投资者—国家争端解决机制的革新与国家的“回归”
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摘要
国家的"离开"是各国解决国际投资争端的基本特点,表现为程序方面投资者—国家仲裁逐渐取代了传统的外交保护,实体待遇方面某些条款的模糊性将国家缔约权让与了私人主导的投资仲裁庭。在构建投资者—国家仲裁机制时,理论上认为该机制的唯一功能在于解决争端,但据此构建的制度框架无法匹配国际司法机关的多重功能。仲裁造法、裁决不一致以及限制国家管制权等现象日益突出,使得各国普遍质疑现行投资者—国家仲裁机制的妥当性。欧盟拟创设的投资法院体系模式代表了国际投资争端解决的新趋势,体现了国家在投资争端解决程序和实体待遇方面正在寻求"回归"。认识国际司法机关的多功能性、承认国际司法机关的司法造法可能性,并且利用缔约方的政治立法权限制国际司法机关的司法造法,有助于构建更适当的国际投资争端解决机制。
The departure of states works as a basic feature for international investment dispute settlement among states,which manifests that ISDS is in place of traditional diplomatic protection on procedural side and private-controlled investment tribunal acquires the treaty-making power owned by contracting states previously as a result of vagueness of investment treaty clauses.In the process of building-up of ISDS mechanism,uni-functional orientation for dispute settlement and ensuing institutional framework are unable to match the reality which international courts behave multi-functionally.Arbitral law-making,inconsistent awards and imposed limits to state power come to the front,which present chances for stakeholders to challenge current ISDS,especially about its legitimacy and legality.Investment Court System pattern initiated by EU signifies a new tendency relating to investment dispute settlement,which indicates states are seeking for return to investment dispute settlement procedure and the drawing up of more restrictivesubstantive treatments offered to investors.Knowing the multi-functionality behaved by international courts,acknowledging arbitral law-making possibility and setting up limits to arbitral lawmaking through contracting parties'political-legislative law-making are beneficial to structure a more suitable mechanism for investment dispute settlement.
The departure of states works as a basic feature for international investment dispute settlement among states,which manifests that ISDS is in place of traditional diplomatic protection on procedural side and private-controlled investment tribunal acquires the treaty-making power owned by contracting states previously as a result of vagueness of investment treaty clauses.In the process of building-up of ISDS mechanism,uni-functional orientation for dispute settlement and ensuing institutional framework are unable to match the reality which international courts behave multi-functionally.Arbitral law-making,inconsistent awards and imposed limits to state power come to the front,which present chances for stakeholders to challenge current ISDS,especially about its legitimacy and legality.Investment Court System pattern initiated by EU signifies a new tendency relating to investment dispute settlement,which indicates states are seeking for return to investment dispute settlement procedure and the drawing up of more restrictivesubstantive treatments offered to investors.Knowing the multi-functionality behaved by international courts,acknowledging arbitral law-making possibility and setting up limits to arbitral lawmaking through contracting parties'political-legislative law-making are beneficial to structure a more suitable mechanism for investment dispute settlement.
引文
(1)See Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen,Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy:The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015),pp.6-7.
(2)有学者认为投资者-国家仲裁并不是现代投资条约的创新,只不过是在投资条约化时代被具体化而已。See Jason Webb Yackee,“The First Investor-state Arbitration?The Suez Canal Dispute of 1864 and Some Reflections on the Historiography of International Investment Law”,in Stephan W.Schill,Christian J.Tams and Rainer Hofmann(eds.),International Investment Law and History(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2018),pp.70-101.
(3)See Aikaterini Titi,The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law(Baden-Baden:Beck/Hart,2014),pp.123-188.
(4)See Barton Legum,“Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment Disputes”,in Karl P Sauvant(ed.),Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),pp.231-239.
(1)See Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé(eds.),Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy(United Kingdom:Cambridge University Press,2013),pp.389-456;also see Katharina Diel-Gligor,Towards Consistency in International Investment Jurisprudence:A Preliminary Ruling System for ICSID Arbitration(Leiden:Brill-Nijhoff,2017),pp.333-451.
(2)See Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo(eds.),The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration(Leiden:BrillNijhoff,2014),pp.241-349.
