我国P2P网贷平台生存状况影响因素研究——基于3842家P2P网贷平台数据的实证分析
|
摘要
近年来,我国P2P网贷平台在爆发式增长的同时"暴雷"不断,大量平台停业或倒闭的原因有待深入研究。基于网贷之家披露的3 842家P2P网贷平台数据的分析表明,平台实力、风控能力、业务模式及行业监管等方面的因素显著影响P2P网贷平台的生存状况:注册资本金不足、未披露实缴资本、注册城市等级低、无国资系背景、无上市/风投系背景、无资金银行存管、无第三方担保/垫付/保险、无抵(质)押物/风险准备金、有天标/1月标、不允许自动投标和债权转让、未加入监管协会、无ICP经营许可证的平台死亡风险较高且生存时间较短,其中无上市/风投系背景、无资金银行存管、未加入监管协会、无ICP经营许可证的平台生存状况更加严峻;不同因素对问题平台三种死亡状态的影响具有差异性,跑路风险最大的为无资金银行存管、无第三方担保/垫付/保险、无抵(质)押物/风险准备金、无ICP经营许可证的平台,提现困难风险最大的为无资金银行存管、无第三方担保/垫付/保险、有天标/1月标、不允许自动投标和债权转让、未加入监管协会的平台,而无国资系背景、未加入监管协会、无ICP经营许可证是导致平台停业事件发生的主要原因。
In recent years,while China's P2P online loan platforms are greatly increasing,a lot of the platforms are closing down,and the reason for frequently closing down of P2P loan platforms needs to be deeply studied. The analysis based on 3842 P2P online loan platforms disclosed by online loan home shows that platform strength,risk control capability,business model and industry regulation significantly affect the survival status of the P2P platforms. The death risk is high and survival time is short under the situations such as insufficient registered capital,undisclosed paid-in capital,low registered regional level,no state-owned background,no listing/wind investment background,no funds deposit,no third-party guarantee/advance/insurance,no( Quality) collateral/risk reserve,with day mark/1 month mark,no automatic bidding and transfer of creditor's rights,no participation in supervision association,platform without ICP business license,among which the platforms with no listing/wind investment background,no funds deposit,no participation in supervision association,and platform without ICP business license are more severe for survival. The influence of different factors on three kinds of death status of problem platforms is different. The most risk of running is no funds deposit,no third-party guarantee/advance/insurance,no( Quality) collateral/risk reserve,and the platform without ICP business license. The most difficult cashing platforms are those which have no funds deposit,no third-party guarantee/advance/insurance,with day mark/1 month mark,no automatic bidding and transfer of creditor ' s rights,and no participation in supervision association. The lack of state-owned background,non participation in industrial regulatory association,and no ICP license are the main reasons for the platforms to suspend business.
In recent years,while China's P2P online loan platforms are greatly increasing,a lot of the platforms are closing down,and the reason for frequently closing down of P2P loan platforms needs to be deeply studied. The analysis based on 3842 P2P online loan platforms disclosed by online loan home shows that platform strength,risk control capability,business model and industry regulation significantly affect the survival status of the P2P platforms. The death risk is high and survival time is short under the situations such as insufficient registered capital,undisclosed paid-in capital,low registered regional level,no state-owned background,no listing/wind investment background,no funds deposit,no third-party guarantee/advance/insurance,no( Quality) collateral/risk reserve,with day mark/1 month mark,no automatic bidding and transfer of creditor's rights,no participation in supervision association,platform without ICP business license,among which the platforms with no listing/wind investment background,no funds deposit,no participation in supervision association,and platform without ICP business license are more severe for survival. The influence of different factors on three kinds of death status of problem platforms is different. The most risk of running is no funds deposit,no third-party guarantee/advance/insurance,no( Quality) collateral/risk reserve,and the platform without ICP business license. The most difficult cashing platforms are those which have no funds deposit,no third-party guarantee/advance/insurance,with day mark/1 month mark,no automatic bidding and transfer of creditor ' s rights,and no participation in supervision association. The lack of state-owned background,non participation in industrial regulatory association,and no ICP license are the main reasons for the platforms to suspend business.
引文
[1]KLAFFT M.Peer to peer lending:Auctioning microcredits over the internet[M].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2008.
[2]FREEDMAN S,JIN G Z.Do social networks solve information problems for peer-to-peer lending?Evidence from Prosper.com[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,2008.
[3]POPE D G,SYDNOR J R.What's in a picture?Evidence of discrimination from Prosper.com[J].Journal of Human Resources,2011,46(1):53-92.
[4]IYER R,KHWAJA A I,LUTTMER E F P,et al.Screening in new credit markets:Can individual lenders infer borrower creditworthiness in peer-to-peer lending?[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,2009.15242.
[5]李悦雷,郭阳,张维.中国P2P小额贷款市场借贷成功率影响因素分析[J].金融研究,2013(7):126-138.
