期的中国与美国》,世界知识出版社,2016年,第273—291页。
(44)David Shambaugh,“Containment or Engagement of China?Calculating Beijing's Responses”,pp.180-209.
(45)构建中美建设性战略伙伴关系的声明,见“China,U.S.Pledge to Build Constructive Strategic Partnership”,中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆网站,http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zysj/zrjfm/t36212.htm;佐利克关于利益攸关方的讲话,参见Robert Zoellick,“Whither China:From Membership to Responsibility?” NBR Analysis,Vol.16,No.4,December 2005,pp.5-14;关于相互战略保证的提法,参见James Steinberg and Michael E.O'Hanlon,Strategic Reassurance and Resolve:U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century,Princeton University Press,2014,pp.5-6。
(46)冷战后的历次国家安全战略报告,参见National Security Strategy Archive,http://nssarchive.us/。
(47)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”,Remarks at the Hudson Center,November 20,2014,http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1896;Michael J.Green,By More Than Providence:Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783,Columbia University Press,2017,pp.471-472.
(48)Andrew J.Nathan and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as Security Strategy:Power and Vulnerability in the ‘China Model’”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.131,No.2,2016,pp.313-339.
(49)“纠缠的大国”这一提法见David Shambaugh,ed.,Tangled Titans:The United States and China,Rowman & Littlefield Publisher,2013。
(50)技术出口管制见Hugo Meijer,Trading with the Enemy:The Making of Export Control Policy Toward the People's Republic of China,pp.2-3;人权问题和台湾问题见Robert L.Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen:The Politics of U.S.-China Relations,1989—2000。
(51)“接触+遏制”(congagement)的提法见Aaron L.Friedberg,Contest for Primacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,W.W.Norton & Company,2011,p.88;王缉思:《“遏制”还是“交往”?——评冷战后美国对华政策》,载王缉思:《国际政治的理性思考》,北京大学出版社,2006年,第188页;周方银:《韬光养晦与两面下注——中国崛起过程中的中美战略互动》,《当代亚太》,2011年第5期,第6—26页;郝雨凡、张燕冬:《限制性接触——美国新政府对华政策透视》,《战略与管理》,2001年第4期,第38—43页。
(52)John Lewis Gaddis,Strategies of Containment:A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War,pp.24-52.
(53)Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,p.9.
(54)关于对华接触包含防范但不包括遏制的说法,参见赵穗生:《奥巴马对华积极接触政策及其挑战》,第1—23页;王缉思主编:《释疑:走出中美困局》,社会科学文献出版社,2014年,第16—17页;薛力:《接触中有防范,但没有遏制》,《太平洋学报》,2004年第9期,第56—63页;王伟光:《结构性因素与中美关系的变迁》,《美国研究》,2013年第4期,第52—71页。关于美国“亚太再平衡”不是为了遏制中国,参见 Nina Silove,“The Pivot Before the Pivot:U.S.Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia”,International Security,Vol.40,No.4,Spring 2016,p.46。
(55)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64;Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2011,p.26.
(56)佐利克在著名的“利益攸关方”讲话中指出,对华接触政策成功地将中国融入了既有国际体系。Robert Zoellick,“Whither China:From Membership to Responsibility?” pp.5-14.
(57)王缉思、李侃如:《中美战略互疑:解析与应对》,社会科学文献出版社,2013年。
(58)对中美实力对比的论述,参见Stephen G.Brooks and William C.Wohlforth,“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century:China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position”,International Security,Vol.40,No.3,Winter 2015/2016,pp.7-53;William Z.Y.Wang,Stephen G.Brooks and William C.Wohlforth,“Correspondence:Debating China's Rise and the Future of U.S.Power”,International Security,Vol.41,No.2,Fall 2016,pp.188-191;Robert Ross,“Engagement in U.S.China Policy”,in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross,eds.,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,p.180;Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.8。
(59)Joseph S.Nye,Jr.,“Time Will Tell”,in “Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July 2018,pp.190-192.
(60)Thomas J.Christensen,“Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?The Rise of China and U.S.Policy Toward East Asia”,p.83.
(61)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,W.W.Norton & Company,2015,p.288.
(62)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.24.
(63)中国的和平发展源于美国立足实力优势的对华接触政策,参见:Wang Jisi,“China's Search for Stability with America”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.84,No.5,2005,pp.39-48;J.Stapleton Roy,“Engagement Works”,in “Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,pp.185-186;Thomas Christensen and Patricia Kim,“Don't Abandon Ship”,in“Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,pp.188-190;Eric Li,“Better Together”,in“Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,pp.192-193。
(64)中国从国际秩序中获益的说法,参见Andrew J.Nathan and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as a Security Strategy:Power and Vulnerability in the‘China Model’”,pp.313-339。
(65)对于自由主义国际秩序的讨论,参见[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《中国的崛起、美国及自由世界秩序的未来》,载[美]沈大伟主编:《纠缠的大国:中美关系的未来》,丁超、黄富慧、洪漫译,新华出版社,2015年,第42—43页;Daniel Deudney and G.John Ikenberry,“Liberal World:The Resilient Order”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,2018,pp.16-24;Graham Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order:From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,2018,pp.124-133。关于中国参与国际制度与社会化,参见江忆恩:《中国参与国际体制的若干思考》,《世界经济与政治》,1999年第7期,第4—10页;Alastair Iain Johnston,Social States:China in International Institutions,1989—2000,Princeton University Press,2008。
(66)Robert Ross,“Engagement in U.S.China Policy”,p.180.
(67)台海危机后“中国威胁论”的上升,参见:Aaron L.Friedberg,Contest for Primacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.98;Emma V.Broomfield,“Perceptions of Danger:The China Threat Theory”,The Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.12,No.35,2003,pp.265-284。
(68)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the 21st Century,p.2;Adam P.Liff and G.John Ikenberry,“Racing Toward Tragedy?China's Rise,Military Competition in the Asia Pacific,and the Security Dilemma”,International Security,Vol.39,No.2,Fall 2014,pp.52-53.
