美国在南海问题上的对华政策转向——基于强制外交与威慑理论的考察
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摘要
"亚太再平衡"战略实施以来,美国在南海问题上的对华政策经历了从强制外交到威慑的转向,奥巴马执政初期和中期通过强制外交政策逼迫中国"澄清"南海主张及其法理依据,要求中国停止在南海的维权行动,并推动中国与东盟国家加快"南海行为准则"的制定进程。从奥巴马执政后期开始,美国在南海问题上对华政策逐步由注重强制外交转向更具被动防御性的威慑,以慑止中国主导南海的进一步行动为主要目标。美国的政策转向受到中美南海战略动机不对称因素的深刻影响,也与美国实施强制外交的策略性失误密切相关。基于强制外交转向威慑政策的路径分析可以大体判断,延续在南海对华威慑政策是特朗普政府最为现实的选择,通过对其政策目标的重设和威慑强度的调整,美国将在相当程度上为其中长期政策走势奠定基调。
Since the introduction of the "Asia Pacific Re-balancing"strategy,the U.S.policy towards China with respect to the South China Seas has shifted from coercive diplomacy to deterrence.From the outset of the Obama Administration until his midterm as President,the U.S.employed coercive diplomacy to press China to"clarify"its claims to the South China Seas,as well as the legal basis for these claims,demanding that China discontinue actions to assert its rights in South China Seas,further pushing China to speed up progress in working with ASEAN to determine the South China Sea Code of Conduct.Towards the end of the Obama Administration,the U.S.shifted in its approach away from coercive diplomacy towards a more passive form of preventative deterrence.The main objective of this new approach was to deter China from taking further actions in the South China Sea.The change in U.S.policy was influenced deeply by the asymmetric strategic motivations of the U.S.and China respectively visà-vis the South China Seas,and further by strategic miscalculations made by the U.S.in carrying out its coercive diplomacy.By carefully analyzing the shift from coercive diplomacy to a deterrence policy,we can generally conclude that continuing the deterrence policy was the most practical option for the Trump Administration.By resetting its policy objectives and adjusting the level of its deterrence,the U.S.has set the tone for the direction of its policy over the medium to long term.
Since the introduction of the "Asia Pacific Re-balancing"strategy,the U.S.policy towards China with respect to the South China Seas has shifted from coercive diplomacy to deterrence.From the outset of the Obama Administration until his midterm as President,the U.S.employed coercive diplomacy to press China to"clarify"its claims to the South China Seas,as well as the legal basis for these claims,demanding that China discontinue actions to assert its rights in South China Seas,further pushing China to speed up progress in working with ASEAN to determine the South China Sea Code of Conduct.Towards the end of the Obama Administration,the U.S.shifted in its approach away from coercive diplomacy towards a more passive form of preventative deterrence.The main objective of this new approach was to deter China from taking further actions in the South China Sea.The change in U.S.policy was influenced deeply by the asymmetric strategic motivations of the U.S.and China respectively visà-vis the South China Seas,and further by strategic miscalculations made by the U.S.in carrying out its coercive diplomacy.By carefully analyzing the shift from coercive diplomacy to a deterrence policy,we can generally conclude that continuing the deterrence policy was the most practical option for the Trump Administration.By resetting its policy objectives and adjusting the level of its deterrence,the U.S.has set the tone for the direction of its policy over the medium to long term.
引文
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(77)分别为全球战略环境、挑衅的类型、战争的意象、单边的或联盟的强制外交、敌手的孤立。
(78)或称为影响强制外交成功的条件,主要有:目标的明确性、动机的强度、动机的不对称、被强制方的紧迫感、强有力的领导、充分的国内支持、被强制方对于难以接受的危机升级的恐惧。参见Alexander L.George and William E.Simons eds.,The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy:Laos,Cuba,Vietnam,pp.270-290。
(79)Jack S.Levy,“Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy:The Contributions of Alexander George”,Political Psychology,Vol.29,No.4,Aug.,2008,p.538.
(80)尽管利益与动机两者并不能完全等同,强制国可以通过强化自身对于利益的需求而限制对手对其利益的需求并通过提供积极诱导创造有利于己的不对称动机,但在南海问题情境下,中美两国的战略动机与利益总体而言具有高度一致性。
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(85)薛力:《美国学者视野中的南海问题》,载《国际关系研究》2014年第2期,第104页。
(86)Taylor M.Fravel,U.S.Policy towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995,Berlin:Springer International Publishing,2016,p.2.
(87)参见高程:《美国对外政策的驱动力:物质利益至上?》,载《美国研究》2012年第2期,第82～96页。
(88)Matthew R.Costlow,“Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea”,2012,p.45,http://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Costlow-South-China-Sea-22-Jan-2013.pdf.
(89)Krista E.Wiegand,Enduring Territorial Disputes:Strategies of Bargaining,Coercive Diplomacy,and Settlement,Athens,Georgia:University of Georgia Press,2011,p.109.