[6]郑迎飞,陈晓静.P2P网贷平台本息保障与投资者反应[J].金融论坛,2018,23(1):66-80.
[7]GAO.Person-to-person pending:New regulatory challenges could emerge as the industry grows[R].Government Accountability Office Reports,2011.
[8]ASHTA A,ASSADI D.Do social cause and social technology meet?Impact of Web 2.0 technologies on peer-to-peer lending transactions[M].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2008.
[9]李琪,王振.P2P网贷平台风险和标的风险的辨析[J].上海金融,2016(10):92-95.
[10]叶青,李增泉,徐伟航.P2P网络借贷平台的风险识别研究[J].会计研究,2016(6):38-45+95.
[11]王修华,孟路,欧阳辉.P2P网络借贷问题平台特征分析及投资者识别---来自222家平台的证据[J].财贸经济,2016(12):71-84.
[12]李先玲.资本充足、从业背景与平台倒闭---来自中国231个P2P网络借贷平台的证据[J].经济经纬,2016,33(6):137-142.
[13]吴庆田,罗璨,陈宜瑄.P2P网贷平台特征与平台运营的稳健性---基于中国1706家P2P网贷平台的证据[J].金融理论与实践,2018(4):62-70.
[14]曹晓路.金融消费者利益保护与P2P网络借贷监管博弈分析---兼评现行网络借贷监管办法[J].金融监管研究,2016(11):92-106.
[15]宫晓林.P2P网络借贷风险与监管---基于有限理性假说的分析[J].投资研究,2014,33(6):29-40.
[16]叶湘榕.P2P借贷的模式风险与监管研究[J].金融监管研究,2014(3):71-82.
[17]张海洋.信息披露监管与P2P借贷运营模式[J].经济学(季刊),2017,16(1):371-392.
[18]赵远.基于生存分析的上市公司财务风险预警研究[D].昆明:云南财经大学,2011.
[19]葛健康.基于Cox模型的我国P2P平台经营困境预警研究[D].杭州:浙江财经大学,2016.
[20]巴曙松,侯鑫彧,张帅.基于生存模型的P2P平台生存规律与政策模拟研究[J].当代财经,2018(1):44-56.
[21]魏鹏飞.P2P平台特质与投资者选择[J].中国流通经济,2016,30(12):92-99.
[22]郭海凤,陈霄.P2P网贷平台综合竞争力评价研究[J].金融论坛,2015,20(2):12-23.
[23]汪静,陈晓红,杨立.P2P网贷平台信息披露水平、投资人信任与投资风险[J].中国经济问题,2018(3):106-121.
(1)删失数据有左删失、右删失和区间删失三种类型。左删失指个体的起点信息缺失,右删失数据指个体的终点信息缺失,区间删失指个体的起点和终点信息都缺失。其中,右删失又分为I型和II型,I型删失指所有发生删失个体的观测结束时间相同,II型删失指所有发生删失个体的观测开始时间相同。
(1)Cox模型是由英国统计学家Cox(1972)年提出的一种半参数回归模型,该模型同时以生存时间和生存结局为因变量,研究多种因素对生存状况的影响,能有效利用删失数据的不完全信息,而且不需要设定生存时间的具体分布类型,适用于本文样本数据的分析。
(1)缺少第三方资金存管,无法将客户资金分离,平台易设资金池,恶意携款跑路的风险也较大;无第三方担保/垫付/保险和抵(质)押物/风险准备金的平台,对高额坏账风险无法把控,信用度较低,易发生跑路事件;无ICP经营许可证的平台缺少备案监管,不具备合规平台资质,易发生跑路事件。
(2)无资金银行存管意味着平台易私设资金池,易发生挪用资金和不合理投资行为,进而导致资金链断裂,发生提现困难事件;无第三方担保/垫付/保险的平台经营风险较大,一旦发生高额坏账将导致资金周转困难,发生提现困难事件;有天标/1月标会加剧平台期限错配和流动性风险,从而导致现金流不足、资金链断裂,造成提现困难;不允许自动投标和债权转让会增加资金站岗时间,降低资金使用效率和流动性,经过授权的自动投标及低频次的合规逐笔转让可以有效降低提现困难风险;未加入监管协会的平台受外部监管较少,容易发生不合规行为并导致提现困难事件。
(1)缺乏强有力背景支持的平台,股东投资意愿不强,投入不足,加上监管趋严和市场竞争加剧,未加入监管协会和没有ICP许可证的平台生存艰难,不得不选择停业退出或进行战略转型。
[2]FREEDMAN S,JIN G Z.Do social networks solve information problems for peer-to-peer lending?Evidence from Prosper.com[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,2008.
[3]POPE D G,SYDNOR J R.What's in a picture?Evidence of discrimination from Prosper.com[J].Journal of Human Resources,2011,46(1):53-92.