(69)Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft,America and the World:Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy,Basic Books,2008,pp.113-131;Zbigniew Brzezinski,Strategic Vision:America and the Crisis of Global Power,Basic Books,2012.
(70)David M.Lampton,Same Bed,Different Dreams:Managing U.S.-China Relations,1989—2000,University of California Press,2001,pp.10-11;Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the 21st Century,p.xiv.
(71)Jeffrey Bader,“U.S.-China Relations:Is It Time to End the Engagement?”
(72)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,pp.291-292.
(73)Ibid.,p.293.
(74)Ibid.,p.290.
(75)Elizabeth C.Economy,“The Debate on U.S.-China Relations:Make Room,Make Way,or Make Hay”,May 20,2015,https://www.cfr.org/blog/debate-us-china-relations-make-room-make-way-or-make-hay.
(76)David M.Lampton,“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations Is upon US”,https://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/.
(77)经济相互依赖是中美关系的压舱石的说法,参见郎平:《贸易何以促成和平:以中美关系为例》,《世界经济与政治》,2006年第11期,第24—31页;王伟光:《结构性因素与中美关系的变迁》,第52—71页。
(78)对中美共享脆弱性的阐述,见Andrew J.Nathan and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as a Security Strategy:Power and Vulnerability in the‘China Model’”,pp.313-339。
(79)Jia Qingguo,“The Impact of 9-11 on Sino-US Relations:A Preliminary Assessment”,International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,Vol.3,No.2,2003,pp.159-177;Aaron L.Friedberg,“11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations”,Survival,Vol.44,No.1,2002,pp.33-35.
(80)Aaron L.Friedberg,Contest for Primacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.100.
(81)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,p.295.
(82)David M.Lampton,“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations Is upon US”.
(83)Daniel H.Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?” Rhodium Group,January 19,2018,https://rhg.com/research/post-engagement-us-china-relationship/.
(84)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”.
(85)Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,p.69.
(86)[美]金骏远:《中国大战略与国际安全》,林民旺、王军译,社会科学文献出版社,2008年,第11—13页。
(87)Patrick Porter,“Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed:Power,Habit,and the U.S.Foreign Policy Establishment”,International Security,Vol.42,No.4,Spring 2018,pp.9-46.
(88)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.308.
(89)Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,Henry Holt and Company,2015,p.6.
(90)Aaron Friedberg,“The Signs Were There”,in “Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate” p.187.
(91)Ibid.,p.188.
(92)关于90年代美国对华决策的过程,以及前政要在对华决策中的影响,参见:Ramon H.Myers,Michel C.Oksenberg and David Shambaugh,eds.,Making China Policy:Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2001;Jean A.Garrison,Making China Policy:From Nixon to G.W.Bush,Lynne Rienner Publishers,2005。
(93)James Mann,About Face:A History of America's Curious Relationship with China,from Nixon to Clinton,Alfred A.Knopf,1998,pp.369-376.
(94)James Mann,The China Fantasy:Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China,Penguin Books,2007,p.xiii.
(95)在多位美国学者和官员的著述中都可以看到这样的叙述。白邦瑞的说法最有代表性,他认为美国对中国存在五个错误判断:(1)认为接触中国能够实现与中国的全面合作;(2)认为中国正走在民主化的道路上;(3)认为中国是一个应当得到美国帮助的脆弱国家;(4)认为中国希望成为像美国一样的国家;(5)认为中国的“鹰派”很弱小。参见Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,pp.7-14。傅立民在其著作《有趣的时代》开篇也有相似的表述。参见[美]傅立民:《有趣的时代:美国应如何处理中美关系》,王柏松、王在亮译,社会科学文献出版社,2018年,第1页。
(96)关于意识形态与美国对华政策的研究,参见王立新:《意识形态与美国外交政策》,北京大学出版社,2007年,第九、十章,第317—389页;王立新:《意识形态与美国对华政策——以艾奇逊和“承认问题”为中心的再研究》,《中国社会科学》,2005年第3期,第177—191页。
(97)Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,p.60.
(98)中美关系史与美国的中国情结,参见[美]邹谠:《美国在中国的失败(1914—1950年)》,王宁、周先进译,上海人民出版社,2016年;陶文钊:《中美关系史(1911—1949)》,上海人民出版社,2016年。
(99)Zachary Fredman,“Fredman on Wheeler,‘The Role of American NGOs in China's Modernization:Invited Influence’”,https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/reviews/73557/fredman-wheeler-role-americ an-ngos-chinas-modernization-invited.
(100)Daniel H.Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?”
(101)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,p.291.
(102)Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.116.
(103)James Mann,“America's Dangerous ‘China Fantasy’”,The New York Times,October 27,2016,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/opinion/americas-dangerous-china-fantasy.html?_r=0;James Mann,The China Fantasy:Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China,p.2.
(104)Robert A.Manning,“America's ‘China Consensus’ Implodes”,National Interests,May 21,2015,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-china-consensus-implodes-12938.
(105)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”.
(106)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.9.
(107)陶文钊:《中美关系史(1911—1949)》,第1—2页。
(108)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”.
(109)Daniel H.Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?”
(110)Ka Zeng,Trade Threats,Trade Wars:Bargaining,Retaliation,and American Coercive Diplomacy,The University of Michigan Press,2004,pp.91-126.Ronald W.Cox,“Corporate Interests and U.S.Foreign Policy”,in G.William Domhoff et al.,eds.,Studying the Power Elites:Fifty Years of Who Rules America?Routledge,2018,p.133.
(111)Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.116.