(90)李忠林:《中国对南海战略态势的塑造及启示》,载《现代国际关系》2017年第2期,第24～28页。
(91)Robert J.Art and Patrick M.Cronin,The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,Washington,D.C.:United States Institute of Peace,2003,pp.374-375.
(92)弗里德曼认为,美国冷战后的强制外交主要是用于对付弱小国家,以捍卫美国的非核心利益。参见Lawrence Freedman ed.,Strategic Coercion:Concepts and Cases,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1998,p.3。
(93)Troy Stephen Goodfellow,“Period,Power and Purpose:Understanding Compellent Threat in the Twentiethe Century”,Ph.D dissertation,University of Toronto,2000,pp.13-14.
(94)David J.Firestein,“The U.S.-China PerceptionGap in the South China Sea”,The Diplomat,August 19,2016,http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-us-china-perception-gap-in-the-south-china-sea/.
(95)Andrew Chubb,“The South China Sea:Defining the ‘Status Quo’”,The Diplomat,June 11,2015,http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-south-china-sea-defining-the-status-quo/.
(96)Ted Galen Carpenter,“China as a Prickly,But Pragmatic,Revisionist Power”,January 17,2013,https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-prickly-pragmatic-revisionist-power.
(97)Matthew Scarlett,“Coercive Naval Diplomacy”,May 14,2009,p.2.
(98)Daniel L.Byman,Matthew C.Waxman and Eric Larson,Air Power as a Coercive Instrument,Report of Project Air Forc,Rand,p.129,https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1061.pdf.
(99)Ibid.,p.137.
(100)Hal Brands and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,Winter 2018,pp.25-28.
(101)Maria Sperandei,“Bridging Deterrence and Compellence:An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy”,p.268.
(102)Ibid,p.261.
(103)所谓国家意志是一国为了实现特定的国家目标而持有的国家意愿和采取的行为的集合。参见郑建君:《 政治心理学研究的基本内容、方法与发展趋向》,载《政治学研究》2011年第4期,第59～67页。
(104)国家意志服从于特定的国家目标,因而受到国家利益和战略动机的极大影响。参见袁伟华、韩召颖:《权力转移、国家意志与国际秩序变迁——对七月危机的考察》,载《世界经济与政治》2015年第12期,第32～33页。
(105)周士新:《冷战后美国在中东地区的强制性外交》,载《外交评论》2009年第1期,第112页。
(106)尽管存在对于威慑理论研究理性逻辑的批判,但“理性选择”作为威慑研究的基石仍未动摇。参见张曙光:《威慑理论:美国国际战略学的一个重要领域》,载《美国研究》1990年第4期,第31～60页。
(107)Robert J.Art and Patrick M.Cronin eds.,The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,Washington,D.C.:United States Institute of Peace,2003,p.4.
(108)如奥巴马政府时期负责亚太安全事务的助理国防部长施大伟认为,中国岛礁建设等行为正在改变“后行为宣言时期的现状”(post-DOC status quo)。参见David Shear,“Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations”。
(109)苏晓晖:《美国新政府南海政策发展态势研究》,载《太平洋学报》2017年第7期,第38页。
(110)“President Donald J.Trump’s State Visit to China”,The White House.
(111)左希迎:《特朗普政府亚太安全战略的调整》,载《世界经济与政治》2017年第5期,第53～54页。
(112)Satori Mori,“Thinking about Long-Term Strategy in the South China Sea”,Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,Jun 13,2017,https://amti.csis.org/long-term-strategy-scs/.
(113)Steven Stashwick,“Expect a Heavier US Presence in the South China Sea,But What can it Achieve?”The Diplomat,February 15,2017,http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/expecting-a-heavier-us-presence-in-the-south-china-sea-but-what-can-it-achieve/.
(114)Ely Ratner,“How to Stop China in the South China Sea”,Foreign Affairs,June 3,2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/course-correction.
(115)Peter Navarro and Alexander Gray,“Donald Trump’s Peace through Strength Vision for the Asia-Pacific”,Foreign Policy,November 9,2016,http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/07/donald-trumps-peace-through-strength-vision-for-the-asia-pacific/.
(116)National Security Strategy of the United States,The White House,December 2017,p.26.
(117)The White House,“President Trump is Rebuilding America’s National Security”,February 28,2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/president-trump-rebuilding-americas-national-security.
(118)左希迎:《特朗普政府亚太安全战略的调整》,第56页。
(119)Clarence J.Bouchat,U.S.Landpower in the South China Sea,Carlisle:United States Army War College Press,2017.
(120)Franz-Stefan Gady,“South China Sea:US Navy Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation”,The Diplomat,August 10,2017,https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/south-china-sea-us-navy-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-operation/.
