管理层预测能力、环境不确定性与盈余管理
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摘要
管理层业绩预告的准确性会受到盈余管理的影响,但更取决于管理层的预测能力,管理层业绩预告的持续准确性不仅可以在一定程度上剔除盈余管理的噪音,还可以在一定程度上反映管理层的预测能力。以2010—2016年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,以前3年管理层业绩预告偏差的均值度量管理层预测能力,实证考察了管理层预测能力与盈余管理的相关性,以及环境不确定性的调节作用。研究发现:公司管理层的预测能力越差,管理层进行盈余管理的动机越强,盈余管理程度越大,即真实盈余管理程度越大,应计盈余管理程度也越大;环境不确定性程度越高,管理层预测能力与真实盈余管理程度和应计盈余管理程度之间的相关性越显著。研究结果表明,业绩预告的持续准确性可以对外传递公司的盈余质量信息,有利于缓解政策制定者和监管者一直担忧的业绩预告可靠性问题。
The accuracy of earnings forecast is influenced not only by earning management,but also by managements' forecasting ability. What's more, the persistent accuracy of earnings forecast not only reduces the noise of earnings management but also reflects managements' forecasting ability to a certain degree. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managements' forecasting ability and earnings management and the moderating effect of environmental uncertainty using the data of China's A-stock listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2010 to 2016.We use the average accuracy of the previous three years' earnings forecast to measure the forecasting ability of management. We find that the lower the managements' forecasting ability,the stronger the motivation of management for earnings management, the higher degree of real earnings management and accrual earnings management. In addition, the degree of environmental uncertainty could enhance the significance of the relationship between managements' forecasting ability and earnings management. This research shows that the persistent accuracy of earnings forecast can transfer the company's earnings quality information, which will help alleviate the reliability of performance forecasts that policymakers and regulators have been worried about.
The accuracy of earnings forecast is influenced not only by earning management,but also by managements' forecasting ability. What's more, the persistent accuracy of earnings forecast not only reduces the noise of earnings management but also reflects managements' forecasting ability to a certain degree. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managements' forecasting ability and earnings management and the moderating effect of environmental uncertainty using the data of China's A-stock listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the years from 2010 to 2016.We use the average accuracy of the previous three years' earnings forecast to measure the forecasting ability of management. We find that the lower the managements' forecasting ability,the stronger the motivation of management for earnings management, the higher degree of real earnings management and accrual earnings management. In addition, the degree of environmental uncertainty could enhance the significance of the relationship between managements' forecasting ability and earnings management. This research shows that the persistent accuracy of earnings forecast can transfer the company's earnings quality information, which will help alleviate the reliability of performance forecasts that policymakers and regulators have been worried about.
引文
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[2]杨德明,林斌.业绩预告的市场反应研究[J].经济管理,2006(16):26-31.
[3]李馨子,肖土盛.管理层业绩预告有助于分析师盈余预测修正吗[J].南开管理评论,2015(2):30-38.
[4]董南雁,梁巧妮,林青.管理层业绩预告策略与隐含资本成本[J].南开管理评论,2017(2):45-57.
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[7]郭娜,祁怀锦.业绩预告披露与盈余管理关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2010(2):81-88.
[8]乔君,宋海燕.业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究[J].内蒙古财经学院学报,2012(2):63-71.
[9]黄晓蓓,郑建明.业绩预告、盈余管理与经济后果[J].经济问题探索,2015(2):22-30.
[10]吉姗姗,王福胜.管理层会使报告盈余满足自己发布的盈余预测吗?——基于闭区间预测的实证分析[J].财经论丛,2017(2):67-75.
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[13]KIM J W, SHI Y. Voluntary disclosure and thecost of equity capital:evidence from management earnings forecasts[J]. Journal of Accounting&Public Policy, 2011,30(4):348-366.
[14]王艳艳.管理层盈佘预测与权益资本成本[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2013(5):114-123.
[15]王玉涛,王彦超.业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗[J].金融研究,2012(6):193-206.
[16]KRISHNAN G V,PEVZNER M,SENGUPTA P.How do auditors view managers'voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees[J]. Journal of Accounting&Public Policy, 2012, 31(5):492-515.
