高管团队异质性、CEO权力与企业成本粘性的实证分析
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摘要
企业成本粘性正成为实证会计领域一个重要关注的话题,过高的企业成本粘性不利于企业价值极大化。以我国上市公司为样本,对高管特质、CEO权力与成本粘性间的关系进行实证分析。研究发现:团队年龄异质性、教育水平异质性、任期异质性会显著增加企业成本,但专业背景异质性有利于降低企业成本;在考虑CEO权力后,CEO权力的扩大有利于协调高管团队意见,降低成本;其在与高管特质四大因素交互后,团队年龄异质性、教育水平异质性、任期异质性、专业背景异质性受到了削弱或强化。要降低企业的成本粘性,应多注意团队成员的年龄差异、高管的受教育水平、任期以及团队的专业背景;同时也要重视对CEO的赋权,除重视与考察其个人履历与能力外,还应通过契约的方式赋予其管理企业更合适的权力。
Cost stickiness is an important research topic in the field of management accounting,and too high cost stickiness is not good for enterprise to realize profit maximization.This paper takes Chinese listed companies as samples,analyzes the relationship between executive traits and cost stickiness.It also verifies whether the expansion of CEO rights reinforces or weakens the relationship between executive traits and cost stickiness.The empirical results show that team age heterogeneity,education level heterogeneity,tenure heterogeneity will significantly increase the cost of the company,but differences in professional background help to reduce costs.After considering the powers of CEO,the expansion of CEO really helps to coordinate executive team opinion and cut the cost.After interacting with the top four factors,team age heterogeneity,education level heterogeneity,tenure heterogeneity,professional background heterogeneity have been weakened or strengthened.From a policy perspective,to reduce cost stickiness,we need pay more attention to the age of the team members,the education level of the senior executive,the tenure and the professional background of the team.We should also attach importance to the empowerment of CEO.In the selection of CEO,we should attach importance to and examine their personal experience and ability at the same time,to give them more appropriate powers to manage the business by way of a contract.
Cost stickiness is an important research topic in the field of management accounting,and too high cost stickiness is not good for enterprise to realize profit maximization.This paper takes Chinese listed companies as samples,analyzes the relationship between executive traits and cost stickiness.It also verifies whether the expansion of CEO rights reinforces or weakens the relationship between executive traits and cost stickiness.The empirical results show that team age heterogeneity,education level heterogeneity,tenure heterogeneity will significantly increase the cost of the company,but differences in professional background help to reduce costs.After considering the powers of CEO,the expansion of CEO really helps to coordinate executive team opinion and cut the cost.After interacting with the top four factors,team age heterogeneity,education level heterogeneity,tenure heterogeneity,professional background heterogeneity have been weakened or strengthened.From a policy perspective,to reduce cost stickiness,we need pay more attention to the age of the team members,the education level of the senior executive,the tenure and the professional background of the team.We should also attach importance to the empowerment of CEO.In the selection of CEO,we should attach importance to and examine their personal experience and ability at the same time,to give them more appropriate powers to manage the business by way of a contract.
引文
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[11]周晓惠,田蒙蒙,聂浩然.高管团队异质性、盈余管理与企业绩效[J].南京审计大学学报,2017(3):75-85.
[12]Finkelsteins S.Power in top management teams:dimensions,measurement,and validation[J].The Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[13]Malletto P,Fowler K L.Effects of board composition andstock ownership on the adoption of“poison pills”[J].Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(5):1010-1035.
[14]Galbraith J R.Organization design.[M].Boston:Addison Wesley Publishing Company,1977:598-618.
[15]Mullins W A,Schoar. How do CEO see their role? management philosophies and styles in family and non family firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2016,119(3):24-43.
[16]权小锋,吴世农.CEO权力强度、信息披露质量与公司业绩的波动性——基于深交所上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2010(4):142-153.
[17]陈国辉,伊闽南.CEO权力强度、内部控制与创业板上市公司盈利预测质量[J].审计与经济研究,2018(5):46-54.
[18]饶育蕾,王建新.CEO过度自信、董事会结构与公司业绩的实证研究[J].管理科学,2010(5):2-13.
[19]胡明霞,干胜道.生命周期效应、CEO权力与内部控制质量——基于家族上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2018(3):64-70.
[20]Banker R H,Johnston. An empirical study of cost drivers in the U. S.Airliner Industry[J].Accounting Review,1993,68(5):576-601.
[21]周虹,李端生.高管团队异质性、CEO权力与企业内部控制质量[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(6):83-95.
[2]Dierynck B,Landsman W R,Renders A.Do managerial incentives drive cost behavior?evidence about the role of the zero earnings benchmark for labor cost behavior in belgian private firms[J].The Accounting Review,2012,87(3):1219-1246.
[3]孙铮,刘浩.中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究[J].经济研究,2004(12):26-34.
[4]洪昀,隋晓敏.融资融券能抑制企业费用粘性吗——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2019(1):105-110.
[5]Hambrick D C,Masion P A.Upper echelons:the organization as a reflection of its top managers[J].The Academy of Management Reviews, 1984,9(2):193-206.
[6]Auh S,Menguc B.Balancing exploration and exploitation:the moderating role of competitive intensity[J].Journal of Business Research,2005,58(12):1652-1661.
[7]Jiang J,Wu W,Chiang C.Interrelationships between TMT management styles and organizational innovation[J].Industrial Management and Data Systems,2002,102(3):171-183.
[8]Smith W K,Tushman M L.Managing strategic contradictions:A top management model for managing innovation streams[J].Organization Science,2005,16(5):522-536.
[9]孙海法,姚振华,严茂胜.高管团队人口统计特征对纺织和信息技术公司经营绩效的影响[J].南开管理评论,2006(6):61-67.
[10]周业安,程栩,郭杰.高管背景特征与资本结构动态调整——国际比较与中国经验[J].经济理论与经济管理,2012(12):35-42.
[11]周晓惠,田蒙蒙,聂浩然.高管团队异质性、盈余管理与企业绩效[J].南京审计大学学报,2017(3):75-85.
[12]Finkelsteins S.Power in top management teams:dimensions,measurement,and validation[J].The Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[13]Malletto P,Fowler K L.Effects of board composition andstock ownership on the adoption of“poison pills”[J].Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(5):1010-1035.
[14]Galbraith J R.Organization design.[M].Boston:Addison Wesley Publishing Company,1977:598-618.
[15]Mullins W A,Schoar. How do CEO see their role? management philosophies and styles in family and non family firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2016,119(3):24-43.
[16]权小锋,吴世农.CEO权力强度、信息披露质量与公司业绩的波动性——基于深交所上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2010(4):142-153.
[17]陈国辉,伊闽南.CEO权力强度、内部控制与创业板上市公司盈利预测质量[J].审计与经济研究,2018(5):46-54.
[18]饶育蕾,王建新.CEO过度自信、董事会结构与公司业绩的实证研究[J].管理科学,2010(5):2-13.
[19]胡明霞,干胜道.生命周期效应、CEO权力与内部控制质量——基于家族上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2018(3):64-70.
[20]Banker R H,Johnston. An empirical study of cost drivers in the U. S.Airliner Industry[J].Accounting Review,1993,68(5):576-601.
[21]周虹,李端生.高管团队异质性、CEO权力与企业内部控制质量[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(6):83-95.