(121)Bill Gertz,“Showdown:Trump is Putting the Squeeze on China in the South China Sea”,The National Interest,August 14,2017,http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/showdown-trump-putting-the-squeeze-china-the-south-china-sea-21903 page=show.
(122)Ely Ratner,“How to Stop China in the South China Sea”,June 3,2017.
(123)James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“Standing up to China is not ‘Extremism’—It’s Smart Foreign Policy”,The National Interest,January 29,2017,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/standing-china-not-extremism%E2%80%94its-smart-foreign-policy-19228.
(124)James Kraska,“Tillerson Channels Reagan on South China Sea”,The Lawfare,January 12,2017,https://www.lawfareblog.com/tillerson-channels-reagan-south-china-sea.
(125)Ross Babbage,“Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea”,December 14,2016,http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6223_%28SCS_Report%29Final2-web.pdf.
(126)Alexander Vuving,“How America can Take Control in the South China Sea”,Foreign Policy,February 13,2017,http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/13/how-the-u-s-can-take-control-in-the-south-china-sea/.
(127)Patrick M.Cronin,“Power and Order in the South China Sea:A Strategic Framework for U.S.Policy”,Report for Center for a New American Security,November 2016,pp.6-7,htttps://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/power-and-order-in-the-south-china-sea.
(128)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea:Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”,January 26,2017,https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-some-fundamental-strategic-principles.
(129)Jim Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon,“Can Donald Trump Avoid a Dangerous South China Sea showdown?”The National Interest,January 20,2017,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/01/20/can-donald-trump-avoid-a-dangerous-south-china-sea-showdown/.
(130)“China Pushes back after Tillerson Warns on South China Sea”,January 12,2017,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-12/tillerson-says-china-can-t-have-access-to-south-china-sea-isles.
(131)Mark J.Valencia,“Trump’s Troubling South China Sea Policy”,The Japan Times,May 14,2017,http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/14/commentary/world-commentary/trumps-troubling-south-china-sea-policy/.
(132)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea:Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”.
(133)Harry J.Kazianis,“Donald Trump’s South China Sea Challenge:4 Ways America can Push back against China”,The National Interest,November 25,2016,http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/donald-trumps-south-china-sea-challenge-4-ways-america-can-18511.
(134)William Choong,“Why Donald Trump should Place a South China Sea Redline on Scarborough Shoal”,The National Interest,April 28,2017,http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-donald-trump-should-place-south-china-sea-redline-20388.
(135)Satori Mori,“Thinking About Long-term Strategy in the South China Sea”.
(136)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”.
(137)Lyle Morris,“The Era of Coast Guards in the Asia-Pacific is upon Us”,Mar 8,2017,https://amti.csis.org/era-coast-guards-asia-pacific-upon-us/.
(138)National Security Strategy of the United States,The White House,December 2017,p.34.
(139)Dean Cheng,“China’s ‘Core’ Maritime Interests:Security and Economic Factors”,Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia,February 28,2017,p.6,http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20170228/105614/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-ChengD-20170228.pdf.
(140)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”.
(141)Ross Babbage,“Executive Summary”,in “Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea:Strategy Options for the Trump Adminstration”,December 14,2016.
(142)Satori Mori,“Thinking About Long-term Strategy in the South China Sea”.
(143)James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“Deterring China in the ‘Gray Zone’:Lessons of the South China Sea for U.S.Alliances”,Orbis,Vol.61,Issue 3,May 2017,pp.337-339
(144)Ryan Pickrell,“Is Donald Trump Giving up on the South China Sea?”;Ryan Pickrell and Quinn Marschik,“China,the South China Sea and North Korea”,The National Interest,March 11,2018,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-south-china-sea-north-korea-24847.
(2)Ankit Panda,“Rex Tillerson,Trump’s Secretary of State Nominee,Has a Dangerous Idea for the South China Sea”,January 12,2017,http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/rex-tillerson-trumps-secretary-of-state-nominee-has-a-dangerous-idea-for-the-south-china-sea/.
(3)Gary Sands,“Sean Spicer on the South China Sea”,February 6,2017,https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2017/02/06/sean-spicer-south-china-sea/.
(4)“Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Ministerial Joint Statement”,United States Department of State,August 6,2017,https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273216.htm.
(5)“President Donald J.Trump’s State Visit to China”,The White House,November 10,2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-visit-china/.