(112)这一派别在美国包括人权和宗教组织、受中美贸易损害的美国产业界和劳工、台湾支持的游说集团等。参见Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.116。
(113)Ibid.,p.117.
(114)参见Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.118。
(115)关于战略精英威胁认知与对外政策的研究,参见Keren Yarhi-Milo,“In the Eye of the Beholder:How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries”,pp.7-51。关于意识形态传统与对外政策的研究,参见王立新:《意识形态与美国外交政策》。关于利益集团游说与对外政策的研究,经典讨论参见John J.Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt,The Israel Lobby and U.S.Foreign Policy,Farrar,Straus and Giroux,2007。
(116)[美]罗伯特·杰维斯:《信号与欺骗:国际关系中的形象逻辑》,徐进译,中央编译出版社,2017年。
(117)关于中国“战略欺骗”美国的讨论,参见:Aaron L.Friedberg,“Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”,pp.7-40;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64;Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,2015。
(118)[美]金骏远:《中国大战略与国际安全》;Avery Goldstein,“An Emerging China's Emerging Grand Strategy:A Neo-Bismarchian Turn?”in G.John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno,eds.,International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific,Columbia University Press,2003,pp.57-87;Jia Qingguo,“Learning to Live with the Hegemon:Evolution of China's Policy Toward the U.S.Since the End of the Cold War”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.14,No.44,2005,pp.395-407;Jia Qingguo,“Peaceful Development:China's Policy of Reassurance”,Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.59,No.4,2005,pp.493-507;达巍:《超越现实主义:作为中国对美战略的“新型大国关系”》,载贾庆国、严军主编:《新型大国关系:机遇与挑战》,北京大学出版社,2015年,第1—16页;宫力、谢莉娇编:《如何与美国共处:冷战后中国对美方针与中美关系》,九州出版社,2010年。
(119)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”,pp.7-40;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64.
(120)Ibid.
(121)弗里德伯格观点的内在逻辑和他之前的著作是一脉相承的。对其观点逻辑出发点的讨论,参见Yuen Foong Khong,“Primacy or World Order?The United States and China's Rise:A Review Essay”,International Security,Vol.38,No.3,Winter 2013/2014,pp.153-175。
(122)Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,pp.1-16.
(123)Jia Qingguo,“Learning to Live with the Hegemon:Evolution of China's Policy Toward the U.S.Since the End of the Cold War”,pp.395-407;Jia Qingguo,“Peaceful Development:China's Policy of Reassurance”,pp.493-507.
(124)鲍威尔说中美关系处于最好时期,见Liu Wendy,“Continue Colin Powell's Pragmatic Policy Toward China”,The Seattle Times,December 15,2004,https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/continue-colin-powells-pragmatic-policy-toward-china/;佐利克关于利益攸关方的讲话,见Robert Zoellick,“Whither China:From Membership to Responsibility?” pp.5-14。
(125)[美]金骏远:《中国大战略与国际安全》,第六、七、八章。
(126)Kai He,“Undermining Adversaries:Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies After the Cold War”,Security Studies,Vol.21,No.2,2012,pp.154-191;Kai He,“How Could China Bargain for a Peaceful Accommodation?” Orbis,Vol.60,No.3,2016,pp.382-394;Kai He,“Dynamic Balancing:China's Balancing Strategies Towards the United States,1949-2005”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.18,No.58,2009,pp.113-136.
(127)这种论调在21世纪初“中国威胁论”盛行之时也有所表现,只不过没有形成大规模的影响,代表作品见Bill Gertz,The China Threat:How the People's Republic Targets America,Regnery Publishing,2000。
(128)改革试验与增量改革,参见吴敬琏:《当代中国经济改革教程》,上海远东出版社,2016年,第56—89页;邓小平:《改革开放是很大的试验》,载《邓小平文选(第三卷)》,人民出版社,1993年,第130页。
(129)关于以经济建设为中心、韬光养晦的说法,参见邓小平:《改革开放政策稳定,中国大有希望》《我们有信心把中国的事情做得更好》《在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点》,载《邓小平文选(第三卷)》,第315、324、370页。
(130)中国学习和适应国际环境的研究,还可以参见:Jeffrey W.Legro,“Purpose Transitions:China's Rise and the American Response”,in Robert S.Ross and Zhu Feng,eds.,China's Ascent:Power,Security,and the Future of International Politics,Cornell University Press,2008,pp.163-187;Tang Shiping,“From Offensive to Defensive Realism:A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China's Security Strategy”,in Robert S.Ross and Zhu Feng,eds.,China's Ascent:Power,Security,and the Future of International Politics,pp.141-162。
(131)当然,部分学者已经在这方面作出了努力,见陶文钊:《中国的改革开放与有利国际环境的积极营造》,《国际展望》,2018年第3期,第1—12页;唐世平:《国际秩序变迁与中国的选项》,《中国社会科学》,2019年第3期,第187—203页;达巍:《选择国内战略,定位中美关系》,《美国研究》,2019年第2期,第20—31页。
(2)Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.2,March 2018,pp.60-70.
(3)关于“对华接触失败论”的讨论,参见邵育群:《“对华接触失败论”之后是什么?》,《国际关系研究》,2018年第1期,第35—41页;Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.2,2018,pp.60-70;Jeffrey Bader,“U.S.-China Relations:Is It Time to End the Engagement?” Policy Brief,Brookings Institution,September 2018,https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-china-relations-is-it-time-to-end-the-engagement/;David Dollar,et al.,“Avoiding War:Containment,Competition,and Cooperation in U.S.-China Relations”,A Brookings Interview,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/fp_20171121_china_interview.pdf。
(4)National Security Strategy of the United States of America,December 2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
(5)Keith Bradsher and Steven Lee Myer,“Trump's Trader War Is Rattling China's Leaders”,The New York Times,August 14,2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump-xi-jinping-.html.