(3)See Jean E.Kalicki and Anna Joubin-bret(eds.),Reshaping the Investor-state Dispute Settlement System:Journeys for the 21st Century(Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff,2015),pp.569-889.
(4)具体包括从投资程序方面、实体待遇方面以及投资政策与趋势方面构建国家重新控制投资条约体系的建议,参见Andreas Kulick,“Reassertion of Control:An Introduction”,in Andreas Kulick(ed.),Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2017),pp.3-29。
(5)See Pia Eberhardt&Cecilia Olivet,Profiting from Injustice:How Law Firms,Arbitrators and Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom(Brussels/Amsterdam:Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute,2012),pp.36-50.
(6)国家在实体待遇方面的“回归”主要表现为国际投资协定逐渐从第一代条约转向第二代条约。表现形式为通过采取详细定义加附件方式,制定投资实体待遇条款和限制相关条款适用范围,限制仲裁庭的自由裁量权。本文重在研究国家“回归”争端解决程序。
(7)See Berk Demirkol,Judicial Acts and Investment Treaty Arbitration(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.7-12.
(1)See Wolfgang Friedmann,The Changing Structure of International Law(London:Stevens&Sons,1964),pp.60-62.
(2)法律化方法并不能够解决所有的国家间争端,甚至有可能恶化争端,典型者如国际法院处理的美国与尼加拉瓜案件,最终导致美国撤销了依据《国际法院规约》第36(2)条作出的任择管辖声明。参见Wade Mansell and Karen Openshaw,International Law:A Critical Introduction(Oxford/Portland,Hart Publishing,2013),p.12。
(3)See Emmerich De Vattel,The Law of Nations(Indianapolis:Liberty Fund,Inc.,2008),p.298.
(4)See HerschL auterpacht(ed.),Oppenheim's International Law,vol.I(London:Longman,8th,1955),pp.686-687.
(5)See Mavrommatis Case(Greece v.U.K.),PCIJ Series A,No.2,1924,p.12.
(6)Art.1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries,ILC 2006,UN Doc.A/61/10,p.29.
(7)有学者认为,外交保护学说同时包括母国襄助本国国民和本国国民遵守国际最低行为标准两个方面。国民请求母国进行外交保护时,必须无过错(clean hand)。但经过西方国际法学者的刻意选择后,外交保护学说强调母国保护,漠视本国国民遵守国际最低行为标准。See Muin Boase,“A Genealogy of Censurable Conduct:Antecedents for an International Minimum Standard of Investor Conduct”,in Stephan W.Schill,Christian J.Tams and Rainer Hofmann(eds.),International Investment Law and History(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2018),pp.321-366.
(8)Andreas Kulick,“Narrating Narratives of International Investment Law:History and Epistemic Forces”,in Stephan W.Schill,Christian J.Tams and Rainer Hofmann(eds.),International Investment Law and History(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2018),pp.54-55.
(9)现代观点认为母国主张具有双重属性,同时代表受损国民个人和母国利益。受损国民将法律申诉权转移给母国行使,但仍然保留裁决收益(award proceeds)的经济利益请求权。See Jose Daniel Amado and Jackson Shaw Kern,Arbitrating the Conduct of International Investors(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.45-47.
(10)See Stephan Hobe,“The Law Relating to Alien,the International Minimum Standard and State Responsibility”,in Marc Bungenberg,Jorn Griebel,Stephan Hobe and August Reinisch(eds.),International Investment Law:A Handbook(BadenBaden/Munchen/Oxford/Portland:Beck/Hart,2015),pp.7-13;August Reinisch and Loretta Malintoppi,“Methods of Dispute Resolution”,in Peter Muchlinski,Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer(eds.),The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),pp.712-714.
(1)See Ibrahim F.I.Shihata,“Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:The Roles of ICSID and MIGA”,(1986)1(1)ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 1,pp.1-25.
(2)See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer,Principles of International Investment Law(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2nd,2012),p.4.
(3)该条约第11条规定了临时的国家-国家仲裁程序和国际法院程序,没有规定投资者-国家仲裁程序。第一个规定无条件的投资者-国家仲裁程序的为意大利-乍得双边投资条约(1969)。See Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell,Law and Practice of Investment Treaties:Standards of Treatment(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2009),pp.44-45.