[17]廖义刚,邓贤琨.业绩预告偏离度、内部控制质量与审计收费[J].审计研究,2017(4):56-64.
[18]KASZNIK R. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1999, 37(1):57-81.
[19]TRUEMAN B. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?[J]. Journal of Accounting&Eco-nomics, 1986, 8(1):53-71.
[20]GOODMAN T H, NEAMTIU M, SHROFF N, et al.Management forecast quality and capital investment decisions[J]. The Accounting Review, 2014, 89(1):331-365.
[21]赵慧,胡国强,张俊民.管理层盈利预测包含了公司投资质量信息吗?[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2017(2):98-105.
[22]潘飞,石美娟,童卫华.高级管理人员激励契约研究[J].中国工业经济,2006(3):68-74.
[23]ROYCHOWDHURY S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics, 2006, 42(3):335-370.
[24]叶陈云,谢志华,杨克智.股权分置改革、会计稳健性与盈余管理研究[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2012(4):64-71.
[25]黄梅,夏新平.操纵性应计利润模型检测盈余管理能力的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009(5):136-143.
[2]杨德明,林斌.业绩预告的市场反应研究[J].经济管理,2006(16):26-31.
[3]李馨子,肖土盛.管理层业绩预告有助于分析师盈余预测修正吗[J].南开管理评论,2015(2):30-38.
[4]董南雁,梁巧妮,林青.管理层业绩预告策略与隐含资本成本[J].南开管理评论,2017(2):45-57.
[5]郭娜.管理层业绩预告误差与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济经纬,2010(6):76-80.
[6]COTTER J, TUNA I, WYSOCKI P D. Expectations management and beatable targets:how do analysts react to explicit earnings guidance?[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2006, 23(3):593-624.
[7]郭娜,祁怀锦.业绩预告披露与盈余管理关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2010(2):81-88.
[8]乔君,宋海燕.业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究[J].内蒙古财经学院学报,2012(2):63-71.
[9]黄晓蓓,郑建明.业绩预告、盈余管理与经济后果[J].经济问题探索,2015(2):22-30.
[10]吉姗姗,王福胜.管理层会使报告盈余满足自己发布的盈余预测吗?——基于闭区间预测的实证分析[J].财经论丛,2017(2):67-75.
[11]PATELL J M. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior:empirical test[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1976, 14(2):246-276.
[12]徐高彦,曹俊颖,徐汇丰,等.上市公司盈余预告择时披露策略及市场反应研究——基于股票市场波动的视角[J].会计研究,2017(2):35-41.
[13]KIM J W, SHI Y. Voluntary disclosure and thecost of equity capital:evidence from management earnings forecasts[J]. Journal of Accounting&Public Policy, 2011,30(4):348-366.
[14]王艳艳.管理层盈佘预测与权益资本成本[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2013(5):114-123.
[15]王玉涛,王彦超.业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗[J].金融研究,2012(6):193-206.
[16]KRISHNAN G V,PEVZNER M,SENGUPTA P.How do auditors view managers'voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees[J]. Journal of Accounting&Public Policy, 2012, 31(5):492-515.
[17]廖义刚,邓贤琨.业绩预告偏离度、内部控制质量与审计收费[J].审计研究,2017(4):56-64.
[18]KASZNIK R. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1999, 37(1):57-81.
[19]TRUEMAN B. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts?[J]. Journal of Accounting&Eco-nomics, 1986, 8(1):53-71.
[20]GOODMAN T H, NEAMTIU M, SHROFF N, et al.Management forecast quality and capital investment decisions[J]. The Accounting Review, 2014, 89(1):331-365.
[21]赵慧,胡国强,张俊民.管理层盈利预测包含了公司投资质量信息吗?[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2017(2):98-105.
[22]潘飞,石美娟,童卫华.高级管理人员激励契约研究[J].中国工业经济,2006(3):68-74.
[23]ROYCHOWDHURY S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics, 2006, 42(3):335-370.
[24]叶陈云,谢志华,杨克智.股权分置改革、会计稳健性与盈余管理研究[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2012(4):64-71.
[25]黄梅,夏新平.操纵性应计利润模型检测盈余管理能力的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009(5):136-143.
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