(6)“Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China”,The White House,October 4,2018,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
(7)倪峰:《常规因素与非常规因素汇合——美国对华政策的质变》,《现代国际关系》,2018年第7期,第15—23页;Jeffrey Bader,“U.S.-China Relations:Is It Time to End the Engagement?”牛军:《轮回:中美关系与亚太秩序演变(1978—2018)》,第9—25页;胡然、赵建伟、王缉思:《冰冻三尺,非一日之寒:对近十年来中美关系的回溯与分析》,载北京大学国际战略研究院编:《中国国际战略评论2018(下)》,世界知识出版社,2018年,第1—28页;达巍:《世界秩序的变局与中美关系的范式性转折》,载北京大学国际战略研究院编:《中国国际战略评论2018(下)》,第29—38页;赵穗生:《从“错位的共识”到竞争对手:美国对华政策40年》,《人民论坛·学术前沿》,2018年第23期(上),第19—35页。
(8)虽然这个问题得到了广泛关注,但学者们提出问题的方式却不只一种,如美国冷战后为何对中国采取软制衡而不是硬制衡?克林顿政府对华政策为何转向全面接触?为什么美国在明知中国是潜在竞争对手的情况下依然帮助中国发展?但这些问题的基本指向都是对华接触政策的延续性。参见Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“If Not Soft Balancing,Then What?Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S.Policy Toward China”,Security Studies,Vol.17,No.2,2008,p.380;David M.Edelestein,Over the Horizon:Time,Uncertainty,and the Rise of Great Powers,Cornell University Press,2017,p.2;Chi-hung Wei,“Engaging a State that Resists Sanctions Pressure:U.S.Policy Toward China,1992—1994”,Millennium:Journal of International Studies,Vol.43,No.2,2015,pp.429-449。
(9)张曙光:《接触外交:尼克松政府与解冻中美关系》,世界知识出版社,2009年。
(10)参见冷战后美国政府历次发布的《美国国家安全战略》报告关于中国的部分,以及Aaron Friedberg,“The Debate over U.S.China Strategy”,Survival,Vol.57,No.3,2015,pp.89-110;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,Survival,Vol.60,No.3,2018,pp.7-64。
(11)John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,W.W.Norton & Company,2001.
(12)中国从与美国交往的过程中获得的各种收益,参见:Hugo Meijer,Trading with the Enemy:The Making of Export Control Policy Toward the People's Republic of China,Oxford University Press,2016,pp.2-3;Suisheng Zhao,“American Reflections on the Engagement with China and Responses to President Xi's New Model of Major Power Relations”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.26,No.106,2017,pp.489-503。弗里德伯格的大多数文章都持这样的观点:Aaron L.Friedberg,“Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”,Survival,Vol.60,No.1,2018,pp.7-40;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64。布莱克维尔和阿什利也持相同的观点:Robert D.Blackwill and Ashley J.Tellis,“Revisiting U.S.Grand Strategy Toward China”,Council Special Report,No.72,March 2015,Council on Foreign Relations,p.4。
(13)中国的GDP增长率见国家统计局网站,http://data.stats.gov.cn/ks.htm?cn=C01&zb=A0501。
(14)中美全面交往带给中国的技术收益,参见Hugo Meijer,Trading with the Enemy:The Making of Export Control Policy Toward the People's Republic of China,pp.2-3。
(15)中美军费数据对比,见斯德哥尔摩和平研究所网站数据,http://visuals.sipri.org/。
(16)[美]白永辉:《从“利益攸关方”到“战略保证”——政治—经济的分析视角》,赵明昊译,于铁军校,《国际政治研究》,2010年第2期,第105—119页;赵穗生:《奥巴马对华积极接触政策及其挑战》,《美国问题研究》,2011年第1期,第1—23页。
(17)Stephanie Condon,“Obama:‘We Welcome China's Rise’”,CBS News,January 20,2011,https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-we-welcome-chinas-rise/;Daniel Halper,“Hillary:We ‘Welcome China's Rise’”,The Weekly Standard,January 31,2013,https://www.weeklystandard.com/daniel-halper/hillary-we-welcome-chinas-rise.
(18)中国问题被政治化的历史叙述,见Robert L.Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen:The Politics of U.S.-China Relations,1989—2000,Brookings Institution Press,2003。
(19)历次美国对华政策大辩论的代表作,参见:David Shambaugh,“Containment or Engagement of China?Calculating Beijing's Responses”,International Security,Vol.21,No.2,Fall 1996,pp.180-209;Thomas J.Christensen,“Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?The Rise of China and U.S.Policy Toward East Asia”,International Security,Vol.31,No.1,Summer 2006,pp.81-126;Suisheng Zhao,“American Reflections on the Engagement with China and Responses to President Xi's New Model of Major Power Relations”,pp.489-503;Aaron Friedberg,“The Debate over U.S.China Strategy”,pp.89-110;陶文钊:《美国对华政策大辩论》,《现代国际关系》,2016年第1期,第19—28页;[美]何汉理:《美国国内对华政策辩论与中美关系未来》,《美国问题研究》,2016年第1期,第1—9页。
(20)Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross,eds.,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,Routledge,1999,pp.1-32.其他的政策选项还有预防性战争、制衡、搭便车、捆绑和推卸责任等。
(21)保罗·肯尼迪在《战略与外交:1870—1945》一书中对绥靖政策作出了经典定义,绥靖政策是指通过理性协商与妥协的方式,承认并满足(特定行为体的)不满,从而在避免成本高昂、残酷危险的武装冲突的前提下解决国际(或国内)争端。参见Paul Kennedy,“The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy,1865—1939”,in Paul Kennedy,Strategy and Diplomacy,1870—1945,Fontana Press,1984,p.16。
(22)对接触政策与绥靖政策的辨析,参见Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,pp.1-32;Stephen R.Rock,Appeasement in International Politics,The University Press of Kentucky,2000,pp.21-23。对战略视野的讨论,参见David M.Edelestein,Over the Horizon:Time,Uncertainty,and the Rise of Great Powers。
(23)对国际秩序稳定性的讨论,参见奥根斯基和吉尔平的论述。Robert Gilpin,War and Change in World Politics,Cambridge University Press,1981,pp.50-105;A.F.K.Organski,World Politics,2nd Edition,Alfred A.Knopf,1968,pp.363-376.