(6)鞠海龙:《美国奥巴马政府南海政策研究》,载《当代亚太》2011年第3期,第97～122页;周琪:《冷战后美国南海政策的演变及其根源》,载《世界经济与政治》2014年第6期,第23～44页;信强:《“五不”政策:美国南海政策解读》,载《美国研究》2014年第6期,第51～68页;张晓明:《美国南海政策的起源及演变》,载《美国研究》2016年第1期,第34～51页;韦宗友:《特朗普政府南海政策初探》,载《东南亚研究》2018年第2期,第123～136页。
(7)王传剑:《南海问题与中美关系》,载《当代亚太》2014年第2期,第4～26页;荣正通:《身份认知差异与中美关系中的南海问题》,载《国际关系研究》2016年第2期,第140～152页。
(8)杨震、周云亨、朱漪:《论后冷战时代中美海权矛盾中的南海问题》,载《太平洋学报》2015年第4期,第35～45页。
(9)邓凡:《美国干涉南海问题的政策趋势》,载《太平洋学报》2011年第11期,第83～91页;张学昆:《美国介入南海问题的现状、动因及趋势》,载《和平与发展》2013年第6期,第42～52页;张宇权:《干涉主义视角下的美国南海政策逻辑及中国的应对策略》,载《国际安全研究》2014年第5期,第81～102页。
(10)Dan De Luce,“With Trump Focused on North Korea,Beijing Sails ahead in South China Sea”,Foreign Policy,November 16,2017,http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/16/with-trump-focused-on-north-korea-beijing-sails-ahead-in-south-china-sea/;Bill Hayton,“The Week Donald Trump Lost the South China Sea”,Foreign Policy,July 31,2017,http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/the-week-donald-trump-lost-the-south-china-sea/.
(11)赵明昊:《美国在南海问题上对华制衡的政策动向》,载《现代国际关系》2016年第1期,第29～41页;焦世新:《“亚太再平衡”与美国对南海政策的调整》,载《美国研究》2016年第6期,第64～89页。
(12)钱春泰:《武力威胁与对外政策》,上海人民出版社2010年版,第7页。
(13)Thomas Schelling,Arms and Influence,New Haven:Yale University Press,2008,pp.69-73.
(14)Alexander L.George and William E.Simons eds.,The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy:Laos,Cuba,Vietnam,Boulder:Westview Press,1994;Alexander L.George ed.,Avoiding War:Problems of Crisis Management,Boulder Colo:Westview Press,1991.
(15)Robert S.Ross,“The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation:Coercion,Credibility,and the Use of Force”,International Security,Vol.25,No.2,Fall 2000,p.88.
(16)布莱德·罗伯茨:《从威慑到劝阻:布什政府的战略稳定战略》,载《国际观察》2004年第6期,第42页。
(17)参见钱春泰:《美国与强制外交理论》,载《美国研究》2006年第3期,第49～64页;钱春泰:《论冷战后美国的强制外交》,载《国际观察》2007年第3期,第12～20页。
(18)“精准威慑”是指从“一刀切”的威慑概念,转变为适用于先进的军事竞争对手、地区大规模杀伤性武器拥有国以及恐怖主义组织的更为合适的方式,同时保护盟友并劝阻潜在的竞争者的威慑理念。参见U.S.Department of Defense,Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR) Report,Washington,D.C.:Department of Defense,2006,pp:2,4,27,50-51。
(19)“灵活威慑选项”是指总统或国防部门按次序执行可伸缩的选项对危机加以慑止,以防止危机恶化并允许其降级的威慑方式。参见“Appendix F:Flexible Deterrence Options and Flexible Response Options”,in Steve Townsend,“Joint Publication 5-0:Joint Planning”,Joint Force Quarterly,October 2017。
(20)Thuc D.Pham,“Deterring Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea”,The Diplomat,January 17,2016,https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/deterring-chinese-coercion-in-the-south-china-sea/;张文宗:《美国对华威慑与胁迫及中国应对》,载《现代国际关系》2016年第12期,第24～31页。
(21)David M.Lampton,“The US and China:Siding from Engagement to Coercive Diplomacy”,August 4,2014,https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-63-us-and-china-sliding-engagement-coercive-diplomacy.
(22)Maria Sperandei,“Bridging Deterrence and Compellence:An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy”,International Studies Review,Vol.8,No.2,Jun 2006,p.255.
(23)Janice Gross Stein,“Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf,1990-91:A Failed or Impossible Task?”,International Security,Vol.17,No.2,1992,pp.147-179;Stephen J.Cimbala,“Coercion in War and Diplomacy:Deterrence and Compellence in the Persian Gulf”,in Stephen J.Cimbala ed.,Military Persuasion:Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War,University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press,1994.pp.166-199.
(24)Maria Sperandei,“Bridging Deterrence and Compellence:An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy”,pp.254-263.
(25)Eric Herring,Danger and Opportunity:Explaining International Crisis Outcomes,Manchester:Manchester University Press,1995,pp.15-16.
(26)这些案例包括但不限于:1948～1949年和1958～1962年的柏林危机、1941年日本偷袭珍珠港、1954～1955年的台海危机、1962年的古巴导弹危机、1969年的中苏边界危机、1982年马岛战争、1990～1991年的海湾战争等。参见 Maria Sperandei,“Bridging Deterrence and Compellence:An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy”,p.261。
(27)钱春泰:《美国与强制外交理论》,第52～53页。
(28)Robert Haddick,“Salami Slicing in the South China Sea:China’s slow,Patient Approach to Dominating Asia”,Foreign Policy,August 3,2012,http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/.