[4]IYER R,KHWAJA A I,LUTTMER E F P,et al.Screening in new credit markets:Can individual lenders infer borrower creditworthiness in peer-to-peer lending?[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,2009.15242.
[5]李悦雷,郭阳,张维.中国P2P小额贷款市场借贷成功率影响因素分析[J].金融研究,2013(7):126-138.
[6]郑迎飞,陈晓静.P2P网贷平台本息保障与投资者反应[J].金融论坛,2018,23(1):66-80.
[7]GAO.Person-to-person pending:New regulatory challenges could emerge as the industry grows[R].Government Accountability Office Reports,2011.
[8]ASHTA A,ASSADI D.Do social cause and social technology meet?Impact of Web 2.0 technologies on peer-to-peer lending transactions[M].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2008.
[9]李琪,王振.P2P网贷平台风险和标的风险的辨析[J].上海金融,2016(10):92-95.
[10]叶青,李增泉,徐伟航.P2P网络借贷平台的风险识别研究[J].会计研究,2016(6):38-45+95.
[11]王修华,孟路,欧阳辉.P2P网络借贷问题平台特征分析及投资者识别---来自222家平台的证据[J].财贸经济,2016(12):71-84.
[12]李先玲.资本充足、从业背景与平台倒闭---来自中国231个P2P网络借贷平台的证据[J].经济经纬,2016,33(6):137-142.
[13]吴庆田,罗璨,陈宜瑄.P2P网贷平台特征与平台运营的稳健性---基于中国1706家P2P网贷平台的证据[J].金融理论与实践,2018(4):62-70.
[14]曹晓路.金融消费者利益保护与P2P网络借贷监管博弈分析---兼评现行网络借贷监管办法[J].金融监管研究,2016(11):92-106.
[15]宫晓林.P2P网络借贷风险与监管---基于有限理性假说的分析[J].投资研究,2014,33(6):29-40.
[16]叶湘榕.P2P借贷的模式风险与监管研究[J].金融监管研究,2014(3):71-82.
[17]张海洋.信息披露监管与P2P借贷运营模式[J].经济学(季刊),2017,16(1):371-392.
[18]赵远.基于生存分析的上市公司财务风险预警研究[D].昆明:云南财经大学,2011.
[19]葛健康.基于Cox模型的我国P2P平台经营困境预警研究[D].杭州:浙江财经大学,2016.
[20]巴曙松,侯鑫彧,张帅.基于生存模型的P2P平台生存规律与政策模拟研究[J].当代财经,2018(1):44-56.
[21]魏鹏飞.P2P平台特质与投资者选择[J].中国流通经济,2016,30(12):92-99.
[22]郭海凤,陈霄.P2P网贷平台综合竞争力评价研究[J].金融论坛,2015,20(2):12-23.
[23]汪静,陈晓红,杨立.P2P网贷平台信息披露水平、投资人信任与投资风险[J].中国经济问题,2018(3):106-121.
(1)删失数据有左删失、右删失和区间删失三种类型。左删失指个体的起点信息缺失,右删失数据指个体的终点信息缺失,区间删失指个体的起点和终点信息都缺失。其中,右删失又分为I型和II型,I型删失指所有发生删失个体的观测结束时间相同,II型删失指所有发生删失个体的观测开始时间相同。
(1)Cox模型是由英国统计学家Cox(1972)年提出的一种半参数回归模型,该模型同时以生存时间和生存结局为因变量,研究多种因素对生存状况的影响,能有效利用删失数据的不完全信息,而且不需要设定生存时间的具体分布类型,适用于本文样本数据的分析。
(1)缺少第三方资金存管,无法将客户资金分离,平台易设资金池,恶意携款跑路的风险也较大;无第三方担保/垫付/保险和抵(质)押物/风险准备金的平台,对高额坏账风险无法把控,信用度较低,易发生跑路事件;无ICP经营许可证的平台缺少备案监管,不具备合规平台资质,易发生跑路事件。
(2)无资金银行存管意味着平台易私设资金池,易发生挪用资金和不合理投资行为,进而导致资金链断裂,发生提现困难事件;无第三方担保/垫付/保险的平台经营风险较大,一旦发生高额坏账将导致资金周转困难,发生提现困难事件;有天标/1月标会加剧平台期限错配和流动性风险,从而导致现金流不足、资金链断裂,造成提现困难;不允许自动投标和债权转让会增加资金站岗时间,降低资金使用效率和流动性,经过授权的自动投标及低频次的合规逐笔转让可以有效降低提现困难风险;未加入监管协会的平台受外部监管较少,容易发生不合规行为并导致提现困难事件。
(1)缺乏强有力背景支持的平台,股东投资意愿不强,投入不足,加上监管趋严和市场竞争加剧,未加入监管协会和没有ICP许可证的平台生存艰难,不得不选择停业退出或进行战略转型。
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |