企业政治关联与企业风险投资策略选择研究——不同公司治理机制与风险投资机构特质的调节作用
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摘要
文章以2009年10月到2016年12月在深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的上市公司为研究对象,深入分析了政治关联对风险投资策略的影响,并进一步探讨了风险投资机构特质和不同公司治理机制的调节作用。研究结论显示:政治关联企业倾向于选择联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略;激励型公司治理机制会加强政治关联企业选择联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略的行为;监督型公司治理机制会减弱政治关联企业选择联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略的行为;国有风险投资机构正向调节政治关联与联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略之间的关系;经验丰富的风险投资机构更能加剧政治关联与联合投资策略以及分阶段投资策略之间的正相关程度。本研究对拓展政治关联和风险投资领域的理论和实践具有一定的启示意义。
This paper takes the companies first listed on the Shenzhen GEM and SMEs from October 2009 to December 2016 as the research object,deeply analyzes the impact of political connections on venture capital strategies,and further explores the characteristics of venture capital institutions and the moderating effects of different corporate governance mechanisms. The results show: Politically connected enterprises tend to choose the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The incentive-based corporate governance mechanism positively moderates the relationship between political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The monitoring-based mechanism negatively moderates the re?lationship between political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The state-owned venture capital institutions positively moderates the relationship between political connections and the joint investment strate?gy and the staged investment strategy;The experienced venture capital institutions positively moderates the relationship be?tween political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy. This study has important im?plications for the development of theory and practice of political connections and venture capital.
This paper takes the companies first listed on the Shenzhen GEM and SMEs from October 2009 to December 2016 as the research object,deeply analyzes the impact of political connections on venture capital strategies,and further explores the characteristics of venture capital institutions and the moderating effects of different corporate governance mechanisms. The results show: Politically connected enterprises tend to choose the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The incentive-based corporate governance mechanism positively moderates the relationship between political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The monitoring-based mechanism negatively moderates the re?lationship between political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy;The state-owned venture capital institutions positively moderates the relationship between political connections and the joint investment strate?gy and the staged investment strategy;The experienced venture capital institutions positively moderates the relationship be?tween political connections and the joint investment strategy and the staged investment strategy. This study has important im?plications for the development of theory and practice of political connections and venture capital.
引文
[1]HAMBRICK D C,MASON P A.Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[2]戴维奇,魏江,余纯国.过往绩效与公司风险投资:高管政治网络的调节效应[J].科研管理,2012,33(1):138-146.
[3]GUPTA A K,SAPIENZA H J.Determinants of venture capital firms’preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1992,7(5):347-362.
[4]PATZELT H,KNYPHAUSEN D Z,FISCHER H T.Upper echelons and portfolio strategies of venture capital firms[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2009,24(6):558-572.
[5]CLERCQ D D,DIMOV D.Explaining venture capital firms’syndication behaviour:A longitudinal study[J].Venture Capital,2004,6(4):243-256.
[6]MA D.Power source mismatch and the effectiveness of interorganizational relations:the case of venture capital syndication.[J].Academy of Management Journal,2012,56(3):711-734.
[7]GU Q,LU X.Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation:A study of venture capital syndication in China[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(5):739-750.
[8]TIAN X.The causes and consequences of venture capital stage financing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,101(1):132-159.
[9]HEGE U.Determinants of Venture Capital Performance:Europe and the United States[J].2006,56(1):33-56.
[10]李严,罗国锋,马世美.风险投资机构人力资本与投资策略的实证研究[J].管理科学,2012,25(3):45-55.
[11]吴翠凤,吴世农,刘威.风险投资介入创业企业偏好及其方式研究--基于中国创业板上市公司的经验数据[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(5):151-160.
[12]董静,汪立,吴友.地理距离与风险投资策略选择--兼论市场环境与机构特质的调节作用[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(2):4-16.
[13]DAS S R,JO H,KIM Y.Polishing diamonds in the rough:The sources of syndicated venture performance[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2011,20(2):199-230.
[14]李严,庄新田,罗国锋,等.风险投资策略与投资绩效--基于中国风险投资机构的实证研究[J].投资研究,2012(11):88-100.
[15]SAHLMAN,WILLIAM A.Aspects of financial contracting in venture capital[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2010,1(2):23-36.
[16]WRIGHT M,LOCKETT A.The Structure and Management of Alliances:Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry[J].Journal of Management Studies,2003,40(8):2073-2102.
[17]HARKINS S G,PETTY R E.Effects of Task Difficulty and Task Uniqueness on Social Loafing[J].Journal of Personality&Social Psychology,1982,43(6):1214-1229.
[18]BOTTAZZI L,RIN M D,HELLMANN T.Who are the active investors?:Evidence from venture capital[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,89(3):488-512.
[19]郑君君,赵贵玉,范文涛.投资辛迪加与融资市场中的道德风险[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,28(11):23-28.
[20]MEULEMAN M,WRIGHT M,MANIGART S,et al.Private Equity Syndication:Agency Costs,Reputation and Collaboration[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2009,36(5/6):616-644.
[21]SORENSON O,STUART T.Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Financing[J].American Journal of Sociology,2001,106(6):1546-1588.
[22]FACCIO M,MASULIS R,MCCONNELL J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[23]FACCIO M.Differences between politically connected and non-connected firms:a cross country analysis[J].Financial Management,2010,39(3):905-928.
[24]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009(3):134-142.
[25]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010(3):65-77.
[26]TAHOUN A.The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2014,111(1):86-110.
[27]SUN P,MELLAHI K,WRIGHT M.The contingent value of corporate political ties[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2012,26(3):68-82.
[28]ZHENG W,KULWANT S,WILL M.Buffering and enabling:The impact of interlocking political ties on firm survival and sales growth[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(11):1615-1636.
[29]于蔚,汪淼军,金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012(9):125-139.
[30]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[31]JENSEN M C,MICHAEL C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[32]张学勇,廖理.风险投资背景与公司IPO:市场表现与内在机理[J].经济研究,2011(6):118-132.
[33]FULLER D B.How law,politics and transnational networks affect technology entrepreneurship:Explaining divergent venture capital investing strategies in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2010,27(3):445-459.
[34]王会娟,张然.私募股权投资与被投资企业高管薪酬契约--基于公司治理视角的研究[J].管理世界,2012(9):156-167.
[35]BRANDER J A,DU Q,HELLAMNN T.The Effects of Government-Sponsored Venture Capital:International Evidence[J].Review of Finance,2010,19(2):571-618.
[36]GOMPERS P,KOVNER A,LERNER J,et al.Venture capital investment cycles:The impact of public markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(1):1-23.
[37]BARRY C B,MUSCARELLA C J,III J W P,et al.The role of venture capital in the creation of public companies:Evidence from the going-public process[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):447-471.
[38]沈维涛,叶小杰,徐伟.风险投资在企业IPO中存在择时行为吗--基于我国中小板和创业板的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(2):133-142.
[39]冯慧群.风险投资是民营企业IPO的“救星”吗[J].财贸经济,2016,37(8):66-80.
[40]周萍,蔺楠.创业导向企业的成长性:激励型与监督型公司治理的作用--基于中国创业板上市公司的实证研究[J].经济管理,2015(3):44-55.
[41]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,等.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012(1):105-119.
[42]MASON C.Determinants of long-distance investing by business angels in the UK[J].Entrepreneurship&Regional Development,2010,22(2):113-137.
[43]CHAHINE S,FILATOTCHEV I.The effects of venture capitalist affiliation to underwriters on short-and long-term performance in French IPOs[J].Global Finance Journal,2008,18(3):351-372.
(1)如果创业企业有两家或两家以上的风险投资机构共同介入,则以主导风险投资机构特质为标准。关于主导风险投资机构的判定,借鉴董静等(2017)的方法。首先,若只有一家风险投资机构投资的样本,则该机构即为主导机构;然后,对于联合投资的样本,以股权占比最大的机构为主导机构;最后,如果有多家风险投资机构股权占比相等,则认定拥有较高投资经验的机构为主导机构。
(2)根据Cohen(1978)、Covin等(2006)以及Wiklund和Shepherd(2009)的研究,当加入交互项后会对主效应的系数造成干扰,因此研究中应仅仅使用主效应模型去证实主效应假设。
[2]戴维奇,魏江,余纯国.过往绩效与公司风险投资:高管政治网络的调节效应[J].科研管理,2012,33(1):138-146.
[3]GUPTA A K,SAPIENZA H J.Determinants of venture capital firms’preferences regarding the industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1992,7(5):347-362.
[4]PATZELT H,KNYPHAUSEN D Z,FISCHER H T.Upper echelons and portfolio strategies of venture capital firms[J].Journal of Business Venturing,2009,24(6):558-572.
[5]CLERCQ D D,DIMOV D.Explaining venture capital firms’syndication behaviour:A longitudinal study[J].Venture Capital,2004,6(4):243-256.
[6]MA D.Power source mismatch and the effectiveness of interorganizational relations:the case of venture capital syndication.[J].Academy of Management Journal,2012,56(3):711-734.
[7]GU Q,LU X.Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation:A study of venture capital syndication in China[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(5):739-750.
[8]TIAN X.The causes and consequences of venture capital stage financing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,101(1):132-159.
[9]HEGE U.Determinants of Venture Capital Performance:Europe and the United States[J].2006,56(1):33-56.
[10]李严,罗国锋,马世美.风险投资机构人力资本与投资策略的实证研究[J].管理科学,2012,25(3):45-55.
[11]吴翠凤,吴世农,刘威.风险投资介入创业企业偏好及其方式研究--基于中国创业板上市公司的经验数据[J].南开管理评论,2014,17(5):151-160.
[12]董静,汪立,吴友.地理距离与风险投资策略选择--兼论市场环境与机构特质的调节作用[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(2):4-16.
[13]DAS S R,JO H,KIM Y.Polishing diamonds in the rough:The sources of syndicated venture performance[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2011,20(2):199-230.
[14]李严,庄新田,罗国锋,等.风险投资策略与投资绩效--基于中国风险投资机构的实证研究[J].投资研究,2012(11):88-100.
[15]SAHLMAN,WILLIAM A.Aspects of financial contracting in venture capital[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,2010,1(2):23-36.
[16]WRIGHT M,LOCKETT A.The Structure and Management of Alliances:Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry[J].Journal of Management Studies,2003,40(8):2073-2102.
[17]HARKINS S G,PETTY R E.Effects of Task Difficulty and Task Uniqueness on Social Loafing[J].Journal of Personality&Social Psychology,1982,43(6):1214-1229.
[18]BOTTAZZI L,RIN M D,HELLMANN T.Who are the active investors?:Evidence from venture capital[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,89(3):488-512.
[19]郑君君,赵贵玉,范文涛.投资辛迪加与融资市场中的道德风险[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,28(11):23-28.
[20]MEULEMAN M,WRIGHT M,MANIGART S,et al.Private Equity Syndication:Agency Costs,Reputation and Collaboration[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2009,36(5/6):616-644.
[21]SORENSON O,STUART T.Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Financing[J].American Journal of Sociology,2001,106(6):1546-1588.
[22]FACCIO M,MASULIS R,MCCONNELL J.Political connections and corporate bailouts[J].Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[23]FACCIO M.Differences between politically connected and non-connected firms:a cross country analysis[J].Financial Management,2010,39(3):905-928.
[24]吴文锋,吴冲锋,芮萌.中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J].管理世界,2009(3):134-142.
[25]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].经济研究,2010(3):65-77.
[26]TAHOUN A.The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2014,111(1):86-110.
[27]SUN P,MELLAHI K,WRIGHT M.The contingent value of corporate political ties[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2012,26(3):68-82.
[28]ZHENG W,KULWANT S,WILL M.Buffering and enabling:The impact of interlocking political ties on firm survival and sales growth[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(11):1615-1636.
[29]于蔚,汪淼军,金祥荣.政治关联和融资约束:信息效应与资源效应[J].经济研究,2012(9):125-139.
[30]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[31]JENSEN M C,MICHAEL C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[32]张学勇,廖理.风险投资背景与公司IPO:市场表现与内在机理[J].经济研究,2011(6):118-132.
[33]FULLER D B.How law,politics and transnational networks affect technology entrepreneurship:Explaining divergent venture capital investing strategies in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2010,27(3):445-459.
[34]王会娟,张然.私募股权投资与被投资企业高管薪酬契约--基于公司治理视角的研究[J].管理世界,2012(9):156-167.
[35]BRANDER J A,DU Q,HELLAMNN T.The Effects of Government-Sponsored Venture Capital:International Evidence[J].Review of Finance,2010,19(2):571-618.
[36]GOMPERS P,KOVNER A,LERNER J,et al.Venture capital investment cycles:The impact of public markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(1):1-23.
[37]BARRY C B,MUSCARELLA C J,III J W P,et al.The role of venture capital in the creation of public companies:Evidence from the going-public process[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):447-471.
[38]沈维涛,叶小杰,徐伟.风险投资在企业IPO中存在择时行为吗--基于我国中小板和创业板的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(2):133-142.
[39]冯慧群.风险投资是民营企业IPO的“救星”吗[J].财贸经济,2016,37(8):66-80.
[40]周萍,蔺楠.创业导向企业的成长性:激励型与监督型公司治理的作用--基于中国创业板上市公司的实证研究[J].经济管理,2015(3):44-55.
[41]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,等.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012(1):105-119.
[42]MASON C.Determinants of long-distance investing by business angels in the UK[J].Entrepreneurship&Regional Development,2010,22(2):113-137.
[43]CHAHINE S,FILATOTCHEV I.The effects of venture capitalist affiliation to underwriters on short-and long-term performance in French IPOs[J].Global Finance Journal,2008,18(3):351-372.
(1)如果创业企业有两家或两家以上的风险投资机构共同介入,则以主导风险投资机构特质为标准。关于主导风险投资机构的判定,借鉴董静等(2017)的方法。首先,若只有一家风险投资机构投资的样本,则该机构即为主导机构;然后,对于联合投资的样本,以股权占比最大的机构为主导机构;最后,如果有多家风险投资机构股权占比相等,则认定拥有较高投资经验的机构为主导机构。
(2)根据Cohen(1978)、Covin等(2006)以及Wiklund和Shepherd(2009)的研究,当加入交互项后会对主效应的系数造成干扰,因此研究中应仅仅使用主效应模型去证实主效应假设。