(4)See Farouk El-Hosseny,Civil Society in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Status and Prospects(Leiden:Koninklijke Brill,2017),p.295;also see Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen,Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy:The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015),p.xiii.
(5)See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer,Principles of International Investment Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),p.20.
(6)关于《华盛顿公约》缔结详情,参见Antonio R.Parra,The History of ICSID(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2012),pp.1-117。
(7)有学者认为美国FCNs其实就是最早的投资保护的双边条约,参见Kenneth J.Vandevelde,The First Bilateral Investment Treaties:U.S.Postwar Friendship,Commerce,and Navigation Treaties(New York:Oxford University Press,2017),pp.27-28。
(8)有学者认为当前的国际投资条约体制实际上是一种多边体制或双边基础之上的多边体制,参见Stephan W.Schill,The Multilateralization of International Investment Law(New York:Cambridge University Press,2009),pp.65-117。
(9)See Berk Demirkol,Judicial Acts and Investment Treaty Arbitration(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.1-2.
(1)See Kate Miles,The Origins of International Investment Law:Empire,Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013),pp.33-42.
(2)See Joanna Jmielniak,Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen,“Introduction”,in Joanna Jmielniak,Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen(eds.),Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law(New York:Cambridge University Press,2016),p.1.
(3)See Valentina Vadi,Analogies in International Investment Law and Arbitration(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2016),p.63.
(4)See Anne K.Hoffmann,“Counterclaims”,in Meg Kinnear,Geraldine Fischer and Jara Minguez Almeida(eds.),Building International Investment Law.The First 50 Years of ICSID(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2016),pp.505-520.
(5)See H.H.A.Van Harten,Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2007),pp.50-58;also see Eric De Brabandere,Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law:Procedural Aspects and Implications(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2016),pp.17-21;Zachary Douglas,“The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration”,(2003)74 BritishY earbook of International Law 151,pp.151-155.
(6)See Jonathan Bonnitcha,Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel,The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime(New York:Oxford University Press,2017),pp.62-65.
(1)See Sergio Puig,“Social Capital in the Arbitration Market”,(2014)25(2)The European Journal of International Law 387,p.388.
(2)See Mary Ellen O'Connell,The Power and Purpose of International Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),pp.40-42.
(3)See Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy(New York:Columbia University Press,2nd,1979),p.47
(4)See Andrew T.Guzman,How International Law Works:A Rational Choice Theory(New York:Oxford University Press,2010),pp.33-48.
(5)See Jose Daniel Amado and Jackson Shaw Kern,Arbitrating the Conduct of International Investors(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),p.162.
(6)See Luke Peterson and Filip Balcerzak,“Amidst Concerns about Prompt Payment of Arbitral Awards,Stays of Enforcement Are Lifted in Two ICSID Cases”,Investment Arbitration Reporter(1 April,2014).
(7)See W.Kidane,The Culture of International Arbitration(New York:Oxford University Press,2017),p.285.
(1)See Campbell Mc Lachlan,Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger,International Investment Arbitration:Substantive Principles(New York:Oxford University Press,2007),p.45.
(2)在解决外国投资争端的初级阶段,投资者与东道国间争端常通过条约(比如“杰伊条约”)设立的临时委员会进行解决。19世纪至20世纪60年代,投资者和东道国间争端常依据双方间达成的合同中的同意仲裁条款组建的司法机关解决。See Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer,International Investment Law:Text,Cases and Materials(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2013),pp.369-370.
(3)See Jan Paulsson,“Arbitration Without Privity”,(1995)10 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 232,p.232.
(4)See ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited(United Kingdom)v.The Republic of Argentina,UNCITRAL,PCA Case No.2010-9,Jurisdiction(Feb.10,2012),para.270.
(5)See Andrea K.Bjorklund,“Contract Without Privity:Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance”,(2001)2 Chicago Journal of International Law 183,p.183.
(6)关于该理论以及优缺点的详细阐述,参见Frederic Gilles Sourgens,A Nascent Common Law:The Process of Decisionmaking in International Legal Disputes Between States and Foreign Investors(Leiden:Brill-Nijhoff,2015),pp.35-48。
(7)See Jan Paulsson,“Tipping Point”,in Meg Kinnear,Geraldine Fischer and Jara Minguez Almeida(eds.),Building International Investment Law:The First 50 Years of ICSID(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2016),pp.85-94.