(29)有学者认为,二战后世界进入了“大国无战争时代”。参见杨原:《大国无战争时代霸权国与崛起国权力竞争的主要机制》,载《当代亚太》2011年第6期,第6～32页。
(30)Christine Shelly,“US Policy on Spratly Islands and South China Sea”,U.S.Department of State,May 10,1995,http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1995/9505/950510 db.html.
(31)周琪:《冷战后美国南海政策的演变及其根源》,第28～30页;Ian James Storey,“Creeping Assertiveness:China,the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.21,No.1,April 1999,p.110.
(32)Liselotte Odgaard,“Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea”,Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol.23,No.2,August 2001,p.292.
(33)Timo Kivim?ki,Liselotte Odgaard and Stein T?nnesson,“What Could be Done?”In Timo Kivim?ki ed.,War or Peace in the South China Sea,Copenhagen:NIAS Press,2002,p.135.
(34)Rowan Callick,“Barack Obama’s ‘Sputnik Moment’ Signals Strategic Shift to Asia”,January 29,2011,http://uyghuramerican.org/article/barack-obamas-sputnik-moment-signals-strategic-shift-asia.html.
(35)Michael G.Gallagher,“China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea”,International Security,Vol.19,No.1,Summer,1994,pp.169-194.
(36)Ralf Emmers,“Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea:Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo”,paper for Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore,September 2005,pp.7-8.
(37)David M.Lampton,“The US and China:Siding From Engagement to Coercive Diplomacy”,August4,2014,https://www.pacforum.org/analysis/pacaet-63-us-and-China-sliding-engagement-coercive-diplomacy.
(38)Christine Shelly,“US Policy on Spratly Islands and South China Sea”.
(39)Hillary Rodham Clinton,“Remarks by Secretary of State”,July 23,2010,https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.
(40)Daniel R.Russel,“Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific”,February 5,2014,https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm.
(41)Daniel R.Russel,“Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific”,February 5,2014,https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm.
(42)Kevin Baumert and Brian Melchior,“Limits in the Seas,No.143,China:Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”,United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,December 5,2014,https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.
(43)John Kirby,“Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration”,July 12,2016,https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm.
(44)参见孔令杰、王看、刘聪聪:《国际主流媒体关于菲律宾南海仲裁案的报道情况调查研究》,载《亚太安全与海洋研究》2016年第4期,第69～86页。
(45)Daniel R.Russel,“Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific”,February 5,2014.
(46)David Shear,“Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations”,May 13,2015,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051315_Shear_Testimony.pdf.
(47)Andrew S.Erickson,“Hearing on America’s Security Role in the South China Sea”,Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,July 23,2015,http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20150723/103787/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-EricksonA-20150723.pdf.pp.3-4.
(48)Ian Storey,“The South China Sea Dispute:How Geopolitics Impedes Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management”,paper presented at Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World,FLACSO-ISA,Buenos Aires,Argentina,July 23-25,2014,p.8,http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/b1d7cb3a-0487-493a-92e5-4c85727ba1b9.pdf.
(49)Gregory B.Poling,“Recent Trends in the South China Sea and U.S.Policy”,July 2014,p.10,https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140728_Poling_TrendsSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
(50)Prashanth Parameswaran,“US Launches New Maritime Security Initiative at Shangri-La Dialogue 2015”,The Diplomat,June 2,2015,https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-launches-new-maritime-security-initiative-at-shangri-la-dialogue-2015/.
(51)Carlyle A.Thayer,“Indirect Cost Imposition Strategies in the South China Sea:U.S.Leadership and ASEAN Centrality”,Report for the Center of a New American Security,April 2015,pp.10-12,https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Maritime-8-Thayer.pdf.
(52)Hillary Rodham Clinton,“Remarks by Secretary of State”.
(53)“Stirring up the South China Sea (III):A Fleeting Opportunity for Calm ”,Crisis Group Asia Report,May 7,2015,p.8,https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190793/267-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-iii-a-fleeting-opportunity-for-calm.pdf.
(54)Gregory B.Poling,“Recent Trends in the South China Sea and U.S.Policy”,pp.7-8.
(55)参见陈慈航:《美国在“南海行为准则”问题上的政策论析》,载《国际政治研究》2018年第4期,第68～98页;陈慈航、孔令杰:《中美在“南海行为准则”问题上的认知差异与政策互动》,载《东南亚研究》2018年第3期,第81～107页。
(56)Daniel R.Russel,“Maritime Issues in East Asia”,Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,May 13,2015,https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/05/24226 2.htm.
(57)David Shear,“Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations”,2015.p.5.
(58)Michael McDevitt,“U.S.South China Sea Policy 2015-2016:The Growing Role of the Defense Department”,in Murray Hiebert,Gregory B.Poling and Conor Cronin eds.,In the Wake of Arbitration:Paper from the Sixth Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference,Washington,D.C.:CSIS,2017.