(24)关于通过绥靖争取时间的讨论,参见Norrin M.Ripsman and Jack S.Levy,“Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930”,International Security,Vol.33,No.2,Fall 2008,pp.148-181。将接触作为威慑准备的讨论,参见Dong Jung Kim,“Economic Deterrence Through Economic Engagement”,Foreign Policy Analysis,Vol.15,No.2,April 2019,pp.176-186,https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/ory00。
(25)关于释放善意信号的研究,参见:Robert Powell,“Uncertainty,Shifting Power,and Appeasement”,American Political Science Review,Vol.90,No.4,December 1996,pp.749-764;Shiping Tang and Evan Braden Montgomery,“Uncertainty and Reassurance in International Politics”,International Security,Vol.32,No.1,Summer 2007,pp.193-200;Andrew Kydd,“Trust,Reassurance,and Cooperation”,International Organization,Vol.54,No.2,Spring 2000,pp.325-357;Shiping Tang,“Reassurance:A Defensive Realism Theory of Cooperation-Building”,in Shiping Tang,A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time:Defensive Realism,Palgrave Macmillan,2010,pp.129-162;Evan Braden Montgomery,“Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma:Realism,Reassurance,and the Problem of Uncertainty”,International Security,Vol.31,No.2,Fall 2006,pp.151-185。
(26)关于现状国倾向于寻求安全的研究,参见:Jeffrey W.Taliaferro,“Security Seeking Under Anarchy:Defensive Realism Revisited”,International Security,Vol.25,No.3,Winter 2000/01,pp.128-161;Andrew Kydd,“Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”,Security Studies,Vol.7,No.1,1997,pp.114-155。
(27)对遏制政策内容的讨论,参见John Lewis Gaddis,Strategies of Containment:A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War,Oxford University Press,2005,p.35。
(28)关于判断战略意图的讨论,参见[美]罗伯特·杰维斯:《国际政治中的知觉与错误知觉》,秦亚青译,上海人民出版社,2015年,第二章、第三章,第34—123页;Sebastian Rosato,“The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers”,International Security,Vol.39,No.3,Winter 2014/2015,pp.48-88;Keren Yarhi-Milo,“In the Eye of the Beholder:How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries”,International Security,Vol.38,No.1,Summer 2013,pp.7-51。
(29)米尔斯海默对绥靖政策的批评,参见[美]约翰·米尔斯海默:《大国政治的悲剧(修订版)》,王义桅、唐小松译,上海人民出版社,2014年,第156页。
(30)德国两次崛起失败的直接原因是,在前后两个崛起进程中德国最终都诉诸扩张主义政策,从而招致其他国家的联合制衡。
(31)关于英美和解的讨论,参见:Chad E.Nelson,“Why the Great Powers Permitted the Creation of an American Hegemon”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.132,No.4,2017/18,pp.685-718;Charles A.Kupchan,How Enemies Become Friends:The Sources of Stable Peace,Princeton University Press,2010,pp.73-111。
(32)对现状国接触崛起国倾向的讨论,参见Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,p.9。
(33)关于预防性战争与权力转移理论的讨论,参见Jack S.Levy,“Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War”,World Politics,Vol.40,No.1,1987,pp.82-107。
(34)关于理性绥靖的讨论,参见Daniel Treisman,“Rational Appeasement”,International Organization,Vol.58,No.2,Spring 2004,pp.345-373。
(35)关于攻防理论的讨论,参见:Charles L.Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann,“What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Security,Vol.22,No.3,Spring 1998,pp.44-82;Macro Nilsson,“Offense-Defense Balance,War Duration,and the Security Dilemma”,Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.56,No.3,2012,pp.467-489。
(36)Evan Braden Montgomery,“Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma:Realism,Reassurance,and the Problem of Uncertainty”,pp.151-185.
(37)Stephen R.Rock,Appeasement in International Politics,pp.18-19;Andrew Kydd,“Trust,Reassurance,and Cooperation”,pp.330-333.
(38)关于寻求安全的现状国之间能够避免冲突、维持和平的研究,参见Andrew Kydd,“Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”,pp.114-155。
(39)关于寻求安全的现状国之间能够避免冲突、维持和平的研究,参见Andrew Kydd,“Sheep in Sheep's Clothing:Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”,pp.114-155。
(40)对于相互依赖与冲突行为的研究,参见:Dale C.Copeland,“Economic Interdependence and War:A Theory of Trade Expectations”,International Security,Vol.20,No.4,Spring 1996,pp.5-41;Etel Solingen,“Domestic Coalitions,Internationalization,and War:Then and Now”,International Security,Vol.39,No.1,Summer 2014,pp.44-70。
(41)Norrin M.Ripsman and Jack S.Levy,“Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930”,pp.148-181.
(42)Peter Trubowitz and Peter Harris,“When States Appease:British Appeasement in the 1930s”,Review of International Studies,Vol.41,No.2,2015,pp.289-311;Alexander Anievas,“The International Political Economy of Appeasement:The Social Sources of British Foreign Policy During the 1930s”,Review of International Studies,Vol.37,No.2,April 2011,pp.601-629.
