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强制减排交易机制外企业会自愿减排么?
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  • 英文篇名:Do enterprises choose voluntary emissions trading outside mandatory mechanism?
  • 作者:陆敏 ; 苍玉权 ; 李岩岩
  • 英文作者:LU Min;CANG Yu-quan;LI Yan-yan;Institute of Statistic Science and Big Data,Nanjing Audit University;School of Economics,Nanjing University;School of International Audit,Nanjing Audit University;
  • 关键词:自愿减排交易 ; 动态博弈 ; 强制减排概率 ; 企业市场势力 ; 补贴政策
  • 英文关键词:voluntary emissions trading mechanism;;dynamic game theory;;mandatory reduction probability;;enterprises' market power;;subsidy policy
  • 中文刊名:ZGRZ
  • 英文刊名:China Population,Resources and Environment
  • 机构:南京审计大学统计科学与大数据研究院;南京大学经济学院;南京审计大学国际审计学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-05-15
  • 出版单位:中国人口·资源与环境
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.29;No.225
  • 基金:江苏省哲学社会科学基金项目“区域碳交易体系的社会福利效应研究“(批准号:16GLB013);; 江苏省高校优势学科建设工程项目(PAPD);; 江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目“碳交易机制影响经济增长么?——基于试点省份面板数据的实证分析”(批准号:2016SJB630049)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:ZGRZ201905003
  • 页数:9
  • CN:05
  • ISSN:37-1196/N
  • 分类号:24-32
摘要
强制减排交易机制和自愿减排交易机制都是解决气候变化问题的有效市场手段。目前中国的强制减排交易机制纳入了部分行业进行管制促使企业自主性降低碳排放,在试点范围内,企业整体履约率保持较高水平,碳排放总量和强度呈现双降趋势,但强制减排交易机制外依然存在大量企业,激励这些企业参与自愿减排交易机制主动降低碳排放,有利于国家碳减排目标的顺利实现,有利于推动经济绿色发展和生态文明建设进程。本文从现实背景出发,以强制减排交易机制外企业为研究对象,引进政府强制减排概率和财政补贴参数,构建动态博弈理论模型,分析企业和政府的行为选择,根据不同类型企业市场势力大小,研究促进企业参与自愿减排交易机制的可能策略选择。研究结果发现:①自愿减排交易机制是政府管理部门和企业的成本有效的选择,自愿减排机制可以促进企业降低二氧化碳排放,但企业的市场势力会影响企业执行自愿减排的效率;②自愿减排交易机制下,需要政府管理部门发挥重要作用,促使企业改进自愿减排的效果;③对企业的补贴政策在社会福利损失较小时,可以发挥辅助性作用,提高企业自愿减排的积极性和减排水平。因此,对于强制减排交易机制外的企业,增强企业参与自愿减排的积极性,提高企业自愿减排水平,政府管理部门需要根据企业的行业类型和特点,制定精准、细化的自愿减排减排政策,需要保持一定的潜在管制压力进行协调和引导,在必要的时候还可以借助一定的财政补贴手段来提升企业自愿减排水平。
        Mandatory and voluntary emissions trading systems are effective market mechanism to curb climate change. China's mandatory emissions trading mechanism has incorporated some industries to promote enterprises to reduce carbon emissions consciously,the enterprises' compliance rate remains high,and overal carbon emissions and intensity of carbon emissions show a double downward trend within the scope of the pilot,while there are still a great number of enterprises outside the mandatory emissions trading mechanism,encouraging these enterprises to participate in the voluntary emissions trading mechanism to reduce carbon emissions actively is conducive to realize national carbon emission reduction targets smoothly and to promote green development of economy and construction of ecological civilization. Against the background, taking the enterprises outside the mandatory emissions trading mechanism as the research object,this paper employs the parameters of government compulsory emissions reduction probability and financial subsidy,constructs the dynamic game theory model,and analyzes the behavior choice of enterprises and governments.According to the market power of different enterprise,this paper explores the possible strategies to promote the participation of enterprises in voluntary emissions trading mechanism. It is proved that: ① Voluntary emissions trading mechanism is cost-effective for both government and enterprises,and it can promote enterprises to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. However,efficiency of implementing voluntary mechanism may be affected by the enterprises' market power. ② Government should have an important role in voluntary emissions trading mechanism and help enterprises to improve effects of voluntary reduction. ③ Given the social welfare loss is small,subsidy policy could fulfill supporting feature,enhance enthusiasm and reduction level of enterprises in voluntary emissions trading mechanism. Therefore,to enhance enthusiasm of participating in voluntary emission reduction and raise the level of voluntary emission reduction for enterprises outside the mandatory emissions trading mechanism,government should formulate precise and detailed voluntary emission reduction policies according to the types and characteristics of enterprises,and maintain a certain potential regulatory pressure to coordinate and guide,and if necessary,financial subsidies could be used to improve the level of voluntary emission reduction.
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