(59)Aisa -Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,United States Department of Defense,August 2015,pp.19-20,https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.
(60)晋军:《美国〈亚太海上安全战略〉解读》,载《国际研究参考》2015年第10期,第39页。
(61)Daniel R.Russel,“Remarks at the Fifth Annual South China Sea Conference”,Statement in the Center for Strategic and International Studies,July 21,2015,https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/07/245142.htm.
(62)韦宗友:《美国南海政策新发展与中美亚太共处》,第144页。
(63)“炮舰外交”可以被视为“海上强制外交”的别称。参见Matthew Scarlett,“Coercive Naval Diplomacy”,May 14,2009,p.1,http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a503100.pdf。
(64)Julian Ku,“The US Navy’s ‘Innocent Passage’ in the South China Sea may have Actually Strengthened China’s Sketchy Territorial Claims”,The Lawfare,November 4,2015,https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-navys-innocent-passage-south-china-sea-may-have-actually-strengthened-chinas-sketchy-territorial.
(65)Joseph Gagliano,“FONOPS and Deterrence:There’s No ‘FDO’ in ‘FONOPS’”,February 29,2016,https://blog.usni.org/posts/2016/02/29/fonops-and-deterrence-theres-no-fdo-in-fonops.
(66)Julian G.Ku,M.Taylor Fravel and Malcolm Cook,“Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea aren’t enough”,Foreign Policy,May 16,2016,http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/freedom-of-navigation-operations-in-the-south-china-sea-arent-enough-unclos-fonop-philippines-tribunal/.
(67)Carlyle A.Thayer,“Chinese Takeout the Trump Administration Adds Uncertainty to the Standoff in the South China Sea”,March 6,2017,http://www.c3sindia.org/archives/chinese-takeout-the-trump-administration-adds-uncertainty-to-the-standoff-in-the-south-china-sea-by-carlyle-a-thayer/.
(68)Gregory Poling and Zack Cooper,“Developing a Scarborough Contingency Plan”,March 30,2016,https://amti.csis.org/developing-scarborough-contingency-plan/.
(69)Carlyle A.Thayer,“Australian Intelligence:China Poised to Take ‘Decisive and Provocative’ Action in the South China Sea”,April 15,2016,http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/australian-intelligence-china-poised-to-take-decisive-and-provocative-action-in-the-south-china-sea/.
(70)Jay Batongbacal,“Scarborough Shoal:A Red Line?”April 25,2016,https://amti.csis.org/scarborough-shoal-red-line/.
(71)Dan Lamothe,“Why the Pugnacious A-10 is Flying Maritime Patrols over the South China Sea”,The Washington Post,April 27,2016,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/27/why-the-pugnacious-a-10-is-flying-maritime-patrols-over-the-south-china-sea/?utm_term.=8ab51cd83354.
(72)Jim Garamone,“Carter Visits USS Stennis Operating in South China Sea”,U.S.Department of Defense,https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/722856/carter-visits-uss-stennis-operating-in-south-china-sea/.
(73)Floyd Whaley,“U.S.and Philippines Bolster Air and Sea Patrols in South China Sea”,The New York Times,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-philippines-us-naval-patrols.html.
(74)David B.Larter,“The U.S.Sends Another Strong Message to China”,June 20,2016,https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2016/06/20/the-u-s-sends-another-strong-message-to-china/.
(75)Franz-Stefan Gady,“US Navy Sends Electronic Attack Warplanes to Philippines Amid South China Sea Tensions”,The Diplomat,June 17,2016,https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/us-navy-sends-electronic-attack-warplanes-to-philippines-amid-south-china-sea-tensions/.
(76)Franz-Stefan Gady,“US Navy Destroyers Patrol near China’s Man-Made Islands in South China Sea”,The Diplomat,July 8,2016,https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/us-navy-destroyers-patrol-near-chinas-man-made-islands-in-south-china-sea/.
(77)分别为全球战略环境、挑衅的类型、战争的意象、单边的或联盟的强制外交、敌手的孤立。
(78)或称为影响强制外交成功的条件,主要有:目标的明确性、动机的强度、动机的不对称、被强制方的紧迫感、强有力的领导、充分的国内支持、被强制方对于难以接受的危机升级的恐惧。参见Alexander L.George and William E.Simons eds.,The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy:Laos,Cuba,Vietnam,pp.270-290。
(79)Jack S.Levy,“Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy:The Contributions of Alexander George”,Political Psychology,Vol.29,No.4,Aug.,2008,p.538.
(80)尽管利益与动机两者并不能完全等同,强制国可以通过强化自身对于利益的需求而限制对手对其利益的需求并通过提供积极诱导创造有利于己的不对称动机,但在南海问题情境下,中美两国的战略动机与利益总体而言具有高度一致性。
(81)Robert D.Kaplan,“The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict”,August 15,2011,http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/the-south-china-sea-is-the-future-of-conflict/.