(43)张曙光:《接触外交:尼克松政府与解冻中美关系》;樊超:《合作与共赢:蜜月期的中国与美国》,世界知识出版社,2016年,第273—291页。
(44)David Shambaugh,“Containment or Engagement of China?Calculating Beijing's Responses”,pp.180-209.
(45)构建中美建设性战略伙伴关系的声明,见“China,U.S.Pledge to Build Constructive Strategic Partnership”,中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆网站,http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zysj/zrjfm/t36212.htm;佐利克关于利益攸关方的讲话,参见Robert Zoellick,“Whither China:From Membership to Responsibility?” NBR Analysis,Vol.16,No.4,December 2005,pp.5-14;关于相互战略保证的提法,参见James Steinberg and Michael E.O'Hanlon,Strategic Reassurance and Resolve:U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century,Princeton University Press,2014,pp.5-6。
(46)冷战后的历次国家安全战略报告,参见National Security Strategy Archive,http://nssarchive.us/。
(47)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”,Remarks at the Hudson Center,November 20,2014,http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1896;Michael J.Green,By More Than Providence:Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783,Columbia University Press,2017,pp.471-472.
(48)Andrew J.Nathan and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as Security Strategy:Power and Vulnerability in the ‘China Model’”,Political Science Quarterly,Vol.131,No.2,2016,pp.313-339.
(49)“纠缠的大国”这一提法见David Shambaugh,ed.,Tangled Titans:The United States and China,Rowman & Littlefield Publisher,2013。
(50)技术出口管制见Hugo Meijer,Trading with the Enemy:The Making of Export Control Policy Toward the People's Republic of China,pp.2-3;人权问题和台湾问题见Robert L.Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen:The Politics of U.S.-China Relations,1989—2000。
(51)“接触+遏制”(congagement)的提法见Aaron L.Friedberg,Contest for Primacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,W.W.Norton & Company,2011,p.88;王缉思:《“遏制”还是“交往”?——评冷战后美国对华政策》,载王缉思:《国际政治的理性思考》,北京大学出版社,2006年,第188页;周方银:《韬光养晦与两面下注——中国崛起过程中的中美战略互动》,《当代亚太》,2011年第5期,第6—26页;郝雨凡、张燕冬:《限制性接触——美国新政府对华政策透视》,《战略与管理》,2001年第4期,第38—43页。
(52)John Lewis Gaddis,Strategies of Containment:A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War,pp.24-52.
(53)Randall L.Schweller,“Managing the Rise of Great Powers:History and Theory”,p.9.
(54)关于对华接触包含防范但不包括遏制的说法,参见赵穗生:《奥巴马对华积极接触政策及其挑战》,第1—23页;王缉思主编:《释疑:走出中美困局》,社会科学文献出版社,2014年,第16—17页;薛力:《接触中有防范,但没有遏制》,《太平洋学报》,2004年第9期,第56—63页;王伟光:《结构性因素与中美关系的变迁》,《美国研究》,2013年第4期,第52—71页。关于美国“亚太再平衡”不是为了遏制中国,参见 Nina Silove,“The Pivot Before the Pivot:U.S.Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia”,International Security,Vol.40,No.4,Spring 2016,p.46。
(55)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64;Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2011,p.26.
(56)佐利克在著名的“利益攸关方”讲话中指出,对华接触政策成功地将中国融入了既有国际体系。Robert Zoellick,“Whither China:From Membership to Responsibility?” pp.5-14.
(57)王缉思、李侃如:《中美战略互疑:解析与应对》,社会科学文献出版社,2013年。
(58)对中美实力对比的论述,参见Stephen G.Brooks and William C.Wohlforth,“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century:China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position”,International Security,Vol.40,No.3,Winter 2015/2016,pp.7-53;William Z.Y.Wang,Stephen G.Brooks and William C.Wohlforth,“Correspondence:Debating China's Rise and the Future of U.S.Power”,International Security,Vol.41,No.2,Fall 2016,pp.188-191;Robert Ross,“Engagement in U.S.China Policy”,in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross,eds.,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,p.180;Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.8。
(59)Joseph S.Nye,Jr.,“Time Will Tell”,in “Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,July 2018,pp.190-192.
(60)Thomas J.Christensen,“Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?The Rise of China and U.S.Policy Toward East Asia”,p.83.
(61)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,W.W.Norton & Company,2015,p.288.
(62)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.24.
(63)中国的和平发展源于美国立足实力优势的对华接触政策,参见:Wang Jisi,“China's Search for Stability with America”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.84,No.5,2005,pp.39-48;J.Stapleton Roy,“Engagement Works”,in “Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,pp.185-186;Thomas Christensen and Patricia Kim,“Don't Abandon Ship”,in“Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,pp.188-190;Eric Li,“Better Together”,in“Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate”,pp.192-193。
(64)中国从国际秩序中获益的说法,参见Andrew J.Nathan and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as a Security Strategy:Power and Vulnerability in the‘China Model’”,pp.313-339。
(65)对于自由主义国际秩序的讨论,参见[美]约翰·伊肯伯里:《中国的崛起、美国及自由世界秩序的未来》,载[美]沈大伟主编:《纠缠的大国:中美关系的未来》,丁超、黄富慧、洪漫译,新华出版社,2015年,第42—43页;Daniel Deudney and G.John Ikenberry,“Liberal World:The Resilient Order”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,2018,pp.16-24;Graham Allison,“The Myth of the Liberal Order:From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.97,No.4,2018,pp.124-133。关于中国参与国际制度与社会化,参见江忆恩:《中国参与国际体制的若干思考》,《世界经济与政治》,1999年第7期,第4—10页;Alastair Iain Johnston,Social States:China in International Institutions,1989—2000,Princeton University Press,2008。
(66)Robert Ross,“Engagement in U.S.China Policy”,p.180.