(8)See Joost Pauwelyn,“Rational Design or Accidental Evolution?The Emergence of International Investment Law”,in Zachary Douglas,Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E.Vinuales,The Foundations of International Investment Law:Bringing Theory into Practice(New York:Oxford University Press,2014),pp,31-33.
(1)Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations,in Reports of the International Law Commission,58th session,May 1-June 9,July 3-Aug.11,2006,U.N.Doc.A/61/1;GAOR,61st Sess.,Supp.No.10(2006),p.1.
(2)关于国际法上单方行为的详细研究,参见Przemyslaw Saganek,Unilateral Acts of States in Public International Law(Leiden:Brill-Nijhoff,2015),pp.1-85。
(3)See Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet,Droit International Public(Paris:Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence,7th,2002),pp.361-364.
(4)See Michael D.Nolan&Frederic G.Sourgens,“A Preliminary Comment-The Interplay between State Consent to ICSIDArbitration and Denunciation of the ICSID Convention:The(Possible)Venezuela Case Study,”(2007)8 Transnational Dispute Management 1,pp.28-29.
(5)See Philippa Webb,Judicial Integration and Fragmentation in the International Legal System(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2013),p.150.
(1)See Jean d'Aspremont,Formalism and the Sources of International Law:A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules(New York:Oxford University Press,2013),pp.12-29.
(2)关于国际投资法渊源的介绍,参见Christian J.Tams,“The Sources of International Investment Law:Concluding Thoughts”,in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere,International Investment Law:The Sources of Rights and Obligations(Leiden:MartinusN ijhoff,2012),pp.319-331;Jean d'Aspremont and Samantha Besson(eds.),The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2018),pp.1069-1115。
(3)See Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin,The Making of International Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2007),p.268.
(4)关于条约和习惯法之间的联系与区别,参见See Robert Kolb,Theory of International Law(Oxford:Hart Publishing,2016),pp.124-134。
(5)See Jeffery P.Commission,“Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence”,(2007)24(2)Journal of International Arbitration 129,pp.129-158.
(6)See Philippa Webb,Judicial Integration and Fragmentation in the International Legal System(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2013),pp.197-198.
(1)See Meg Kinnear,“Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration”,in Katia Yannaca-Small(ed.),Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements:A Guide to the Key Issues(New York:Oxford University Press,2012),p.533.
(2)See Irmgard Marboe,Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2009),p.186.
(3)See Hans van Houtte and Bridie Mc Asey,“Future Damages in Investment Arbitration-A Tribunal with a Crystal Ball?”,in David D.Caron,Stephan W.Schill,Abby Cohen Smutny and Epaminontas E.Triantafilou(eds.),Practising Virtue:Inside International Arbitration(New York:Oxford University Press,2015),pp.642-657.
(4)See Susan D.Franck,“Review:The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment by JoséE.Alvarez”,(2012)106(4)The American Journal of International Law 890,p.894;also see Matthew Hodgson,“Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration”,(2014)9 Global Arbitration Review 1,p.5.
(5)See Diana Rosert,The Stakes Are High:A Review of the Financial Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration(Winnipeg:International Institute for Sustainable Development,2014),p.3.
(6)See Vattenfall AB and others v.Federal Republic of Germany,ICSID Case No.ARB/09/6,Request for Arbitration(30 Mar2009),p.24.
(7)See Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen,Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy:The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015),p.6.
(1)关于第三方资助的研究,感兴趣的读者可以进一步阅读以下材料。Jonas von Goeler,Third-Party Funding and its Impact on International Arbitration Proceedings(New York:Wolters Kluwer,2016);also see Lisa Bench Nieuwveld and Victoria Shannon Sahani,Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration(New York:Wolters Kluwer,2017).
(2)最新数据和详细清单参见:http://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/third-party-funders,最后访问时间:2018年4月12日。
(3)See Howard Mann,“Reconceptualizing International Investment Law:Its Role in Sustainable Development”,(2013)17(2)Lewis and Clark Law Review 521,p.534.
(4)关于美国国际投资协定的历史演进,参见Kenneth J Vandevelde,U.S.International Investment Agreements(New York:Oxford University Press,2009),pp.11-26。
(5)See JoséE.Alvarez,“The Return of the State”,(2011)20 Minnesota Journal of International Law 223,pp.223-264.
(6)See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,In Whose Name?:A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication(New York:Oxford University Press,2016),p.xliii.
(1)European Commission,Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement(CETA)(26 September,2014).
(2)Cecilia Malmstrom,Investments In TTIP and beyond-towards an International Investment Court(5 May,2015).
(3)See F.Baetens,“The European Union's Proposed Investment Court System:Addressing Criticisms of Investor-State Arbitration While Raising New Challenges”,(2016)43(4)Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367,pp.367-384.
(1)See EU Parliament,TTIP:Ease Access to Us Market,Protect EU Standards,Reform Dispute Settlement(8 July 2015).
(2)See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,In Whose Name?:A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication(New York:Oxford University Press,2016),p.li.
(1)See Jose Daniel Amado and Jackson Shaw Kern and Martin Doe Rodriguez,Arbitrating the Conduct of International Investors(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.1-2.
(2)See Michael Waibel,Asha Kaushal and Kyo-Hwa Chung(eds.),The Backlash against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and Reality(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2010),pp.xxxvii-li.
(3)See Anthea Roberts,“Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation:The Dual Role of States”,(2010)104American Journal of International Law 179,p.186.
(4)See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,In Whose Name?:A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication(New York:Oxford University Press,2016),pp.9-17.
(2)有学者认为投资者-国家仲裁并不是现代投资条约的创新,只不过是在投资条约化时代被具体化而已。See Jason Webb Yackee,“The First Investor-state Arbitration?The Suez Canal Dispute of 1864 and Some Reflections on the Historiography of International Investment Law”,in Stephan W.Schill,Christian J.Tams and Rainer Hofmann(eds.),International Investment Law and History(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2018),pp.70-101.
(3)See Aikaterini Titi,The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law(Baden-Baden:Beck/Hart,2014),pp.123-188.
(4)See Barton Legum,“Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment Disputes”,in Karl P Sauvant(ed.),Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),pp.231-239.
(1)See Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé(eds.),Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy(United Kingdom:Cambridge University Press,2013),pp.389-456;also see Katharina Diel-Gligor,Towards Consistency in International Investment Jurisprudence:A Preliminary Ruling System for ICSID Arbitration(Leiden:Brill-Nijhoff,2017),pp.333-451.
(2)See Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo(eds.),The Role of the State in Investor-State Arbitration(Leiden:BrillNijhoff,2014),pp.241-349.
(3)See Jean E.Kalicki and Anna Joubin-bret(eds.),Reshaping the Investor-state Dispute Settlement System:Journeys for the 21st Century(Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff,2015),pp.569-889.
(4)具体包括从投资程序方面、实体待遇方面以及投资政策与趋势方面构建国家重新控制投资条约体系的建议,参见Andreas Kulick,“Reassertion of Control:An Introduction”,in Andreas Kulick(ed.),Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2017),pp.3-29。
(5)See Pia Eberhardt&Cecilia Olivet,Profiting from Injustice:How Law Firms,Arbitrators and Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom(Brussels/Amsterdam:Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute,2012),pp.36-50.
(6)国家在实体待遇方面的“回归”主要表现为国际投资协定逐渐从第一代条约转向第二代条约。表现形式为通过采取详细定义加附件方式,制定投资实体待遇条款和限制相关条款适用范围,限制仲裁庭的自由裁量权。本文重在研究国家“回归”争端解决程序。
(7)See Berk Demirkol,Judicial Acts and Investment Treaty Arbitration(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.7-12.
(1)See Wolfgang Friedmann,The Changing Structure of International Law(London:Stevens&Sons,1964),pp.60-62.
(2)法律化方法并不能够解决所有的国家间争端,甚至有可能恶化争端,典型者如国际法院处理的美国与尼加拉瓜案件,最终导致美国撤销了依据《国际法院规约》第36(2)条作出的任择管辖声明。参见Wade Mansell and Karen Openshaw,International Law:A Critical Introduction(Oxford/Portland,Hart Publishing,2013),p.12。
(3)See Emmerich De Vattel,The Law of Nations(Indianapolis:Liberty Fund,Inc.,2008),p.298.
(4)See HerschL auterpacht(ed.),Oppenheim's International Law,vol.I(London:Longman,8th,1955),pp.686-687.
(5)See Mavrommatis Case(Greece v.U.K.),PCIJ Series A,No.2,1924,p.12.
(6)Art.1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries,ILC 2006,UN Doc.A/61/10,p.29.
(7)有学者认为,外交保护学说同时包括母国襄助本国国民和本国国民遵守国际最低行为标准两个方面。国民请求母国进行外交保护时,必须无过错(clean hand)。但经过西方国际法学者的刻意选择后,外交保护学说强调母国保护,漠视本国国民遵守国际最低行为标准。See Muin Boase,“A Genealogy of Censurable Conduct:Antecedents for an International Minimum Standard of Investor Conduct”,in Stephan W.Schill,Christian J.Tams and Rainer Hofmann(eds.),International Investment Law and History(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2018),pp.321-366.
(8)Andreas Kulick,“Narrating Narratives of International Investment Law:History and Epistemic Forces”,in Stephan W.Schill,Christian J.Tams and Rainer Hofmann(eds.),International Investment Law and History(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2018),pp.54-55.
(9)现代观点认为母国主张具有双重属性,同时代表受损国民个人和母国利益。受损国民将法律申诉权转移给母国行使,但仍然保留裁决收益(award proceeds)的经济利益请求权。See Jose Daniel Amado and Jackson Shaw Kern,Arbitrating the Conduct of International Investors(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.45-47.
(10)See Stephan Hobe,“The Law Relating to Alien,the International Minimum Standard and State Responsibility”,in Marc Bungenberg,Jorn Griebel,Stephan Hobe and August Reinisch(eds.),International Investment Law:A Handbook(BadenBaden/Munchen/Oxford/Portland:Beck/Hart,2015),pp.7-13;August Reinisch and Loretta Malintoppi,“Methods of Dispute Resolution”,in Peter Muchlinski,Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer(eds.),The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),pp.712-714.
(1)See Ibrahim F.I.Shihata,“Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:The Roles of ICSID and MIGA”,(1986)1(1)ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 1,pp.1-25.
(2)See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer,Principles of International Investment Law(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2nd,2012),p.4.
(3)该条约第11条规定了临时的国家-国家仲裁程序和国际法院程序,没有规定投资者-国家仲裁程序。第一个规定无条件的投资者-国家仲裁程序的为意大利-乍得双边投资条约(1969)。See Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell,Law and Practice of Investment Treaties:Standards of Treatment(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2009),pp.44-45.
(4)See Farouk El-Hosseny,Civil Society in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Status and Prospects(Leiden:Koninklijke Brill,2017),p.295;also see Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen,Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy:The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015),p.xiii.
(5)See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer,Principles of International Investment Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),p.20.
(6)关于《华盛顿公约》缔结详情,参见Antonio R.Parra,The History of ICSID(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2012),pp.1-117。
(7)有学者认为美国FCNs其实就是最早的投资保护的双边条约,参见Kenneth J.Vandevelde,The First Bilateral Investment Treaties:U.S.Postwar Friendship,Commerce,and Navigation Treaties(New York:Oxford University Press,2017),pp.27-28。
(8)有学者认为当前的国际投资条约体制实际上是一种多边体制或双边基础之上的多边体制,参见Stephan W.Schill,The Multilateralization of International Investment Law(New York:Cambridge University Press,2009),pp.65-117。
(9)See Berk Demirkol,Judicial Acts and Investment Treaty Arbitration(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.1-2.
(1)See Kate Miles,The Origins of International Investment Law:Empire,Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013),pp.33-42.
(2)See Joanna Jmielniak,Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen,“Introduction”,in Joanna Jmielniak,Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen(eds.),Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law(New York:Cambridge University Press,2016),p.1.
(3)See Valentina Vadi,Analogies in International Investment Law and Arbitration(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2016),p.63.
(4)See Anne K.Hoffmann,“Counterclaims”,in Meg Kinnear,Geraldine Fischer and Jara Minguez Almeida(eds.),Building International Investment Law.The First 50 Years of ICSID(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2016),pp.505-520.
(5)See H.H.A.Van Harten,Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2007),pp.50-58;also see Eric De Brabandere,Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law:Procedural Aspects and Implications(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2016),pp.17-21;Zachary Douglas,“The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration”,(2003)74 BritishY earbook of International Law 151,pp.151-155.
(6)See Jonathan Bonnitcha,Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel,The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime(New York:Oxford University Press,2017),pp.62-65.
(1)See Sergio Puig,“Social Capital in the Arbitration Market”,(2014)25(2)The European Journal of International Law 387,p.388.
(2)See Mary Ellen O'Connell,The Power and Purpose of International Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2008),pp.40-42.
(3)See Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave:Law and Foreign Policy(New York:Columbia University Press,2nd,1979),p.47
(4)See Andrew T.Guzman,How International Law Works:A Rational Choice Theory(New York:Oxford University Press,2010),pp.33-48.
(5)See Jose Daniel Amado and Jackson Shaw Kern,Arbitrating the Conduct of International Investors(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),p.162.
(6)See Luke Peterson and Filip Balcerzak,“Amidst Concerns about Prompt Payment of Arbitral Awards,Stays of Enforcement Are Lifted in Two ICSID Cases”,Investment Arbitration Reporter(1 April,2014).
(7)See W.Kidane,The Culture of International Arbitration(New York:Oxford University Press,2017),p.285.
(1)See Campbell Mc Lachlan,Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger,International Investment Arbitration:Substantive Principles(New York:Oxford University Press,2007),p.45.
(2)在解决外国投资争端的初级阶段,投资者与东道国间争端常通过条约(比如“杰伊条约”)设立的临时委员会进行解决。19世纪至20世纪60年代,投资者和东道国间争端常依据双方间达成的合同中的同意仲裁条款组建的司法机关解决。See Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer,International Investment Law:Text,Cases and Materials(Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2013),pp.369-370.
(3)See Jan Paulsson,“Arbitration Without Privity”,(1995)10 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 232,p.232.
(4)See ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited(United Kingdom)v.The Republic of Argentina,UNCITRAL,PCA Case No.2010-9,Jurisdiction(Feb.10,2012),para.270.
(5)See Andrea K.Bjorklund,“Contract Without Privity:Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance”,(2001)2 Chicago Journal of International Law 183,p.183.
(6)关于该理论以及优缺点的详细阐述,参见Frederic Gilles Sourgens,A Nascent Common Law:The Process of Decisionmaking in International Legal Disputes Between States and Foreign Investors(Leiden:Brill-Nijhoff,2015),pp.35-48。
(7)See Jan Paulsson,“Tipping Point”,in Meg Kinnear,Geraldine Fischer and Jara Minguez Almeida(eds.),Building International Investment Law:The First 50 Years of ICSID(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2016),pp.85-94.
(8)See Joost Pauwelyn,“Rational Design or Accidental Evolution?The Emergence of International Investment Law”,in Zachary Douglas,Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge E.Vinuales,The Foundations of International Investment Law:Bringing Theory into Practice(New York:Oxford University Press,2014),pp,31-33.
(1)Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations,in Reports of the International Law Commission,58th session,May 1-June 9,July 3-Aug.11,2006,U.N.Doc.A/61/1;GAOR,61st Sess.,Supp.No.10(2006),p.1.
(2)关于国际法上单方行为的详细研究,参见Przemyslaw Saganek,Unilateral Acts of States in Public International Law(Leiden:Brill-Nijhoff,2015),pp.1-85。
(3)See Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet,Droit International Public(Paris:Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence,7th,2002),pp.361-364.
(4)See Michael D.Nolan&Frederic G.Sourgens,“A Preliminary Comment-The Interplay between State Consent to ICSIDArbitration and Denunciation of the ICSID Convention:The(Possible)Venezuela Case Study,”(2007)8 Transnational Dispute Management 1,pp.28-29.
(5)See Philippa Webb,Judicial Integration and Fragmentation in the International Legal System(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2013),p.150.
(1)See Jean d'Aspremont,Formalism and the Sources of International Law:A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules(New York:Oxford University Press,2013),pp.12-29.