(82)参见罗肖:《南海与中国的核心利益:争论、回归及超越》,载《当代亚太》2018年第1期,第122～155页。
(83)聂文娟:《中国的身份认同与南海国家利益的认知》,载《当代亚太》2017年第1期,第149～151页。
(84)Hillary Rodham Clinton,“Remarks by Secretary of State”.
(85)薛力:《美国学者视野中的南海问题》,载《国际关系研究》2014年第2期,第104页。
(86)Taylor M.Fravel,U.S.Policy towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995,Berlin:Springer International Publishing,2016,p.2.
(87)参见高程:《美国对外政策的驱动力:物质利益至上?》,载《美国研究》2012年第2期,第82～96页。
(88)Matthew R.Costlow,“Gunboat Diplomacy in the South China Sea”,2012,p.45,http://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Costlow-South-China-Sea-22-Jan-2013.pdf.
(89)Krista E.Wiegand,Enduring Territorial Disputes:Strategies of Bargaining,Coercive Diplomacy,and Settlement,Athens,Georgia:University of Georgia Press,2011,p.109.
(90)李忠林:《中国对南海战略态势的塑造及启示》,载《现代国际关系》2017年第2期,第24～28页。
(91)Robert J.Art and Patrick M.Cronin,The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,Washington,D.C.:United States Institute of Peace,2003,pp.374-375.
(92)弗里德曼认为,美国冷战后的强制外交主要是用于对付弱小国家,以捍卫美国的非核心利益。参见Lawrence Freedman ed.,Strategic Coercion:Concepts and Cases,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1998,p.3。
(93)Troy Stephen Goodfellow,“Period,Power and Purpose:Understanding Compellent Threat in the Twentiethe Century”,Ph.D dissertation,University of Toronto,2000,pp.13-14.
(94)David J.Firestein,“The U.S.-China PerceptionGap in the South China Sea”,The Diplomat,August 19,2016,http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-us-china-perception-gap-in-the-south-china-sea/.
(95)Andrew Chubb,“The South China Sea:Defining the ‘Status Quo’”,The Diplomat,June 11,2015,http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-south-china-sea-defining-the-status-quo/.
(96)Ted Galen Carpenter,“China as a Prickly,But Pragmatic,Revisionist Power”,January 17,2013,https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-prickly-pragmatic-revisionist-power.
(97)Matthew Scarlett,“Coercive Naval Diplomacy”,May 14,2009,p.2.
(98)Daniel L.Byman,Matthew C.Waxman and Eric Larson,Air Power as a Coercive Instrument,Report of Project Air Forc,Rand,p.129,https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1061.pdf.
(99)Ibid.,p.137.
(100)Hal Brands and Zack Cooper,“Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea”,Naval War College Review,Vol.71,No.1,Winter 2018,pp.25-28.
(101)Maria Sperandei,“Bridging Deterrence and Compellence:An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy”,p.268.
(102)Ibid,p.261.
(103)所谓国家意志是一国为了实现特定的国家目标而持有的国家意愿和采取的行为的集合。参见郑建君:《 政治心理学研究的基本内容、方法与发展趋向》,载《政治学研究》2011年第4期,第59～67页。
(104)国家意志服从于特定的国家目标,因而受到国家利益和战略动机的极大影响。参见袁伟华、韩召颖:《权力转移、国家意志与国际秩序变迁——对七月危机的考察》,载《世界经济与政治》2015年第12期,第32～33页。
(105)周士新:《冷战后美国在中东地区的强制性外交》,载《外交评论》2009年第1期,第112页。
(106)尽管存在对于威慑理论研究理性逻辑的批判,但“理性选择”作为威慑研究的基石仍未动摇。参见张曙光:《威慑理论:美国国际战略学的一个重要领域》,载《美国研究》1990年第4期,第31～60页。
(107)Robert J.Art and Patrick M.Cronin eds.,The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,Washington,D.C.:United States Institute of Peace,2003,p.4.
(108)如奥巴马政府时期负责亚太安全事务的助理国防部长施大伟认为,中国岛礁建设等行为正在改变“后行为宣言时期的现状”(post-DOC status quo)。参见David Shear,“Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations”。
(109)苏晓晖:《美国新政府南海政策发展态势研究》,载《太平洋学报》2017年第7期,第38页。
(110)“President Donald J.Trump’s State Visit to China”,The White House.
(111)左希迎:《特朗普政府亚太安全战略的调整》,载《世界经济与政治》2017年第5期,第53～54页。
(112)Satori Mori,“Thinking about Long-Term Strategy in the South China Sea”,Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,Jun 13,2017,https://amti.csis.org/long-term-strategy-scs/.