(67)台海危机后“中国威胁论”的上升,参见:Aaron L.Friedberg,Contest for Primacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.98;Emma V.Broomfield,“Perceptions of Danger:The China Threat Theory”,The Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.12,No.35,2003,pp.265-284。
(68)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the 21st Century,p.2;Adam P.Liff and G.John Ikenberry,“Racing Toward Tragedy?China's Rise,Military Competition in the Asia Pacific,and the Security Dilemma”,International Security,Vol.39,No.2,Fall 2014,pp.52-53.
(69)Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft,America and the World:Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy,Basic Books,2008,pp.113-131;Zbigniew Brzezinski,Strategic Vision:America and the Crisis of Global Power,Basic Books,2012.
(70)David M.Lampton,Same Bed,Different Dreams:Managing U.S.-China Relations,1989—2000,University of California Press,2001,pp.10-11;Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the 21st Century,p.xiv.
(71)Jeffrey Bader,“U.S.-China Relations:Is It Time to End the Engagement?”
(72)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,pp.291-292.
(73)Ibid.,p.293.
(74)Ibid.,p.290.
(75)Elizabeth C.Economy,“The Debate on U.S.-China Relations:Make Room,Make Way,or Make Hay”,May 20,2015,https://www.cfr.org/blog/debate-us-china-relations-make-room-make-way-or-make-hay.
(76)David M.Lampton,“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations Is upon US”,https://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/.
(77)经济相互依赖是中美关系的压舱石的说法,参见郎平:《贸易何以促成和平:以中美关系为例》,《世界经济与政治》,2006年第11期,第24—31页;王伟光:《结构性因素与中美关系的变迁》,第52—71页。
(78)对中美共享脆弱性的阐述,见Andrew J.Nathan and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as a Security Strategy:Power and Vulnerability in the‘China Model’”,pp.313-339。
(79)Jia Qingguo,“The Impact of 9-11 on Sino-US Relations:A Preliminary Assessment”,International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,Vol.3,No.2,2003,pp.159-177;Aaron L.Friedberg,“11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations”,Survival,Vol.44,No.1,2002,pp.33-35.
(80)Aaron L.Friedberg,Contest for Primacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.100.
(81)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,p.295.
(82)David M.Lampton,“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations Is upon US”.
(83)Daniel H.Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?” Rhodium Group,January 19,2018,https://rhg.com/research/post-engagement-us-china-relationship/.
(84)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”.
(85)Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,p.69.
(86)[美]金骏远:《中国大战略与国际安全》,林民旺、王军译,社会科学文献出版社,2008年,第11—13页。
(87)Patrick Porter,“Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed:Power,Habit,and the U.S.Foreign Policy Establishment”,International Security,Vol.42,No.4,Spring 2018,pp.9-46.
(88)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.308.
(89)Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,Henry Holt and Company,2015,p.6.
(90)Aaron Friedberg,“The Signs Were There”,in “Did America Get China Wrong?The Engagement Debate” p.187.
(91)Ibid.,p.188.
(92)关于90年代美国对华决策的过程,以及前政要在对华决策中的影响,参见:Ramon H.Myers,Michel C.Oksenberg and David Shambaugh,eds.,Making China Policy:Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations,Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,2001;Jean A.Garrison,Making China Policy:From Nixon to G.W.Bush,Lynne Rienner Publishers,2005。
(93)James Mann,About Face:A History of America's Curious Relationship with China,from Nixon to Clinton,Alfred A.Knopf,1998,pp.369-376.
(94)James Mann,The China Fantasy:Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China,Penguin Books,2007,p.xiii.
(95)在多位美国学者和官员的著述中都可以看到这样的叙述。白邦瑞的说法最有代表性,他认为美国对中国存在五个错误判断:(1)认为接触中国能够实现与中国的全面合作;(2)认为中国正走在民主化的道路上;(3)认为中国是一个应当得到美国帮助的脆弱国家;(4)认为中国希望成为像美国一样的国家;(5)认为中国的“鹰派”很弱小。参见Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,pp.7-14。傅立民在其著作《有趣的时代》开篇也有相似的表述。参见[美]傅立民:《有趣的时代:美国应如何处理中美关系》,王柏松、王在亮译,社会科学文献出版社,2018年,第1页。
(96)关于意识形态与美国对华政策的研究,参见王立新:《意识形态与美国外交政策》,北京大学出版社,2007年,第九、十章,第317—389页;王立新:《意识形态与美国对华政策——以艾奇逊和“承认问题”为中心的再研究》,《中国社会科学》,2005年第3期,第177—191页。
(97)Kurt M.Campbell and Ely Ratner,“The China Reckoning:How Beijing Defied American Expectations”,p.60.
(98)中美关系史与美国的中国情结,参见[美]邹谠:《美国在中国的失败(1914—1950年)》,王宁、周先进译,上海人民出版社,2016年;陶文钊:《中美关系史(1911—1949)》,上海人民出版社,2016年。
(99)Zachary Fredman,“Fredman on Wheeler,‘The Role of American NGOs in China's Modernization:Invited Influence’”,https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/reviews/73557/fredman-wheeler-role-americ an-ngos-chinas-modernization-invited.
(100)Daniel H.Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?”
(101)Thomas J.Christensen,The China Challenge:Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power,p.291.
(102)Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.116.
(103)James Mann,“America's Dangerous ‘China Fantasy’”,The New York Times,October 27,2016,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/opinion/americas-dangerous-china-fantasy.html?_r=0;James Mann,The China Fantasy:Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China,p.2.
(104)Robert A.Manning,“America's ‘China Consensus’ Implodes”,National Interests,May 21,2015,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-china-consensus-implodes-12938.
(105)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”.
(106)Michael D.Swaine,America's Challenge:Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century,p.9.
(107)陶文钊:《中美关系史(1911—1949)》,第1—2页。
(108)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in U.S.China Policy”.