(2)关于国际投资法渊源的介绍,参见Christian J.Tams,“The Sources of International Investment Law:Concluding Thoughts”,in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere,International Investment Law:The Sources of Rights and Obligations(Leiden:MartinusN ijhoff,2012),pp.319-331;Jean d'Aspremont and Samantha Besson(eds.),The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2018),pp.1069-1115。
(3)See Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin,The Making of International Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2007),p.268.
(4)关于条约和习惯法之间的联系与区别,参见See Robert Kolb,Theory of International Law(Oxford:Hart Publishing,2016),pp.124-134。
(5)See Jeffery P.Commission,“Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence”,(2007)24(2)Journal of International Arbitration 129,pp.129-158.
(6)See Philippa Webb,Judicial Integration and Fragmentation in the International Legal System(Croydon:Oxford University Press,2013),pp.197-198.
(1)See Meg Kinnear,“Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration”,in Katia Yannaca-Small(ed.),Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements:A Guide to the Key Issues(New York:Oxford University Press,2012),p.533.
(2)See Irmgard Marboe,Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law(New York:Oxford University Press,2009),p.186.
(3)See Hans van Houtte and Bridie Mc Asey,“Future Damages in Investment Arbitration-A Tribunal with a Crystal Ball?”,in David D.Caron,Stephan W.Schill,Abby Cohen Smutny and Epaminontas E.Triantafilou(eds.),Practising Virtue:Inside International Arbitration(New York:Oxford University Press,2015),pp.642-657.
(4)See Susan D.Franck,“Review:The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment by JoséE.Alvarez”,(2012)106(4)The American Journal of International Law 890,p.894;also see Matthew Hodgson,“Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration”,(2014)9 Global Arbitration Review 1,p.5.
(5)See Diana Rosert,The Stakes Are High:A Review of the Financial Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration(Winnipeg:International Institute for Sustainable Development,2014),p.3.
(6)See Vattenfall AB and others v.Federal Republic of Germany,ICSID Case No.ARB/09/6,Request for Arbitration(30 Mar2009),p.24.
(7)See Lauge N.Skovgaard Poulsen,Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy:The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2015),p.6.
(1)关于第三方资助的研究,感兴趣的读者可以进一步阅读以下材料。Jonas von Goeler,Third-Party Funding and its Impact on International Arbitration Proceedings(New York:Wolters Kluwer,2016);also see Lisa Bench Nieuwveld and Victoria Shannon Sahani,Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration(New York:Wolters Kluwer,2017).
(2)最新数据和详细清单参见:http://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/third-party-funders,最后访问时间:2018年4月12日。
(3)See Howard Mann,“Reconceptualizing International Investment Law:Its Role in Sustainable Development”,(2013)17(2)Lewis and Clark Law Review 521,p.534.
(4)关于美国国际投资协定的历史演进,参见Kenneth J Vandevelde,U.S.International Investment Agreements(New York:Oxford University Press,2009),pp.11-26。
(5)See JoséE.Alvarez,“The Return of the State”,(2011)20 Minnesota Journal of International Law 223,pp.223-264.
(6)See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,In Whose Name?:A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication(New York:Oxford University Press,2016),p.xliii.
(1)European Commission,Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement(CETA)(26 September,2014).
(2)Cecilia Malmstrom,Investments In TTIP and beyond-towards an International Investment Court(5 May,2015).
(3)See F.Baetens,“The European Union's Proposed Investment Court System:Addressing Criticisms of Investor-State Arbitration While Raising New Challenges”,(2016)43(4)Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367,pp.367-384.
(1)See EU Parliament,TTIP:Ease Access to Us Market,Protect EU Standards,Reform Dispute Settlement(8 July 2015).
(2)See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,In Whose Name?:A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication(New York:Oxford University Press,2016),p.li.
(1)See Jose Daniel Amado and Jackson Shaw Kern and Martin Doe Rodriguez,Arbitrating the Conduct of International Investors(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2018),pp.1-2.
(2)See Michael Waibel,Asha Kaushal and Kyo-Hwa Chung(eds.),The Backlash against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and Reality(Alphen aan den Rijn:Kluwer Law International,2010),pp.xxxvii-li.
(3)See Anthea Roberts,“Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation:The Dual Role of States”,(2010)104American Journal of International Law 179,p.186.
(4)See Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke,In Whose Name?:A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication(New York:Oxford University Press,2016),pp.9-17.