(113)Steven Stashwick,“Expect a Heavier US Presence in the South China Sea,But What can it Achieve?”The Diplomat,February 15,2017,http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/expecting-a-heavier-us-presence-in-the-south-china-sea-but-what-can-it-achieve/.
(114)Ely Ratner,“How to Stop China in the South China Sea”,Foreign Affairs,June 3,2017,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/course-correction.
(115)Peter Navarro and Alexander Gray,“Donald Trump’s Peace through Strength Vision for the Asia-Pacific”,Foreign Policy,November 9,2016,http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/07/donald-trumps-peace-through-strength-vision-for-the-asia-pacific/.
(116)National Security Strategy of the United States,The White House,December 2017,p.26.
(117)The White House,“President Trump is Rebuilding America’s National Security”,February 28,2017,https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/president-trump-rebuilding-americas-national-security.
(118)左希迎:《特朗普政府亚太安全战略的调整》,第56页。
(119)Clarence J.Bouchat,U.S.Landpower in the South China Sea,Carlisle:United States Army War College Press,2017.
(120)Franz-Stefan Gady,“South China Sea:US Navy Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation”,The Diplomat,August 10,2017,https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/south-china-sea-us-navy-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-operation/.
(121)Bill Gertz,“Showdown:Trump is Putting the Squeeze on China in the South China Sea”,The National Interest,August 14,2017,http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/showdown-trump-putting-the-squeeze-china-the-south-china-sea-21903 page=show.
(122)Ely Ratner,“How to Stop China in the South China Sea”,June 3,2017.
(123)James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“Standing up to China is not ‘Extremism’—It’s Smart Foreign Policy”,The National Interest,January 29,2017,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/standing-china-not-extremism%E2%80%94its-smart-foreign-policy-19228.
(124)James Kraska,“Tillerson Channels Reagan on South China Sea”,The Lawfare,January 12,2017,https://www.lawfareblog.com/tillerson-channels-reagan-south-china-sea.
(125)Ross Babbage,“Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea”,December 14,2016,http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6223_%28SCS_Report%29Final2-web.pdf.
(126)Alexander Vuving,“How America can Take Control in the South China Sea”,Foreign Policy,February 13,2017,http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/13/how-the-u-s-can-take-control-in-the-south-china-sea/.
(127)Patrick M.Cronin,“Power and Order in the South China Sea:A Strategic Framework for U.S.Policy”,Report for Center for a New American Security,November 2016,pp.6-7,htttps://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/power-and-order-in-the-south-china-sea.
(128)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea:Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”,January 26,2017,https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-some-fundamental-strategic-principles.
(129)Jim Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon,“Can Donald Trump Avoid a Dangerous South China Sea showdown?”The National Interest,January 20,2017,https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/01/20/can-donald-trump-avoid-a-dangerous-south-china-sea-showdown/.
(130)“China Pushes back after Tillerson Warns on South China Sea”,January 12,2017,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-12/tillerson-says-china-can-t-have-access-to-south-china-sea-isles.
(131)Mark J.Valencia,“Trump’s Troubling South China Sea Policy”,The Japan Times,May 14,2017,http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/14/commentary/world-commentary/trumps-troubling-south-china-sea-policy/.
(132)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea:Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”.
(133)Harry J.Kazianis,“Donald Trump’s South China Sea Challenge:4 Ways America can Push back against China”,The National Interest,November 25,2016,http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/donald-trumps-south-china-sea-challenge-4-ways-america-can-18511.
(134)William Choong,“Why Donald Trump should Place a South China Sea Redline on Scarborough Shoal”,The National Interest,April 28,2017,http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-donald-trump-should-place-south-china-sea-redline-20388.
(135)Satori Mori,“Thinking About Long-term Strategy in the South China Sea”.
(136)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”.
(137)Lyle Morris,“The Era of Coast Guards in the Asia-Pacific is upon Us”,Mar 8,2017,https://amti.csis.org/era-coast-guards-asia-pacific-upon-us/.
(138)National Security Strategy of the United States,The White House,December 2017,p.34.
(139)Dean Cheng,“China’s ‘Core’ Maritime Interests:Security and Economic Factors”,Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia,February 28,2017,p.6,http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20170228/105614/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-ChengD-20170228.pdf.
(140)Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman,“The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”.
(141)Ross Babbage,“Executive Summary”,in “Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea:Strategy Options for the Trump Adminstration”,December 14,2016.
(142)Satori Mori,“Thinking About Long-term Strategy in the South China Sea”.
(143)James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara,“Deterring China in the ‘Gray Zone’:Lessons of the South China Sea for U.S.Alliances”,Orbis,Vol.61,Issue 3,May 2017,pp.337-339
(144)Ryan Pickrell,“Is Donald Trump Giving up on the South China Sea?”;Ryan Pickrell and Quinn Marschik,“China,the South China Sea and North Korea”,The National Interest,March 11,2018,https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-south-china-sea-north-korea-24847.
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