(109)Daniel H.Rosen,“A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship?”
(110)Ka Zeng,Trade Threats,Trade Wars:Bargaining,Retaliation,and American Coercive Diplomacy,The University of Michigan Press,2004,pp.91-126.Ronald W.Cox,“Corporate Interests and U.S.Foreign Policy”,in G.William Domhoff et al.,eds.,Studying the Power Elites:Fifty Years of Who Rules America?Routledge,2018,p.133.
(111)Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.116.
(112)这一派别在美国包括人权和宗教组织、受中美贸易损害的美国产业界和劳工、台湾支持的游说集团等。参见Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.116。
(113)Ibid.,p.117.
(114)参见Aaron L.Friedberg,A Contest for Supremacy:China,America,and the Structure for Mastery in Asia,p.118。
(115)关于战略精英威胁认知与对外政策的研究,参见Keren Yarhi-Milo,“In the Eye of the Beholder:How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries”,pp.7-51。关于意识形态传统与对外政策的研究,参见王立新:《意识形态与美国外交政策》。关于利益集团游说与对外政策的研究,经典讨论参见John J.Mearsheimer and Stephen M.Walt,The Israel Lobby and U.S.Foreign Policy,Farrar,Straus and Giroux,2007。
(116)[美]罗伯特·杰维斯:《信号与欺骗:国际关系中的形象逻辑》,徐进译,中央编译出版社,2017年。
(117)关于中国“战略欺骗”美国的讨论,参见:Aaron L.Friedberg,“Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”,pp.7-40;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64;Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,2015。
(118)[美]金骏远:《中国大战略与国际安全》;Avery Goldstein,“An Emerging China's Emerging Grand Strategy:A Neo-Bismarchian Turn?”in G.John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno,eds.,International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific,Columbia University Press,2003,pp.57-87;Jia Qingguo,“Learning to Live with the Hegemon:Evolution of China's Policy Toward the U.S.Since the End of the Cold War”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.14,No.44,2005,pp.395-407;Jia Qingguo,“Peaceful Development:China's Policy of Reassurance”,Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.59,No.4,2005,pp.493-507;达巍:《超越现实主义:作为中国对美战略的“新型大国关系”》,载贾庆国、严军主编:《新型大国关系:机遇与挑战》,北京大学出版社,2015年,第1—16页;宫力、谢莉娇编:《如何与美国共处:冷战后中国对美方针与中美关系》,九州出版社,2010年。
(119)Aaron L.Friedberg,“Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”,pp.7-40;Aaron L.Friedberg,“Competing with China”,pp.7-64.
(120)Ibid.
(121)弗里德伯格观点的内在逻辑和他之前的著作是一脉相承的。对其观点逻辑出发点的讨论,参见Yuen Foong Khong,“Primacy or World Order?The United States and China's Rise:A Review Essay”,International Security,Vol.38,No.3,Winter 2013/2014,pp.153-175。
(122)Michael Pillsbury,The Hundred-Year Marathon:China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,pp.1-16.
(123)Jia Qingguo,“Learning to Live with the Hegemon:Evolution of China's Policy Toward the U.S.Since the End of the Cold War”,pp.395-407;Jia Qingguo,“Peaceful Development:China's Policy of Reassurance”,pp.493-507.
(124)鲍威尔说中美关系处于最好时期,见Liu Wendy,“Continue Colin Powell's Pragmatic Policy Toward China”,The Seattle Times,December 15,2004,https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/continue-colin-powells-pragmatic-policy-toward-china/;佐利克关于利益攸关方的讲话,见Robert Zoellick,“Whither China:From Membership to Responsibility?” pp.5-14。
(125)[美]金骏远:《中国大战略与国际安全》,第六、七、八章。
(126)Kai He,“Undermining Adversaries:Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies After the Cold War”,Security Studies,Vol.21,No.2,2012,pp.154-191;Kai He,“How Could China Bargain for a Peaceful Accommodation?” Orbis,Vol.60,No.3,2016,pp.382-394;Kai He,“Dynamic Balancing:China's Balancing Strategies Towards the United States,1949-2005”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.18,No.58,2009,pp.113-136.
(127)这种论调在21世纪初“中国威胁论”盛行之时也有所表现,只不过没有形成大规模的影响,代表作品见Bill Gertz,The China Threat:How the People's Republic Targets America,Regnery Publishing,2000。
(128)改革试验与增量改革,参见吴敬琏:《当代中国经济改革教程》,上海远东出版社,2016年,第56—89页;邓小平:《改革开放是很大的试验》,载《邓小平文选(第三卷)》,人民出版社,1993年,第130页。
(129)关于以经济建设为中心、韬光养晦的说法,参见邓小平:《改革开放政策稳定,中国大有希望》《我们有信心把中国的事情做得更好》《在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点》,载《邓小平文选(第三卷)》,第315、324、370页。
(130)中国学习和适应国际环境的研究,还可以参见:Jeffrey W.Legro,“Purpose Transitions:China's Rise and the American Response”,in Robert S.Ross and Zhu Feng,eds.,China's Ascent:Power,Security,and the Future of International Politics,Cornell University Press,2008,pp.163-187;Tang Shiping,“From Offensive to Defensive Realism:A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China's Security Strategy”,in Robert S.Ross and Zhu Feng,eds.,China's Ascent:Power,Security,and the Future of International Politics,pp.141-162。
(131)当然,部分学者已经在这方面作出了努力,见陶文钊:《中国的改革开放与有利国际环境的积极营造》,《国际展望》,2018年第3期,第1—12页;唐世平:《国际秩序变迁与中国的选项》,《中国社会科学》,2019年第3期,第187—203页;达巍:《选择国内战略,定位中美关系》,《美国研究》,2019年第2期,第20—31页。
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